EZEIRUAKU v. BULL et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/16/2014. (dmr)(n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VINCENT O. EZEIRUAKU, doing
business as SABA PRODUCTS,
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action
No. 14-2567 (JBS/KMW)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DAN BULL, INDIVIDUALLY AND
POLICE, AS AN OFFICER OF THE
LONDON POLICE, et al.,
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this action concerning the police seizure of $80,000 in
undisclosed U.S. currency in London's Heathrow International
Airport, pro se Plaintiff Vincent O. Ezeiruaku (hereinafter,
“Plaintiff”) moves for reconsideration of the Court’s November
3, 2014 Opinion and Order dismissing his Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
[Docket Item 11.]
The Court finds
as follows:
1.
Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint in this action
on April 22, 2014.
(Pl.’s Compl. [Docket Item 1].)
Defendants
thereafter moved to dismiss on the basis that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (hereinafter, the
“FSIA”), immunized Defendants the “London Police” and two of its
officers, Dan Bull and David March (hereinafter, “Defendants”)
from suit as instrumentalities of the United Kingdom, a foreign
sovereign[.]” (Defs.’ Br. [Docket Item 5-1], 3–4, 9–10 (citation
omitted).)
2.
On November 3, 2014, the Court found that the FSIA
conferred such immunity, and further concluded that Plaintiff’s
allegations fail to fall within the commercial activity,
expropriation, and tortious activity exceptions to FSIA
immunity.
Ezeiruaku v. Bull, No. 14-2567, 2014 WL 5587404, at
*3-*7 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2014).
The Court, accordingly, dismissed
Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
3.
In the pending motion, Plaintiff argues, in a one-page
submission, that the Court’s November 3, 2014 Opinion requires
reconsideration, because Defendants conducted “a commercial
activity” by “deposit[ing] [his] money into an [i]nterest
bearing account,” and profiting from the entire “ordeal” alleged
in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
(Pl.’s Br. [Docket Item 11], 1.)
Defendants, however, assert that Plaintiff merely “restates the
law and the arguments set forth in his Opposition to
[Defendants’] motion to dismiss,” and, accordingly, argue that
Plaintiff’s motion must be denied.1
(Defs.’ Opp’n [Docket Item
12], 2.)
1
Defendants also oppose Plaintiff’s motion on timeliness
grounds. (Defs.’ Opp’n [Docket Item 12], 1.) The Court,
however, rejects Defendants’ argument. Rather, because
Plaintiff received electronic service of the Court’s November 3,
2
4.
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides that a party moving
for reconsideration must set forth “concisely the matter or
controlling decisions which the party believes” the Court
“overlooked” in its prior decision.
L. CIV. R. 7.1(i).
“As
such, a party seeking reconsideration must satisfy a high
burden, and must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to
correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest
injustice.”
Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 04-
2355, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009) (citing Max's
Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,
677 (3d Cir. 1999); N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,
52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)).
5.
However, “[m]otions for reconsideration are granted
sparingly and only when dispositive factual matters or
controlling decisions of law were brought to the court’s
attention but not considered.”
O.O.C. Apparel, Inc. v. Ross
Stores, Inc., No. 04-6409, 2007 WL 869551, at *2 (D.N.J. March
20, 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, a motion for
reconsideration does “not provide the parties with an
2014 Opinion and Order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d)
requires the addition of three days to the fourteen day period
set forth by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). Plaintiff, accordingly,
timely filed his motion for reconsideration on November 19,
2014, sixteen days after the Court’s November 3, 2014 decision.
3
opportunity for a second bite at the apple[,]” Tishcio v.
Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998), nor “a
vehicle to relitigate old matters or argue new matters that
could have been raised before the court made its original
decision.”
Manning v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., No. 12-4466, 2013 WL 2285955, at *2 (D.N.J. May 23, 2013)
(citing Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349,
352 (D.N.J. 2001; Tishcio, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 532).
Indeed,
“[m]ere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show
that the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law and
should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]”
Schiano v. MBNA Corp., No. 05-1771, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 (D.N.J.
Dec. 28, 2006) (internal citations omitted).
6.
Here, Plaintiff’s submission does not identify, as
required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), “an intervening change in
controlling law[,]” the presence of new, previously unavailable,
evidence, nor “the need to correct a clear error of law or [to]
prevent manifest injustice.”
Altana Pharma AG, 2009 WL 5818836,
at *1; see also L. CIV. R. 7.1(i).
Rather, Plaintiff merely
recapitulates one of his prior arguments concerning the
commercial activity exception to FSIA immunity.
(Compare Pl.’s
Br. [Docket Item 11], with Pl.’s Opp’n [Docket Item 6].)
7.
The Court’s November 3, 2014 decision, however,
expressly rejected such argument.
4
Indeed, the Court’s Opinion
explained, at great length, the reasons why the commercial
activity exception failed to apply in this instance, and found
Defendants’ alleged retention of interest and purported profit—
the argument identically asserted in support of Plaintiff’s
request for reconsideration—insufficient to satisfy the direct
effect and substantiality requirements of such exception.
See
Ezeiruaku, 2014 WL 5587404, at *4-*5 (finding Defendants’ acts
not “commercial in nature or in purpose” and, even if
commercial, finding such acts “far too trivial and
unsubstantiated” to satisfy the commercial activity exception).
8.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s evaluation
of the commercial activity exception fails to constitute a valid
ground for reconsideration and is, in any event, without merit
for the reasons stated in the Court’s November 3, 2014 Opinion.
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will, accordingly, be
denied.
9.
An accompanying Order will be entered.
December 16, 2014
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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