EZEIRUAKU v. BULL et al
Filing
9
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/3/2014. (dmr)(n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VINCENT O. EZEIRUAKU, doing
business as SABA PRODUCTS,
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action
No. 14-2567 (JBS/KMW)
v.
DAN BULL, INDIVIDUALLY AND
POLICE, AS AN OFFICER OF THE
LONDON POLICE, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Vincent O. Ezeiruaku, Pro Se
900 Monet Court
Williamstown, N.J. 08094
Aileen F. Droughton, Esq.
Marta N. Kozlowska, Esq.
TRAUB LIEBERMAN STRAUS & SHREWSBERRY LLP
322 Highway 35 South, First Floor
Red Bank, N.J. 07701
Attorney for Defendants
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
In this action concerning the police seizure of $80,000 in
undisclosed U.S. currency in London’s Heathrow International
Airport, Defendants the “London Police” 1 and two of its officers,
1
Though Plaintiff’s Complaint names “‘the London Police,’”
Defendant asserts that no such entity exists. (Defs.’ Br. at n.
2 (citation omitted).) Rather, Defendants assert that “the
Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis” constitutes the
proper defendant. (Id.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17
generally requires an action to “be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest.” FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). Here,
however, the parties do not dispute the nature of the real party
Dan Bull and David March (hereinafter, “Defendants”), move to
dismiss pro se Plaintiff Vincent O. Ezeiruaku’s (hereinafter,
“Plaintiff”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (3) and (5).
[Docket Item 5.]
In his Complaint, Plaintiff generally asserts that
Defendants seized his currency in violation of his “federally
guaranteed constitutional” rights.
[Docket Item 1.]
Defendants
move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint principally on the basis
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1603, and 1605 (hereinafter, the “FSIA”), provides Defendants,
arms of a foreign sovereign, with immunity from this litigation.
Moreover, because acts of foreign nationals form the fabric of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants challenge whether the Court
possesses personal jurisdiction over Defendants and, relatedly,
question whether this District constitutes a proper venue in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Lastly, Defendants dispute
the efficacy of Plaintiff’s service of his Complaint by mail,
and argue that effective service in this instance requires
compliance with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T.
361.
Plaintiff, relying principally upon the liberal
construction afforded pro se pleadings, argues that the nature
in interest, and the misidentification does not alter the
disposition of the pending motion.
2
of this action falls within the commercial activity,
expropriation, and tortious activity exceptions to the
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a).
The principal issue before the Court is whether foreign
immunity under the FSIA insulates Defendants from this
litigation. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds the
Defendants immune, and therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
The Court will
accordingly grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss on that basis.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The facts set forth below are those alleged in Plaintiff’s
Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of
the pending motion. 2
Plaintiff alleges that, while traveling
through London’s International Airport on January 18, 2013,
Defendants, officers of the London “Police” force, “discovered”
in Plaintiff’s possession and “immediately confiscated” $80,000
in U.S. currency.
(Compl. at ¶¶ 1-2.)
Defendants purportedly
failed to communicate the basis for such seizure—whether at the
time of the incident or thereafter—but nonetheless retained the
funds for in excess of fourteen months.
(Id. at ¶¶ 3-7.)
Defendant David Marsh, however, ultimately found “no link”
2
Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint in this action on April
22, 2014. [Docket Item 1.]
3
between the funds and any illegal activities, and therefore
represented an intention to return such funds with interest.
(Id. at ¶ 7.)
Despite that representation, the sums remitted by
Defendants allegedly amounted to “less than the original
$80,000.”
(Id. at ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff asserts in his Complaint that this fourteen month
seizure “violated his federally guaranteed constitutional rights
of due process,” “right to property,” and “civil rights,”
because such seizure occurred without reasonable suspicion that
the seized currency bore a relationship with illegal activity.
(Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.)
Plaintiff therefore seeks monetary damages
for the various business losses allegedly derived from “the
deprivation” of Plaintiff’s currency.
(Id. at ¶ 9.)
B. Parties’ Arguments
Defendants, relying upon the various provisions of Rule
12(b), move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the
following grounds: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, ineffective service of
process, and failure to state a claim.
Br.)
(See generally Defs.’
Defendants principally argue, however, that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the
FSIA confers immunity upon Defendants, particularly because this
action concerns a seizure that occurred in Defendants’ “official
capacity as instrumentalities of the United Kingdom, a foreign
4
sovereign[.]”
(Defs.’ Br. at 3-4, 9-10 (citation omitted).)
Moreover, because the entire fabric of this litigation concerns
events in London, Defendants assert that this action and
specifically their conduct lacks any appreciable nexus with New
Jersey.
(Id. at 5-8.)
Defendants accordingly argue that
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction and/or for improper venue, because “no appropriate
venue exists” for Plaintiff’s claims.
(Id. at 8.)
Lastly,
Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff successfully effectuated
service of his Complaint.
(Id. at 11-12.)
Defendants
specifically argue that Plaintiff’s service by mail to
Defendants’ “place of work” fails to constitute effective
service.
(Id.)
Rather, given the international scope of this
litigation, Defendants assert that effective service requires
compliance with the Hague Convention, not service upon
Defendants by mail.
(Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff generally counters that the nature the
purportedly tortious conduct asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint
“strips” Defendants “of any immunity under the law.” 3
3
(Pl.’s
On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed, without leave of Court, a
sur-reply to Defendants’ motion. [Docket Item 8.] See also L.
CIV. R. 7.1(d)(6) (“No sur-replies are permitted without
permission of the Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom the case is
assigned.”). Notwithstanding the procedurally improper nature
of Plaintiff’s filing, Defendants have filed no opposition, and
the Court will therefore consider the submission. The Court,
however, readily dispenses with the arguments set forth in
Plaintiff’s sur-reply, particularly to the extent Plaintiff
5
Opp’n at 2.)
In so asserting, Plaintiff asserts that sovereign
immunity exceptions, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), (3),
and (5) collectively, or in the alternative, provide authority
for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this
action. 4
(Id.; see also Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2.)
Plaintiff
further argues that Defendants’ engaged in targeted contact with
this District (and more generally the United States) by
returning the seized currency to Plaintiff in New Jersey.
at 3.)
(Id.
Lastly, Plaintiff contends that he properly effectuated
service of his Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1608(b)(3)(B), and accordingly asserts that Defendants’ motion
should be denied in its entirety.
relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as a basis to exercise “foreign
diversity jurisdiction” over this action. (Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2
(emphasis in original).) 28 U.S.C. § 1332, however, fails to
provide a jurisdictional basis relevant to this action, which
concerns indisputably instrumentalities of a foreign state.
Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants qualify as an
“‘agency or instrumentalit[ies]’” of a foreign state in
accordance with the definition set forth in the FSIA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b). (Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2.) The FSIA therefore
“provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction” over the
foreign state Defendants in this Court. Argentine Rep. v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
4 Plaintiff alternatively argues, in reliance on the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, that the purportedly tortious
nature of the alleged conduct precludes Defendants’ assertion of
immunity. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) The Alien Tort Claims Act
provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States,” Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
(emphasis added), and has no application to Plaintiff, “a
naturalized citizen of the United States[.]” (Pl.’s Sur-reply
at 3.)
6
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
the party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the
burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994).
“Courts have an independent obligation to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party
challenges it.”
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).
Notwithstanding this sua sponte obligation, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) enables a party, as here, to move to
dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court’s jurisdiction may be
challenged either facially (based on the legal sufficiency of
the claim) or factually (based on the sufficiency of a
jurisdictional fact).
(3d Cir. 2000).
Gould Elecs. v. U.S., 220 F.3d 169, 178
“The substantive distinction between a facial
attack and a factual attack is that in a facial attack the
defendant contests the sufficiency of the complaint, while a
factual attack challenges the existence in fact of federal
subject matter jurisdiction.”
LaLoup v. U.S., ___ F. Supp. 2d
____, No. 13-7124, 2014 WL 3361804, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 10,
2014).
In considering a facial challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), as here, the Court considers
“whether the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as
7
true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the
district court.” 5
Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
The action must accordingly be
dismissed if the allegations on the face of the complaint,
accepted as true, fail to “allege facts sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the district court.” Licata v. U.S.P.S., 33 F.3d
259, 206 (3d Cir. 1994).
DISCUSSION
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Foreign sovereign immunity has long been recognized as a bar
as to suits against foreign sovereigns in United States federal
and state courts.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
Indeed, the FSIA provides the exclusive
source of subject matter jurisdiction over claims in United
States courts against foreign states and their agencies or
instrumentalities. See Rep. of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S.
607, 610–11 (1992).
The FSIA specifically provides
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury
civil action against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for
relief in personam with respect to which the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity either under
5
Under a factual attack, by contrast, the Court’s inquiry is not
cabined to allegations in the complaint. Rather, the Court may
“consider affidavits, depositions, and testimony to resolve
factual issues bearing on jurisdiction.” Gotha v. U.S., 115
F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Mortensen v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891–92 (3d Cir. 1977).
8
sections 1605–1607 of this title or under any
applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1330.
A foreign state, its agents, and its
instrumentalities therefore possess presumptive immunity from
suits in federal courts, absent a demonstration by the plaintiff
that the claim falls within a statutory exception to immunity. 6
See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (generally noting that, “a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided” in sections
1605 and 1607 to the FSIA).
In Federal Insurance Company v. Richard I. Rubin & Company,
Inc., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), and in reliance on the FSIA’s
legislative history, the Court of Appeals adopted a burdenshifting analysis to guide a court’s jurisdictional inquiry
under the FSIA.
In accordance with this framework, once the
defendant makes the prima facie case that the defendant
qualifies as a foreign state under the FSIA (or where, as here,
it is readily apparent from the pleadings and undisputed that
the defendants constitute qualifying agents and/or
instrumentalities of a foreign state), the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating the
6
The FSIA generally defines a “‘foreign state’” to include “a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
Here, as stated above, the parties do not dispute that
Defendants constitute agents and/or an instrumentality of a
foreign state, as defined by the FSIA. (See Defs.’ Br. at 3-4;
Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2-3.)
9
application of one of the statutory exceptions to immunity.
at 1285.
Id.
“If the plaintiff satisfies his burden of production,
‘jurisdiction exists unless the defendant demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claimed exception does
not apply.’”
Abdulla v. Embassy of Iraq at Wash., D.C., No. 12-
2590, 2013 WL 4787225, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013) (quoting
Peterson v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir.
2010)).
In opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff raises three
FSIA exceptions as a basis to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over this litigation.
at 2; Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2.)
(See generally Pl.’s Opp’n
Plaintiff specifically relies upon
the commercial activity, expropriation, and tortious activity
exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), (3), and (5).
The Court therefore turns to whether these exceptions confer
jurisdiction in this instance.
1. The Commercial Activity Exception Does Not Apply
The commercial activity exception, set forth in Section
1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, provides that
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States ... in any
case—in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
10
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
The FSIA defines the term “commercial
activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act,” but requires such
activity to have a “substantial contact” with the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) & (e) (emphasis added).
The commercial activity exception accordingly entails a twostep analysis.
The initial inquiry concerns whether “a
sufficient jurisdictional nexus” exists between the foreign
state’s alleged commercial activity and the United States.
Federal Ins. Co., 12 F.3d at 1286.
Assuming the requisite
jurisdictional nexus, the inquiry then turns to whether a
sufficient “substantive connection” exists between the foreign
state’s alleged commercial activity and the United States.
Id.
In other words, the basis for litigation under this exception
must concern a foreign state’s direct participation in
commercial activity in the United States, or a foreign state’s
engagement in a commercial activity with a significant and
substantial connection to the United States.
added).
Id. (emphases
Consequently, “‘commercial within the meaning of the
FSIA’” connotes a foreign state acting “not as a regulator of a
market, but in the manner of a private player within” such
market.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 614 (citation omitted).
In relying upon this exception, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ seizure of Plaintiff’s currency enabled Defendants
11
to profit from the interest accrued during their retention of
Plaintiff’s funds.
(Pl.’s Sur-reply at 2-3.)
Plaintiff
therefore argues that this alleged profit constitutes commercial
activity with “a direct effect in the United States,” because
Defendants’ seizure purportedly rendered Plaintiff “unable to
continue his business as usual [] in the United States.”
at 3; see also Compl. at ¶ 9.)
(Id.
The activities identified by
Plaintiff, however, even accepted as true, do not identify
activities commercial in nature or in purpose.
See LaLoup, 2014
WL 3361804, *19 (finding that (1) establishing and maintaining
consulates, (2) promoting business interests through economic
and commercial offices, and (3) sponsoring tourism through
tourist offices failed to constitute commercial activity under
the FSIA); Richardson v. Att’y Gen. of the B.V.I., No. 2008-144,
2013 WL 4494975, at * 4 (D.V.I. Aug. 20, 2013) (finding that the
“alleged negligent arrest of a vessel and its passengers” did
not qualify as commercial activity).
Rather, in alleging that
Defendants engaged in commercial activity in the disputed
seizure, Plaintiff relies upon quintessentially sovereign acts,
namely, London’s policing of its international airport (see
Compl. at ¶¶ 1-3), and not conduct of a nature that a private
party would ordinarily undertake for profit.
See Cmty. Fin.
Grp., Inc. v. Rep. of Kenya, 663 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding the decisions concerning whether to “seize property
12
during criminal investigations” governmental, “rather than
commercial activities”).
Indeed, “a foreign state's exercise of
the power of its police has long been understood ... as
peculiarly sovereign in nature.”
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507
U.S. 439, 361 (1993) (citations omitted).
Moreover, the disputed acts in this instance have far too
trivial and unsubstantiated an impact on the United States to
satisfy the direct effect and substantiality requirements of the
exception. See Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618 (finding that
jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception “may not be
predicated on purely trivial effects in the United States”).
Indeed, in arguing that Defendants’ conduct impacted the United
States, Plaintiff relies upon nebulous and speculative
assertions of lost profits, but concedes that the underlying
conduct bears no transactional relationship to the United
States.
(See Compl. at ¶ 9.)
fail to suffice.
These allegations, accordingly,
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) & (e) (defining the
“commercial activity” exception). As a result, the alleged acts
fall beyond the scope of the commercial activity exception to
sovereign immunity.
2. The Expropriation Exception Does Not Apply
The expropriation exception, set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(3) of the FSIA, provides that
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States ... in any
13
case—in which rights in property taken in violation of
international law are in issue and that property or
any property exchanged for such property is present in
the United States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and
that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States....
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
Thus, in order to establish
jurisdiction pursuant to this exception, a plaintiff must show
that: “(1) rights in property are in issue; (2) that the
property was ‘taken’; (3) that the taking was in violation of
international law; and (4) that one of the two nexus
requirements is satisfied.”
Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. Ltd.
v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted); Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d
661, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Zappia for the four elements
relevant to the FSIA’s expropriation exception).
Here, the
Court need not belabor the first three elements of the
exception, because Plaintiff patently fails to satiate the nexus
requirement.
Indeed, the FSIA provides two paths to demonstrate the
requisite nexus, neither of which Plaintiff demonstrates in this
instance.
Specifically, Plaintiff could first show that
“property or any property exchanged for such property is present
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
14
carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(3). In the alternative, Plaintiff could show that
“property or any property exchanged for such property is owned
or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial
activity in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
Here,
however, and as stated above, Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege that Defendants engaged in any commercial
activity in the United States.
Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged no
nexus, whether factual or legal, between Defendants’ conduct and
the United States, beyond the mere remittance (by mail) of
Plaintiff’s seized currency.
(See Compl. at ¶ 8.)
Moreover,
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants possessed his currency
in the United States, nor that Defendants have retained or
exchanged the purportedly expropriated property.
See Cmty. Fin.
Grp., Inc., 663 F.3d at 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding the
expropriation exception inapplicable where plaintiff “failed to
establish that the property [was] present in the United States
or that the expropriating defendants engage in commercial
activity in the United States”).
Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint
squarely states that Defendants returned his property upon
conclusion of their official investigation, and prior to the
inception of this litigation.
(See id. at ¶¶ 7-9.)
15
As a
result, the alleged acts fall beyond the scope of the
expropriation exception to sovereign immunity.
3. The Tortious Activity Exception Does Not Apply
The tortious activity exception, set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(5) of the FSIA, provides that
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States ... in any
case— in which money damages are sought against a
foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage
to or loss of property, occurring in the United States
and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his
office or employment....
28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5) (emphases added).
The limited scope of
this exception covers “only torts occurring within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” regardless of
whether the alleged tort “may have had effects in the United
States.” Argentine Rep., 488 U.S. at 441.
Even if Plaintiff’s
allegations, accepted as true, could plausibly be construed to
allege that Defendants engaged in tortious conduct, Plaintiff
has not alleged, nor could he allege, that such conduct occurred
“within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States[.]”
Id.
Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly reflects that acts
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom form
the core predicate of this action. 7
7
(See Compl. at ¶¶ 1-3.)
Having concluded that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court need not
address Defendants’ alternative arguments concerning personal
16
The
tortious activity exception, accordingly, has no application to
this litigation.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations
fail to fall within the relied-upon exception to the FSIA.
Having so concluded, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this action, and will accordingly grant Defendants’ motion
to dismiss on that basis.
The accompanying Order will be
entered.
November 3, 2014
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
jurisdiction, venue, and/or the sufficiency of service of
process. (See generally Defs.’ Br.) However, even if the Court
found sovereign immunity did not apply—which it does—it is
dubious that the Court would ever have personal jurisdiction
over Defendants, particularly given their asserted lack of
contacts with this District (see Lockeyear Aff. at ¶¶ 5-9), and
because, aside from Plaintiff’s citizenship, this action bears
no appreciable connection with the United States.
17
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VINCENT O. EZEIRUAKU, doing
business as SABA PRODUCTS,
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action
No. 14-2567 (JBS/KMW)
v.
DAN BULL, INDIVIDUALLY AND
POLICE, AS AN OFFICER OF THE
LONDON POLICE, et al.,
ORDER
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants’
motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Vincent O. Ezeiruaku’s
(hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (3) and (5) [Docket Item 5];
and the Court having considered the parties’ submissions; and
for the reasons explained in the Opinion of today’s date; and
for good cause shown;
IT IS this
3rd
day of
November , 2014, hereby
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Docket Item 5]
shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this case.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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