COFIELD v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/30/2014. (bdk, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
DR. KEENAN K. COFIELD,
:
: Civil Action No. 14-2637 (RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,:
:
Respondents.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s 48-page
submission styled as a § 2241 petition.

See Docket Entry No. 1.

Petitioner is a recreational litigant.

Accord Tucker v. Ann

Klein Forensic Ctr. Hosp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55314, at *1
(D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2014) (quoting Marrakush Soc. v. New Jersey
State Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009),
for the definition of “recreational litigant” as “the one who
engages in litigation as sport and files numerous submissions
with little regard for substantive law or court rules” and
relying on Jones v. Warden of the Stateville Correctional Ctr.,
918 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1995), for the observation
that, “when confronted with a recreational litigant, courts, to
protect themselves and other litigants, have enjoined the filing
of further case without leave of court”) (brackets omitted).

From this Court’s own research, Petitioner – prior to
initiating the case at bar – has already commenced one hundred
and fifteen civil matters in various federal district courts,
including the United States District Courts for the Western and
Eastern Districts of Virginia, Southern and Northern Districts of
Alabama, District of Maryland, District of Columbia, Eastern
District of Kentucky, Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern
District of Florida, District of Kansas, District of Colorado,
Northern District of Georgia, Eastern District of North Carolina,
Southern District of New York, Northern District of Ohio, and
Middle District of Pennsylvania.

In addition, it appears that

Petitioner has filed over twenty appellate actions with the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, Eleventh
and Federal Circuits and several actions with the United States
Supreme Court.
next target.

Petitioner has now selected this District as his

Toward that end, he has made the submission at bar

naming the United States, United States Attorney General, U.S.
Marshal Service, Bureau of Prisons, State of Maryland, its
Secretary, Maryland Department of Corrections, Maryland state
court, the clerk, a Maryland warden and a New Jersey warden as
Respondents in this matter.

See Docket Entry No. 1, at 1-2.

Petitioner’s submission stated his “redemptionist/sovereign
citizen’s” beliefs, see id. at 16-20, challenged his state and
federal arrests, adjudications of his state/federal actions and

2

requested prison-term credits with regard to his unspecified
state and/or federal sentences.

See id. at 10-24.

This Court’s review of Petitioner’s online records revealed
that, after having served a number of state sentences, Petitioner
was first released from state custody into federal custody and
then left that federal custody on July 11, 2012, being released
to Maryland custody for the purposes of serving his next set of
state terms.

See http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/; see also Docket

Entry No. 1 (Petitioner is confined at the “ECI-Annex MD DOC”).
To the extent Petitioner is raising civil rights challenges
relating to his arrest, his claims are, at the very least: (a)
deficient for being not amenable to litigation in this habeas
matter; and (b) brought in a court of improper venue.1

See

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
To the extent Petitioner is aiming to challenge his state
sentences or seeks credit against his state sentences, his claims
are deficient as being § 2254 challenges and, at the very least,
brought before a court of improper venue.2

See 28 U.S.C. §

2241(a), (c)(3) (§ 2241 confers jurisdiction to issue habeas

1

In addition, these claims appear untimely. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); Dique v.
New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
2

In addition, these claims appears both untimely and
unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 515 (1982).
3

writs to a person who is “in [federal] custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”);
compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (§ 2254 confers jurisdiction to issue
“writs of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a state court . . . on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States”).
To the extent Petitioner seeks credits against his expired
federal terms, he fails to meet the “in custody” requirement even
if this Court were to assume that, during his federal term,
Petitioner was confined, at some point, in a New Jersey-located
federal facility.

See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989);

DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 441 (3d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1149 (2005); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716,
717 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[F]or a federal court to have jurisdiction,
a petitioner must be in custody under the conviction he is
attacking at the time the habeas petition is filed”).

To the

extent Petitioner is seeking credits against his future federal
terms, his claims are: (a) speculative (since he has no basis to
claim that he would be confined in New Jersey); and (b)
premature, as has already been explained to him.

See, e.g.,

Cofield v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94781,
at *1 (D. Md. June 14, 2006) (“Petitioner’s federal sentence
imposed by Judge Garbis is to be served consecutive to his

4

current state sentences.

His continuing attempt to have the U.S.

Bureau of Prisons award him credits against his federal sentence
is premature in that he remains housed in state custody and has
not yet commenced serving his federal conspiracy sentence)
(citation omitted).
In light of the abundance of legal guidance provided to
Petitioner by the district judges who presided over his 115 civil
matters and by the appellate panels that ruled on his actions,
Petitioner cannot keep litigating his frivolous claims.

Where a

habeas litigant is attempting to re-litigate the very same issue
time and again, or where the litigant raises claims already known
to him as facially meritless, it is well within the broad scope
of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a district court
to issue an order restricting the filing of such frivolous cases
by that litigant.

See e.g., In Re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d

Cir. 1982) (citing Lacks v. Fahmi, 623 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 115 (5th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Clinton v. United States, 297 F.2d 899,
901 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 856, 82 S. Ct. 944, 8
L. Ed. 2d 14 (1962)).

Likewise, Petitioner’s claims asserting

his redemptionist/sovereign citizen beliefs abuse the legal
process and will not be tolerated.

See, e.g., Ali v. New Jersey,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150195, at *5-15 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2012)
(collecting cases and detailing the nature and legal deficiency
5

of redemptionist, sovereign citizen, “Moorish,” “Marrakush,” etc.
beliefs and jurisdiction challenges based on such beliefs).
Here, Petitioner’s attempt to raise already litigated and
redemptionist claims abuses the equitable nature of the habeas
writ.

See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-19, 83 S. Ct.

1068 (1963); Furnari v. United States Parole Comm’n, 531 F.3d
241, 250 (3d Cir. 2008).

This Court, therefore, strongly urges

Petitioner to take his litigations in this District (and in all
other federal courts, with utmost seriousness, since sanctions
will be applied to Petitioner if he continues abusing the legal
process.

“The courts in this nation stand ready to address

challenges brought by litigants in good faith.

Which, in turn,

means that the judiciary — including the Judges in this District
— expect litigants to treat their litigation with utmost
seriousness, without abusing legal process and without unduly
testing of the resolve or common sense of the judiciary.”

In re

Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536, 580 (D.N.J. 2010).
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s submission, Docket
Entry No. 1, will be dismissed.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: April 30, 2014

6