J.L. et al v. HARRISON TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION et al

Filing 111

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 5/11/2017. (TH, )

[Docket No. 101]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

J.L., a minor, individually and
by her Parents K.L. and J.L.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 14-2666 (RMB/JS)
OPINION

v.
HARRISON TOWNSHIP BOARD OF
EDUCATION and CLEARVIEW BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Jamie Epstein, Esq.
107 Cherry Parke, Suite C
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002
Attorney for Plaintiffs J.L., a minor, individually and
by her Parents K.L. and J.L.
Brett E.J. Gorman, Esq.
Parker McCay PA
9000 Midlantic Drive, Suite 300
Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 08054
Attorney for Defendants Harrison Township Board of
Education and Clearview Board of Education
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
After years of protracted and hostile litigation, on August
19, 2016, this Court issued an Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs’
Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Docket Nos. 95, 96].

The Court

addressed Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees as a
prevailing party and found that Plaintiffs’ counsel had engaged

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in bad faith and improperly prolonged the litigation in order to
inflate his fees.

As a result, in addressing Plaintiffs’ first

Motion for Attorney’s Fees, the Court granted, in part, denied,
in part, and reserved, in part.

Specifically, the Court found

that Plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees as
prevailing parties, which, however, represented only a fraction
of the hours billed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, Jamie Epstein, at a
reasonable hourly rate to be determined at a hearing on a later
date, unless Defendants agreed to the $500 hourly rate requested
by Plaintiffs.

Mr. Epstein attacks this latter statement as an

advisory opinion by the Court.
Shortly thereafter, on August 31, 2016, Defendants’
counsel, Brett Gorman, submitted a letter on the public docket
advising the Court and Plaintiffs that Defendants stipulated to
Plaintiffs’ requested hourly rate of $500 [Docket No. 97],
thereby obviating the need for a hearing regarding the
appropriate hourly rate.

Remarkably, over approximately the

next two weeks, counsel for the parties attempted to negotiate a
proposed form of order for the Court’s consideration and
signature in light of Defendants’ stipulation to Plaintiffs’
requested hourly rate.
negotiations failed.

Unfortunately, yet unsurprisingly, these
Defendants’ counsel submitted a proposed

form of order on September 13, 2016 [Docket No. 98].

That same

day, the Court issued a Final Order and Judgment, noting that

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Defendants had stipulated to Plaintiffs’ requested rate of $500
per hour, without conceding that this represented an appropriate
market rate [Docket No. 99].
A month later, Plaintiffs moved once again for attorney’s
fees incurred as a result of the negotiations regarding the
submission of a simple proposed form of order, originally
requesting in excess of $3,250 [Docket No. 101].

After full

briefing on this motion, Plaintiffs now demand $5,000 in
attorney’s fees [Docket No. 109].

The Court has considered the

parties’ submissions and finds Plaintiffs’ requested attorney’s
fees of $5,000 to be not only excessive and unreasonable, but
unconscionable.

For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs’

Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied.
I.

LEGAL STANDARDS
On August 25, 2015, this Court ruled that Plaintiffs were

the prevailing parties in the underlying litigation, pursuant to
the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.
(“IDEA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 [Docket Nos. 69, 70].
Under IDEA, a prevailing party may be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees, as follows:
(B) Award of attorney’s fees. (i) In general, in any
action or proceeding brought under this section, the
court,
in
its
discretion,
may
award
reasonable
attorney’s fees as part of the costs--

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(I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child
with a disability.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).

IDEA, however, mandates a

reduction in fees whenever the court finds that “the parent, or
the parent’s attorney, during the course of the action or
proceeding, unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the
controversy.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(i).

Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act authorizes an award of
attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in the court’s discretion:
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a
violation of a provision of this title, the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
29 U.S.C. § 794a(b).
While a prevailing party may collect reasonable attorney’s
fees, the “prevailing party is not automatically entitled to
compensation for all the time its attorneys spent working on the
case; rather, a court awarding fees must decide whether the
hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the
particular purposes described and then exclude those that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”

Interfaith

Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 726 F.3d 403, 416 (3d Cir.
2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. Von Muller, 540
F. App’x 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Even prevailing parties
are not automatically entitled to attorneys’ fees, however, as

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whether to grant a fee request is a discretionary decision left
to the district courts.

In exercising its discretion to decide

whether to award attorneys’ fees, district courts are to
consider frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness
(both in the factual and in the legal components of the case)
and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence.”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).

Importantly, a prevailing

party is entitled “to a reasonable fee, not a windfall.”

M.G.

v. E. Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 386 F. App’x 186, 189 (3d Cir.
2010).
As to specific billing entries, “once the fee petitioner
‘submit[s] evidence supporting the hours worked and rates
claimed,’ the party opposing the fee application has the burden
to challenge the reasonableness of the requested fee.”

McKenna

v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 459 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); citing
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).

To

satisfy this burden, the party opposing a motion for fees must
“identify the portion of the fee request being challenged and
state the grounds for the challenge with sufficient specificity
to give the fee applicants notice that they must defend the
contested portion of their fee petition.”

Bell v. United

Princeton Property, Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 715 (3d Cir. 1989).

5

“Once the adverse party raises sufficiently specific
objections to the fee request, a district court ‘has a great
deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light of those
objections.’”

Taylor v. USF-Red Star Exp., Inc., 212 F. App’x

101, 111 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183).
Moreover, although a court generally may not reduce a fee
petition on its own initiative in the absence of specific
objections from the party, the court may sua sponte “reduce
requested fees with respect to matters within the judge’s
personal knowledge.”

Bell, 884 F.2d at 718-19.

Additionally,

“it should not be overlooked that the awarding of an attorney
fee is a judicial action and, regardless of the parties’
indifference to it, a court need not lend its imprimatur to an
inappropriate order merely because there was no objection to its
entry.”
II.

McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459 n. 13.

ANALYSIS
After Defendants agreed to stipulate to Plaintiffs’

requested hourly rate, all that was left for the parties to do
was submit a straightforward proposed form of order for this
Court’s consideration and signature embodying this agreement.
This was a simple administrative task that any sensible and
experienced attorneys could have easily completed in well under
an hour.

Nevertheless, Mr. Epstein now seeks $5,000 in

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attorney’s fees incurred in connection with performing this
single task. 1

On its face, this request is unconscionable.

Plaintiffs contend that they are automatically and
categorically entitled to all attorney’s fees requested that
Defendants have not specifically challenged.
mistaken.

Plaintiffs are

See Interfaith, 726 F.3d at 416; Von Muller, 540

F. App’x at 106-07; McKenna, 582 F.3d at 459 n. 13.

This Court

“has a positive and affirmative function in the fee fixing
analysis, not merely a passive role.”

Interfaith, 726 F.3d

at 416 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

To blindly

permit Plaintiffs to recover Mr. Epstein’s unreasonable
attorney’s fees would amount to an abdication of this Court’s
responsibilities.

Thus, the Court will consider each of

Defendants’ challenges to Plaintiffs’ fee request and evaluate
the reasonableness of each of Mr. Epstein’s billing entries
prior to lending its judicial imprimatur to any additional fee
award.

The Court will not permit Plaintiffs to recover

attorney’s fees for “hours that are excessive, redundant or
otherwise unnecessary[.]”

Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist.,

1

In their own words, Plaintiffs demand further attorney’s
fees to compensate them for “Plaintiffs’ counsel’s efforts in
dealing with Defendants’ counsel’s obstruction to fulfilling the
Court’s advisory opinion in regards to obtaining a stipulation.”
Epstein Aff. ¶ 4 [Docket No. 101-2].
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205 F.3d 583, 595 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in
another pattern of uncooperative conduct in order to increase
his overall fee.”
Court agrees.

Defs. Opp. Br. at 4 [Docket No. 107].

The

IDEA mandates a reduction in fees whenever the

court finds that “the parent, or the parent’s attorney, during
the course of the action or proceeding, unreasonably protracted
the final resolution of the controversy.”
§ 1415(i)(3)(F)(i).

20 U.S.C.

The Court had previously found that

Mr. Epstein had unreasonably protracted this litigation.
Opinion at 48-50.

See

It is now clear to the Court that its Opinion

appears to have had no positive effect.

This entire litigation

before this Court could have been resolved several months ago.
Plaintiffs’ counsel could have submitted a limited supplemental
fee application accounting for his reasonable fees incurred in
connection with his collaborative discussions with Defendants’
counsel.

Plaintiffs’ appeal could have proceeded in a timely

fashion.

Instead, Plaintiffs’ appeal of this Court’s Final

Order and Judgment has since been stayed pending the resolution
of the instant motion [Docket No. 110].

Accordingly, pursuant

to IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(i), Plaintiffs’ requested
attorney’s fees must be reduced to reflect Mr. Epstein’s

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unreasonable protraction of the final resolution of this
litigation.
Plaintiffs are only entitled to recover reasonable
attorney’s fees.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (“. . . the

court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the
parent of a child with a disability.”) (emphasis added);
29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (“. . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of the costs.”) (emphasis added).

Here, in light of the

procedural posture of the litigation, reasonable attorney’s fees
would be minimal.

Generously speaking, experienced counsel

acting in good faith could have completed the one outstanding
task--collaborating with opposing counsel to prepare a proposed
form of order--in under an hour.

A supplemental fee petition to

account for these limited additional fees reasonably should have
taken no longer than thirty minutes for a skilled attorney to
draft.

This is the most Plaintiffs should properly be permitted

to recover, especially in light of Mr. Epstein’s repeated
unreasonable protraction of this case and his bad faith conduct
throughout the litigation.

The Court will nonetheless evaluate

each of Mr. Epstein’s billing entries and identify and exclude
those that are unreasonable, “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary.”

See Holmes, 205 F.3d at 595.

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Between August 19, 2016, the date on which this Court
issued its Opinion, and August 31, 2016, the date on which
Defendants advised the Court and Plaintiffs that they no longer
contested Plaintiffs’ requested rate of $500 per hour [Docket
No. 97], Mr. Epstein amassed an additional $800 in attorney’s
fees for 1.6 hours spent on various tasks.
[2]-[8]. 2

Billing Entries

These fees are excessive.

First, on August 20, 2016, Mr. Epstein billed thirty
minutes reviewing and analyzing the Court’s “opinion [95], order
[96] regarding hourly rate” and eighteen minutes communicating
with his client, also “regarding hourly rate.”
[2], [3].

Billing Entries

The portion of this Court’s Opinion regarding the

applicable hourly rate is less than eight pages long.
Opinion at 53-61.

See

The Court sees no reason why Mr. Epstein

spent thirty minutes reviewing this brief section and an
additional eighteen minutes communicating with his client
regarding the hourly rate.

The hourly rate had presumably

already been discussed between counsel and Plaintiffs, given
that it was the hourly rate that Plaintiffs requested.

At most,

only 0.2 hours should have been expended on these tasks.

2

Numbers in brackets refer to the billing entries set forth
in Plaintiffs’ initial bill submitted in connection with the
instant motion [Docket No. 101-3].

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In billing entry [4], counsel documented twenty-four
minutes spent “research[ing] RMB stipulation opinions” on August
26, 2016.

The Court agrees with Defendants that no legal

research was necessary to draft a stipulation as to the hourly
rate.

This was merely an administrative task.

As such, the

Court finds the time reflected in this entry to be unreasonable
and unnecessary.

The Court will not award any fees incurred for

research that was entirely unwarranted in light of the
procedural posture of the case.

Additionally, on the same day,

Plaintiffs’ counsel documented four separate entries for email
communications with Defendants’ counsel.
[5]-[8].

Billing Entries

These entries are duplicative of one another.

Plaintiffs have not substantiated their request for twenty-four
minutes of email correspondence between Mr. Epstein and
Mr. Gorman on a single day.

A reasonable attorney’s fee for

this email correspondence is $50, representing 0.1 hours.
On August 31, 2016, Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 0.2 hours
reviewing and analyzing Defendants’ letter advising Plaintiffs
and the Court that they stipulated to Plaintiffs’ requested
hourly rate.

Billing Entry [9].

Defendants’ letter [Docket

No. 97] is barely half a page long.
to review and analyze it.

Six minutes is ample time

Thus, Plaintiffs should only be

permitted to recover fees for 0.1 hours for this task.

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Next, on September 8, 2016, Mr. Epstein billed 0.2 hours
(or $100) reviewing and analyzing Defendants’ proposed
stipulation.

Billing Entry [10].

Defendants challenge this

entry, arguing that the time spent reviewing and analyzing the
proposed stipulation was unreasonable, given that the document
is less than two pages long.

Plaintiffs respond that

Mr. Epstein had to check the quotations from the Court’s Opinion
included in the proposed stipulation, even though Mr. Epstein
had already billed for reviewing and analyzing the Court’s
Opinion.

This task was totally unnecessary and, in any case,

reviewing a less-than-two-page document and searching the
Court’s Opinion on the online public docket should not require
twelve minutes.

The Court finds that 0.1 hours properly

reflects the time reasonably spent reviewing and analyzing
Defendants’ brief proposed stipulation.
Then, over the course of two days, September 8 and 9, 2016,
Mr. Epstein billed a total of 0.4 hours corresponding via email
with Mr. Gorman regarding a proposed stipulation as to the
hourly rate.

Billing Entries [13], [15], [16].

again, redundant and excessive.

These are, once

Only 0.2 hours should be

permitted for email correspondence between Mr. Epstein and
Mr. Gorman on this subject.
On September 11, 2016, Mr. Epstein billed 1.1 hours
“prepar[ing] for hourly rate trial,” which he knew would never

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occur in light of Defendants’ stipulation to Plaintiffs’
requested hourly rate.

Billing Entry [19].

Regardless of the

parties’ disputes regarding the language of the proposed
stipulation, it was clear that Defendants no longer contested
Plaintiffs’ requested rate.

Indeed, Defendants had publicly

advised the Court and Plaintiffs of their position eleven days
prior.

Defendants properly challenge this entry as

unreasonable.

The Court finds that Mr. Epstein inappropriately

and needlessly billed 1.1 hours (or $550) preparing for a
hearing that he knew was moot and would never occur.

This

billing entry is disallowed in its entirety.
Next, Plaintiffs’ bill reflects two entries on September
13, 2016: 0.2 hours reviewing Defendants’ “proposed
(un-stipulated to) stipulation” and 0.3 hours analyzing the same
“proposed (un-stipulated to) stipulation.”
[20], [24].

Billing Entries

Defendants challenge these entries as excessive and

unreasonable, given that their proposed order [Docket No. 98-1]
is no more than two pages long.

Plaintiffs attempt to justify

the thirty minutes purportedly spent by Mr. Epstein reviewing
and analyzing the two-page proposed order by stating that the
time was “spent in further analysis [98] and how to respond to
the improper and shocking stipulation [98].”

13

Pls. Reply Br.

at 3 [Docket No. 108]. 3

The Court agrees with Defendants that

the 0.5 hours billed reviewing and analyzing the two-page
proposed order is excessive.

Additionally, billing entry [20]

is subsumed within entry [24].

In light of the duplicative and

excessive billing, only 0.1 hours should be awarded.
On September 14, 2016, Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 0.2 hours
reviewing and analyzing this Court’s Final Order and Judgment.
Billing Entry [25].

Defendants respond that “the time spent

reviewing the final order in this case, which was two and [a]
half pages, was excessive.”
concurs.

Defs. Opp. Br. at 7.

The Court

The Final Judgment and Order [Docket No. 99] is no

more than two and a half pages and contains no information
previously unknown to the parties.

There is no reason why

reviewing and analyzing the Final Order and Judgment should have
taken twelve minutes.

Additionally, the Court sees no

reasonable justification for Mr. Epstein’s eighteen-minute entry
for communications with his clients regarding the hourly rate on

3

While the Court would not expect or require consent to a
proposed order admitting bad faith, the Court does not find the
inclusion of such language to be “improper and shocking”.
Indeed, the language in the proposed order that Plaintiffs
contend is “improper and shocking” actually consists of direct
quotations from this Court’s Opinion. In any event, according
to Mr. Epstein’s billing records, he had already reviewed these
“improper” quotations on September 8, 2016. See Pls. Reply Br.
at 3; Billing Entry [10].
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the following day.

Billing Entry [27].

At most, 0.2 hours were

reasonably expended on these tasks.
In connection with the instant motion, Plaintiffs demand a
total of $2,750 in attorney’s fees, reflecting 5.5 hours spent
by Mr. Epstein in drafting his various filings.

Billing Entry

[28]; Pls. Reply Br. at 5; Pls. Letter [Docket No. 109].
request is egregious.

This

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ scant

submissions and finds them wanting.

All three submissions--

Plaintiffs’ opening motion papers [Docket No. 101], Plaintiffs’
supplemental letter brief [Docket No. 105], and Plaintiffs’
reply brief [Docket No. 108]--are woefully deficient, in
addition to being entirely devoid of merit.

The Court cannot

lend its judicial imprimatur to such an excessive and
unreasonable request.
Specifically, in billing entry [28], Plaintiffs request
$1,000 for two hours spent by Mr. Epstein drafting the instant
motion.

Plaintiffs’ motion was patently insufficient.

The

entirety of the submission was five pages, including a full page
for each of the notice of motion [Docket No. 101] and proposed
order [Docket No. 101-1], both of which are form documents.
brief was submitted.

No

Instead, Plaintiffs submitted a two-page,

six-paragraph affidavit from Mr. Epstein that included no
justification or explanation of the time billed whatsoever
[Docket No. 101-2].

Finally, Plaintiffs submitted a spreadsheet

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entitled “10/13/16 JL BILL,” setting forth Mr. Epstein’s billing
entries and corresponding requests for fees [Docket No. 101-3].
Next, Plaintiffs brazenly demand an additional $750 in
attorney’s fees incurred for 1.5 hours spent drafting a response
to this Court’s October 28, 2014 Order.
[Docket No. 105].

Pls. Supp. Br. at 3

On October 28, 2014, due to the inadequacy

of Plaintiffs’ initial submission, the Court ordered Plaintiffs
to submit a supplemental letter brief in support of their
request for attorney’s fees, addressing, in particular, certain
glaringly problematic entries [Docket No. 104].

Plaintiffs

submitted a less-than-three page response [Docket No. 105]. 4

A

supplemental brief should not have been needed in the first
place.

Nonetheless, a $750 bill for drafting that response is

unreasonable.
Finally, Plaintiffs request $1,000 for two hours billed by
Mr. Epstein for drafting Plaintiffs’ reply brief.

This request

was only presented in the reply brief and, thus, Defendants have
not had an opportunity to respond.

Plaintiffs’ reply brief

[Docket No. 108] is roughly a mere four pages long, contains
both factual and typographical errors, and responds to legal
arguments not presented by Defendants in their opposition brief.

4

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ response is laden with
hostility towards both the Court and Defendants.
16

The Court finds this request to be unreasonable and excessive in
light of the brief submitted.
Had Mr. Epstein acted reasonably and in good faith, he
would have incurred only reasonable fees in connection with the
preparation of a proposed form of order.

He then would have

submitted a limited supplemental fee application, which
reasonably would have taken no more than thirty minutes.

A

reasonable attorney’s fee in connection with the preparation of
the supplemental fee request would have been $250.
Based upon the findings set forth above, under normal
circumstances, Plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover,
at most, a total amount of $750 in reasonable attorney’s fees.
This, unfortunately, is not a normal case.

As detailed in this

Court’s prior Opinion and in this Opinion, Mr. Epstein’s
litigation conduct not only forced counsel for Defendants to
expend unnecessary fees, it also required this Court, once
again, to divert its precious limited resources from the
hundreds of other cases on its docket in need of attention.

The

only right and just thing for this Court to do--if its grant of
discretion is to mean anything--is to deny outright all fees.
See, e.g., M.G., 386 F. App’x at 188 n. 3, 189 (noting that “the
egregiousness of [Mr. Epstein’s] conduct alone could plausibly
justify the outright denial of attorney’s fees” and stating that
“[i]f, after following the proper procedures, the Court remains

17

convinced that Epstein’s hourly rate and hours billed are
outrageously excessive, it retains the discretion to award
whatever fee it deems appropriate, including no fee at all”);
Deptford Twp. Sch. Dist. v. H.B. ex rel. E.B., 279 F. App’x 122,
126 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing district court’s finding that
plaintiffs were “prevailing parties” and award of attorney’s
fees, noting that “even if the District Court’s finding . . .
rendered Appellees the ‘prevailing party,’ an award of
attorneys’ fees would not be proper on the particular facts of
this case.

As the District Court noted, the relief achieved

here was ‘scant and unimpressive,’ . . . . Moreover, Appellees’
attorney [Mr. Epstein]--either through gross carelessness or
worse--initially sought fees that included 60 hours billed in a
single day.

On this record, we find that fees should not have

been awarded.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted);
J.T. ex rel. A.T. v. Medford Bd. of Educ., 118 F. App’x 605, 607
(3d Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s decision that Mr.
Epstein and his clients were not entitled to any fees because
they unreasonably and unnecessarily delayed the resolution of
the controversy); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware Cty.
Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 557 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
that, under Sections 1415(i)(3)(D)-(G), “attorney’s fees may be
prohibited or reduced . . . when a parent has unreasonably
protracted the final resolution.”) (emphasis added); L.J. ex

18

rel. V.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 995458, at *13
(D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2009), aff’d, 373 F. App’x 294 (3d Cir. 2010)
(denying outright Mr. Epstein’s request for “an astounding
$10,480 in attorney’s fees” for 26.2 hours billed for logging
billing entries, noting that the request was “unreasonable on
its face, and borderline conscience-shocking.”).

The Court,

therefore, exercises its discretion and denies Plaintiffs’
request for additional attorney’s fees in its entirety.
Enough is enough.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for

Attorney’s Fees is denied.

An appropriate Order shall issue on

this date.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 11, 2017

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