TRENT v. DIBENEDETTO et al
Filing
3
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/17/2014. (TH, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DARON DELREN TRENT,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-3190 (JBS/KMW)
v.
ELIZABETH DIBENEDETTO and
RONALD RIGGINS,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this action, pro se Plaintiff Daron Delren Trent
(hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) generally alleges that Defendants
Elizabeth DiBenedetto and Ronald Riggins (hereinafter,
“Defendants”) violated Plaintiff’s due process rights in
connection with a prison disciplinary hearing by denying him the
right to confront witnesses.
[Docket Item 1].)
(See generally Pl.’s Compl.
Because Plaintiff seeks to bring this action
in forma pauperis, the Court has an obligation to screen the
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court finds as
follows:
1.
Because Plaintiff’s application reflects that he is
indigent, the Court will, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, permit
the Complaint to be filed without prepayment of fees, and will
direct the Clerk of Court to file the Complaint.
2.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B), however, requires the Court to
screen Plaintiff’s Complaint and to dismiss any frivolous or
malicious claim, any claim that fails to state a ground upon
which relief may be granted, and/or any claim that seeks
monetary damages from a defendant with immunity.
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989).
3.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint,
as here, the Court must liberally construe the allegations in
favor of the plaintiff, and generally accepts as true all
factual allegations.
(2007).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
The Court may, however, freely ignore the plaintiff’s
“legal conclusions” and need not credit a pleading that offers
little more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted).
Rather,
the plaintiff’s factual allegations must be facially sufficient
to demonstrate a “plausible” right to relief, by pleading
factual content sufficient for the Court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
4.
Plaintiff, an inmate serving a state sentence for
aggravated assault, alleges that, on February 6, 2013, he
2
received a “disciplinary infraction” for misuse of authorized
medication.
(Pl.’s Compl. at 5.)
In connection with the
adjudication of such infraction on February 13, 2013, however,
Plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary hearing officer,
Defendant Elizabeth DiBenedetto (hereinafter, “DiBenedetto”),
denied Plaintiff’s request for confrontation, and found
Plaintiff guilt of the disciplinary charge.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
filed an administrative appeal of Defendant DiBenedetto’s
decision, but the associate administrator of the correctional
facility, Defendant Ronald Riggins (hereinafter, “Riggins”),
affirmed, finding “no violation of standards or
misinterpretation of facts.” (Id. at 6.)
5.
Plaintiff then filed an appeal with the New Jersey
Appellate Division.
(Id.)
The New Jersey Appellate Division,
however, found that Defendant DiBenedetto “mistakenly exercised
her discretion and failed to honor” Plaintiff’s “limited due
process rights” under New Jersey’s constitution by failing to
afford Plaintiff a right of confrontation.
Trent v. N.J. Dep’t
of Corrs., No. A-3310-12T2, 2014 WL 1239245, at *2-*3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 27, 2014).
The Trent court,
accordingly, remanded for an additional disciplinary hearing,
and directed that Plaintiff be provided a right of
confrontation.
Id.
3
6.
In this federal action, Plaintiff argues that
Defendants collusively participated in a scheme to violate his
“procedural due process rights,” and asserts that the New Jersey
Appellate Division’s decision confirms the intentional nature of
Defendants’ acts.
(Pl.’s Compl. at 6.)
Plaintiff, accordingly,
seeks monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged
constitutional deprivations.
7.
(Id.)
Section 1983 generally provides a federal cause of
action against any person who, “under color of” state law,
“subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Consequently,
in order to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
prove that he: (a) suffered the deprivation of a right secured
by the United States Constitution or federal law, (b) by a
person acting under color of state law.
Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tx., 503 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1992); Morrow v.
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
8.
42 U.S.C. § 1983, accordingly, only provides a vehicle
for vindicating rights secured by the federal Constitution or
federal law.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687,
749 n.9 (1999).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Complaint solely
relies upon the New Jersey constitution, to the extent such
4
constitution affords a limited due process right of
confrontation in prison disciplinary hearings.
1239245, at *2-*3.
Trent, 2014 WL
The federal Constitution, by contrast, does
not require a right of confrontation in connection with such
proceedings.
9.
Notably, while prisoners retain certain basic
constitutional rights, including procedural due process
protections, an inmate’s rights may, under the federal
Constitution, be curtailed in connection with prison
disciplinary hearings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556–57 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of
a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”); Young v. Kann,
926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991).
Indeed, a prison
disciplinary hearing satisfies federal due process if the prison
provides the inmate with: (1) written notice of the charges and
not less than 24 hours to marshal the facts and prepare a
defense for an appearance at the disciplinary hearing; (2) a
written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence
in his defense when doing so will not be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.
See Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1984) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at
5
563–64); Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1992).
In essence, an inmate facing disciplinary charges “must have an
opportunity to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.”
Young
v. Kahn, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted);
see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564 (notice of charge must be given
to inmate “to enable him to marshal facts and prepare a
defense”).
10.
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege a deprivation
of these federal due process requirements.
Indeed, Plaintiff
does not allege that he failed to receive proper notice of the
disciplinary hearing; that Defendant DiBenedetto failed to
provide a written statement of the evidence relied upon in
finding Plaintiff guilty of the disciplinary fraction; nor that
Defendant DiBenedetto prohibited him from presenting evidence in
support of his defense.
(See Pl.’s Compl. 5-6.) Rather,
Plaintiff only challenges the disciplinary hearing to the extent
Defendant DiBenedetto denied his request to confront adverse
witnesses. (Id.)
Though the federal Constitution requires
Plaintiff be provided the opportunity to prepare a defense, such
opportunity does not, however, translate into an unfettered
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.
See
To the contrary, “there is no [federal]
constitutional requirement that prison authorities permit a
prisoner to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”
6
Griffin v. Spratt, 768 F. Supp. 153, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd
in part, 969 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1992); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567-58;
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1976) (noting that
the decision to permit an inmate to confront and cross-examine
witnesses at a disciplinary hearing rests within the sound
discretion of state prison official); Young, 926 F.2d at 1404
(noting that there is no “absolute right to confront and crossexamine witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing”) (citations
omitted).
Consequently, because Plaintiff’s Complaint only
challenges the denial of a purported federal right to
confrontation, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court will,
accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a
claim.
See Jones v. Carroll, No. 07-791, 2008 WL 1743349, at *4
(D. Del. Apr. 16, 2008) (finding the denial of a right to
confront witnesses in a disciplinary hearing insufficient to
state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Kwanzaa v.
Brown, No. 05-5976, 2006 WL 2403978, at *17-*18 (D.N.J. Aug. 17,
2007) (same); Boone v. Brown, No. 05-750, 2005 WL 2006997, at
*11 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2005) (same).
11.
The dismissal, however, will be without prejudice to
Plaintiff’s right to file a motion to amend, accompanied, in
accordance with Local Civil Rule 7.1(f), by a proposed Amended
7
Complaint.
The proposed Amended Complaint, if any, must
identify, with specificity, (1) whether Plaintiff received
written notice of the disciplinary charges and, if so, within
what time frame; (2) whether Plaintiff received a written
statement from the disciplinary officer concerning the basis for
the disciplinary action; and (3) whether the disciplinary
officer otherwise afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to call
witnesses and to present documentary evidence.
Absent such
assertions, bolstered by appropriate factual support,
Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint would fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
12.
An accompanying Order will be entered.
December 17, 2014
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?