LIGGON-REDDING v. GENERATIONS et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/30/2015. (tf,n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ELIZABETH LIGGON-REDDING,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-3191 (JBS/AMD)
v.
GENERATIONS, INTERSTATE,
HARVEST HOUSE APT, TOWANA
KILLINGS,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of
Defendants Generations, Interstate, Harvest House Apt, and
Towana Killings’ (hereinafter, “Defendants”) to dismiss [Docket
Item 15] Pro se Plaintiff Elizabeth Liggon-Redding’s Complaint
[Docket Item 1]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, the owners
or managers of the housing complex in which she has lived since
2008, have treated her unfairly and discriminated against her on
the basis of her disability, in violation of her constitutional
rights.
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for relief, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to
dismiss but will permit Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her
Complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed herein, if
Plaintiff has a factual basis to do so. The Court finds as
follows:
1.
Plaintiff filed this Complaint against Generations,
Interstate, Harvest House Apt, and Towana Killings.1 She pleads
that she moved into Harvest House Senior Apts. in January of
2008, and that since then, she has been “constantly harassed and
discriminated against by Management.” (Complaint [Docket Item 1]
at 1.) Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a model of clarity,
the Court can discern several discrete incidents. First,
individuals “Carol,” “Charlotte,” and Defendant Towana Killings
have all told Plaintiff that they wanted to evict Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff believes that the individuals seeking to evict her are
prejudiced against her. (Complaint at 1.) Second, Plaintiff
alleges that she applied for rental assistance and was “denied
Section Eight,” because she lived in a two-bedroom apartment due
to her disability.2 (Complaint at 2.) Next, Plaintiff states that
Defendants attempted to evict her every year for a total of five
or six times, and implies that they did so because she was
“outspoken” because things were being stolen out of residents’
apartments. (Complaint at 2.) She finally states that most
1
Although Plaintiff fails to identify these individuals, her
Complaint suggests that they are the owners or managers of
Harvest House, the building in which she resides.
2 Plaintiff also complains that when she applies for rental
assistance, “Carol” told someone that Plaintiff did not need it
because she was never home. (Complaint at 2.)
2
recently, after she was voted “President of our Association.”
Defendant Killings told members that Plaintiff could not be
President because she did not get along with Management. After
Plaintiff sent everyone a letter telling them what was
happening, Defendants initiated eviction proceedings against
her. (Complaint at 2-3.)
2.
Plaintiff states that she is disabled. (Complaint at
2.) She alleges the following cause of action:
The Plaintiff is so tired of being Discriminated against by
these individuals all her pleas for relief have fallen on
deaf ears. The fact that they feel they can violate our
Constitutional Right to peacefully assemble, vote for who
we choose to represent us and treat us differently because
we are disabled has to stop.
(Complaint at 4.) She seeks an order from the Court to
Defendants to “Cease and Desist their behavior towards
[Plaintiff] forthwith and if they do not a Jury Trial and One
and One Half Million Dollars, in Punitive and Compensatory
Damages. (Complaint at 5.)
3.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for
emergency stay of eviction seeking to repudiate an agreement in
which she consented to the entry of a New Jersey Superior Court
judgment of eviction and agreed to move out of her apartment.
The Court denied Plaintiff’s application. [Docket Item 5.]
Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R.
3
Civ. P. 12(e). They argue that any claim of discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act must be dismissed because Plaintiff has
failed to set forth any allegations which would plausibly
demonstrate discrimination on the basis of disability, (Def. Br.
at 10-12), and that any constitutional claim under the First
Amendment should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged
that Defendants are government entities. (Id. at 13-14.)
Defendants also attach a declaration by Kelli Staten, a current
Site Manager at Harvest House Apartments, and contend that all
claims are barred by the statute of limitations because
“Charlotte” and “Carol” have not worked at Harvest House for
four or five years, and Defendant Killings has not worked there
since 2014. (Id. at 8-10, 13.) As Staten also asserted that
Plaintiff was evicted from Harvest House in July 2014 due to her
failure to make rent payments, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Complaint is moot as it seeks only injunctive relief. (Id. at
15-16.)
4.
Plaintiff filed a two-page response, styled as a
“Motion to Allow This Case to be Allowed to Proceed to Trial,”
approximately five months after Defendants filed their motion,
as well as a reply in further support of that motion.3 (Pl. Mot.
3
Defendants’ motion was filed on September
sought an extension of time until to file a
Defendants’ motion, which the Court granted
[Docket Item 18.] After Plaintiff failed to
4
4, 2014. Plaintiff
response to
by text order.
file an opposition
[Docket Item 22].) In that reply, Plaintiff notes that she had
asked that Defendant Killings “not be allowed to tell the
residents that [Plaintiff] could not be President of our
Association,” but that “they” refused, and Plaintiff was evicted
as a result. (Pl. Resp. to Def. Letter [Docket Item 25] at 1-2.)
5.
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may
be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that plaintiff
failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
by the revised due date of October 14, 2014, the Court, by
letter dated December 30, 2014, granted another extension
allowing Plaintiff to respond by January 20, 2015. [Docket Item
19.] Plaintiff wrote back, stating that she never received the
first text order, and the Court, in an effort to avoid any
possible confusion and provide Plaintiff with the fullest
opportunity to defend her case, extended the time to respond to
January 30, 2015. [Docket Item 21.] Plaintiff’s response, a twopage “Motion to Allow This Case to be Allowed to Proceed to
Trial” addressing Defendant’s motion, was finally filed on
January 26, 2015. [Docket Item 22.] The Clerk of the Court
docketed Plaintiff’s response as a new motion based upon the
title, and the parties addressed Defendants’ motion to dismiss
in the subsequent briefing on Plaintiff’s motion. (See Def.
Letter [Docket Item 24]; Pl. Resp. to Def. Letter [Docket Item
25].)
5
the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). However, legal conclusions are not entitled to the same
assumption of truth, and “[a] pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. To determine if a complaint meets
the pleading standard, the Court must strip away conclusory
statements and “look for well-pled factual allegations, assume
their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement of relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d
352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Complaint must contain “‘enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest’ the required element.” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 550 U.S. at 556).
6.
Because Ms. Liggon-Redding is a pro se plaintiff, the
Court construes her Complaint liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365,
369 (3d Cir. 2003). If a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal,
“a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). If the pleading “is
so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response,” the Court may direct Plaintiff to provide a more
definite statement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
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7.
Although Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify a
cause of action, the Court liberally construes the Complaint as
attempting to allege a violation of her federal constitutional
rights and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
3604(f)(2)(A) & 3613. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to state a claim for relief.
8.
Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible discrimination
claim under the Fair Housing Act. The FHA prohibits
discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision
of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling,
because of a handicap of . . . that person,” 42 U.S.C. §§
3604(f)(2)(A), and permits any aggrieved person to file an
action in federal court to obtain relief for a discriminatory
housing practice. The FHA defines “handicap” as “(1) a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a
person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such an
impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled, but
fails to specify in the Complaint what her disability is.
Nevertheless, given the relaxed pleading standard for a pro se
plaintiff, Court will take Plaintiff’s allegation of disability
as true, and assume that she falls within the protection of the
FHA for purposes of addressing this motion.
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9.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants discriminated
against her due to her disability, but there are no factual
allegations suggesting that the alleged mistreatment was due to
the fact that Plaintiff was disabled.4 Plaintiff essentially
states in the Complaint that she is disabled and then lists a
number of incidents in which Defendants allegedly mistreated
her. “‘Simply stating that one endured [] discrimination without
presenting allegations suggestive of such conduct does not meet
our pleading standards.’” Deserne v. Madlyn & Leonard Abramson
Ctr. For Jewish Life, Inc., No. 10-03694, 2011 WL 605699, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011) (quoting Funayama v. Nichia Am. Corp.,
No. 08–5599, 2009 WL 1437656 at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009)).
There are no allegations to support any inference that there is
a causal connection between plaintiff’s handicap and any adverse
action taken against her by Defendants. For example, she alleges
that she was denied rental assistance because she was allowed to
have a two-bedroom apartment due to her disability. But nothing
in the Complaint suggests that the denial was due to
discrimination. Indeed, in the same paragraph, Plaintiff states
that she was told she did not qualify for assistance. She also
pleads that before she was denied rental assistance, “Carol told
the individuals” that Plaintiff “did not need it because
4
Plaintiff does not specify what her disability is.
8
[Plaintiff] was never home anyway,” appearing to suggest that
the denial was in fact due to Carol’s influence and not
Plaintiff’s disability.5 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
tried to evict her several times, but the Court can discern no
facts which would indicate that Defendants’ actions were
motivated by discriminatory animus. There are no allegations
that residents who were similarly situated but not disabled were
treated more favorably. In sum, there are no facts in
Plaintiff’s Complaint that would lend plausibility to the bare
legal conclusion of discrimination.
10.
Nor has Plaintiff plausibly asserted claims under the
Constitution. To the extent Plaintiff seeks a remedy under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, she must demonstrate “a violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,
and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 47 (1988); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d
Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants are
government actors, or that they acted “under color of state
law.” See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638-39 (3d
Cir. 1995) (describing various approaches for detecting the
presence of action under color of state law). In the “Parties”
5
Plaintiff does not identify who “Carol” is, nor is “Carol” a
defendant in Plaintiff’s suit.
9
section of the Complaint, Plaintiff lists the Defendants along
with several of their addresses, but does not explain who the
parties are or identify whether any of them are state government
entities. As § 1983 provides a cause of action only against
persons who act “under color of state law” and the Court cannot
determine from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether any of the
Defendants are state government actors, Plaintiff has failed to
state a § 1983 claim for relief for constitutional violations.
Additionally, as articulated above, any discrimination claim
brought under the Equal Protection Clause would fail because
Plaintiff has not alleged facts to plausibly suggest that she
was discriminated against by the state or its agencies due to
her disability.6
6
Relying on a declaration by Kelli Staten attached to their
motion to dismiss, Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims
are moot and are barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
(See Def. Br. at 8-10, 13, & 15; Staten Declaration [Docket Item
15-3].) It is well-settled that on a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b), the court may not consider “matters extraneous to
the pleadings,” unless the document was integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the plaintiff’s complaint. Angelastro
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.
1997). Pension Benefit Guar. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that courts consider only
the allegations of the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters
of public record in deciding motions to dismiss). As the Staten
Declaration is not integral to Plaintiff’s complaint and
Defendants have made no argument for why it should be
considered, the Court will not rely upon it. See In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that district court should not have
considered information from the brief supporting the motion to
dismiss). Thus, Defendants’ statute of limitations and mootness
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11.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a
defendant may move for a more definite statement if the pleading
“is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions for a more
definite statement, however, are “generally disfavored,”
particularly in light of the liberal pleading standards under
the Federal Rules. Premier Payments Online, Inc. v. Payment Sys.
Worldwide, 848 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citation
omitted). Rule 12(e) provides a remedy for an “unintelligible”
pleading that “is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party
cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith,
without prejudice to [itself].” Id.; Clark v. McDonald's Corp.,
213 F.R.D. 198, 232–33 (D.N.J. 2003) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). However, it does not serve as a
mechanism to correct a pleading merely lack in detail. Premier
Payments Online, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (citation omitted).
“Because there is potential that Rule 12(e) could require more
specificity than that required by Rule 8(a)(2) and therefore be
prone to abuse by defendants, its exercise should be cast in the
mold of strictest necessity.” Gittens v. Experian Information
arguments, both of which rely upon new facts contained in the
Staten Declaration, need not be addressed in this Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.
11
Solutions, Inc., No. 13-5534, 2014 WL 1744851, at *2 (D.N.J.
Apr. 30, 2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
12.
The Court, having found that the Complaint fails to
state a plausible claim, will not go further to examine the
Complaint for its shortcomings in being specific as to such
allegations as the dates of these events, the names and titles
of the persons against whom relief is sought, and the grounds
for alleging that Plaintiff’s disability was a motivating factor
in the treatment Plaintiff has received, among other
deficiencies.
13.
Although the Court finds that a more definite
statement is not required, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead
plausible claims for relief. However, as Plaintiff may be able
to submit an amended pleading that cures the deficiencies
discussed herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file
an Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days, accompanied by the
proposed Amended Complaint that attempts to cure these
deficiencies with clear and concise allegations of the grounds
for the causes of action. If Plaintiff files a motion to amend,
it must contain the proposed Amended Complaint as an attachment,
and it must be received by the Clerk’s Office and served on
opposing counsel within thirty (30) days hereof.
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14.
The accompanying Order will be entered.
June 30, 2015
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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