LIGGON-REDDING v. GENERATIONS et al
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/19/2014. (drw)n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
E. LIGGON-REDDING,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-3191 (JBS/AMD)
v.
GENERATIONS, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Before the Court is an emergency motion by Plaintiff E.
Liggon-Redding to stay a state-court eviction process and to
issue a gag order preventing the Defendants from “report[ing] to
anyone anything that will jeopardize the plaintiff’s quest to
procure another apt.” [Docket Item 4.] In this emergency motion,
Plaintiff seeks to repudiate an agreement she signed on June 12,
2014, under which she agreed to move out of her apartment on
July 5, 2014, wherein she also consents to entry of a judgment
of eviction in the Superior Court of New Jersey.
In the present case, Plaintiff, representing herself and
proceeding in forma pauperis, alleges in her Complaint that the
employees at Harvest House Senior Apartments have discriminated
against her on the basis of her disability, initiated wrongful
eviction proceedings against her, and violated her
“Constitutional Right to peacefully assemble, vote for who we
choose to represent us . . . .” [Compl. at 2, 4.] For the
reasons explained below, the Court declines to order a stay of
the eviction process and declines to issue a gag order.
1.
The Court previously permitted Plaintiff’s underlying
Complaint to proceed in an Order filed on May 30, 2014.
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only one and a half pages of
factual allegations. By way of background, she alleges that she
has experienced harassment and discrimination since moving to
Harvest House Senior Apartments in 2008, and that employees
there want to evict her. (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that
she needs a two-bedroom apartment because she is disabled and
needs space for an overnight caregiver. (Id. at 2.) Some other
tenants receive a discount on their rent. (Id.) She asserts that
she was told she did not qualify for a discount because she had
a two-bedroom apartment. (Id.) She therefore concludes that this
amounts to discrimination on the basis of disability. (Id.) The
Complaint contains other assertions that need not be repeated
for present purposes of this emergency motion.
2.
It is difficult for the Court to determine exactly
what relief Plaintiff seeks from this Court. In a section of the
Complaint labeled “Cause of Action,” Plaintiff states:
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The Plaintiff is so tired of being Discriminated
against by these individuals all her pleas for relief
have fallen on deaf ears. The fact that they feel they
can violate our Constitutional Right to peacefully
assemble, vote for who we choose to represent us and
treat us differently because we are disabled has to
stop.
(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff demands that the Court “Order the
Defendants to Cease and Desist their behavior towards her
forthwith and If they do not a Jury Trial and One and One Half
Million Dollars, in Punitive and Compensatory Damages.” (Id. at
4-5.) The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as
attempting to allege a violation of her federal constitutional
rights and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
3604(f)(2)(A) & 3613 (prohibiting discrimination “against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of . . .
that person”), among other possible state-law claims.
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
3.
Plaintiff’s emergency motion states that on April 3,
2014, Defendants negotiated with Plaintiff’s attorney to create
a payment plan and permitted Plaintiff to remain in her
apartment. (Pl. Mot. at 10-11.) Plaintiff asserts that on April
4, 2014, she “paid the amount discussed between their attorney
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and her attorney.” (Id. at 11.) A few days later, Plaintiff
received a letter from Ms. Killing refusing Plaintiff’s “partial
payment” of $1,328 and demanding full payment of her outstanding
balance, $3,460. [Docket Item 4 at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that
she was “forced to sign” a “Consent to Enter Judgment for
Possession (Tenant Vacates)” in order “to procure extra time to
move,” although she also asserts that she was represented by
counsel at that time. (Id. at 11; Docket Item 4 at 4.) The date
by which Plaintiff must vacate the apartment appears to be “7-514.” Plaintiff concludes that she “does not want Defendent [sic]
to be allowed to submit negative information to anyone that may
hinder her chances of now having to procure another apt.” (Pl.
Mot. at 11.)
4.
The Court observes that no defendants have been served
yet in this matter, however Plaintiff asserts that she has taken
every step required of her to effectuate service: “Forms hand
delivered to Marshals for Service on Defendents [sic] June 5,
2014.” (Id. at 11.) Service of process often takes time because
of the competing duties of the U.S. Marshals, so it would not be
surprising if service of process takes several weeks or more.
The Court is unaware whether Plaintiff has served Defendants
with a copy of this emergency motion, and no response has been
received. In the interest of a timely resolution of this motion,
the Court addresses this emergency motion and concludes that a
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stay of the state-court proceedings and a gag order are
inappropriate in this case.
5.
Generally, federal courts “lack the authority to stay
any state court proceedings, including Eviction Actions.” Riddhi
Sub. LLC v. One Exch. JC LLC, No. 12-42, 2012 WL 33903, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2012); see also Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd.
of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970) (“Any doubts as
to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court
proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the
controversy.”). The Anti-Injunction Act provides that a “court
of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
Here, there is no allegation that any federal statute expressly
authorizes the Court to stay the state-court proceedings. See
Hemlock Crossing, LLC v. Logal Twp., No. 07-26, 2007 WL 1203015,
at * (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2007) (citing Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super.
Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1993), for the
proposition that “the FHA does not constitute an express
exception to the Anti-injunction Act”); United States v.
Billingsley, 615 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
neither a private individual nor the government bringing an FHA
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claim would enjoy an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act); 42
U.S.C. § 3613 (providing for private enforcement of the FHA, but
stating no express exception to the Anti-Injunction Act).
6.
Nor is an injunction necessary to aid federal
jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate the Court’s judgments.
See Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc. v. Cent. Iron Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d
791, 794 (3d Cir. 1964) (“If the enjoined state proceeding could
not prejudice any otherwise proper disposition of some claim
pending in the federal suit, the injunction cannot be in aid of
invoked federal jurisdiction.”). Although Plaintiff’s demand for
relief is vague, the Complaint cannot be reasonably construed to
request an injunction for the Defendants to offer Plaintiff a
discount on her rent to stay in her current apartment. Plaintiff
states that what “prompted” her to file this action was Ms.
Tawana Killing, the apartment building’s manager, telling
tenants that Plaintiff could not be president of the tenants’
association because she did not get along with management, and
the resulting allegedly retaliatory eviction. (Compl. at 2-3.)
In this emergency motion, Plaintiff concludes by saying she does
not want Defendants to be allowed to say anything that would
“hinder her chances” of securing a new apartment. (Pl. Mot. at
11.)
7.
Simultaneously, Plaintiff demands $1.5 million in
damages. The Court is satisfied that even if Plaintiff
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ultimately prevails on her claim for an illegal eviction or an
FHA claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3613, a damage award could
provide an adequate remedy for her injury. As “this action
cannot result in any judgment which would be impaired or made
less effective by” any outcome in the state-court eviction
proceeding, the Anti-Injunction Act bars the Court from
enjoining Plaintiff’s eviction proceeding in state court. Jos.
L. Muscarelle, 328 F.2d at 794.
8.
The eviction court is the competent and appropriate
forum for Plaintiff to challenge the consent agreement she
signed and to raise any defenses to prevent her eviction.
Eviction proceedings are peculiarly a creature of state law,
implicating substantial state interests. The “Consent to Enter
Judgment for Possession” that Plaintiff signed last week and
attacks this week is itself captioned in the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Camden County.
Adjudication of the claims before this Court is not affected by
the eviction proceeding, and, likewise, Plaintiff does not
require the assistance of this Court to vindicate her rights in
her eviction proceeding. The Court declines to stay the eviction
proceedings in state court.
9.
The Court also declines to issue a gag order. A gag
order is a prior restraint on speech that implicates First
Amendment rights and is subject to a heavy presumption against
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its constitutional validity. United States v Scarfo, 263 F.3d
80, 92 (3d Cir. 2001); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol.
Gov’t, 731 F.3d 488, 492-94 (5th Cir. 2013). In general, gag
orders are designed to prevent the parties or lawyers from
disseminating information that is confidential or otherwise
prejudicial to the judicial proceedings. Cooper Hosp./Univ. Med.
Ctr. v. Sullivan, 183 F.R.D. 135, 146 (D.N.J. 1998); Scarfo, 263
F.3d at 92. Here, Plaintiff requests an order preventing
Defendants from “submit[ting] negative information to anyone
that may hinder [Plaintiff’s] chances” of securing a new
apartment. (Pl. Mot. at 11.) Such an order would be “a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression” and unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 91.
10.
Plaintiff does not seek to restrict speech that has a
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to this
proceeding, id. at 93 (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501
U.S. 1030 (1991)), nor does she seek to prohibit dissemination
of confidential information. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to gain a
private benefit by restricting the free speech of Defendants,
without serving any articulable public interest. The requested
gag order would prevent the dissemination of any “negative
information” about Plaintiff, even if that information were
truthful. Defendants, like all citizens, are subject to
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defamation laws, which should adequately protect Plaintiff’s
interests. Plaintiff has not identified any harm sufficient to
support a prior restraint on Defendants’ speech.
11.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a stay of
state-court eviction proceedings and denies Plaintiff’s motion
for a gag order against Defendants. An accompanying Order will
be entered.
June 19, 2014
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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