GILLIE v. ESPOSITO et al

Filing 51

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/26/2019. (rss,)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________
DONTA TYRONE GILLIE,

Plaintiff,
v.

STEVEN ESPOSITO, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________

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THE HONORABLE RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Civ. No. 14-3704 (RMB-JS)

OPINION

BUMB, United States District Judge
On June 10, 2014, Plaintiff Donta Tyrone Gillie, a prisoner
formerly confined at FCI-Fort Dix, New Jersey, filed a civil
complaint against Steven Esposito, Pradip Patel, and Abigail Lopez
de Lasalle in their individual capacities as employees of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (ECF No. 1). The Court initially
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment, but Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint
raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (ECF
No. 15). The Court permitted the amended complaint to proceed, and
counsel was appointed.
On December 11, 2018, the Honorable Jerome B. Simandle,
D.N.J., granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction under the FTCA.1 (ECF No. 44). Plaintiff now moves
for reconsideration of that order. (ECF No. 45). The United States
opposes the motion. (ECF No. 49). For the reasons stated below,
the Court denies the motion for reconsideration.
I.

BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court

against Steven Esposito, Pradip Patel, and Abigail Lopez de Lasalle
in their individual capacities as BOP employees. (ECF No. 1). The
Court administratively terminated the complaint on July 14, 2014
after

denying

Plaintiff’s

in

forma

pauperis

application

and

instructing the Clerk to send a new form to Plaintiff. (ECF No.
2). The Court reopened the matter on April 21, 2015 after receiving
a new in forma pauperis application, (ECF No. 3), but the notice
of electronic filing was returned as undeliverable on May 4, 2015,
(ECF No. 4). The Court therefore administratively terminated the
complaint on May 28, 2015 under Local Civil Rule 10.1. (ECF No.
5). The Court reopened the proceedings when Plaintiff provided his
new address. (ECF No. 6).
The complaint alleged that Plaintiff received inadequate
medical care for an injured wrist while he was detained at Fort
Dix. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). The Court concluded in its screening opinion
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim

1

The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 7, 2019.
(ECF No. 50).
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for relief under the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 11). It noted that
“[t]o the extent the complaint could be construed as raising claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (‘FTCA’),” the Court could not
conclude

whether

jurisdiction

would

be

appropriate

because

Plaintiff had not provided information as to whether he had
exhausted the FTCA’s administrative remedies. (Id. at 12-13). The
complaint was dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 12). The Court
granted Plaintiff leave to amend in the event he could show he had
exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id.).
Plaintiff submitted his motion to amend on April 15, 2016.
(ECF No. 15). The Court permitted the amended complaint to proceed
on December 22, 2016 as Plaintiff submitted documentation that he
had completed the FTCA’s administrative remedies. (ECF Nos. 17 &
18). Magistrate Judge Schneider granted Plaintiff’s motion for the
appointment of counsel on December 5, 2017. (ECF No. 28).
The United States filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his FTCA claim before filing his original
complaint. (ECF No. 35) Alternatively, it argued the FTCA claim
was

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations.

(Id.).

The

Court

concluded that Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies
but was barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 43). It
rejected Plaintiff’s argument that it had tolled the statute of
limitations when it permitted the amended complaint containing the
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FTCA claim to proceed. (Id. at 14-15).
Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of that order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The United States opposes
the motion. The Court considers the motion on the papers without
oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).
II.

DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that “[a]

motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28
days after the entry of the judgment.” Petitioner’s motion was
timely.
When a party seeks reconsideration of a judgment, the judgment
may be altered or amended if the party seeking
reconsideration shows at least one of the
following grounds: (1) an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) the availability
of new evidence that was not available when
the court granted the motion for summary
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.
Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). Disagreement
is not an appropriate basis for reconsideration. United States v.
Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff asserts his claim under the third prong, the
need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest
injustice. (ECF No. 45-1 at 10). He argues the Court overlooked
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the judicial delay between when he filed his in forma pauperis
application on August 11, 2014 and when the Court reopened his
case on April 21, 2015. (ECF No. 45-1 at 10). “From August 2014 to
April 2015, Plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, believed he had viable
legal claims against the FBOP and others for his damages once the
Court reinstated his action, and there was no need or reason to
take any further action until this Court in fact notified him that
his case had been reinstated.” (Id.). “But for the Court’s lengthy
delay in reinstating his complaint, Plaintiff may very well have
been able to timely amend his complaint with a claim under the
FTCA.” (Id.).
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The
procedural history and relevant dates were obviously known to the
Court prior to its decision, and any delay in reopening the case
for consideration of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims had no
effect on Plaintiff’s ability to submit an amended complaint once
his FTCA exhaustion was complete. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)
(permitting a party to amend their pleading once as a matter of
course).

The

administrative

BOP’s
claim

October

15,

specifically

2014

denial

stated

of

that

Plaintiff’s
if

he

was

“dissatisfied with this decision, [he could] bring an action
against the United States in an appropriate United States District
Court within six (6) months of the date of this memorandum.” (ECF
No. 19 at 16). Plaintiff was on notice that if he wanted to pursue
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a FTCA claim he had to do so within six months. The Court is not
responsible for Plaintiff’s inaction.
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

discussed

above,

Plaintiff

has

not

established the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent

manifest

injustice.

Therefore,

the

Court

denies

Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e).
An appropriate order follows.

Dated August 26, 2019
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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