HANN v. SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 7/6/16. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
DARRELL K. HANN,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 14-3752 (RBK) (AMD)
:
v.
:
:
SOUTHWOODS STATE PRISON, et al.
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff is a state inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Previously, this matter was administratively terminated as plaintiff had not
paid the filing fee nor had he submitted a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Subsequently, plaintiff submitted another application to proceed in forma pauperis such that the
Clerk will be ordered to reopen this case. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
will be granted based on the information provided therein and the Clerk will be ordered to file
the complaint.
At this time, this Court must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A with respect to plaintiff to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the following reasons, the
complaint will be dismissed.
II.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this screening
Opinion. Plaintiff names three defendants in his complaint: (1) South Woods State Prison; (2)
Several New Jersey DOC Locations; (3) State of New Jersey DOC.
Plaintiff alleges that he had an appointment with an eye doctor in January, 2013. He
claims that she made a final statement that nothing was wrong with his eyes despite never giving
him an eye examination.
Subsequently, on November 29, 2013, plaintiff had another eye appointment with a state
doctor Bonnia. Plaintiff claims that he was sexually harassed during this eye exam when Bonnia
told him that he liked him and kept on touching his shoulder. Plaintiff states that Bonnia told him
that he had no medical condition and no need for eye treatment despite the fact that plaintiff
could not see the letters on the eye chart.
On April 28, 2014, a female eye doctor cancelled plaintiff’s eye appointment for that day.
Plaintiff claims that the institution is trying to have plaintiff see Bonnia.
Plaintiff states that he is afraid he will become permanently blind but that the state has
taken no action.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
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judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66
to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's
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screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the named defendants in this action.
The Department of Corrections is not a “person” subject to Section 1983 liability. See Tulli–
Makowski v. Community Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 12–6091, 2013 WL 1987219, at *3 (D.N.J. May
13, 2013) (citing Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J.
1989)); see also Nadal v. Christie, No. 13–5447, 2014 WL 2812164, at *4 (D.N.J. June 23,
2014). Additionally, the South Woods State Prison also is not a “person” subject to Section 1983
liability. See Owens v. Armstrong, No. 15-4911, 2016 WL 1117945, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 22,
2016) (citation omitted). Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against the named
defendants in this action such that the claims against them will be dismissed with prejudice.
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While not named in the caption of the complaint, plaintiff may also be attempting to
assert claims against the unnamed doctor he saw in January, 2013, as well as Bonnia, who he
saw in November, 2013. This Court construes the complaint as attempting to allege a failure to
provide adequate medical care claim against the unnamed doctor as well as Bonnia.
For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those
needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)). We have found deliberate indifference where a prison
official: “(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182
F.3d at 197. Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any
attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular
course of treatment... (which) remains a question of sound
professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Allegations of negligent treatment or
medical malpractice do not trigger constitutional protections.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013). Deliberate indifference can also be found
“where the prison official persists in a course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury.” See McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App’x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “A medical need is serious if it ‘has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment,’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.’” See Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir.
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2012) (quoting Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth
Cnty. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987))).
The allegations of the complaint fail to state a Section 1983 claim against this unnamed
doctor. While the allegations state that she did not conduct an eye examination on plaintiff,
plaintiff does not allege that she knew of plaintiff’s necessary need for an eye examination, and
that by her failure to provide an eye examination, she was being deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Thus, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to state a clam.
With respect to Bonnia, plaintiff admits in his complaint that he conducted an eye
examination on plaintiff in November, 2013. Plaintiff states that despite not being able to see the
letters on the chart, Bonnia determined that he has no medical condition nor need for eye
treatment. These allegations also fail to state a Section 1983 medical care claim against Bonnia.
Plaintiff’s disagreement with Bonnia’s medical diagnosis does not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 F. App'x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating that complaint that alleges physician was negligent in diagnosing and treating a medical
condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment and that mere disagreement as to
proper medical treatment does not support a claim of inadequate medical mistreatment to support
a constitutional claim); Smith v. O'Boyle, 251 F. App'x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Because a
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment for a prisoner is insufficient to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation, the District Court properly dismissed Smith's complaint.”) (citing
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). At most, plaintiff's allegations only rise to
the level of medical malpractice, which is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate
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indifference to a serious medical need claim. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235 (“Allegations of
medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”).
Plaintiff may also be asserting a sexual harassment claim against Bonnia based on the
allegations of his complaint. As one Court in this District has noted:
Several circuits have found that sexual abuse may violate
contemporary standards of decency and therefore meet the first
requirement of an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Boxer X
v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir.2006); Jackson v.
Madery, 158 Fed. App'x. 656, 662 (6th Cir.2005); Barney v.
Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir.1998); Boddie v.
Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir.1997). However, such abuse
must be “severe or repetitive.” Boddie, 105 F.3d at 862. Isolated
incidents of verbal harassment or touching do not constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation. See Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1111 (“a
female prison guard's solicitation of a male prisoner's manual
masturbation, even under threat of reprisal, does not present more
than de minimis injury”); Jackson, 158 Fed. App'x. at 661–62
(rubbing and grabbing prisoner's buttocks by corrections officer
held to be “isolated, brief, and not severe”); Berryhill v. Schiro,
137 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.1998) (brief touch to prisoner's
buttocks by civilian prison official not a sexual assault under the
Eighth Amendment); Boddie, 105 F.3d at 862 (isolated incidents
where female corrections officer verbally harassed male prisoner,
touched his penis, and pressed against him with her breasts found
“despicable ... [b]ut [ ] do not involve a harm of federal
constitutional proportions.”).
Pantusco v. Sorrell, No. CIV. 09-3518, 2011 WL 2148392, at *7 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011). Indeed,
in a more recent, albeit unpublished case, a panel of the Third Circuit noted as follows as well:
While it is possible for sexual abuse of a prisoner to violate the
Eighth Amendment, see Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861
(2d Cir.1997), a small number of incidents in which a prisoner is
verbally harassed, touched, and pressed against without his consent
do not amount to such a violation. Id. Rather, “isolated episodes of
harassment and touching ... are despicable and, if true, they may
potentially be the basis of state tort actions. But they do not
involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions as defined by
the Supreme Court.” Id.
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Obiegbu v. Werlinger, 581 F. App'x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2014). In this case, plaintiff alleges one
incident where Bonnia purportedly touched him on the shoulder and told him that he liked him.
This event, at most, constitutes an isolated incident that did not violate plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to defendants the
South Woods State Prison, Several New Jersey DOC and the State of New Jersey DOC.
Plaintiff’s claims against the unnamed eye doctor he saw in January, 2013, and Bonnia are
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff shall be given thirty days in
which to file a proposed all-inclusive amended complaint should he elect to do so that corrects
the deficiencies of the complaint as to his claims that were dismissed without prejudice only.
DATED: July 6, 2016
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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