GRANDIZIO v. SMITH et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 1/5/2015. (dmr)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
(Doc. No. 15)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
_________________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JOSEPH SMITH, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ :
JOHN J. GRANDIZIO,
Civil No. 14-3868 (RBK/KMW)
OPINION
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Before the Court are the motions of Defendants Joseph Smith (“Smith”), Matthew
Minutolo (“Minutolo”), Richard Henry (“Henry”), Daniel Aparicio (“Aparicio”) (collectively the
“Officer Defendants”), and the Borough of Stone Harbor (the “Borough”) (collectively
“Defendants”) to dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff John Grandizio (“Plaintiff”) as to the
Borough pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter arises out of the alleged altercation between Plaintiff and Defendants on May
25, 2013, outside of the 96th Street Pub in Stone Harbor, NJ. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17.) At the time of
the incident, Defendants Smith and Minutolo were police officers with the Borough (Compl. ¶¶
6-7), and Defendants Henry and Aparicio were special law enforcement officers with the
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Borough (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10). As Plaintiff and his girlfriend exited the 96th Street Pub in order to
“avoid a physical confrontation as a visibly intoxicated patron had begun making unwanted
sexual advances on [Plaintiff’s girlfriend],” they walked past Aparicio and Henry, who were
located at the front entrance. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Smith and Minutolo arrived at the 96th Street Pub
after Plaintiff and his girlfriend had left. (Compl. ¶ 16.) After Plaintiff and his girlfriend had
walked down the street, they were approached by “several officers, suddenly and without
warning.” (Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was picked up and dragged away, “struck repeatedly about
the head and face, wrestled into a submission hold, and at some point Plaintiff was placed into
handcuffs.” (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff lost consciousness, and when he regained it, he was in
the rear cargo section of a police vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff was transported to police
headquarters, where he was charged with disorderly conduct, and then released from custody.
(Compl. ¶¶ 20-21.) The next day, Plaintiff went to Cape Regional Medical Center for treatment
of his injuries. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff pled guilty to the disorderly persons offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2(a), on December 23, 2013. (Ex. 1 to Def.’s Br., Municipal Court Transcript of
Plaintiff’s Guilty Plea.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 17, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) Against the Officer
Defendants, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure of his person
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983(Count I), assault (Count II), battery (Count III), and false
imprisonment (Count IV). Against the Borough, Plaintiff alleges municipal liability pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V) and liability based on a respondeat superior theory for the assault,
battery, and false imprisonment claims (Count VI). Defendants filed the instant motion to
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dismiss and for summary judgment on August 6, 2014. (Doc. No. 15.) Defendants seek to
dismiss Counts V and VI against the Borough, and summary judgment as to Count IV.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather
than plausible. Id.
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A genuine dispute
of material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the Court
weighs the evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the party moving
for summary judgment. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir.
1996). The moving party may satisfy its burden either by “produc[ing] evidence showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact” or by “‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district
court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325.
If the party seeking summary judgment makes this showing, it is left to the nonmoving
party to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, to
survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Furthermore, “[w]hen opposing
summary judgment, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify
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those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’” Corliss v.
Varner, 247 F. App’x. 353, 354 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2007) (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v.
Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002)).
In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the Court’s role is not
to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province
of the fact finder, not the district court. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
A motion for summary judgment may be filed “at any time until 30 days after the close of
all discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). The Third Circuit has held that “where the facts are in
possession of the moving party a continuance of a motion for summary judgment for purposes of
discovery should be granted almost as a matter of course.” Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49, 51 (3d
Cir. 1984) (quoting Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1973)) (finding that the
district court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment where plaintiffs’
interrogatories pertinent to the dispute remained unanswered by defendants). However, a motion
for summary judgment is not premature per se where it is filed before the close of discovery.
See Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that a motion for summary
judgment made two weeks before close of discovery was not premature where plaintiff did not
seek to conduct additional discovery or argue that particular facts needed to oppose the motion
would be forthcoming were she permitted to conduct more discovery).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. False Imprisonment – Count IV
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Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against
the Officer Defendants. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, although the motion was
filed before the close of discovery, it is not premature. Plaintiff argues generally that “there are
numerous, highly material facts in dispute,” and “there has not been adequate time for
discovery.” (Pl.s’ Br. 5.) However, Plaintiff does not explain what information is required and
why the missing information would be necessary to adequately oppose the motion. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d). Nor does Plaintiff contend that Defendants possess facts needed to oppose the
motion. Rather, the substance of Plaintiff’s opposition rests on the merits of the motion.
Therefore, the Court finds it proper to consider Defendants’ motion at this time.
Defendants argue that the presence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a false
imprisonment claim, and that Plaintiff’s guilty plea for the disorderly conduct offense with which
he was charged establishes probable cause as a matter of law. (Def.’s Br. 9-10.) Plaintiff does
not dispute that he pled guilty to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). (Pl.’s Br. 2.)1 Rather, he argues that the
disorderly persons offense that he was charged with only allows for the issuance of a summons;
therefore his arrest was improper, and the guilty plea does not bar the false imprisonment claim.
(Pl.’s Br. 5-6.)
1
Local Rule 56.1(a) requires that the movant furnish a statement of material facts not in dispute, in a document
separate from his brief. L. Civ. R. 56.1(a). As the rule itself so provides, a defendant’s failure to submit a Rule 56.1
statement is grounds for dismissal. However, a court may excuse the absence of the statement where the
requirements as to the substance of the statement are met. See, e.g., Schecter v. Schecter, No. 07-419, 2008 WL
5054343 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2008). Courts also decline to deny such motions where there is no evidence of bad faith
on the part of the moving party. See Gabriel v. Safeway, Inc., No. 10-2256, 2011 WL 5864033, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov.
21, 2011) (choosing not to deny a motion for summary judgment for failure to submit a Rule 56.1 statement where
there was “no evidence of bad faith . . . [,] Defendants’ factual representations [were] well-organized, and Plaintiff
was able to address each factual assertion in an orderly manner”). Here, although Defendants failed to file a
separate Rule 56.1 statement, Defendants’ brief includes a “Statement of Relevant Facts,” set forth in separately
enumerated paragraphs, with a citation to the record following each statement. (Def.’s Br. 2-5.) Plaintiff responded
to each paragraph in his opposition brief. (Pl.’s Br. 2.) Therefore, the Court will excuse Defendants’ failure to
strictly comply with Rule 56.1, as the requirements of the substance of the statement have been met.
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A common law claim for false imprisonment requires the plaintiff to show that he was (1)
arrested or detained against his will (2) without proper legal authority or justification. Leang v.
Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 591 (2009). Probable cause is an absolute defense to the
tort of false imprisonment in New Jersey. D’Arrigo v. Glaucester City, No. 04-5967, 2007 WL
1755970, at *8 n.12 (D.N.J. June 19, 2007) (citing Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J.
375 (2000)). Furthermore, the Third Circuit has recognized that “a guilty plea—even one for a
lesser offense—does not permit a later assertion of no probable cause.” Walker v. Clearfield
Cnty. Dist. Attorney, 413 Fed. App’x 481, 483 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is therefore
appropriate here, as there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. Given his undisputed guilty
plea, Plaintiff does not have a viable claim for false imprisonment as a matter of law. See
McGann v. Collingswood Police Dep’t, No. 10-3458, 2012 WL 6568397, at *10 & n.11 (D.N.J.
Dec. 17, 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims failed because
of plaintiff’s guilty plea); Ferry v. Barry, No. 12-009, 2012 WL 4339454, at *5 (D.N.J.
September 19, 2012) (same).2, 3
B. Municipal Liability under Section 1983 – Count V
A plaintiff may not hold a municipal entity liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
2
The Court notes that it relies on cases that have interpreted Walker in the context of claims for false imprisonment
pursuant to § 1983. However, the Court finds no meaningful distinction between the common law claim for false
imprisonment and a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. See Wildoner, 162 N.J. at 389 (finding that probable
cause is an absolute defense to plaintiff’s common law and § 1983 false imprisonment claims); Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that, pursuant to § 1983, “an arrest based on probable cause
[cannot] become the source of a claim for false imprisonment”).
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Plaintiff’s argument that summary judgment is not appropriate because he should have only been issued a
summons for his disorderly persons offense, and not arrested, has no merit. The Court agrees with Defendants that
Plaintiff’s interpretation of State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446 (2002), for this proposition is misplaced. Although
the Dangerfield court acknowledged that “the modern view favors the issuance of citations and summonses over
custodial arrests for minor offenses,” the court ultimately held that “we do not disturb the authority of the police to
arrest for disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses that occurred in their presence.” Id. at 460.
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Instead, a viable section 1983 municipal liability claim must include allegations that a
government entity has adopted a particular policy or custom, “whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,” and that such policy
or custom has been “the moving force” behind the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional
rights. Id. at 694. Municipal policy generally involves a “statement, ordinance, regulation, or
decision officially adopted and promulgated by [a local governing] body’s officers.” Simmons
v. City of Phila., 947 F.2d 1042, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). A
municipal custom, although lacking the formal approval of a policy, refers to those official
practices which are “so permanent and well settled . . . as to [have] the force of law.” Id. (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
To survive a motion to dismiss in this context, a plaintiff “must identify a custom or
policy, and specify what that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636,
658 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient
to impose liability under Monell” when the municipal actor does not have policymaking
authority. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see Ingram v. Twp. of
Deptford, 911 F. Supp. 2d 289, 302 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s complaint failed to
plead a Monell claim where plaintiff cited only one past incident of excessive force without
anything linking that incident with the case in dispute).
Under certain circumstances, a municipality’s failure to properly train its employees and
officers can amount to a “custom” that will trigger liability under section 1983. See City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However, such liability is reserved for cases in
which the failure to train evidences a “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of that
municipality’s inhabitants. Id. at 389. It is not enough to allege simply that a training program
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exists and that it has proved to be inadequate. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Rather, the
plaintiff’s burden is to “identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with
his or her injuries and . . . demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be
said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations
occurred.” Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference
may be established when a policymaker has knowledge of a “pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees” but takes no action to augment or alter the municipality’s
employee training programs accordingly. See Lapella v. City of Atlantic City, No. 10-2454,
2012 WL 2952411, at *7 (D.N.J. July 18, 2012) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1360 (2011)).
While the Supreme Court originally fashioned the “deliberate indifference” doctrine in
the context of a municipality’s alleged failure to properly train its police officers, the Third
Circuit has since adopted this standard in other policy and custom situations. Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996). In general, a municipality may be liable under
section 1983 if it tolerates known illegal conduct by its employees. Id. In such circumstances, it
can be said to have a custom that evidences deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens if
(1) policymakers were aware that municipal employees had deprived others of certain
constitutional rights in the past; (2) the municipality failed to take precautions against future
violations; and (3) this failure led, at least in part, to the plaintiff suffering the same deprivation
of rights. See id. (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990)). Thus, in the
context of a plaintiff who alleges that a municipal employee violated his Fourth Amendment
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure of his person, as Plaintiff
does here, he may state a section 1983 claim against the municipality itself if he alleges that
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employees had made such unreasonable searches and seizures in the past, that the municipality
was well aware of these occurrences, that the municipality failed to take action to prevent future
violations, and that this failure contributed in part to the plaintiff being himself subjected to the
unconstitutional search and seizure.
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead factual grounds that permit the Court to draw a
reasonable inference that the Borough maintained a policy or custom of depriving its citizens of
their constitutional rights. Plaintff’s Monell claim rests on the following allegations: (1) that the
Borough “developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of persons in the Borough,” which caused the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
rights (Compl. ¶ 34); (2) that the Borough had a policy and/or custom of “fail[ing] to exercise
reasonable care in hiring its police officers,” including the Officer Defendants (Compl. ¶ 35); (3)
that it was the policy and/or custom of the Borough to “inadequately supervise and train its
police officers,” including the Officer Defendants (Compl. ¶ 36); (4) that as a result of these
polices and customs, Defendants “believed that their actions would not be properly monitored by
supervisory officers and that misconduct would not be investigated or sanctioned, but would be
tolerated (Compl. ¶ 37); and (5) that these policies and customs “demonstrate a deliberate
indifference” by the Borough to the constitutional rights of its citizens (Compl. ¶ 38).
Plaintiff may not simply include a Monell claim in his Complaint as a matter of course by
making the conclusory allegation that the alleged constitutional deprivations were due to a policy
or custom of the Borough. Rather, Plaintiff must allege some actual facts suggesting as much.
Plaintiff does not claim that the Borough lawmakers promulgated an official policy that led to
the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Nor does Plaintiff sufficiently allege
that the Borough maintained a custom that was the “moving force” behind the deprivation.
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Plaintiff does not contend that the Borough failed to take steps to correct any past constitutional
violations by officers; in fact, Plaintiff does not even allege that Borough police officers had
made any unreasonable searches and seizures in the past that the Borough would have the
responsibility of addressing. In short, Plaintiff has not specified what custom or policy of the
Borough led to Plaintiff’s alleged deprivations. See McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658.
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges failure to train, Plaintiff also fails to meet the pleading
standard. Plaintiff has not identified a failure to provide specific training, or identified any
shortcomings in any existing training programs, that caused the specific harm to the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s allegation that the failure to train “fail[ed] to adequately discourage further
constitutional violations” by police officers provides no factual support to establish a causal link
between the alleged insufficient training and the injury claimed by Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Nor
does Plaintiff allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. Thus,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his alleged injury was a result of the Borough’s failure to
train, and not the officers’ individual shortcomings. See Lapella v. City of Atlantic City, 2012
WL 2954111, at *8 (finding that plaintiff did not adequately plead a failure to train claim
because the complaint contained only conclusory allegations).
Finally, Plaintiff does not adequately allege deliberate indifference. Stating that the
Borough’s “policies and customs demonstrate a deliberate indifference” is merely a legal
conclusion, and does not suffice. (Compl. ¶ 38.) As noted supra, to show deliberate
indifference, Plaintiff’s Complaint must include factual allegations demonstrating a past
deprivation of constitutional rights that the Borough was aware of and declined to remedy, which
he has failed to do. Count V of Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed.
C. Respondeat Superior – Count VI
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Count VI of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises a respondeat superior theory of liability against
the Borough for the “assault, battery, and false imprisonment committed against Plaintiff” by the
officer Defendants, as the officers committed the assault, battery, and false imprisonment “while
acting in the scope of their employment” with the Borough.4 (Compl. ¶ 40.) Defendants argue
that the Borough is immune from liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”) on
the assault and battery claims because these are intentional torts. (Def.’s Br. 14-15.) Plaintiff
argues that Count VI alleges a violation of the New Jersey Constitution, and thus the intentional
tort immunity of the NJTCA is inapplicable. (Pl.’s Br. 9-10.)
The NJTCA provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an
act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-2.
However, an exception exists for public entities where the act or omission of the employee
constitutes “a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-10.
Assault and battery are torts that necessitate a showing of intentional or willful misconduct, and
thus the Borough is immune from liability for the assault and battery claims. See Merman v.
City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581, 597 (D.N.J. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims that the
city was vicariously liable for the alleged assault and battery by the city’s police officers based
on immunity under the NJTCA). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument that his assault and battery
claims are actually state constitutional claims is unconvincing. First of all, the New Jersey
Constitution is not mentioned at all in Count VI. Secondly, insofar as Plaintiff does allege a
violation of the New Jersey Constitution in his Complaint, he specifically invokes Article I,
4
As discussed in Section III (A), supra, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on the false
imprisonment claim, and thus it need not address the false imprisonment claim in the context of the motion to
dismiss.
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Section 7, which provides for freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
This provision does not provide constitutional protection from the common law torts of assault
and battery. Therefore, Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim against the Borough for assault and
battery must be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count IV
is granted. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V against the Borough is dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to cure the
deficiencies noted herein within the requisite time period stated in the Order accompanying this
Opinion. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven when a plaintiff does
not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”) Count VI
against the Borough is dismissed with prejudice, as the Court finds that the Borough’s immunity
from suit renders an amendment futile. An appropriate order shall issue.
Dated: 1/5/2015
s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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