RODRIGUEZ-RAMOS v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al
Filing
19
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/15/2015. (tf,n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., :
:
Respondents.
:
___________________________________:
JOSE LUIS RODRIGUEZ-RAMOS,
Civ. No. 14-3942 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Jose Luis Rodriguez-Ramos, #03971-029
FCI Fort Dix
P.O. Box 2000
Fort Dix, NJ 08640
Petitioner, pro se
Frances C. Bajada
Office of the U.S. Attorney
970 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Respondents
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner, Jose Luis Rodriguez-Ramos, a federal prisoner
confined at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Fort
Dix, New Jersey, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking restoration of
approximately 200 days of Good Conduct Time credit. (ECF No. 1).
This case was previously administratively terminated for
failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement. (ECF No. 3).
Petitioner then filed an in forma pauperis application and an
Amended Petition (ECF No. 4).
The Court granted Petitioner’s in
forma pauperis application and required Respondents to submit an
Answer. (ECF No. 7).
Thereafter, on or about December 23, 2014,
Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition. (ECF No. 10).
Respondents filed a Response to the Second Amended Petition on
February 4, 2015. (ECF No. 15).
Petitioner filed a Reply on or
about February 20, 2015. (ECF No. 17).
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition will be
denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced in the United
States District Court for the District of Iowa to 260 months’
imprisonment for Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with
Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
After his
arrival at Fort Dix, Petitioner refused to participate in the
Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) General Education Degree (“GED”)
program.
As a result, on February 12, 2012, Petitioner was
placed in GED unsatisfactory status.
Prior to his placement in GED unsatisfactory status,
Petitioner was earning 54 days of Good Conduct Time (“GCT”) per
year.
After he was placed in unsatisfactory status, however,
Petitioner’s GCT was reduced to 42 days per year.
2
The parties are in agreement as to the events that
transpired up until the filing of the instant § 2241 habeas
petition. (Pet’r’s Reply 2, ECF No. 17) (“Petitioner is in total
agreement with Respondent’s time-line o[f] events, only up to
Petitioner’s original June 9, 2014 § 2241 petition[.]”)
(emphasis omitted).
Petitioner first filed a Request for Administrative Remedy
with the Warden of FCI Fort Dix on February 12, 2014. (Resp’t’s
Br. 8, ECF No. 15).
At that time, Petitioner sought 54 days of
GCT if it was determined that a learning disability was
preventing him from completing the GED program. (Id.).
The
Warden denied Petitioner’s request on March 11, 2014 and
explained that Petitioner’s GCT was reduced to 42 days per year
because Petitioner refused to participate in the GED program.
Petitioner then filed a Regional Administrative Remedy
Appeal on March 17, 2014 and argued that, because he is a
deportable alien, he is not required to take the GED class.
(Resp’t’s Br. 9, ECF No. 15).
On April 24, 2014, the Regional
Director denied Petitioner’s appeal and again explained that
Petitioner would earn only 42 GCT days annually because he
refused to participate in the GED program. (Id.).
Although the parties agree that Petitioner filed the
instant petition on June 9, 2014, they disagree as to when, and
how, Petitioner continued to pursue his administrative remedies.
3
Respondents contend that Petitioner did not file an appeal of
the Regional Director’s response until August 18, 2014.
(Resp’t’s Br. 9, ECF No. 15).
Petitioner, however, contends
that he filed the instant petition after he submitted his appeal
to the Central Office — thus, he asserts his appeal was filed
prior to June 9, 2014. (Pet’r’s Reply 3, ECF No. 17).
In any
event, both parties agree that, to date, no response has been
received from the Central Office.
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that his GCT was
“illegally, and unconstitutionally, deducted from him.” (Am.
Pet. 8, ECF No. 10).
Petitioner explains that he is subject to
deportation upon completion of his sentence and, as a result, he
contends he is not required to participate in the GED program.
Accordingly, Petitioner states that he should receive 54 GCT
days annually and he seeks restoration of “approximately, two
hundred (200) days” of GCT. (Id.).
In their responsive brief, Respondents explain that
Petitioner is not subject to any final order of removal.
Therefore, they contend that Petitioner must participate in the
GED program in order to receive 54 days of GCT per year.
(Resp’t’s Br. 13, ECF No. 15).
Respondents note that it is
unclear how Petitioner calculated a loss of 200 days of GCT and
they speculate that Petitioner may have calculated a projected
loss for the remainder of his 260 months’ imprisonment.
4
Further, Respondents assert that Petitioner has no due process
liberty interest in the possibility of receiving 54 days of GCT
each year. (Resp’t’s Br. 15, ECF No. 15).
Finally, Respondents
contend that the Petition should be dismissed because Petitioner
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id.).
In his Reply brief, Petitioner asserts that he did, in
fact, exhaust his administrative remedies and he again argues
that he is exempt from participation in the GED program because
he is a deportable alien. (Pet’r’s Reply 1, ECF No. 17).
II.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND BOP POLICY
The computation of Petitioner’s GCT is governed by the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which
applies to inmates whose offenses were committed on or after
April 26, 1996.
The PLRA contains two literacy provisions.
The first is
mandatory and requires the BOP “to have in effect a mandatory
functional literacy program for all mentally capable inmates who
are not functionally literate in each Federal correctional
institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(f).
It further requires that
each program “shall include a requirement that each inmate
participate in such program for a mandatory period sufficient to
provide the inmate with an adequate opportunity to achieve
functional literacy, and appropriate incentives which lead to
successful completion of such programs shall be developed and
5
implemented.” Id.
In its implementing regulations, the BOP
requires an inmate “who does not have a verified General
Education Development (GED) credential or a high school diploma”
to “attend an adult literacy program for a minimum of 240
instructional hours or until a GED is achieved, whichever occurs
first.” 28 C.F.R. § 544.70.
The second literacy provision of the PLRA is non-mandatory
and it provides, in relevant part:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of
more than 1 year [,] ... may receive credit toward the
service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time
served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of
the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the
end of the first year of the term, subject to
determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during
that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations
... [I]f the Bureau determines that, during that year,
the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such
institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive
no such credit toward service of the prisoner's
sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the
Bureau determines to be appropriate. In awarding
credit under this section, the Bureau shall consider
whether the prisoner, during the relevant period, has
earned, or is making satisfactory progress toward
earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent
degree. Credit that has not been earned may not later
be granted. Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the
last year or portion of a year of the term of
imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the
last six weeks of the sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
6
The BOP has implemented regulations which govern the award
of GCT under § 3624(b)(1).
Specifically, for PLRA inmates, the
BOP will award:
(1) 54 days credit for each year served (prorated when
the time served by the inmate for the sentence during
the year is less than a full year) if the inmate has
earned or is making satisfactory progress toward
earning a GED credential or high school diploma; or
(2) 42 days credit for each year served (prorated when
the time served by the inmate for the sentence during
the year is less than a full year) if the inmate has
not earned or is not making satisfactory progress
toward earning a GED credential or high school
diploma.
28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c).
Additional BOP regulations explain what will constitute
“satisfactory progress toward earning a GED credential or high
school diploma” for a PLRA inmate:
(b) (1) For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3624, an inmate
subject to ... the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA) shall be deemed to be making satisfactory
progress toward earning a GED credential or high
school diploma unless and until the inmate receives a
progress assignment confirming that:
(i) The inmate refuses to enroll in the
literacy program;
(ii) The inmate has been found to have
committed a prohibited act that occurred in a
literacy program during the last 240
instructional hours of the inmate's most recent
enrollment in the literacy program; or
(iii) The inmate has withdrawn from the
literacy program.
(2) When an inmate subject to ... [the] PLRA
receives a progress assignment indicating that the
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inmate is not making satisfactory progress, the
assignment shall be changed to indicate
satisfactory progress only after the inmate is
currently and continuously enrolled in a literacy
program for a minimum of 240 instructional hours.
Any further withdrawal or finding that the inmate
has committed a prohibited act in a literacy
program during the last 240 instructional hours of
the inmate's most recent enrollment in the
literacy program shall result in a progress
assignment indicating that the inmate is again not
making satisfactory progress (see paragraphs
(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) of this section).
(c) At the end of 240 instructional hours, excluding
sick time, furloughs, or other absences from scheduled
classes, the unit team during scheduled program review
sessions shall meet with the inmate to encourage
continued participation in the literacy program until
the inmate earns a GED credential or high school
diploma. At these meetings, the inmate may elect not
to continue in the literacy program, and no
disciplinary action will be taken. The inmate may not
discontinue this program when participation is
mandated by statute.
28 CFR § 544.73(b)-(c).
Further, the BOP Program Statement 5250.28 instructs staff
to give an EDI GED Progress Assignment of “GED UNSAT” — for
unsatisfactory progress — to any inmate who:
•
refuses to enroll in the literacy program;
•
is found guilty of a violation in a literacy program.
The effective date of the EDI GED UNSAT Progress Assignment
is the date when the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) or
Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) finds the inmate guilty.
Once found guilty of a Prohibited Act that occurs in the
literacy program, he/she will have to complete another 240
instructional hours before he/she can have a GED SAT
Progress Assignment; or
8
•
drops out of the literacy program after 240 instructional
hours. The inmate may not be deemed to be making
satisfactory progress with respect to the VCCLEA and the
PLRA.
However, he/she will be deemed to meet the mandatory
literacy attendance (240 instructional hours) requirement.
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF
PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5350.28, LITERACY PROGRAM (GED
STANDARD), § 17.e(2), 31 (2003); see also
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5350_028.pdf.
III. DISCUSSION
In relevant part, § 2241 states that the writ of habeas
corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless “[h]e is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Additionally, a prisoner has a
liberty interest in GCT credits. Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140,
143 (3d Cir. 2013).
However, for the reasons set forth below,
Petitioner has not shown that the BOP has violated federal law
or his rights under the Constitution and, therefore, the
Petition must be denied.
A. Exhaustion
“Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust their
administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to § 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Vasquez v.
Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 2012).
9
As set forth above, the parties disagree as to when, and
how, Petitioner pursued his administrative appeal to the Central
Office.
Respondents maintain that Petitioner failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies because he did not properly file an
appeal until August 18, 2014.
Respondents cite to their Exhibit
4 in support of this contention. (Resp’t’s Br. 9, ECF No. 15).
However, unlike Respondents’ other Exhibits, Exhibit 4 is a not
a copy of Petitioner’s request and the BOP’s response.
Instead,
this document is titled “Administrative Remedy Generalized
Retrieval Full Screen Format.” (Decl. 16-18, Ex. 4, ECF No. 151).
In addition, there are three separate reports in Exhibit 4,
each of which references the receipt of Petitioner’s grievance
and its status.
In comparing these three documents with the
attachments petitioner provides in his Reply, it appears to the
Court that Petitioner first filed his appeal on May 5, 2014. See
(Decl. 16, Ex. 4, ECF No. 15-1) (“DATE RCV: 05-05-2014”);
(Pet’r’s Reply 8, ECF No. 17) (“DATE RECEIVED: May 5, 2014”).
Petitioner states that he then waited “at least, the
customary thirty (30) days” before filing the instant Petition
on June 9, 2014. (Pet’r’s Reply 3, ECF No. 17).
Presumably,
then, Petitioner interpreted the lack of response within 30 days
to be an effective denial of his request. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18
(“If the inmate does not receive a response within the time
allotted for reply, including extension, the inmate may consider
10
the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.”).
However, Petitioner’s expectation of a response within 30 days
was improper because, by statute, a response from a Central
Office appeal is made within 40 days. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.18
(“If accepted, a Request or Appeal is considered filed on the
date it is logged into the Administrative Remedy Index as
received.
Once filed, response shall be made by the Warden or
C[ommunity] C[orrections] M[anager] within 20 calendar days; by
the Regional Director within 30 calendar days; and by the
General Counsel within 40 calendar days.”) (emphasis added).
Regardless, it appears from the attachments to the parties’
submissions that Petitioner’s initial May 5, 2014 appeal was
rejected on June 30, 2014 (Decl. 16, Ex. 4, ECF No. 15-1)
(“STATUS DT: 06-30-2014”), and a Rejection Notice was sent to
Petitioner on July 1, 2014. (Pet’r’s Reply 8, ECF No. 17)
(“DATE: July 1, 2014”).
Petitioner explains in his Reply that,
on July 15, 2014, he resubmitted his appeal to the Central
Office along with copies of his lower level appeals, as
requested. (Pet’r’s Reply 3, ECF No. 17).
That appeal was received by the Central Office on July 21,
2014. See (Decl. 17, Ex. 4, ECF No. 15-1) (“DATE RCV: 07-212014”); (Pet’r’s Reply 9, ECF No. 17) (“DATE RECEIVED: July 21,
2014”).
However, that appeal, too, was rejected for want of
copies of Petitioner’s lower level appeals on July 29, 2014.
11
(Id.).
Petitioner states that he again resubmitted his appeal
with the requested documentation on August 8, 2014. (Pet’r’s
Reply 3, ECF No. 17).
That appeal was received on August 18,
2014 and was accepted by the Central Office. See (Decl. 18, Ex.
4, ECF No. 15-1) (“DATE RCV: 08-18-2014”).
A notice dated
September 11, 2014 confirmed to Petitioner that his appeal was
received and that a response was due to him by October 17, 2014.
See (Decl. 18, Ex. 4, ECF No. 15-1) (“RESP DUE: 10-17-2014”);
(Pet’r’s Reply 11, ECF No. 17) (“RESPONSE DUE: October 17,
2014”). 1
As set forth above, the parties are in agreement that,
to date, no response has been provided by the Central Office.
Having deciphered the procedural history of Petitioner’s
institutional appeals, it is apparent that Petitioner believed
his administrative remedies were exhausted at the time he filed
the initial § 2241 petition (ECF No. 1) on June 9, 2014.
mistaken.
He was
The appeal was not properly received by the Central
Office until July 21, 2014.
Regardless, because the Central
Office effectively denied his timely appeal by failing to
1
The Court notes that Plaintiff received an initial notice, also
dated September 11, 2014, which indicated a response deadline of
September 27, 2014. (Pet’r’s Reply 10, ECF No. 17) (“RESPONSE
DUE: September 27, 2014”). However, the second notice received
by Petitioner clearly indicates that an extension of time for
the response was granted and that the new due date was October
17, 2014. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion in his Reply
submission, the Court does not find the fact that both notices
were dated the same day to be “odd.” (Pet’r’s Reply 4, ECF No.
17).
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provide a response by the October 17, 2014 due date, see 28
C.F.R. § 542.18, Petitioner’s administrative remedies were fully
exhausted at the time he filed his Second Amended Petition (EFC
No. 10) on December 23, 2014.
Moreover, the Third Circuit has expressed that the purpose
for its exhaustion requirement is that:
(1) judicial review may be facilitated by allowing the
appropriate agency to develop a factual record and
apply its expertise, (2) judicial time may be
conserved because the agency might grant the relief
sought, and (3) administrative autonomy requires that
an agency be given an opportunity to correct its own
errors.
Arias v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 648 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1981)
(citing United States ex rel. Marrero v. Warden, Lewisburg
Penitentiary, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2532, 41 L.Ed.2d 383 (1974)).
In this case, each of the purported purposes of the exhaustion
requirement as explained by the Third Circuit has been served.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has stated that “[i]f a
petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to filing a § 2241 petition, the District Court may in its
discretion either excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the
merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative
remedies before proceeding in court.” Ridley v. Smith, 179 F.
App'x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Here, as set forth above, Petitioner’s claims were
13
ultimately exhausted — prior to the filing of his Second Amended
Petition.
Therefore, Petitioner will be permitted to proceed
before this Court.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Respondents’ argument that
the Petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
The merits of the Petitioner will be
discussed below.
B. Merits
Here, Petitioner’s GCT is being calculated pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3624, 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c), 28 C.F.R. § 544.73(b)-(c),
and BOP Program Statement 5350.28.
The BOP’s application of its
regulations is entitled to deference from this Court. See
Livingood v. Longley, No. 11-19, 2012 WL 1247120, at *6 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 13, 2012) (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)),
aff'd sub nom. Livengood v. Bureau of Prisons, 503 F. App'x 104
(3d Cir. 2012).
Based on the facts of this case, as detailed
below, Petitioner has not shown that the BOP has violated any
federal law or his rights under the Constitution.
1. PETITIONER MUST RECEIVE SATISFACTORY STATUS IN THE GED
PROGRAM TO RECEIVE 54 DAYS OF GCT CREDIT
As set forth above, the award of GCT credit is controlled
by 28 C.F.R. § 523.20.
Of particular relevance to Petitioner’s
argument, the statute directs that
14
an alien who is subject to a final order of removal,
deportation, or exclusion is eligible for, but is not
required to, participate in a literacy program, or to
be making satisfactory progress toward earning a
General Educational Development (GED) credential, to
be eligible for a yearly award of good conduct time.
28 C.F.R. § 523.20(d).
Petitioner concedes that there is no final order of removal
pending against him.
Nevertheless, he contends that, because he
is a deportable alien, and because “it is certain, and without a
doubt, that [he] will, indeed, be deported, upon his release
from incarceration[,]” he is not required to participate in the
literacy program to be eligible for a yearly award of 54 days of
GCT. (Am. Pet. 7, ECF No. 10).
In his Reply brief, Petitioner
elaborates on this claim and argues that, although he is a
deportable alien, he will not be issued a final order of removal
until he completes his current sentence. (Pet’r’s Reply 5, ECF
No. 17).
Thus, Petitioner describes the situation as a
“conundrum” or “Catch 22.” (Id.).
Respondents state simply that there is no final order of
removal for Petitioner; therefore, by statute, he must
participate and make satisfactory progress in the GED program to
receive GCT at a rate of 54 days annually. (Resp’t’s Br. 13, ECF
No. 15).
The Court is in agreement.
The Court certainly respects and understands Petitioner’s
frustration with the fact that his options are limited to
15
participation in a U.S. based GED program to receive GCT when he
ultimately may be deported from this country upon completion of
his sentence.
Indeed, as Petitioner points out, the BOP has
proposed an amendment to its rules regarding GCT which will
provide more effective and practical literacy programs to the
specialized needs of inmates like Petitioner. GOOD CONDUCT TIME:
ALTERNATIVE ADULT LITERACY PROGRAMS, 80 FR 1380-01 (Jan. 9, 2015).
Specifically, the proposed changes will allow certain inmates to
participate in “authorized alternative adult literacy programs”
and, thus, they will not need to demonstrate satisfactory
progress toward earning a GED to receive maximum GCT credit. Id.
at *1380.
However, these are merely proposed changes and, as such,
are not controlling in this case.
The fact remains that a
federal inmate who is not subject to final order of removal must
make satisfactory progress toward earning a GED to earn 54 days
of GCT, even if he is a “sentenced deportable alien” and, as a
corollary, is not required to participate in literacy program.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b); 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.20(c)(1, 2), (d),
544.71(a)(3), 544.73(c); De La Cruz v. Zickefoose, 450 F. App'x
123 (3d Cir. 2011).
16
Thus, even assuming that Petitioner in this case is a
“sentenced deportable alien 2,” he is not subject to a final order
of removal.
Accordingly, he must make satisfactory progress
toward earning his GED in order to receive 54 days of GCT each
year. De La Cruz, 450 F. App'x 123.
2. NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION
A court in this district succinctly addressed the question
of whether a due process rights violation had occurred when a
petitioner lost the ability to earn the maximum amount of GCT
days:
Finally, petitioner argues that his due process rights
were violated. Petitioner claims that he was entitled
to notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect
to the deprivation of his liberty interest to earn
good time credits. (See Dkt. No. 1 at p. 6.)
Nevertheless, petitioner fails to show that his due
process rights were violated. Indeed, “although the
Supreme Court has found that the loss of good conduct
time entitles a prisoner to appropriate due process,
see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–57, 94 S.Ct.
2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), [p]etitioner has no
liberty interest in the opportunity to earn good
conduct time.” Livingood, 2012 WL 1247120, at *7
(citing Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.
1995); Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380 (11th
Cir.1991); see also Shockley v. Hosterman, No. 07–216,
2007 WL 1810480, at *3 (D. Del. June 22, 2007) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause does not guarantee the right to
earn good-time credits.”) (citing Abdul–Akbar v. Dep't
2
A “sentenced deportable alien” is defined as an inmate who is
either (1) “assigned a Public Safety Factor ‘H’ status of
‘Alien’” or (2) “under a final Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (BICE) (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS)) order of deportation, exclusion, or removal.”
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5350.28, LITERACY PROGRAM (GED
STANDARD), § 9(c), 10 (2003).
17
of Corr., 910 F. Supp. 986, 1003 (D. Del. 1995)). In
this case, petitioner's good time credits were not
taken away, instead, petitioner simply lost the
ability to earn an additional twelve days of good time
credits by voluntarily withdrawing from the GED
program.
Colon v. Zickefoose, No. 12-3433, 2013 WL 6497957, at *6 (D.N.J.
Dec. 11, 2013).
As with the petitioner in Colon, Petitioner in this case
was not sanctioned with the loss of GCT days.
Rather, he lost
the ability to earn 54 days annually when he refused to
participate in the GED program.
Accordingly, there has been no
due process violation. See Livengood v. Bureau of Prisons, 503
F. App'x 104, 107 (3d Cir. 2012) (reduction in GCT earning rate
due to GED unsatisfactory status was not a violation of
constitutional due process); Colon, No. 12-3433, 2013 WL 6497957
(same).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s request for a
writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
An appropriate Order will follow.
____s/ Noel L. Hillman____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: October 15, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey
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