COWARD v. WARREN
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 6/23/2014. (nz, )N.M.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES L. COWARD, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-0100(NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Charles L. Coward
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Edith Coward
518 Sadlers Terrace-A 1
Lawnside, NJ 08045
Plaintiffs pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Charles L. Coward (“Plaintiff”), 2 a prisoner
1
Incorrectly identified on the Docket as “Sdlers Terrace.” The
Clerk is directed to correct the misspelling.
2 Although the caption of the Complaint identifies Charles L.
Coward and Edith Coward as co-plaintiffs, Edith Coward is not
further mentioned in the Complaint, nor does the Complaint
assert any facts plausibly giving rise to a claim by Edith
confined at New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey,
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. 3
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in
forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison
conditions).
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from
Coward, nor has she paid a filing fee or submitted an
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, nor did she
sign the Complaint. Accordingly, this Court will dismiss with
prejudice all claims purportedly asserted by Edith Coward.
3
This matter previously was administratively terminated for
failure to prepay the filing fee or submit a complete
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff
has now submitted additional information. Based on his
affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying
dismissals within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and will order the Clerk of the Court to
reopen this matter and to file the Complaint.
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of
this review.
Plaintiff alleges that when he was arrested on
November 12, 2011 he advised jail officials that he had
overdosed on medication in an attempt to kill himself.
He
states that he was taken to the hospital where he was admitted
and treated for four days.
Plaintiff further alleges that when
he was returned to Camden County Jail on November 16, 2011 he
was placed in the mental health unit where he again attempted to
commit suicide and began to smear feces on himself and on the
walls of the cell.
He states that he was dragged from the cell,
handcuffed and shackled, and placed in the shower, then dragged
back to the cell and handcuffed and shackled to the bed.
He
states that “this” was repeated several times over three days.
Plaintiff does not identify the person or persons who took these
actions.
Plaintiff states that on or about November 20, 2011 he was
placed in a restraint chair by Officer Radlinger and Officer
Sweeten.
Plaintiff states that Sgt. H. Sweeten, 4 Lt. Vernon,
Officer Coan, psychologist Lisa Fields, and nurse Ellen Green 5
were also present.
He states that “Lisa Green” (presumably Lisa
4
It appears from Plaintiff’s factual recitation that Officer
Sweeten and Sgt. H. Sweeten are two different individuals.
5
Ms. Green is not named as a defendant.
3
Fields) injected him with medication that made him tired.
Plaintiff states that he was then dragged out of the chair
to the cell and handcuffed and shackled to the bed, face down,
by Officer Radlinger and Officer Sweeten, while Lt. Vernon and
Sgt. Sweeten looked on.
Plaintiff contends that Sgt. Sweeten
told Officer Radlinger to “check him for contraband,” so Officer
Sweeten pulled out his flashlight while Officer Radlinger spread
open Plaintiff’s buttocks and began to look.
Plaintiff contends
that Officer Sweeten put a glove on the flashlight and put it in
Plaintiff’s anus, forcibly pushing.
Plaintiff asserts that Lisa
Fields, nurse Houston, 6 Lt. Vernon, Sgt. Sweeten, and Officer
Coan were present and watched, until nurse Houston stated that
she couldn’t watch this and she and Lisa Fields walked away.
Plaintiff further states that Lt. Vernon held a pellet gun and
told Plaintiff that if he moved “an eyelash,” he would put
fifteen pellets into Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts that he was
then left, shackled face-down to the bed, for three days, lying
in his own waste, during which time he was refused food or water
or use of the restroom.
Plaintiff states that on November 23, 2011, at the end of
those three days, he was transferred to New Jersey State Prison,
as authorized by Commissioner Gary M. Lanigan, New Jersey State
6
Ms. Houston is not named as a defendant.
4
Prison Administrator Charles Warren, Jr., the “John Doe” warden
of Camden County Jail, Lisa Fields, and Ellen Green.
Plaintiff
asserts that this transfer, without any hearing, violated his
due process rights.
Plaintiff alleges that at New Jersey State Prison he was
initially placed on “constant watch.”
He contends that several
days later he was transferred internally to another cell where
he has been locked in 24 hours a day, with no “substantial”
access to legal assistance or to the courts, and that he has
been subjected to daily body cavity searches.
Plaintiff asserts
in general terms that at New Jersey State Prison, he has been
denied religious freedom and needed medical and mental health
treatment.
Plaintiff seeks all appropriate relief.
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
5
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level
... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
The determination of whether the factual
allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is
“‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’”
Bistrian v.
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
6
Court must be mindful to accept its factual allegations as true,
see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.
2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but
must permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)), cited
in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
7
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
Joinder
Rule 18(a) controls the joinder of claims.
In general,
“[a] party asserting a claim ... may join as independent or
alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing
party.”
Rule 20(a)(2) controls the permissive joinder of defendants
in pro se prisoner actions as well as other civil actions.
Persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants
if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.
(emphasis added).
See, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252
Fed.Appx. 436 (3d Cir. 2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th
Cir. 2007).
In actions involving multiple claims and multiple
8
defendants, Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18.
Despite the broad language of rule 18(a),
plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single
action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to
relief against each of them that arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence and presents questions
of law or fact common to all. If the requirements for
joinder of parties have been satisfied, however, Rule
18 may be invoked independently to permit plaintiff to
join as many other claims as plaintiff has against the
multiple defendants or any combination of them, even
though the additional claims do not involve common
questions of law or fact and arise from unrelated
transactions.
7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1655 (3d ed. 2009).
The requirements prescribed by Rule 20(a) are to be
liberally construed in the interest of convenience and judicial
economy.
Swan v. Ray, 293 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, the policy of liberal application of Rule 20 is not a
license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit.
See, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F.App’x 436 (3d Cir.
2007); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007); Coughlin
v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1997).
Pursuant to Rule 21, misjoinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissing an action.
Instead, a court faced with a
complaint improperly joining parties “may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party.
The court may also sever any claims
against a party.”
Here, as discussed more fully below, there is not at least
9
one claim that is asserted against each of the defendants which
arises out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences and
which presents a question of law or fact that is common to all.
Instead there are three distinct claims, each asserted against a
subset of the defendants.
Accordingly, this Court will sever
the claim regarding conditions of confinement at New Jersey
State Prison, which is asserted only against its Administrator
Charles E. Warren. 7
B.
The Camden County Jail Due Process Claims
Criminal pretrial detainees retain liberty interests firmly
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005); Fuentes v.
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000).
Analysis of whether
such a detainee has been deprived of liberty without due process
is governed by the standards set out by the Supreme Court in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 157-
60, 164-67; Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 341-42.
7
The Court notes that Plaintiff has another action, raising
conditions-of-confinement claims, proceeding against
Administrator Warren. See Coward v. Warren, Civil No. 13-2222
(MAS)(D.N.J.). Accordingly, this Court will not presume that
Plaintiff intends to proceed with the rather vague and
conclusory claims asserted -- and severed -- here. Instead, the
Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to open, and then
administratively terminate, a new action, subject to Plaintiff’s
advising the Court of his intent to proceed with the severed
claims by submitting an amended complaint and either prepaying
the filing fee or submitting a new application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.
10
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only
the protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry
is whether those conditions amount to punishment of
the detainee. ...
Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention
amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense,
however. …
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed
for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to
punish on the part of detention facility officials,
that determination generally will turn on whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it]. Thus, if a
particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to punishment. Conversely, if a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees. ...
441 U.S. at 535-39 (citations omitted).
1.
The Events of November 20-23, 2011
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Lt. Vernon, Sgt. H.
Sweeten, Correctional Officer Sweeten, Correctional Officer
Radlinger, Correctional Officer Coan, and psychologist Lisa
Fields participated in a series of events between November 20
and November 23, 2011, during which he allegedly was confined to
a restraint chair, sexually assaulted with a flashlight, and
11
shackled to a bed without food, water, or access to a restroom. 8
Whether construed as a claim of inadequate medical treatment,
excessive use of force, or failure to protect, these allegations
state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal at this
preliminary review.
2.
The “Transfer” Claim
Plaintiff also challenges, on due process grounds, the
decision to transfer him, as a pre-trial detainee and without a
hearing, from Camden County Jail to New Jersey State Prison.
A
pre-trial detainee has no absolute federal right to be detained
in a county jail rather than a state prison.
See Fielder v.
Fornelli, Civil No. 09-0881, 2011 WL 4527322, *5 (W.D. Pa.,
Sept. 6, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL
4527374 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011).
Instead, any § 1983
challenge to such a transfer must raise a plausible claim that
the transfer impinged on some specific federal right, for
example, that such a transfer was intended as an
unconstitutional punishment of a pre-trial detainee, in
violation of the Bell v. Wolfish standards, see Bistrian v.
8
It appears to the Court that Plaintiff described the events of
November 12 to November 19, 2011, as background information.
For example, while providing detailed information regarding the
specific activities of the named defendants with regard to the
events of November 20-23, 2011, Plaintiff has failed to identify
any individual defendant involved in the earlier events.
12
Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012), or that a transfer to a
distant location impaired the pre-trial detainee’s Sixth
Amendment rights of access to counsel and a speedy trial, see
Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981), or that the transfer
deprived the pre-trial detainee of a liberty interest by
subjecting him to substantially more restrictive housing, see
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff was not transferred from the general
population to more restrictive housing, as he had been confined
to the mental health unit from the time of his arrest, due to
two suicide attempts within the space of a week.
Rather, he was
transferred from one mental health unit to another such unit
where he was constantly monitored for several days.
These
circumstances do not plausibly give rise to a claim that the
transfer, itself, was intended to punish Plaintiff.
Moreover, while Plaintiff contends that he had no
“substantial” access to legal assistance, that conclusory
statement is too vague to suggest that the transfer decision
deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel for defense of the criminal charges pending against him.
In this regard, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
the distance between Camden County Jail and New Jersey State
Prison is less than 40 miles, in contrast to the 300-mile
distance to which the detainees in Cobb were subjected.
13
Instead, any unconstitutional conditions of confinement to which
Plaintiff may have been subjected after his internal transfer,
at New Jersey State Prison, on November 28, 2011, are more
properly construed as an element of his severed Due Process
conditions-of-confinement claim against Administrator Charles E.
Warren, Jr.
There is nothing in the facts alleged to suggest
that the transfer decision was made in consideration of the
conditions to which Plaintiff might be subjected at New Jersey
State Prison after his acute suicide-watch status abated.
Accordingly, the claim challenging the transfer decision will be
dismissed without prejudice.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the claim arising out of
Plaintiff’s treatment at Camden County Jail, between November 20
and November 23, 2011, may proceed.
Plaintiff’s Due Process conditions-of-confinement claim,
related to conditions at New Jersey State Prison, will be
severed and administratively terminated.
Plaintiff will be
granted leave to apply to re-open that claim if he intends to
proceed with it.
All remaining claims will be dismissed, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c), for failure to state a claim.
14
However, because it
is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able to supplement his
pleading with facts sufficient to state a claim that the
transfer decision violated his Due Process rights, the Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to file an application to amend,
accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. 9
An appropriate order follows.
At Camden, New Jersey
Dated:
s/Noel L. Hillman
Noel L. Hillman
United States District Judge
June 23, 2014
9
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts
the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates,
LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir.
2013) (collecting cases). See also 6 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed.
2008). To avoid confusion, the safer practice is to submit an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
15
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