BELL v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/15/2014. (dmr)(n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DWIGHT DAVID BELL,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Petitioner,
Civil Action
No. 14-4047 (JBS/KMW)
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Respondent.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
pro se Petitioner Dwight David Bell (hereinafter, the
“Petitioner”) asserts that the State of New Jersey’s
registration requirement for sexual offenders violates his
constitutional rights.
(Pet’r’s Pet. [Docket Item 1], 1-4.)
In
light of the fact that the state purportedly provides “no
remedy[] at law” to request removal from the sex offender
registry, Petitioner urges this federal court to exempt him from
such requirement. (Id. at 1, 4.)
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings
requires the Court to “promptly examine” habeas petitions, in
order to determine whether “the petition and any attached
exhibits” demonstrate an entitlement to relief.
Governing Section 2254 Cases.
Rule 4, Rules
The Court must summarily dismiss
any petition that fails to so demonstrate.
Id.; see also
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (noting that
“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas
petition that appears legally insufficient on its face”) (citing
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings).
For
the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s section 2254 Petition will
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court
finds as follows:
1.
On September 25, 1998, the Superior Court of New
Jersey sentenced Petitioner to ten years of confinement for the
crime of aggravated sexual assault.
(Ex. D to Pet’r’s Pet.)
In
light of Petitioner’s conviction for commission of a sexual
offense, the State of New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law,” N.J.S.A. §
2C:7-2, required Petitioner to, among other things, register as
a sex offender with certain law enforcement agencies.
In the
pending Petition, he urges the Court to “assume jurisdiction”
over his Petition, and to terminate his state registration
obligation in light of a “change in the law” purportedly derived
from a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
(Pet’r’s
Pet. at 1-2, 4.)
2.
A federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain
a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) “‘only if [the
petitioner] is in custody in violation of the constitution or
federal law.’”
Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir.
2007) (citations omitted and emphasis added); see also Felker v.
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Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996) (“Our authority to grant habeas
relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies
the conditions under which such relief may be granted to ‘a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”)
(citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner concedes that the State of
New Jersey released him from custody on April 1, 2004.
(Pet’r’s
Pet. at 1-2 (“Petitioner is currently free after completing a
state sentence for conviction of “Aggravated Sexual Assault.”).)
Though “‘custody extends beyond physical confinement,” courts
generally consider post-release habeas petitions moot, unless
the petitioner can show some “‘significant restraint’” on
liberty.
Leyva, 504 F.3d at 363 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963)).
Collateral consequences of
conviction—like, for example, the inability “to vote, engage in
certain businesses, hold public office, or serve as a juror”—
however, generally fail to satisfy the “in custody” requirement
for habeas jurisdiction.
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491–92
(1989) (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38
(1968)).
3.
Consequently, the Court must consider whether the
State of New Jersey’s continuing registration requirement places
Petitioner “in custody” within the confines of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Though the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet
addressed whether such requirement suffices for purposes of 28
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U.S.C. § 2254, every federal circuit court to have addressed
this question has found the registration requirements for sexual
offenders insufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 336-39 (4th Cir.
2012) (finding the sex offender registration statutes in
Virginia and Texas failed to render the petitioner’s “in
custody” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Virsnieks v.
Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717-19 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that courts
have “uniformly” rejected the argument that “registration under
a sexual offender statute is cognizable in habeas”); Leslie v.
Randall, 296 F.3d 518, 522-23 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding Ohio’s
sex offender registration statute insufficient to satisfy the
“in custody” requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254); McNab v. Kok, 170
F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a habeas petition
after concluding that Oregon’s sex-offender statute does not
place an offender “in custody” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
2254); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999) (same
with respect to California’s statute).
4.
In this action, the Petition only challenges the
requirement that Petitioner register as a sex offender.
(Pet’r’s Pet. at 1-4.)
The weight of authority, however,
dictates that the requirement of registration under the State of
New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law” does not meet the “in custody”
requirement of federal habeas relief.
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See Bankoff v. Pa., No.
09-2042, 2010 WL 396096, at *4-*5 (finding that Megan’s Law
registration does not suffice for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254);
Gargiulo v. Hayman, No. 09-0775, 2009 WL 1346620, *3 (D.N.J. May
13, 2009) (same); Shakir v. State of N.J., No. 05-2980, 2006 WL
126437, *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2006) (same).
The Court finds such
authority persuasive and, accordingly, concludes that the
Petition does not satisfy the “in custody” requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
The Petition will therefore be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.1
5.
The Court will also deny a certificate of
appealability.
Upon entry of a final order adverse to the
petitioner, the Court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability.
See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Proceedings.
Such certificate may issue, however, only
where a petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
1
In that regard, the Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that
Reynolds v. U.S., 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012) constitutes an applicable
change in the law. (Pet’r’s Pet. at 4.) Rather, in Reynolds,
the Supreme Court considered whether the newly-enacted federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
16901-16929 (hereinafter, “SORNA”) required registration of preenactment sexual offenders. Reynolds, 132 S.Ct. at 980. The
Supreme Court’s conclusion that SORNA’s “registration
requirements [did] not apply to pre-Act offenders until the
Attorney General so specifies” therefore concerns only the
newly-enacted federal registration legislation, not the state
analogue implicated in this action, and Petitioner has proffered
no basis to find Reynolds instructive in this instance. Id. at
984. Nor does Reynolds otherwise cast doubt on the Court’s
conclusion herein.
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Consequently, a petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case,
the Court concludes that no reasonable jurists would debate the
Court’s conclusion that the Petition fails to state a cognizable
claim for habeas relief.
See Obado v. N.J., 328 F.3d 716, 717
(3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Consequently, no certificate
of appealability will issue.
6.
An accompanying Order will be entered.
December 15, 2014
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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