ROY v. PENN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER IFP is GRANTED and Clerk shall file the Complaint. ORDERED Complaint is DISMISSED and Plaintiff has 30 days from the entry of this Order to file an amended complaint. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/19/2014. (nz, )n.m.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANK ROY,
Civil No. 14-4277 (NLH/KMW)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

v.

PENN NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Frank Roy
998 W. Landis Ave, Unit 121
Vineland, New Jersey 08360
Pro Se Plaintiff

HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter having come before the Court by way of
Plaintiff’s application [Doc. No. 1-1] to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP application”) in this action and by way of
Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. No. 1] both of which were submitted
to the Court on July 8, 2014; and
The Court recognizing that when a non-prisoner seeks
permission to file a civil complaint in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
requires the person 1 to submit an affidavit that includes a

1

Although Section 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal courts

statement of all assets and that the person is unable to pay
such fees or give security therefor, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a);
and
The Court recognizing that the decision to grant or deny an
IFP application is based solely on the economic eligibility of
the petitioner, see Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir.
1976); and
The Court having reviewed Plaintiff’s IFP application and
affidavit of poverty submitted on July 8, 2014, and Plaintiff
having signed the affidavit in support of his IFP application
declaring under penalty of perjury that he is unable to pay the
costs of these proceedings, accordingly, based on the

apply Section 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications as well.
See, e.g., Hickson v. Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J. 2011)
(citing Lister v. Dept. of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for
IFP status, and not just to prisoners.”) (citing Martinez v.
Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n. 1 (11th Cir.
2004); Haynes v. Scott, 116 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1997); Floyd
v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th Cir.
1997)); El Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, No. 11-5684, 2011 WL 4962326, at
* 11 n.7 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2011) (Kugler, J.) (“Although Section
1915(a) refers to a ‘statement of all assets such prisoner
possesses,’ this section has been applied by courts in their
review of applications of non-prisoners as well.”) (citing
Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The
reference to prisoners in § 1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.
In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons,
not just prisoners.”)).
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information contained therein, the Court hereby grants
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis in this
case and directs the Clerk to file the complaint in this action;
and
The Court also noting that under the PLRA the Court, prior
to docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, must
also review the complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff
is proceeding in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The PLRA requires the Court to sua sponte dismiss any claim if
the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Id.;

and
The Court further noting that a “document filed pro se is
to be liberally construed, ... and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”

Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); and
In considering whether Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a claim, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in

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the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.

2005); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
228 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n deciding a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), [a district court is] ... required to accept as true
all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences
from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to” the
plaintiff); and
The Court asking “‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims[.]’”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232,
236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953
(2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard
for ‘all civil actions[.]’”) (citation omitted); and
The Court noting that under the Twombly/Iqbal standard, a
district court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded
facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”

Fowler

v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949); and
The Court further noting that a district court “must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

4

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for
relief.’”
1950).

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at

“[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief.”

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211; and

Plaintiff purporting to bring this action because Defendant
Penn National Insurance Company allegedly “violated the statute
of Anti-Discrimination and also negligence[,]” (Pl.’s Compl.
[Doc. No. 1] 1); and
Plaintiff alleging in the complaint that he “sustained loss
on 12/02/2011 when [a] rental car was parked in the Camden
ghetto at a nightclub[,]” (Id. ¶ 1); and
Plaintiff further alleging that a “Police officer came to
the scene and to the best of [Plaintiff’s] knowledge said she
had just left another such incident[,]”

(Id.); and

Plaintiff asserting that Chris Arnold, an adjuster 2
“conspired with [an] attorney from Philadelphia[,] Monica
O’Neil[,] to discriminate” and that “[v]ery suspiciously the
case was transferred from the New Jersey claims office to
Philadelphia[,]” (Id. ¶ 2); and
Plaintiff representing that the relevant claim number is

2

Although not specifically set forth in the complaint, it
appears that Chris Arnold may be employed by Defendant Penn
National Insurance Company.
5

17428204 and that his “policy was paid in full and cancelled
after the legitimate claim” and received no refund, (Id. ¶ 3);
and
Plaintiff contending that “Monica O’Neil suspiciously got
involved in this case with her involvement with [Plaintiff] with
something else [and] is guilty of presenting a fraudulent
affidavit in the lower courts[,]” (Id. ¶ 4); and
The Court noting that Plaintiff therefore requests judgment
against Penn National Insurance Company in the amount of
$125,000.00 plus interest and costs of suit; and
The Court noting that while Plaintiff makes a general
allegation of discrimination, he does not further specify
whether he is attempting to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for purported constitutional violations, or under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, or under some other state law antidiscrimination statute; and
The Court finding that, even construed liberally,
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts sufficient to
demonstrate that Plaintiff can maintain a plausible claim for
relief under any federal statute or for a cause of action for
negligence under state law, and does not set forth a sufficient
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court at this

6

time; and
The Court noting that the Twombly/Iqbal standard requires
Plaintiff to do more than simply allege his entitlement to
relief in a conclusory manner and thus dismissal of Plaintiff’s
complaint without prejudice is warranted at this time under §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,
IT IS on this

19th

day of

August

, 2014, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP Application [Doc. No. 1-1]
shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to file Plaintiff’s
complaint [Doc. No. 1] in this action; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint shall be, and hereby is,
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to mark his matter as
CLOSED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended
complaint in this action within thirty (30) days of the date of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order which sets forth sufficient
facts demonstrating that Plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief and that jurisdiction in this Court is proper.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey
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