GOODEN v. JUBILEE et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying without prejudice 20 Motion for Default Judgment. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/11/15. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

Maurice Gooden,
Plaintiff,
v.
Juanita Harris,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 14-4415(RMB)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BUMB, District Judge:
I.

BACKGROUND
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s motion

for default judgment on his malicious prosecution claim against
Juanita Harris. (ECF. Nos. 17-18.) On July 31, 2014, this Court
granted Plaintiff’s IFP application, screened Plaintiff’s civil
rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, dismissed all
Defendants except Juanita Harris, and ordered the Clerk to issue
summons and the U.S. Marshals to serve summons on Defendant
Harris. (Order, ECF No. 5.) On May 19, 2015, the summons was
returned executed. (Process Receipt and Return, ECF No. 16.) The
Process Receipt and Return indicates the summons and complaint
were served on “Lt. Hendricks of IA” at “1300 Bacharach Blvd,
A.C. NJ”. (Id.)
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Deputy U.S. Marshal Anne Marie Leone submitted an
affidavit, stating Plaintiff provided the U.S. Marshals Service
with the Atlantic City Police Department address for service of
process on Juanita Harris. (ECF No. 21.) The Atlantic City
Police Department directs service of all legal process for
officers employed by the police department to the Internal
Affairs section, which has relocated to 1300 Bacharach Blvd.,
Atlantic City, New Jersey. (Id.) Within the Internal Affairs
section, Leone was directed to Lt. Hendricks, who accepted
service of the summons and complaint for Harris. (Id.) Juanita
Harris has not answered the complaint or otherwise responded.
The Clerk of Court entered Default against Harris on July 7,
2015.
II.

DISCUSSION
A. SERVICE
Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment, the Court must determine whether Harris was
properly served with the summons and complaint. See D’Onofrio v.
Il Mattino, 430 F.Supp.2d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2006) “[a] default
judgment entered when there has been no proper service of the
complaint is, a fortiori, void, and should be set aside.”
(quoting Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d
14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)

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provides for service of an individual within a judicial district
of the United States in one of the following ways:
(1) following state law for serving a
summons in an action brought in courts of
general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located or where service
is made; or
(2) doing any of the following:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to the individual
personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the
individual's dwelling or usual place of
abode with someone of suitable age and
discretion who resides there; or
(C) delivering a copy of each to an
agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process.
“The New Jersey Rule governing service of process upon an
individual is akin to the three options outlined in Rule
4(e)(2).” Laffey v. Plousis, Civ. Action No. 05-2796 (JAG), 2008
WL 305289, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2008), aff’d F. App’x 791 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing N.J.R.Super.TAX SURR. CTS. CIV. R. 4:44(a)(1)).
“Good faith reliance on the apparent authority of an
individual to accept service on behalf of a defendant may
satisfy the service of process requirement set forth in Rule
4(e)(2)(C).” Id. (citing Blair v. City of Worcester, 2006 WL
1581582, at *4 (D.Mass. Mar. 13, 2006). However, there must be

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evidence that the individual defendant intended to confer
authority on the agent to accept service of process for her. Id.
The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that an agency
relationship existed and that service was proper. Dunkley v.
Rutgers, No. Civ. 06-5762 (DRD), 2007 WL 2033827, at *2 (citing
Local 617, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen
and Helpers of American v. Hudson Bergen Trucking Co., 182
N.J.Super. 16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (citing 21
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1097, 1101.)
The Court will dismiss the motion for default without
prejudice, allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to satisfy his
burden to show proper service on Defendant Harris. Plaintiff may
also seek leave for an extension of time to serve Defendant
Harris in another manner, for example at her home or by handing
it to her personally.
B.

Malicious Prosecution

Even if Plaintiff establishes proper service on Defendant
Harris, there is another basis to deny his motion for default
judgment at this time; he has not pled facts in support of each
element of a claim for malicious prosecution. Once the Clerk of
Court enters a party’s default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a) for failure to plead or otherwise defend, a
party may apply to the Court for default judgment pursuant to
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “When a defendant fails to appear. . . ,
the district court or its clerk is authorized to enter a default
judgment based solely on the fact that the default has
occurred.” Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.Supp.2d 532, 535
(D.N.J. 2008).
While the court “should accept as true the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the Complaint, the Court need not accept
the moving party's legal conclusions. . . ” Id. at 535-36
(citing Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir.
1990); Directv, Inc. v. Asher, No. 03–1969, 2006 WL 680533, at
*1 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2006) (citing Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 10A Federal Practice and Procedure §
2688, at 58–59, 63 (3d ed. 1998). Therefore, this Court must
determine whether “the unchallenged facts constitute a
legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not
admit mere conclusions of law.” Asher, 2006 WL 680533, at *1
(citing Wright & Miller § 2688, at 63.)
Plaintiff alleged Detective Harris violated his
constitutional rights by maliciously prosecuting him. To prevail
on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff
must establish the following: (1) the defendant initiated a
criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in
Plaintiff’s favor; and (3) the defendant acted maliciously or
for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and
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(5) as a result of the legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered
a deprivation of liberty. Halsey v. Pfeffer, 750 F.3d 273, 29697 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d
Cir. 2007)).
In his declaration in support of default judgment,
Plaintiff asserted Harris was responsible for investigating a
robbery that occurred on October 25, 2012, and she knew or
should have known that Plaintiff was only a witness to the
robbery. (ECF No. 18, ¶2.) On November 30, 2012, when Plaintiff
reported to parole, he was arrested for the October 25, 2012
robbery. (Id., ¶3.) Plaintiff remained in jail on the robbery
charge until May 30, 2013, when the grand jury found “no bill.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff did not allege facts in support of the third
element, that Detective Harris acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. A bare
allegation that Harris knew or should have known Plaintiff was
only a witness to the robbery is insufficient. Compare Morales
v. Busbee, 972 F.Supp. 254, 264 (D.N.J. 1997) (denying summary
judgment where record contained sufficient, credible evidence
that factfinder could conclude the defendant acted with malice
in prosecution of the plaintiff). Plaintiff alleged in the
complaint that he wrote numerous letters to the Chief of the
Atlantic County Police Department asserting false arrest, but
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Plaintiff does not allege that he sent such letters to Detective
Harris. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff did not assert that
Detective Harris was the person who executed his arrest warrant
or, alternatively, that she facilitated Plaintiff’s continued
prosecution after she discovered credible evidence that
Plaintiff was innocent.
Plaintiff must assert facts showing when Detective Harris
discovered evidence that Plaintiff was innocent, what that
evidence was, and that Harris continued Plaintiff’s prosecution
after gaining this knowledge. If Plaintiff establishes proper
service on Harris, he must also meet these requirements before
default judgment can be granted.
IT IS therefore, on this 11th day of December 2015,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF
No. 17) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of his
Memorandum and Order on Plaintiff by regular U.S. Mail.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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