GOODEN v. JUBILEE et al
Filing
4
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 7/31/2014. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________________
:
:
: Civil Action No. 14-4415 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
CHIEF ERNEST JUBILEE, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
_______________________________________
:
MAURICE GOODEN,
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s
submission of a civil complaint, executed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, see Docket Entry No. 1 (“Complaint”), that arrived
accompanied by Plaintiff’s duly executed application to proceed
in this matter in forma pauperis.
See Docket Entry No. 1-1.
In
light of the information provided in the in forma pauperis
application and the absence of three disqualifying strikes, the
Court will grant Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and order the
Clerk to file the Complaint.1
1
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires
this Court to screen a filed complaint and sua sponte dismiss any
claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
Almost seven years ago, i.e., on October 1, 2007, Plaintiff,
while being a pretrial detainee, see https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC
commenced his prior civil action in this District.
See Gooden v.
Platt, Civil Action No. 07-4716 (RMB), Docket Entry No. 1.2
his conviction, he served a six-and-a-half-year term.
//www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1008881&n=0.
Upon
See https:
However,
once released from custody on January 14, 2012, he allegedly
committed another offense, the one that underlies his current
incarceration starting on or prior to October 23, 2013.
See id.3
The events asserted in the Complaint allegedly took place on
October 25, 2012, and November 30, 2012, that is, about nine
months after his January 14, 2012, release but prior to the
offense underlying his current incarceration.
Plaintiff’s allegations are verbatim, as follows:
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint at bar erroneously asserts that his
Gooden v. Platt claims were dismissed by this Court sua sponte as
malicious. See Docket Entry No. 1, at 3. Following a jury
trail, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Gooden v. Platt claims
after the jurors returned “the judgment of no cause,” and the
Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. Gooden v. Platt,
Civil Action No. 07-4716 (RMB), Docket Entry No. 170-1, at 2, 4.
3
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that Plaintiff is now a
civilly committed individual. See Docket Entry No. 1, at 2.
However, the records of the New Jersey Department of Corrections
indicate that he is a convicted prisoner. See https://www6.
state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1008881&n=0.
That said, the
Department of Corrections records do not provide his maximum
release or parole eligibility dates. See id. Moreover, in the
body of his Complaint, Plaintiff designated his address as that
at Ann Klein Forensic Center, a psychiatric hospital for inmates.
See id. at 3. Thus, the status of Plaintiff’s confinement is not
entirely clear.
2
I just came home 10-25-12 after 6½ of incarceration I
went to the barbershop for a shapeup I guy came in a
took the barber Abdul-Majid cellu[l]ar phone, I was
only the witness. Police locked up Abdul-Majid, I went
to A.C.P.D. we was released I went to Parole Office
11/30/12 they said I have a warrant for 1st degree
robbery. But the cops let us both go home. I was
handcuffed 11/30/12 at parole office, was released
5/30/13 no bill. . . . I wrote numerous letter I was
only a witness 10-25-12, my case came back 5/30/13 No
Bill
Docket Entry No. 1, at 4, 5 (grammar/punctuation is original).
The Complaint names two individuals as Defendants and
asserts:
Chief Mr. Ernest Jubilee [who is the] Chief of Atlantic
City Police Dep[artmen]t [is liable to me because] I
wrote numerous letter the Chief never responded Falsely
Arrested and Incarcerated my 1st Degree robbery from
10-25-12 to 5/30/13 was dismissed No Bill Attached.
Det[ective] Ms. Juanita Harris [is an] Atlantic City
Police Detective [she is liable to me because] she was
the det[ective] who investigated case I wrote numerous
letter I was only a witness 10-25-12, my case came back
5/30/13 No Bill by the Grand Jury
Id. at 4 (grammar/punctuation in original).
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a false
arrest claim, his challenges are facially meritless.
“Under both
federal and New Jersey law, a claim for false arrest requires
that (1) there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made
without probable cause.”
Schirmer v. Penkethman, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 182901, at *20 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2012) (citing Ferry v.
Barry, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13460 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2012); Gil
v. New Jersey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85700 (D.N.J. June 19,
3
2012); Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 189 N.J. 497, 916 A.2d 1036
(N.J. 2007)).
“There are two elements required to bring [a false
arrest claim]: (1) constraint of the person against his will (2)
that is without legal justification.”
Gil, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85700, at *4 (citing Pine v. Okzewski, 112 N.J.L. 429, 431, 170
A. 825 (E.& A. 1934); Barletta v. Golden Nugget Hotel Casino, 580
F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.N.J. 1984)); accord Gibson v. Superintendent
of NJ Dept. of Law and Public Safety - Division of State Police,
411 F.3d 427, 451 (3d Cir. 2005) (“False arrest . . . is the
constraint of the person without legal justification”); Singer v.
Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (the
elements of a false arrest or false imprisonment claim are “(1)
the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the
plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did
not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not
otherwise privileged”), cert. den’d, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996).
A
proper legal justification for arrest either arises out of the
circumstances qualifying as probable cause, see Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), or comes in the form of an arrest
warrant.
2010).
See Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.
Therefore, only a deprivation of liberty that occurs
prior to an arraignment and without a proper warrant/probable
cause qualifies as false arrest.
4
Here, Plaintiff concedes that he was merely questioned by
police on October 25, 2012, and allowed to go home, without any
arrest.
Analogously, Plaintiff concedes that, on November 30,
2012, he was detained by probation officers on the basis of a
valid arrest warrant.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims
are facially meritless and will be dismissed with prejudice.
The foregoing leaves this Court with Plaintiff’s allegations
that his November 30, 2012, to May 30, 2013, detention (based on
the robbery charge) violated his rights because those criminal
proceedings were, as a threshold matter, without any basis.4
Such allegations suggest a malicious prosecution claim.
The Court of Appeals recently clarified the analysis of a
malicious prosecution claim.
See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d
273 (3d Cir. 2014).
To prevail on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim under section 1983, [the defendant] must
establish that:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the
plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the defendant initiated
the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other
than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5)
4
It is not immediately clear to this Court as to why
Plaintiff was confined for six months prior to having his case
presented to the grand jury. However, for the purposes of
screening Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court is obligated to
presume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true as pled.
See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a
consequence of a legal proceeding.
Johnson [v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75,] 82 [(3d Cir. 2007)];
see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 349 (3d Cir.
1989).
Id. at 296-97.
Relevant to the inquiries associated with the elements “(3)”
and “(4),” the Court of Appeals pointed out that,
[w]hen falsified evidence is used as a basis to
initiate the prosecution of a defendant, or is used to
convict him, the defendant has been injured regardless
of whether the totality of the evidence, excluding the
fabricated evidence, would have given the state actor a
probable cause defense in a malicious prosecution
action that a defendant later brought against him.
Id. at 89.
The facts and rationale of Halsey indicates that, when a
defendant’s prosecution is initiated in complete void of
evidence, or upon a state actor’s intentional ignorance of
evidence establishing the defendant’s innocence, the tort of
malicious prosecution is complete if the defendant was confined
in connection with his prosecution, and that prosecution ended in
the defendant’s favor.
See id. at 292, n.17 (citing, inter alia,
Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir.
1997), for the observation that, “[l]ike a prosecutor’s knowing
use of false evidence to obtain a tainted conviction, a police
officer’s fabrication and forwarding to prosecutors of known
false evidence works an unacceptable violation of due process”).
6
Correspondingly, if: (a) the police officers investigating
the events of October 25, 2012, robbery detected that Plaintiff
was nothing but a witness to the robbery, and evidence gathered
between October 25, 2012, and November 30, 2012, verified the
lack of Plaintiff’s involvement in the robbery; but (b)
Plaintiff’s arrest warrant was nonetheless executed (e.g., on the
basis of fabricated facts or no facts at all), and it resulted in
Plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty, his malicious prosecution
claim against the state actor who produced that unsubstantiated
arrest warrant and/or continued his prosecution appears viable,
that is, provided that Plaintiff’s assertion as to the grand
jury’s decision not to indict him is, in fact, true.
Here, Plaintiff named two individuals as Defendants.
One is
the Chief of Police and another is the Detective assigned to
investigate Plaintiff’s robbery case.
Plaintiff’s position is
that the Chief is liable to him because the Chief did not respond
to his letters, and the Detective is liable to him because she
continued investigating the robbery charge against Plaintiff
regardless of Plaintiff’s letters stating that he was merely a
witness.
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to implicate the Chief, the
Chief’s alleged failure to respond to Plaintiff’s letters, or the
Chief’s supervisory position cannot render the Chief liable.
See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d
7
1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979); Minnesota
State Bd. Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984);
Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Thus,
Plaintiff’s claims against the Chief will be dismissed.
Analogously, the Detective’s continued investigation of
Plaintiff’s robbery charge was not a wrongful act able to support
a Fourth Amendment claim.
However, liberally construed, the
Complaint could also be read as suggesting that the Detective:
(a) was the one who executed Plaintiff’s arrest warrant without
any evidence that Plaintiff was implicated in the robbery or on
the basis of evidence known to her as false; and/or (b)
facilitated Plaintiff’s continuous prosecution while having her
own credible evidence indicating that Plaintiff was innocent.
So read, and in light of the guidance provided in Halsey,
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against the Detective
shall proceed past the sua sponte dismissal stage.
An
appropriate Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: July 31, 2014
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?