STEWART v. CITY OF ATLANTIC POLICE DEPARTMENT et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/10/2015. (bdk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
JAMES STEWART,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 14-4700 (NLH)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
CITY OF ATLANTIC POLICE
:
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________:
APPEARANCES:
James Stewart, #222848
Atlantic County Justice Facility
5060 Atlantic Ave.
Mays Landing, NJ 08330
Plaintiff pro se
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a state inmate confined at the Atlantic County
Justice Facility in Mays Landing, New Jersey.

Plaintiff brings

this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
has submitted an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Based on the in forma pauperis application, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application and will order the Clerk to file the
complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.
Because each of Plaintiff’s claims is insufficiently plead, the
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief will be granted.

However, Plaintiff shall be given

leave to file an amended complaint.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff states that on January 31, 2014 he was accused of
attempting to rob an attendant at a gas station.

Plaintiff

states that two police officers, “Officers Beradis and Larelli,”
arrived on the scene and searched him.

Plaintiff asserts that

the search did not reveal any incriminating evidence.

Plaintiff

contends that Officers Beradis and Larelli then radioed to
headquarters and had “detective Brown” obtain video surveillance
footage of the alleged robbery.

Plaintiff states that this

footage was “logged and entered into Atlantic City property and
evidence.” Complaint at 5, Stewart v. City of Atlantic County
Police Department, et al., No. 14-4700 (D.N.J. July 28, 2014),
ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff admits that the video shows him “walking

in and out of the store[,]” however, he argues that it does not
show a robbery occurring. Id.

Plaintiff contends that, despite

the lack of evidence, he was arrested and later indicted and

imprisoned under $200,000 bail for “robbery charges 1.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff names several defendants in the complaint;
specifically: the Atlantic City Police Department, the Atlantic
County Justice Facility, the Superior Court of Atlantic County,
the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office, and the Atlantic County
Grand Jury Committee.
With respect to the false arrest claim against the Atlantic
County Police Department, Plaintiff argues that he was arrested
despite the absence of evidence against him.
In the section of his Complaint naming the Atlantic County
Justice Facility as a defendant, Plaintiff states that he was
attacked by three inmates and that he suffers physically and
emotionally as a result of the attack.

The Court construes this

as a failure to protect claim.
As to the Superior Court of Atlantic County, Plaintiff
states that he was held in the Atlantic County Justice Facility
with high bail under robbery charges with “[in]sufficient
evidence.” 2 Id. at 6-7.

1The

complaint is unclear as to the precise charges brought
against Plaintiff and whether he has been convicted and
sentenced.
2

In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that he was held “under
robbery charges with sufficient evidence.” Presumably, this is
a typo as Plaintiff continually maintains that there is
insufficient evidence against him with respect to the alleged
robbery.

Plaintiff next states that the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s
Office is to blame “for the physical beatings, the stress, and
emotional damages” that he and his family are enduring as a
result of the Prosecutor’s decision to indict him rather than
release him. Id. at 7.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Atlantic County Grand
Jury Committee was coerced into indicting him by the
Prosecutor’s Office.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages in the amount of
$3,500,000 related to the attack he suffered and his false
imprisonment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.

The

PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To survive sua sponte

screening for failure to state a claim 3, the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB
Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Moreover, while pro se

pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x
120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v.
Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States,
287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)).

B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his Constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall
not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see
also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
IV.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to
challenge his conviction or sentence, or the fact of his
incarceration, his challenge is subject to dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d

Cir. 2006) (“It is well-settled that when a state prisoner is
challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983
action.”) (citation omitted).

However, to the extent that

Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief for the claims discussed
above, further discussion is warranted.
A. Claims against Atlantic City Police Department
As an initial matter, the Atlantic City Police Department
is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. See Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105
L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

A court in this district recently explained:

A New Jersey police department is not an independent
entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, but only
“an executive and enforcement function of municipal
government.” N.J.S.A. 40A:14–118. The case law under
Section 1983 uniformly holds that the proper defendant
is therefore the municipality itself, not the police
department. See Jackson v. City of Erie Police Dep't,
570 F. App'x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam; not
precedential) (“We further agree with the District
Court that the police department was not a proper
party to this action. Although local governmental
units may constitute ‘persons' against whom suit may
be lodged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a city police
department is a governmental sub-unit that is not
distinct from the municipality of which it is a
part.”) (citation omitted). See also Bonenberger v.
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997)
(Court “treat[s] the municipality and its police
department as a single entity for purposes of section
1983 liability”); Michaels v. State of New Jersey, 955
F. Supp. 315, 329 n. 1 (D.N.J. 1996).
Rivera v. Zwiegle, No. 13–3024, 2014 WL 6991954, at *3 (D.N.J.
Dec. 09, 2014).

Also, even if Plaintiff had properly named the municipality
as a defendant, the Complaint would not state a claim.

This

Court explained in Charm v. New Jersey, No. 11–4676, 2012 WL
1455457 (D.N.J. April 24, 2012):
[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct.
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, “it is [only]
when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
and acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id.
Charm, 2012 WL 1455457 at *2.

This complaint fails to make any

allegations of an unconstitutional policy or custom that would
create municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs. New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d
611 (1978). See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 757 F.3d 99,
110–11 (3d Cir. 2014) (complaint must plead facts to support
Monell liability); McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636,
658 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating to satisfy pleading standard for
Monell claim, complaint “must identify a custom or policy, and
specify what exactly that custom or policy was”); Karmo v.
Borough of Darby, No. 14–2797, 2014 WL 4763831, at *6 (E.D.Pa.
Sept. 25, 2014) (same).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against

the Atlantic City Police Department are dismissed. 4

4

The Court notes that Plaintiff provides the names of specific
officers in the body of his Complaint. However, there is no

B. Claims Against Atlantic County Justice Facility
Plaintiff has named the Atlantic County Justice Facility as
a defendant in his Complaint.

A jail, however, like a police

department, is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983.
See, e.g., Parrish v. Aramark Foods, Inc., No. 11–5556, 2012 WL
1118672, at *3 (D.N.J. April 2, 2012) (collecting cases).
The Court notes, however, that under the Eighth Amendment,
prison officials must take reasonable measures “to protect
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811
(1994) (internal quotations omitted). 5

“Being violently

assaulted in prison is simply ‘not part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id.
at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.
2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

In light of Plaintiff’s description

of the attack against him and his resulting physical and
emotional injuries, Plaintiff may have intended this section of

indication that those officers were intended to be named as
individual defendants in this action.
5

To the extent Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, under the
Constitution's guarantees of due process, a pretrial detainee is
entitled to, at a minimum, no less protection from inmate
violence than a sentenced inmate is under the Eighth Amendment.
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012).

his Complaint to assert a failure to protect claim.
Nevertheless, such a claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
To successfully state a claim for failure to protect,
Plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) he is “incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of harm”; and (2) the
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” that
amounts to “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837, cited in Bistrian, 696 F.3d at
367.

In this case, Plaintiff has neither named a prison

official nor alleged facts showing deliberate indifference.
Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
C. Claims Against the Superior Court of Atlantic County
As with the previous defendants, Plaintiff cannot state a
claim against the Superior Court of New Jersey because that
party is not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. See
Will, 491 U.S. at 70–71; Ray v. New Jersey, 219 F. App’x 121 (3d
Cir. 2007); Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 869 F. Supp. 289,
296–97 (D.N.J. 1994).

More specifically, the Eleventh

Amendment, which applies to § 1983 claims, bars suits against
states. See Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 813 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Superior Court of Atlantic County is part of the judicial
branch of New Jersey and is thus immune pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment.

Johnson, 869 F. Supp. at 296–98.

Therefore,

Plaintiff's allegations against this defendant will be dismissed
with prejudice.
D. Claims Against the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office
Plaintiff has not presented a viable claim against the
Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office.

Like police departments,

jails and superior courts, prosecutor’s offices are not
cognizable as “persons” for the purposes of a § 1983 suit.
Briggs v. Moore, 251 F. App'x 77 (3d Cir. 2007) (police
department and prosecutor's office are not “persons” within the
meaning of § 1983 suit); see also Pitman v. Ottehberg, No. 10–
2538, 2015 WL 179392 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2015) (Section 1983 claim
cannot exist against a prosecutor’s office); Kamienski v.
Attorney Gen. New Jersey, No. 11–3056, 2012 WL 4034236, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2012); West v. City of Jersey City Police
Dept., No. 09–2836, 2009 WL 2016221 (D.N.J. July 07, 2009)
(prosecutor's office is not a cognizable “person” for the
purposes of § 1983 action).

Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against

the Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office fail for this reason
alone.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff had named a specific
prosecutor as a defendant, the claim, as pled, would fail.
Plaintiff’s vague allegations relate to the Prosecutor’s
Office’s role in Plaintiff’s indictment.

In other words, the

allegations in the Complaint relate to a prosecutor acting

within his authority in seeking an indictment.

Accordingly, any

named prosecutor would likely be immune from suit because he was
acting within the scope of his duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); LeBlanc v.
Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(finding prosecutors immune from suit where they are acting
within the scope of their duties in a criminal prosecution and
noting that the protection includes a prosecutor’s activities
with preparing and filing charging documents); Green v. United
States, 418 F. App’x 63, 66 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(“[P]rosecutors enjoy immunity from suit for damages under §
1983 for actions performed within their authority) (citations
omitted); Darby v. Geiger, 441 F. App’x 840 (3d Cir. 2011).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff meant to bring a claim
against a specific prosecutor for malicious prosecution, this
claim, as pled, is untenable.

First, Plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to show that any representative of the Atlantic
County Prosecutor's Office acted maliciously or in bad faith.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not asserted that any criminal
proceeding ended in his favor. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d
75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (enumerating the elements of a
malicious prosecution claim).
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s claim against the
Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office is dismissed.

E. Claims Against the Atlantic County Grand Jury Committee
Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against
Defendant Atlantic County Grand Jury Committee.

In this section

of his Complaint, Plaintiff expresses his disagreement with the
grand jury’s decision and summarily concludes that the grand
jury was coerced into indicting him by the Prosecutor’s Office.
There is nothing alleged in this section which can be construed
as a cause of action under § 1983.
Regardless, even if facts comprising a cause of action had
been properly pled, grand jurors acting within the scope of
their duties — similar to a judge and prosecutor — possess
absolute immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20
(1976).

A court in this district has stated with respect to

grand juries:
Courts have been consistent in holding grand jurors
absolutely immune from liability for acts committed
within the scope of their duties. This immunity
protects grand jurors to enable them to be free to
exercise their best judgment regarding sensitive legal
and factual questions presented to them in secret
proceedings without fear of being held accountable in
damages actions. See DeCamp v. Douglas County Franklin
Grand Jury, 978 F.2d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 509 U.S. 1047 (1993).
Ray v. New Jersey, No. 05-3508, 2006 WL 182083, at *7 (D.N.J.
Jan. 20, 2006), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 121 (3d Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, because the Complaint in this action fails to
allege that the grand jurors acted outside the scope of their

quasi-judicial statutory authority in indicting Plaintiff, this
claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
V.

CONCLUSION

Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint unless amendment would be futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In this
case, because it is possible that Plaintiff may be able to
supplement his complaint with facts sufficient to overcome the
deficiencies noted herein, Plaintiff shall be given leave to
file an application to re-open accompanied by a proposed amended
complaint. 6

An appropriate Order follows.

____s/ Noel L. Hillman__
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: March 10, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey

6

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts
the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates,
LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir.
2013)(collecting cases); see also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). To avoid
confusion, the safer practice is to submit an amended complaint
that is complete in itself. Id.