FOX v. BAYSIDE STATE PRISON et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 2/1/2016. (drw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
ANTHONY FOX,
:
:
Plaintiff,
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Civ. No. 14-5344 (RBK)
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v.
:
:
OPINION
BAYSIDE STATE PRISON, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
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_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court previously
dismissed Defendants Gary M. Lanigan and John Powell (collectively, the “Defendants”).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Local Civil
Rule 7.1. The Court rules on this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78; no oral
argument was held. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will be
denied.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Under Local Civil Rule 7.1, an aggrieved party may move for reconsideration of a prior
ruling of the Court. Such motions are typically construed as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment. Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2013).
“[A] proper Rule 59(e) motion ... must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N.
River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). “The standard
for reargument is high and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly.” Yarrell v.
Bartkowski, No. 10–5337, 2012 WL 1600316, at *3 (D.N.J. May 7, 2012) (citing United States v.
Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994)).
III.
BACKGROUND
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that he suffered injuries to his nose
after receiving medical treatment while incarcerated at Bayside State Prison. He alleges that the
treatment he received for his injured nose was inadequate, and that he has sustained permanent
injuries. Plaintiff named several defendants in the amended complaint, including John Powell,
Administrator of Bayside State Prison, and Gary Lanigan, Commissioner of the New Jersey
Department of Corrections. He alleged that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs, that they failed to institute policies to address the needs of inmates, and that they
failed to supervise their agents and employees. He brought Eight Amendment denial of medical
care claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, amongst other claims.
These defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In an opinion and order dated August 18, 2015
(hereinafter “prior ruling”), this Court granted their joint motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. Nos. 31,
32.) The official capacity claims were dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, and the
individual capacity claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
which rejects the notion that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements” are entitled to a presumption of truth. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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IV.
DISCUSSION
In his moving papers, Plaintiff argues that the Court committed an error of law and fact
by failing to properly apply the Third Circuit-sanctioned, three step approach for assessing the
sufficiency of complaints under Iqbal.1 (See Dkt. No. 34 at p. 5.). Indeed, the Court explicitly
acknowledged these steps in its prior opinion. (See Dkt. No. 31, p. 2.) A recent Third Circuit
case reiterates the steps:
First, [the court] must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff
must plead to state a claim.” Second, it should identify allegations
that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., No. 14-3792, 2016 WL 106159, at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016)
(internal citations omitted).
In support of his argument, Plaintiff lists a number of allegations that he purports the
Court overlooked in its analysis. For example, Plaintiff points to the allegations that “Plaintiff
received surgery to his nose but was informed additional surgery would be necessary [and]
Defendants have refused to permit the additional surgery and have failed to treat plaintiff
properly for the injuries suffered.” (See Dkt. No. 34 at p. 5 (quoting Dkt. No. 8, ¶¶ 20-21)).
Plaintiff further points to additional allegations that he suggests are “well-pleaded allegations
which must be given the assumption of veracity.” (Id. at p. 6). These allegations are that
Defendants engaged in the following acts:
a) failing to provide for plaintiff’s basic needs including the
safety of his person;
The Court reads Plaintiff’s motion as challenging only the dismissal of the individual capacity
claims. Plaintiff’s motion papers do not reference the immunity aspect of the Court’s prior
ruling.
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d) improper monitoring and supervision of plaintiff’s care;
o) conducting unreasonable and inadequate investigations of
plaintiff’s complaints;
p) failing to respond promptly to plaintiff’s complaints that he
had not taken drugs or overdosed;
t) failing to supervise their agents, employees and/or
representatives including medical staff, correctional officers and all
others involved with plaintiff;
x) unreasonably placing plaintiff in lock-up on suspicion of
overdosing when his loss of consciousness was caused by the
administration of an improper injection by defendants.
(Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 8, ¶ 24).)
Nowhere in any of these allegations, however, is a specific reference to Defendants
Lanigan or Powell. There is no mention whatsoever of any actions they took, their actual
knowledge or acquiescence in subordinate conduct, or their creation or maintenance of a policy,
custom, or practice that violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Simply put, Plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration ignores the actual legal basis for the Court’s granting of Defendants’ motion
to dismiss—Plaintiff’s failure to plead personal involvement.
In its prior ruling, the Court explained the necessity of pleading personal involvement in
§ 1983 cases:
“In order for liability to attach under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a
defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his federal rights.” Fears
v. Beard, 532 F. App’x 78, 81 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Rode v.
Dellaciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “[L]iability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge
and acquiescence.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted).
(Dkt. No. 31, p. 6.)
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The Court went on to explain that supervisors must have been personally involved in the
conduct that caused Plaintiff’s alleged harm in order to be held liable under the supervisory
liability doctrine:
In raising a § 1983 claim against a supervisor, a supervisor can be liable “if they
established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused
[the] constitutional harm,” or “if they participated in violating plaintiff’s rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of
and acquiesced in [their] subordinates violations.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Particularly after Iqbal, the
connection between the supervisor’s directions and the constitutional deprivation
must be sufficient to ‘demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus’ or ‘affirmative link’
between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at
issue.’” Id. (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)).
(Dkt. No. 31, pp. 6-7.)
Applying these pleading standards to Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court explicitly noted
Plaintiff’s outright failure to provide any facts “describing how Powell and Lanigan violated his
constitutional rights.” (Dkt. No. 31, p. 7 (emphasis added).) The Court noted that, for example,
Plaintiff could have alleged that “these defendants directed the deprivation of his constitutional
rights or that they created policies which left subordinates with no discretion other than to apply
them in a fashion which actually produced the alleged deprivation.” (Id.) Yet, Plaintiff did not.
Instead, the Amended Complaint makes only the conclusory statement that Lanigan “had
specific knowledge of the within conduct and policy and practice and took no steps to prevent
said actions.” (Id. (quoting Dkt. No. 8 at p. 8.)). As the Court previously explained, “merely
stating that failure to provide training or appropriate training to those persons charged with dayto-day care is conclusory statement.” (Id. (citing Cherry v. Whitehead, No. 09-4161, 2012 WL
253138, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2012)). Finally, the Court further reasoned that, even under a state
created danger theory, a plaintiff must still allege personal involvement. (Id. at p. 8 (citing
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 431 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006)). In short, the Court’s prior
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ruling made abundantly clear that “allegations of personal involvement on the part of Powell and
Lanigan with respect to being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs is lacking in
the amended complaint.” (Id.)
The Third Circuit recently reaffirmed the principle that, under Iqbal, “state officials are
liable only for their own unconstitutional actions.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 319 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. granted, judgment rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Taylor v.
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 192 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2015) (emphasis added). And, the Third Circuit
recently affirmed dismissal of a complaint that was “largely conclusory [in that it] did not allege
any specific conduct by any specific [defendant] ….” Serrano-Gomez v. Houtzdale Correction
Facility, No. 15-2448, 2016 WL 258519, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 21, 2016). In this motion for
reconsideration, Plaintiff has not pointed to any allegations in the Amended Complaint that call
into question the Court’s prior ruling that he failed to sufficiently allege any specific
unconstitutional actions or inactions on the part of Defendants Lanigan and Powell. Therefore,
his motion must be denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. An
appropriate Order will be entered.
DATED: February 1, 2016
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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