BROWN v. MEYER

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/31/16. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RAHEEM BROWN,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-5468 (JBS-KMW)

v.
J. DAVID MEYER, ESQ.,

OPINION
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Raheem Brown, Plaintiff Pro Se
#222987
Atlantic County Justice Facility
5060 Atlantic Avenue
Mays Landing, NJ 08330
SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Raheem Brown seeks to bring a civil rights
complaint pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his attorney,
J. David Meyer. (Complaint, Docket Entry 1). Based on
Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigency and in forma pauperis
application, (Docket Entry 1-1), his request to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Atlantic County

Justice Facility (“ACJF”). He alleges that on June 30, 2014, he
appeared before Drug Court Judge Connor, “who could be a victim
on my case.” (Complaint ¶ 4). The complaint alleges Mr. Meyer
failed to request a change in venue due to the judge’s conflict
of interest. (Id.). Plaintiff requests this Court remove Mr.
Meyers from Plaintiff’s case, order a change of venue, and
reinstate his Drug Court application. (Id. ¶ 5).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
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defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). However,
“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their

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complaints to support a claim.”

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,

704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Primarily, the complaint must be dismissed as Mr. Meyers is
not a “state actor” within the meaning of § 1983. The complaint
does not state whether Mr. Meyers is privately retained or a
public defender; in either case, attorneys are not acting under
color of state law in the course of representing a defendant.
See Polk Ctny. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing a
lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding.”). Plaintiff has not alleged a set of facts
under which this Court could reasonably infer there was a close
nexus between the state and Mr. Meyer. The complaint has
therefore failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
must be dismissed.
Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to
dismissal under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies
leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff’s complaints regarding
his attorney’s performance are more appropriately brought in a
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after he has
exhausted all of his state court remedies. The Court declines to
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open such a petition at this time as it appears from the
complaint that proceedings are still underway in state court.1
The dismissal of his complaint is without prejudice to
Plaintiff’s ability to raise these claims in a § 2254 petition
after he has exhausted state court remedies.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed for

failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

March 31, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

1

It would additionally be inappropriate for this Court to
interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings due to the
abstention doctrine as announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971); see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“[F]ederal courts must abstain in certain
circumstances from exercising jurisdiction over a claim where
resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state
proceeding.”).
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