SHEERAN et al v. M/V SWAN CHACABUCO et al

Filing 102

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/27/2017. (tf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN SHEERAN and KELLY
SHEERAN,
Plaintiffs,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil No. 14-5482 (JBS/AMD)

v.
BLYTH SHIPHOLDING S.A., et al.

OPINION

Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Brian D. Kent, Esq.
LAFFEY BUCCI & KENT LLP
1435 Walnut Street, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
-andBruce David Zeidman, Esq.
COSKY & ZEIDMAN, Attorneys at Law
209 Haddon Ave.
Haddonfield, NJ 08033
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Patrick M. Northen, Esq.
Francis P. Maneri, Esq.
Jordan M. Rand, Esq.
DILWORTH PAXSON, LLP
457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 700
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Attorneys for Defendant Holt Logistics Corp.
John Philip Johnson, Jr., Esq.
COZEN O’CONNOR PC
457 Haddonfield Road, Suite 300
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Attorney for Defendant Inchcape Shipping Services
Mary Elisa Reeves, Esq.
REEVES MCEWING LLP
719 E. Passyunk Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19147
Attorney for Defendant NYK Cool a/k/a Cool Carriers AB

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Steven Sheeran was injured while working aboard

the M/V Swan Chacabucco in the Port of Gloucester, New Jersey.
At this juncture, three Defendants remain: NYK Cool a/k/a Cool
Carriers AB, Holt Logistics Corporation, and Inchcape Shipping
Services. Presently before the Court are motions for summary
judgment filed by each Defendant [Docket Items 73, 76 & 77], and
an accompanying motion to seal filed by Holt. [Docket Item 74.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant all
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and grant Holt’s
unopposed motion to seal.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
The facts surrounding Plaintiff’s injury aboard the M/V

Swan Chacabucco (“the Swan Chacabucco” or “the Ship”) are
straightforward. Plaintiff was employed as a longshoreman with
Gloucester Marine Terminals, LLC (“GTL”) from October 2011 until
the day of his accident on January 23, 2012. (Deposition of
Steven Sheeran (“Sheeran Dep.”) at 27:12-21.) GTL had been hired
as a stevedore to unload cargo at Gloucester Marine Terminal in

1

The Court distills this undisputed version of events from the
parties’ statements of material facts, affidavits, and exhibits,
and recounts them in the manner most favorable to Plaintiff, as
the party opposing summary judgment.
2

Gloucester City, New Jersey. (Deposition of Walter Curran
(“Curran Dep.”) at 70:13-23.) GTL provided all longshoremen with
safety trainings and a copy of a safety manual, although the
parties dispute exactly how thorough and effective this training
was. (Sheeran Dep. at 35:20-36:23.)
On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff was assigned to unload
pallets of fruit from the holds of two ships: one in the
morning, and the Swan Chacabucco in the afternoon. (Id. at
92:18-97:13.) Plaintiff had worked as a hold man discharging
palletized fruit from ships at Gloucester Terminal before. (Id.
at 104:17-24.) Sometime in the afternoon, Plaintiff was in the
process of steadying a full pallet tray in the hold of the Swan
Chacabucco while it was being lowered by a crane when the tray
swayed and Plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of the Ship’s
hold. (Id. at 190:1-191:20.) As soon as Plaintiff slipped, the
tray lowered to the floor and crushed Plaintiff’s left foot.
(Id. at 195:2-12.) Plaintiff suffered “severe and permanent
injuries” from the accident. (Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20, 26,
33, 39, 48, 55.) At the time of Plaintiff’s accident, Steven
Amato was the crane operator and Naman McRae was the signalman,
both other GTL employees who had previously performed those
roles. (Deposition of Steven Amato (“Amato Dep.”) at 105:12-20;
Deposition of Naman McRae (“McRae Dep.”) at 23:12-24.) The tray
3

was owned by GLT and the crane was mounted on the Swan
Chacabucco’s deck and owned by the vessel’s owner. (See Blyth
Shipholding’s Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories ¶¶ 8, 13,
16; see also Deposition of Jens Hedelund (“Hedelund Dep.”) at
70:7-71:7.)
Plaintiff settled a workers’ compensation claim pursuant to
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act against GTL
in June of 2014. (Application for Approval of Partial Settlement
before Administrative Law Judge Adele Odegard.) This suit,
originally filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden
County, followed in September of 2014. [Docket Item 1.] The
three moving Defendants remain: Holt Logistics Corporation, NYK
Cool, and Inchcape Shipping Services.
Holt Logistics Corporation
Holt Logistics Corporation (“Holt Logistics”) is a company
owned by the same family (“the Holt brothers”) that owns
Plaintiff’s former employer, GTL. (Deposition of Peter Inskeep
(“Inskeep Dep.”) at 40:23-41:8.) GTL’s business consists of
“receiving and delivering cargo from both trucks and railroad,
and then loading or discharging cargo to or from ships that
berth there.” (Curran Dep. At 70:13-23.) Holt Logistics is an
independently-managed company that provides information
technology, human resources, payroll, accounting, marketing, and
4

other back-end administrative services to GTL and the other
companies owned by the Holt brothers. (Inskeep Dep. at 40:14-19;
Deposition of Michael J. Quigley (“Quigley Dep.”) at 37:10-19;
Curran Dep. at 108:13-23.) The Client Services Agreement between
GTL and Holt Logistics provides that Holt Logistics will furnish
“administrative services (the Back Office Services)” but is not
“responsible for the operation of [GTL’s] business, nor for
supervision of [GTL’s] employees.” (Client Services Agreement,
Exhibit Under Seal.) Holt Logistics does not have its own safety
department (Quigley Dep. at 37:23-38:2), and GTL managementlevel employees testified at their depositions that Holt
Logistics had no authority to supervise GTL’s stevedoring
operations at the terminal, “run any operations,” provide safety
trainings, train new GTL employees, supervise GTL employees, or
“make decisions on behalf of Gloucester Terminals.”(Curran Dep.
at 72:12-73:2, 146:2-5, 199:4-10; Inskeep Dep. at 96:5-98:10;
Quigley Dep. at 72:15-73:7.) While Holt Logistics employees like
Mr. Inskeep2 consulted for GTL, that consulting appears to have
been limited to making recommendations to improve the efficiency
of GTL’s operations, consistent the Client Services Agreement,
and all findings were reported to the GTL manager of operations

2

Mr. Inskeep was a Holt Logistics employee until he succeeded
Mr. Curran as GTL’s manager of operations on December 31, 2011.
5

who “was in charge of all of Gloucester Terminals” and had the
power to make decisions over GTL staffing and operations.
(Inskeep Dep. at 48:15-49:15.)
NYK Cool
At the time of Plaintiff’s accident, the Swan Chacabucco
was owned by Blyth Shipholding, S.A. (“Blyth Shipholding” or
“Blyth”), and under a term charter to NYK Cool AB a/k/a Cool
Carriers AB (“NYK Cool”). (Charter Party dated July 14, 2011.)
Pursuant to the terms of the charter party, it was the owner’s
responsibility to maintain and repair the vessel and its
equipment, employ its crew, and assume care of the cargo, and
the time charterer’s responsibility to arrange and pay for cargo
and its loading and unloading at various ports, and pay all port
charges. (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 29, 49.) NYK Cool contracted with GTL to
provide stevedoring services at Gloucester Marine Terminal to
discharge palletized fruit exported from Chile from November 1,
2010 through October 31, 2013. (Stevedoring and Terminal
Operating Agreement dated November 1, 2010.) Pursuant to the
terms of the stevedoring agreement, GTL was to “furnish
sufficient and adequate supervision, personnel, suitable
mechanical equipment, gear, forklifts and any other items of
equipment necessary for the handling of the cargo.” (Id. at ¶
1.2.) NYK Cool also contracted with Inchcape Shipping Services
6

(“Inchcape”) to serve as its port agent at Gloucester Marine
Terminal. (Agency Agreement dated December 18, 2011.) The agency
agreement provided that Inchcape would “liase with terminals,
stevedores, receivers, shippers and NYKC’s representative,”
coordinate the arrival, discharge, and departure of NYK Cool’s
vessel at the terminal, and handle all documentation for the
vessel. (Id. at ¶¶ 2.01-2.28.)
NYK Cool did not provide or inspect the crane or cargo tray
involved in Plaintiff’s accident, nor did it pay, train, or
supervise any of the longshoremen. (Hedelund Dep. at 70:772:13.) In fact, it did not have authority to direct the cargo
operations handled by the stevedore GTL, or train or supervise
GTL’s longshoremen. (Id. at 72:9-13; Curran Dep. at 196:5-197:7,
200:16-201:202-21, 204:11-207:23; Inskeep Dep. at 94:5-95:4;
Deposition of Theodoros Bakiroglou (“Bakiroglou Dep.”) at 125:3126:15.) NYK Cool’s port captain, Mr. Hedelund, was not required
to be present at the port for unloading operations but was in
Gloucester on and off during Chilean fruit season, December
through April, including on the day of Plaintiff’s accident.
(Hedelund Dep. at 16:12-17:17:22, 46:14-18.) The port captain’s
role is to “coordinate the discharging of the ship as a
communication link between the stevedores, vessels and agents.”
(Id. at 42:5-11.) This includes communicating, by phone and
7

email, with the ship when, where, and how many gangs will be
required to discharge the vessel based on the number of
containers, the warehouse space available, and the weather. (Id.
at 44:9-46:8.) There is no evidence that Mr. Hedelund was
present at the port at the time of Plaintiff’s accident and he
was not informed that it had occurred until much later. (Id. at
55:2-58:8.)
Inchcape Shipping Services
As mentioned above, Inchcape was hired by NYK Cool to serve
as its port agent at Gloucester Marine Terminal (and at ports in
Philadelphia, Wilmington, Delaware, and Long Beach and Los
Angeles, California). (Agency Agreement dated December 18,
2011.) The agency agreement sets forth Inchcape’s general
responsibilities at port on NYK Cool’s behalf, including, inter
alia: “keep NYKC informed by quickest means of any special
occurrence connected with the vessel, her crew and cargo and
follow in this respect the instructions of NYKC;” “administering
the following contracts on behalf of NYKC which NYKC may have
with other agent [sic] which for this purpose to include
stevedores, terminal operators, pilotage companies, towing
companies;” “supervise and co-ordinate the activities of
stevedores and terminal operators to ensure efficient rotation
and the most economical dispatch of the ships. NYKC Port Captain
8

coordinates activities of stevedore if available;” and “liase
with terminals, stevedores, receivers, shippers and NYKC’s
representative” and handle all documentation for the vessel.
(Id. at ¶¶ 1(b), 3(b), 9(b), and Addendum No. 1 ¶¶ 2.01-2.28.)
The contract specifically provides that “This Agreement is not
an exclusive arrangement and either party may engage other
agents in support of their business activities. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Inchcape’s specific agency instructions with respect to the
Swan Chacabucco’s call at Gloucester Marine Terminal were set
forth in a separate Port Agency Appointment & Pro-forma
Disbursement Account Request. (Port Agency Appointment dated
January 11, 2012.) Generally, this document instructed Inchcape
to keep in daily contact with NYK Cool regarding the discharging
operations of the Ship, and to collect and forward all invoices
for taxes, dues, and levies through NYK Cool’s preferred online
system. (Id.)
Inchcape’s port agent in Gloucester, Mr. Hubbard, described
his role as follows: “I . . . advised ETAs to the terminal, the
port captain, authorities, ordered pilots, tugs, lines handlers,
Customs, Immigration. Made sure paperwork was filed with the
U.S. Coast Guard so the ship could enter without delay, and
communicated with the port captain and the vessel for any
specific requirements.” (Deposition of Justin Hubbard (“Hubbard
9

Dep.”) at 60:24-61:13.) He testified that he did not
“administer” any contracts for the work of stevedores or
terminal operators because that “happened outside us,” by which
he meant that NYK Cool contracted directly with stevedores
without involving Inchcape, and that it was “not [his] job” to
coordinate stevedore activities or provide NYK Cool a plan for
discharging the vessel. (Id. at 61:14-64:14, 89:5-13; see also
id. at 69:11-17.)
Mr. Hubbard’s testimony is corroborated by Mr. Hedelund,
the port captain for NYK Cool: “The agent performs two functions
for us. They have a documentation side under Inchcape Logistics,
which handled all the paperwork related to the cargo. And then
you got an operations side, which handles the ordering of pilots
and linesmen, tugboats, and they handle, typically handle,
owners’ matters like delivery of provisions, spare parts. The
operations department takes care of any bunkering arrangement to
get oil onboard, and the produce the statement of fact together
with the vessel’s Master.” (Hedelund Dep.at 24:22-25:24.) Mr.
Hedelund further testified that, when he was port captain, he
never understood that Inchcape had been contracted to administer
the stevedoring contract in Gloucester or oversee stevedoring
operations. (Id. at 31:10-34:7, 41:8-43:3.) Mr. Bakiroglou, the
Ship’s captain, similarly stated that Inchcape’s role at the
10

port was administrative only. (Bakiroglou Dep. at 129:8-132:8.)
Likewise, Mr. Inskeep testified that he would “have a huge
problem” if Inchcape exercised any supervisory role over GTL’s
stevedores because “they’re not their employees. They have no
say. It’s not their lane. I would probably ban them from the
pier, to be honest with you. . . . They don’t really have a role
directly with us; their role is with the ship, the vessel
owners. It is coordinating, at least my understanding it is
coordinating food, it’s setting up arrival, it’s getting bunker
for them. Has nothing to do with the labor or our operations.”
(Inskeep Dep. at 90:20-93:4.) Mr. Curran, too, said that
Inchcape “never” had control over the GTL stevedores, and that
they merely advised GTL “when the ship was arriving and when
they wanted to sail, potential sailing time. Other than that,
that was pretty much it.” (Curran Dep. at 194:12-195:17.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) generally provides
that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” such
that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A “genuine” dispute of “material” fact
exists where a reasonable jury’s review of the evidence could
result in “a verdict for the non-moving party” or where such
11

fact might otherwise affect the disposition of the litigation.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts, however, fail to
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. Conclusory, selfserving submissions cannot alone withstand a motion for summary
judgment. Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d
254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, here the Plaintiff, and must provide that party the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 378 (2007); Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir.
2014). However, any such inferences “must flow directly from
admissible evidence [,]” because “‘an inference based upon []
speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual
dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.’” Halsey, 750
F.3d at 287 (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d
360, 382 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1990); citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255).
IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (the “LHWCA” or “the Act”), governs an
injured longshoreman’s claims. In particular, § 905 codifies the
12

exclusive remedy for injured longshoremen, and provides in
pertinent part:
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904
of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee . . .
In the event of injury to a person covered under this
chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such
person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
by reason thereof, may bring an action against such
vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions
of section 933 of this title . . . If such person was
employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was
caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
stevedoring services to the vessel. . . . The remedy
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all
other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 905(a)-(b) (emphasis added). The LHWCA defines a
“vessel” to include “vessel’s owner, owner pro hac vice, agent,
operator, charter or bare boat charterer, master, office, or
crew member.” 33 U.S.C. § 902(21). “Although several courts have
identified certain ambiguity in the definition of ‘vessel’ under
the LHWCA, extant authority reflects that the LHWCA plainly
includes ‘time charterers’ and ‘bareboat charters’ . . . within
its statutory scope.” Jones v. Sanko Steampship Co., Ltd., 148
F. Supp. 3d 374, 387 (D.N.J. 2015) (collecting cases). The
Supreme Court has concluded that vessel owners owe longshoremen
three general duties:
(1) a ‘turnover duty,’ which relates to the condition of
the ship upon commencement of stevedoring operations and
13

includes a corollary duty to warn; (2) an ‘active
operations duty,’ which requires that a vessel exercise
reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in
areas that remain under the ‘active control of the
vessel;’ and (3) a ‘duty to intervene,’ which imparts an
obligation upon the vessel to intervene in certain
circumstances in areas under the principal control of
the independent stevedore.
Id. (citing Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451
U.S. 156 (1981) and Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92
(1994)).
LHWCA’s exclusivity provisions do not preclude an injured
longshoreman from asserting negligence claims against third
parties other than the employer. 33 U.S.C. § 933(i). The
“general maritime negligence standard” is “the duty of
exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each
case.” Goldsmith v. Swan Reefer A.S., 173 Fed. Appx. 983, 988
(3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959)). To prevail on a
maritime negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) a duty of
care which obliges the person to conform to a certain standard
of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a reasonably close
causal connection between the offending conduct and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss, injury or damages
suffered by the Plaintiff.” Galentine v. Estate of Stekervetz,
273 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (D. Del. 2003) (citing 1 Thomas
Shoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3 at 170 (3d ed.
14

2001)).
A. Holt Logistics3
Plaintiff alleges that Holt Logistics “was responsible for
controlling, managing, operating, and/or supervising the
stevedoring and/or longshoring operations of Gloucester
Terminals, LLC, and therefore owed a duty to exercise reasonable
care in the work to be performed on the M/V Swan Chacabucco

3

Holt Logistics has also filed an unopposed motion to seal
[Docket Item 74] Exhibit I to its motion for summary judgment,
which contains the Client Services Agreement between Holt
Logistics and GTL. Local Civil Rule 5.3(c) generally allows the
Court to restrict public access to any privileged or otherwise
confidential materials or judicial proceedings upon request by
any party. L. CIV. R. 5.3(c)(1). The party seeking to seal
documents or to otherwise restrict public access must
demonstrate: (a) the nature of the materials or proceedings at
issue; (b) the legitimate private or public interests which
warrant the relief sought; (c) the clearly defined and serious
injury that would result if the relief sought is not granted;
and (d) why a less restrictive alternative to the relief sought
is not available. See L. CIV. R. 5.3(c)(2).
Here, Holt Logistics argues that the Client Services
Agreement, designated as “Confidential,” contains “proprietary,
nonpublic business information . . . which would cause
substantial injury to Holt Logistics if disclosed publicly.”
(Holt Br. at 1, 4.) Defendant also represents that this document
is subject to the parties’ confidentiality agreement. Finally,
Defendant argues that no less restrictive alternative to sealing
is available because only a single exhibit of the entire summary
judgment record will be sealed.
The Court finds that Holt Logistics has satisfied the
factors set forth in L. Civ. R. 5.3(c), and holds that Plaintiff
has demonstrated good cause under the Rule for this exhibit to
be sealed from the public. The Court finds that the Client
Services Agreement contains nonpublic business information, is
limited in scope, and poses a risk of harm to Holt Logistics if
disclosed. Consequently, Holt Logistic’s motion to seal will be
granted.
15

and/or at the Port and to provide a safe work environment for
the Plaintiff Steven Sheeran, who was a business invitee upon
the premises at all relevant times.” (Third Amended Complaint
[Docket Item 62] at ¶ 30.) In other words, Plaintiff asserts
that Holt Logistics exercised day-to-day control over GTL’s
stevedoring operations, and accordingly assumed a duty of care
to longshoremen like Plaintiff. The parties do not dispute that
federal maritime law controls Plaintiff’s dispute, and that his
claims are based in LHWCA’s § 933(i) exception.4
As a general matter, it is the stevedore’s obligation “to
avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards.”
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 170. The LHWCA “requires the stevedore, the
longshoremen’s employer, to provide a ‘reasonably safe’ place to
work and to take such safeguards with respect to equipment and
working conditions as the Secretary of Labor may determine to be
necessary to avoid injury to longshoremen.” Id. (emphasis
added). Maritime tort law imposes a duty of care on one “who
undertakes . . . to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person,” as
Plaintiff contends Holt Logistics has done with respect to GTL’s

4

Accordingly, the Court need not address two of Holt Logistics’
alternative arguments, that it is not liable to Plaintiff as an
alter ego of GTL, or that it is not liable to Plaintiff if New
Jersey common law applies to this action. (Holt Br. at 28-34.)
16

stevedoring operations, only where
(a)
(b)
(c)

His failure to exercise reasonable care increases
the risk of such harm, or
He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or
The harm is suffered because of reliance of the
other or the third person upon the undertaking.

Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 715 (3d Cir. 1982)
(citing Restatement of Torts § 324A.) In short, Holt Logistics
can only be liable to a longshoreman in negligence if it assumed
control over GTL’s stevedoring operations.
Plaintiff relies on testimony from Mr. Inskeep, a former
Holt Logistics employee who consulted with GTL on a number of
“back office” issues, to support his position that Holt
Logistics was directly involved in GTL’s stevedoring operations.
Plaintiff’s expert witness, Thomas Bolcar, opined that “Holt
Logistics, through its employee, Mr. Inskeep, was clearly and
directly involved in and responsible for the stevedoring
operations of Gloucester Terminals” because Mr. Inskeep assisted
Mr. Curran, the then-manager of operations at GTL, in hiring a
new manager of stevedoring operations at GTL, and because Mr.
Inskeep “analyzed operations at Gloucester Terminals, reporting
his observations directly to top Holt Logistics management, and
then implementing changes at Gloucester Terminals.” (Bolcar
Expert Report at 7, 10.) But Plaintiff – and Mr. Bolcar –
misrepresent Mr. Inskeep’s testimony, and ignore his repeated
17

statements that he always worked under, or in consultation with,
Mr. Curran while he was at Holt Logistics and that the
consulting advice he provided to GTL was “almost to a T” what
Holt Logistics had contracted to provide in the Client Services
Agreement. (Inskeep Dep. at 96:5-98:10.) In fact, Mr. Inskeep’s
testimony was consistent with that of other GTL managers that
only GTL managers had authority to oversee GTL’s stevedoring
operations at the terminal or “make any decisions on behalf of
Gloucester Terminals” (Curran Dep. at 72:12-73:2, 146:2-5,
199:4-10; Quigley Dep. at 72:15-73:7), and consistent with the
Client Services Agreement that shows that Holt Logistics
provides “administrative services (the Back Office Services)”
but is not “responsible for the operation of [GTL’s] business,
nor for supervision of [GTL’s] employees.” (Client Services
Agreement, Exhibit Under Seal.) To the contrary, Mr. Inskeep’s
testimony does not show that he or Holt Logistics “under[took]
to perform a duty owed by [GTL] to the [longshoremen],”
Patentas, 687 F.2d at 715, and Mr. Bolcar’s opinion alone cannot
create a dispute of material fact where it is not supported by
facts in the record. Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 755 n.
12 (3d Cir. 2000).5 Because there is no evidence in the record by

5

Plaintiff also relies on purported screenshots of LinkedIn.com
profiles for Mr. Inskeep and Mr. Florkiewicz, GTL’s stevedoring
manager, showing that both men “hold themselves out” as Holt
18

which a jury could reasonably find that Holt Logistics
controlled GTL’s stevedoring operations, Holt Logistics owed
Plaintiff no duty of care as a matter of law. Holt Logistics’
motion for summary judgment will be granted.
B. NYK Cool

Logistics employees. On summary judgment, the Court may only
consider evidence that is “potentially admissible at trial.”
Webster v. Dollar General, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 692, 700
(D.N.J. 2016) (citing City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v.
David/Randall Assocs., 96 F. Supp. 3d 403, 409 n. 4 (D.N.J.
2015) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)). Before considering hearsay
statements in a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
“determine if the nonmoving party can produce admissible
evidence regarding a disputed issue of material fact at trial.”
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d
231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016). The proponent must “explain the
admissible form that is anticipated.” Id.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how these LinkedIn
profiles would be admissible at trial. No witness has
authenticated these printouts, Fed. R. Evid. 901, or explained
when they were created or last updated to determine whether they
are probative of Mr. Inskeep or Mr. Florkiewicz’s relationship
to Holt and GTL, either at the time of Plaintiff’s accident or
today. Moreover, these profiles are a quintessential example of
an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement, i.e. that Mr. Inskeep and Mr.
Florkiewicz are employees of Holt, not GTL. Fed. R. Evid.
801(c). There is no indication in the record that Holt prepared
and posted these profiles, or authorized Mr. Inskeep and Mr.
Florkiewicz to do so, such that these statements are admissible
against Holt as the statement of a party opponent. Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2). Finally, there is no reason to find that Plaintiff
might be able to introduce these statements at trial, i.e. that
if these declarants were called as witnesses at trial, they
would testify that they regard themselves as Holt employees.
Their deposition testimony on point was directly contradictory.
Accordingly, these LinkedIn profiles are inadmissible and are
insufficient to create a material dispute of fact on summary
judgment.
19

Plaintiff’s claims against NYK Cool arise under both 33
U.S.C. §§ 905(b) and 933(i). Plaintiff alleges that NYK Cool “as
charterer of the Swan Chacabucco, owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the work to be performed on the Ship and/or
at the Port and to provide a safe work environment for the
Plaintiff, Steven Sheeran, who was a business invitee upon the
premises at the all [sic] relevant times” that it breached by,
inter alia, failing to inspect the premises, supervise work at
the port, and have a safety program and designated safety
person. (Third. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-22.) He also alleges that NYK
Cool is liable for Plaintiff’s accident as the “owner” or “owner
pro hac vice” of the Swan Chacabucco. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-48.)
The parties do not dispute that NYK Cool was the time
charterer of the Ship, and this conclusion is consistent with
the record presently before the Court. (Compare NYK Cool’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2 with Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant NYK Cool’s Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 2.) A “time
charterer obtains use of a vessel’s carrying capacity for a
fixed charter period, while the vessel owner (bareboat charterer
or owner pro hac vice) retains control of the vessel’s
management and navigation.” Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 378 n.4
(citing Dougherty v. Navigazione San Paolo, S.P.A. Medafrica
Line, 622 F. Supp. 1, 1 (E.D. Pa. 1984)); see also JJ Water
20

Works, Inc. v. San Juan Towing and Marine Servs. Inc., 59 F.
Supp. 3d 380, 392 (D.P.R. 2014) (“The principal distinction
between the [bareboat and time charter] depends on the degree of
control retained by the owner of the vessel. Under a time
charter, the charterer engages for a fixed period of time a
vessel, which remains manned and navigated by the vessel owner,
to carry cargo wherever the charterer instructs. The owner
remains in possession and control of the chartered vessel,
provides a crew, and is responsible for normal operating
expenses.” (internal citations omitted).) Here, the charter
party identifies Blyth Shipholding as the Swan Chacabucco’s
owner and NYK Cool as the “charterer,” for a period beginning
January 1, 2012 up to December 31, 2012. (Charter Party at 1.)
The charter party required Blyth to “maintain the Vessel” and
“provide and pay for the maintenance and repairs to the Vessel,”
and “ensure that the Vessel is at all times manned with an
experienced Master, Officers and Crew” and pay their wages. (Id.
at ¶¶ 11, 34.) In fact, the Ship’s captain, Mr. Bakiroglou,
testified that he was employed by Chartworld on behalf of Blyth.
(Bakiroglou Dep. at 102:5-15.) Because Blyth retained control of
the Ship and provided its crew, NYK Cool could not have been an
owner pro hac vice. Accordingly, NYK Cool can only be liable to
Plaintiff if it breached a duty owed to him in its capacity as a
21

time charterer, responsible for the commercial and logistical
aspects of the Ship’s call at Gloucester Marine Terminal.
“Although the overwhelming weight of authority makes plain
that ‘time charterers’ . . . qualify as a vessel within the
meaning of § 905(b), equal authority states that the duties
applicable to a vessel owner differ from the duties imparted
upon” an owner pro hac vice and a time charterer. Jones, 148 F.
Supp. 3d at 393. “In general, a time charterer that has no
control over the vessel assumes no liability for negligence,
unless the harm occurs within the charterer’s traditional sphere
of control and responsibility or has been transferred to the
charterer by the clear language of the charter agreement.” Id.
(citing Kerr-McGee v. Ma-Ju Marine Servs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1332,
1343 (5th Cir. 1987)). Stated otherwise, “a time charterer may
be liable to a longshoreman only if the time charterer acts
independently negligently or otherwise unreasonably in relation
to its own charter activities.” Id.
Plaintiff’s position that NYK Cool owed him a duty to
provide a safe environment aboard the Ship is inconsistent with
well-settled law that “imposing a duty upon vessels to supervise
and inspect cargo operations for the benefit of longshoremen
then on board would undermine Congress’ intent in § 5(b) [of the
LHWCA] to terminate the vessel’s automatic, faultless
22

responsibility for conditions caused by the negligence or other
defaults of the stevedore.” Howlett, 512 U.S. at 101 (citing
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 168); see also Derr v. Kawasaki Kisen K.K.,
835 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Scindia compels the holding
that the shipowner has no duty to supervise or inspect cargo
loaded or unloaded by stevedores and therefore may not be held
liable for injuries arising out of the stevedore’s failure to
perform his job properly.”).
As applied here, Plaintiff has identified nothing that NYK
Cool or its port captain did or failed to do “in relation to its
own charter activities” that touches on the crane, tray, or
longshoremen who injured Plaintiff, or anything in NYK Cool’s
contracts with either Blyth or GTL by which it assumed a duty to
control stevedoring operations. NYK Cool’s representative
testified that his role at Gloucester Marine Terminal was to
“coordinate the discharging of the ship as a communication link
between the stevedores, vessels and agents” by phone and email.
(Hedelund Dep. at 42:5-11, 44:9-46:8.) Indeed, it is undisputed
that NYK Cool representatives would not have been permitted by
any of GTL’s managers to direct the cargo operations, supervise
longshoremen, or advise the stevedore as to which particular
longshoremen should be permitted to work in which particular
roles in the unloading operation. (Id. at 72:9-13; Curran Dep.
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at 196:5-197:7, 200:16-201:202-21, 204:11-207:23; Inskeep Dep.
at 94:5-95:4; Bakiroglou Dep. at 125:3-126:15.)
In response, Plaintiff points only to his expert Mr.
Bolcar’s opinion that NYK Cool owed, and breached, Scindia
duties and United Nations codes to Plaintiff based on its role
as “the operators” of the Ship. (Bolcar Expert Report at 4, 8,
10.) Contrary to Mr. Bolcar’s assumption that NYK Cool was the
owner, owner pro hac vice, or bareboat charterer of the Ship,
the record demonstrates that NYK Cool was not “responsible for
crewing the vessel and the actions of the crew.” (Id. at 4.)
Those responsibilities rested with Blyth. Where an expert’s
opinion is not grounded in the facts of the case, it may be
disregarded. Elcock, 233 F.3d at 755 n. 12. Accordingly, because
there are no material factual disputes about NYK Cool’s role
with regards to the Ship, and no evidence that it breached any
duties owed or undertaken as the time charterer, NYK Cool’s
motion for summary judgment will be granted.
C. Inchcape Shipping Services
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “Inchcape, as the port
agent, owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in the work to be
performed on the M/V Swan Chacabucco and/or at the Port and to
provide a safe work environment for the Plaintiff, Steven
Sheeran, who was a business invitee upon the premises at the all
24

relevant times,” and breached it by, inter alia, failing to
“safely coordinate the work on the premises” and “hire competent
employees, safety inspectors, contractors and subcontractors.”
(Thid Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40.)
As a general matter, “[t]he liability standard for a
general agent is the same as that for a shipowner under the
LHWCA.” Marino v. Kent Line Intern., 256 Fed. Appx. 448, 452 n.
2 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 902(21)). As the agent for
NYK Cool, “a time charterer [with] no control over the vessel,”
Inchcape likewise assumed “no liability for negligence, unless
the harm occurs within the charterer’s traditional sphere of
control and responsibility or has been transferred to the
charterer by the clear language of the charter agreement.”
Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d. at 393 (citing Kerr-McGee v. Ma-Ju
Marine Servs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Here, it is not “clear” from the language of the agency
agreement that any control or responsibility over stevedoring
operations had been transferred to Inchcape.6 Moreover, agency

6

Plaintiff’s expert Mr. Bolcar’s opinion to the contrary is
unavailing because, as a stevedore superintendent, he is not
qualified to render an opinion about the interpretation or
enforceability of a contract. (See Deposition of Tom Bolcar
(“Bolcar Dep.”) at 156:15-18, 159:11-161:18, 166:10-168:18,
171:18-172:19.) Only a witness “qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid.
702; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
25

authority “exists only in accordance with manifestations of the
principal and, as to transactions capable of delegation to the
agent,” and NYK Cool could not have delegated responsibility
over stevedoring operations which it itself did not hold. Third
Restatement of Agency § 7 & Cmt. (a). The agency agreement, when
read as a whole, does not unambiguously obligate Inchcape to
supervise the activity of the stevedores, as Plaintiff argues.7
Contracts “must be read as a whole, without artificial emphasis
on one section, with a consequent disregard for others.” Borough
of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Mercer,
755 A.2d 637, 645 (N.J. App. Div. 2000). Paragraph 9(b), which
would be Plaintiff’s strongest evidence that Inchcape undertook
responsibility for stevedoring operations, is internally
inconsistent: it both provides that “The Agent shall supervise
and co-ordinate the activities of the stevedores and terminal
operators,” and that “NYKC’s port captain coordinates activities
of stevedores if available.” (Agency Agreement.) Both of these
statements likewise stand in tension with Paragraph 7’s non-

(1993).
7 “The interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a legal
question for the court and may be decided on summary judgment
unless there is uncertainty, ambiguity or the need for parol
evidence in aid of interpretation. . . . The interpretation of
the terms of a contract are decided by the court as a matter of
law unless the meaning is both unclear and dependent on
conflicting testimony.” Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty. Improvement
Authority, 962 A.3d 591, 600 (N.J. App. Div. 2009).
26

exclusivity provision, “This agreement is not an exclusive
agreement and either party may provide services to or engage
other agents in support of their business activities.” (Id.) And
Plaintiff makes no effort to square his isolated reading of a
few stray lines in the agency agreement with the specific
instructions given to Inchcape with respect to the Swan
Chacabucco’s call at Gloucester Marine Terminal in January,
2012, which says nothing about stevedores (see generally Port
Agency Appointment), and with NYK Cool’s separate agreement with
GTL for stevedoring services. (See Stevedoring and Terminal
Operating Agreement.) Accordingly, because Inchcape’s agency
agreement did not transfer responsibility over stevedoring
operations “by the clear language of the charter agreement,” it
can only be liable to Plaintiff for his injury if it acted
negligently with respect to something within its “traditional
sphere of control and responsibility” as port agent. Jones, 148
F. Supp. 3d. at 393.
The record is devoid of any evidence that Inchcape’s role
as a port agent implicated the equipment or longshoremen that
caused Plaintiff’s accident. Rather, Inchcape has pointed to
consistent testimony from Mr. Hubbard and representatives from
NYK Cool, GTL, and the Ship demonstrating that its role as agent
was entirely administrative and logistical, and consisted
27

primarily of filing paperwork for the Ship and communicating the
timing of the Ship’s arrival at port and unloading operations
with all relevant parties, including NYK Cool, the Ship’s
Captain, the stevedore, the Coast Guard, and Customs and
Immigration. (Hubbard Dep. at 60:24-64:14, 69:11-17, 89:5-13;
see also Hedelund Dep.at 24:22-25:24, 31:10-34:7, 41:8-43:3;
Bakiroglou Dep. at 129:8-132:8; Inskeep Dep. at 90:20-93:4;
Curran Dep. at 194:12-195:17.) In response, Plaintiff relies
solely on Mr. Bolcar’s inadmissible expert opinion to create a
material legal, not factual, dispute about the interpretation of
the agency agreement. Because there are no material factual
disputes about Inchcape’s role with regards to the Ship, and no
evidence that it breached any duties owed or undertaken as the
port agent for the Ship’s time charterer, Inchcape’s motion for
summary judgment will be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant all
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and Holt Logistics’s
unopposed motion to seal. An accompanying Order will be entered.

March 27, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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