INGRAM v. COUNTY OF CAMDEN et al

Filing 210

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/15/2019. (rtm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

XAVIER INGRAM,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
14-5519 (JBS-KMW)

v.
COUNTY OF CAMDEN, et al.,
Defendants.

DARREN A. DICKERSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.
14-6905 (RBK-KMW)

v.
COUNTY OF CAMDEN, et al.,

MEMORANDUM
OPINION

Defendants.

SIMANDLE, District Judge:
1.

On June 14, 2014, Plaintiff Xavier Ingram was allegedly

assaulted by several Camden County Police Officers resulting in
catastrophic injuries including quadriplegia, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. As the alleged assault unfolded, Plaintiff Darren
A. Dickerson was a bystander who yelled curse words at the police
officers about their misconduct and allegedly was also attacked by
certain police officers, causing injury, also in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs filed separate suits in this Court which

were

consolidated

for

purposes

of

management

and

pretrial

discovery before the Honorable Karen M. Williams, U.S. Magistrate
Judge.
2.

This matter comes before the Court by way of motion to

consolidate for trial the cases of Ingram v. County of Camden,
Civil No. 14-5519 (JBS-KMW), (hereinafter “the Ingram matter”)
with Dickerson v. County of Camden, Civil No. 14-6905 (RBK-KMW),
(hereinafter “the Dickerson matter”) filed by Plaintiff Darren A.
Dickerson. (See Dickerson Mot. [Docket Item 172].)1 The present
motion is opposed by Defendants County of Camden, Camden County
Police

Department,

John

Scott

Thomson,

and

Orlando

Cuevas

(hereinafter “County Defendants”), who are defendants in both the
Ingram matter and in the Dickerson matter, and by Defendant Merck
in the Ingram matter.2 (See County’s Opp’n [Docket Item 190];
Merck’s Opp’n [Docket Item 195].) Thereafter, Plaintiff Dickerson
filed a reply brief. (See Dickerson Reply [Docket Item 201].)

1

The present motion and the parties’ related submissions were
filed solely in the Ingram matter, pursuant to Rule 42.1, L. Civ.
R. Therefore, any citations to documents on the record in this
Memorandum Opinion shall be made to items that are present on the
Ingram docket, unless otherwise noted. The undersigned decides the
consolidation motion as the judge to whom the earlier-filed matter
was assigned, pursuant to Rule 42.1, L. Civ. R.
2

Defendant Marchiafava in the Ingram matter and Defendant Shockley
in the Dickerson matter each joined County Defendants’ brief. (See
Letters [Docket Items 191, 193].)
2

The Court has considered the submissions and decides the
pending motion [Docket Item 172] pursuant to Rule 78(b), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff Dickerson’s

motion to consolidate these cases will be granted.
4.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a),3 “district

courts have ‘broad power’ to consolidate cases that share ‘common
question[s] of law or fact.’” A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ellerman
Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 812 (1965); citing United States
v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a district
court

has

“broad

discretion

in

its

rulings

concerning

case

management”)). “The mere existence of common issues, however, does
not require consolidation.” Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford
Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 80-81 (D.N.J. 1993) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Rather, “[t]he savings of time and
effort gained through consolidation must be balanced against the
inconvenience,

delay

or

expense

that

might

result

from

simultaneous disposition of the separate actions.” Id. (citations

3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) specifically provides that,
“[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or
fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; (3)
or issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 42(a).
3

omitted). However, ultimately, “a court may consolidate cases if,
in

its

discretion,

‘consolidation

would

facilitate

the

administration of justice.’” Doug Brady, Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg.
Laborers

Statewide

Funds,

250

F.R.D.

171,

176

(D.N.J.

2008)

(quoting Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Pan Am. Resources, Inc.,
775 F.Supp. 759, 761 (D.Del.1991)).
5.

Plaintiff Dickerson argues that the Ingram and Dickerson

matters should be consolidated because both matters arise from the
same series of events, both matters involve the same causes of
action,

both

matters

include

the

same

law

firm

representing

Defendant County of Camden, both matters were consolidated for the
purposes of discovery, both matters will include the same videotape
evidence, substantially the same fact witnesses,4 and the same
expert witnesses.5 (Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 8.) There
is substantial overlap of named defendants.6 Plaintiff Dickerson

4

Dickerson has identified eight fact witnesses who would testify
as to both incidents.
5

Plaintiff Dickerson concedes that he and Plaintiff Ingram would
rely on different doctors’ testimony regarding their respective
injuries. (Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 8.)
6

The Ingram and Dickerson pleadings both name Camden County,
Camden County Police Department, Chief Thomson, and Officer
Cuevas, each of whom is represented by the law firm of Brown &
Connery. Ingram also names Officer Marchiafava (represented by
Brown & Connery), Officer Gennetta (represented by Zeller &
Wieliczko) and Officer Merck (represented by Blumberg & Wolk),
while Dickerson names Officer Shockley (represented by Brown &
Connery).
4

further argues that consolidation of the Ingram and Dickerson
matters would conserve the resources of the Court, of Defendant
County of Camden (and therefore of the taxpayers), and of both
Plaintiff Dickerson and Plaintiff Ingram. (Id. at 9.) Finally,
Plaintiff Dickerson asserts that in the absence of consolidation,
two separate trials may yield two inconsistent verdicts with
respect to Defendants’ liability in these two matters. (Id.)
6.

County Defendants oppose Plaintiff Dickerson’s motion on

the grounds that the facts underlying the Ingram matter will be
relevant only as background or context to the Dickerson matter,
not as substantive evidence of the allegations set forth by
Plaintiff Dickerson. (See County Opp’n [Docket Item 190], 9.)
County

Defendants

appropriate

because

further
the

assert

Ingram

and

that

consolidation

Dickerson

matters

is

not

include

separate Officer Defendants and because the Ingram matter includes
a number of Daubert issues that are not present in the Dickerson
matter. (See id. at 9-10.) County Defendants argue that those
Officer Defendants who are only in the Dickerson matter should not
be required to defend against the allegations in the Ingram matter,
and vice versa. (See id. at 10.) County Defendants go on to assert
that similar allegations in the two matters regarding police
practices and Monell liability and the fact that the parties rely
on the same experts in both matters are insufficient grounds to
justify consolidation of Ingram and Dickerson. (See id. at 10-11.)

5

County Defendants also emphasize that the Ingram and Dickerson
matters rely on separate facts and only have certain overlapping
fact witnesses. (See id. at 11-12.) Finally, County Defendants
argue that the fact that County Defendants are represented by the
same counsel in both Ingram and Dickerson is irrelevant and that
Plaintiff Dickerson is overstating the efficiency to be realized
by combining the two matters. (See id.)7
7.

Defendant Merck opposes Plaintiff Dickerson’s present

motion, asserting that the events in the Ingram and Dickerson
matters are not intertwined, as they involve separate defendants
and separate legal claims. (See Merck Opp’n [Docket Item 195], 4.)
Defendant

Merck

also

asserts

that

he

will

be

prejudiced

by

consolidating these two matters; in particular he foresees being
prejudiced if Plaintiff Dickerson’s Monell expert is permitted to
discuss the expert’s opinion regarding Defendant Merck’s personnel

7

County Defendants also note that Plaintiff Ingram has taken no
position regarding Plaintiff Dickerson’s motion. (See County’s
Opp’n [Docket Item 190], 12.) However, it is unclear to the Court
why any party’s decision to neither support nor oppose a motion
should weigh in favor of or against such a motion. County
Defendants then assert that “[Plaintiff] Ingram does not share any
of
[Plaintiff]
Dickerson’s
concerns
regarding
resources,
inconsistent verdicts, or anything else.” (Id.) The Court sees no
basis for County Defendants’ assertions regarding what concerns
Plaintiff Ingram may or may not have. As Plaintiff Ingram has not
filed any submissions with regard to the present motion, the Court
is left to guess as to what basis County Defendants rely upon in
order to make such seemingly definitive assertions on behalf of
Plaintiff Ingram. All that we know is that Plaintiff Ingram does
not oppose the consolidation of his case with Plaintiff
Dickerson’s.
6

records and the expert’s opinion that Defendant Merck should have
received a remedial intervention as a result of his record. (See
id. at 5-6.) Defendant Merck also argues that the jury may be
confused, because it is possible that different attorneys may be
advocating on behalf of Defendant Marchiafava with respect to the
Ingram matter as opposed to the Dickerson matter. (See id. at 78.)
8.

In his reply brief, Plaintiff Dickerson reiterates his

position that there is significant overlap of the facts, witnesses,
and parties in the Ingram and Dickerson matters, and that there
are significant efficiency benefits to be realized by all parties,
by the Court, and by the taxpayer, were these two matters to be
consolidated. (Dickerson Reply [Docket Item 201], 2-6.)
9.

The Ingram matter revolves around an encounter between

Camden County Police officers and Plaintiff Ingram on June 12,
2014; the Dickerson matter revolves around Plaintiff Dickerson’s
observations of Plaintiff Ingram’s encounter, his comments to
Camden County Police officers during that encounter, and the
officers’ immediate reaction to Plaintiff Dickerson’s comments.
(See Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 2; County’s Opp’n [Docket
Item 190], 2-3; Merck’s Opp’n [Docket Item 195], 1.) Both matters
involve claims regarding inappropriate police practices imposing
excessive
Ingram’s

force

and

encounter

Monell
with

liability

Camden

7

arising

County

Police

from

Plaintiff

officers

and

Plaintiff Dickerson’s subsequent reaction to that encounter. (See
generally Second Amended Complaint [Docket Item 64], in the Ingram
matter; Complaint [Docket Item 1], in the Dickerson matter.) The
parties agree that many of the expert witnesses in these two
matters will overlap, though they may opine on slightly different
facts in relation to the claims of the two plaintiffs. (See
Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 8; County’s Opp’n [Docket Item
190], 11; Merck’s Opp’n [Docket Item 195], 5.) The parties appear
to agree that there are likely to be common fact witnesses in these
two matters. (See Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 8; County’s
Opp’n [Docket Item 190], 11; Merck’s Opp’n [Docket Item 195], 4.)
The parties further appear to agree that at least some of the facts
surrounding
necessary

Plaintiff

to

present

Ingram’s
at

the

encounter
trial

of

with
the

police

will

Dickerson

be

matter,

including the same videotape evidence, in order to provide the
jury

with

the

proper

background

and

context

to

Plaintiff

Dickerson’s claims. (See Dickerson Br. [Docket Item 172-5], 8;
County’s Opp’n [Docket Item 190], 9; Merck’s Opp’n [Docket Item
195], 1.)8

8

Defendant Merck’s opposition brief [Docket Item 195] does not
directly address Plaintiff Dickerson’s claims that certain
evidence regarding Plaintiff Ingram’s encounter with police will
be necessary at the trial of the Dickerson matter, though Defendant
Merck does assert that the two matters are “not ‘intertwined,’”
that the two matters include different Officer Defendants, and
that each matter includes certain distinct circumstances. (Merck’s
Opp’n [Docket Item 195], 4.)
8

10.

Assessing these common factors against the prospects of

inconvenience or unfair prejudice to litigants and confusion of
the jury, the Court finds that these two cases involve a number of
common questions of law and fact, that there would be significant
time and expense saved by the parties, the Court, and the public
purse, were the Ingram and Dickerson matters to be consolidated,
and, therefore, that consolidation of the Ingram and Dickerson
matters “would facilitate the administration of justice.”9
11.

The Court has considered County Defendants’ argument,

that the Officer Defendants in each of the two matters are not
identical, and that they should not be required to defend against
claims made in matters to which they are not a party. As noted,
three Officer Defendants are named only in Ingram (i.e. Machiafava,
Gennetta, and Merck) and Officer Shockley is the only defendant
named solely in Dickerson. However, no party has stated that a
jury

may

confuse

one

Officer

Defendant

in

one

matter

for

a

different Officer Defendant in the other matter, nor has any party
described

any

“inconvenience”

or

“expense”

that

they

might

9

County Defendants observe, supra, that the Ingram matter has
certain Daubert motions pending that do not involve any of the
issues in the Dickerson matter. However, two matters do not need
to present completely identical questions of law and fact in order
to be consolidated, and furthermore no party has asserted that the
Daubert motions currently pending in the Ingram matter would cause
any “inconvenience, delay or expense” to the parties present in
only the Dickerson matter, and the Court does not find any
substantial issue.
9

experience as a result of consolidation. Even from the County’s
perspective, separate trials would be substantially redundant and
more expensive than one consolidated trial.10 The Court agrees with
County

Defendants’

assessment

that

consolidation

may

lead

to

certain Officer Defendants sitting through certain days of trial
that do not directly address the claims against them, (see County’s
Opp’n [Docket Item 190], 10); however, such minimal delays for one
party in these matters, which were each filed in 2014, are not
significant enough to override the advantages of consolidation
described, supra. Moreover, the trial schedule can be managed to
minimize such unnecessary days of attendance.
12.

The Court is mindful of the potential for prejudice

described by Defendant Merck, supra; however, any such prospect
can easily be cured by limiting instructions or other remedies
available to the parties and the Court under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

Defendant

County

of

Camden

faces

Monell

liability

related to the training and supervision of Defendant Merck and
others in Ingram, and having a separate trial regarding Monell

10

The Court notes its decision is not based upon the prospect of
avoiding inconsistent verdicts, as argued by Plaintiff Dickerson.
Liability or non-liability for excessive force in one case does
not imply that the same result should be reached in the other. To
this extent, as the jury will be instructed, the jury will be
informed that it must consider each plaintiff’s claims separately
and reach individual verdicts independent of each other.
10

liability in Dickerson does not eliminate the prospect of Monell
evidence being adduced that involves Defendant Merck’s record.
13.

Moreover,

after

various

dispositive

motions

are

addressed in Ingram and Dickerson, the Court will be in position
to assess the final scope of trial. At that time, the Court may
also consider whether the trial should be bifurcated into two
phases, with Phase I concerning questions of individual liability
of Officer Defendants and Phase II, if necessary, addressing Monell
liability

and

damages.

Such

a

determination

awaits

further

developments.
14.

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Dickerson’s

motion to consolidate the cases of Ingram v. County of Camden,
Civil No. 14-5519 (JBS-KMW), with Dickerson v. County of Camden,
Civil No. 14-6905 (RBK-KMW) [Docket Item 172] for trial will be
granted. An accompanying Order will be entered.

January 15, 2019
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

11