BROWN v. DONIO et al
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/8/2014. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RAHEEM H. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
HON. JUDGE DONIO, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil No. 14-5697 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Raheem H. Brown, Pro Se
222987
Atlantic County Justice Facility
5060 Atlantic Avenue
Mays Landing, NJ 08330
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Plaintiff, Raheem H. Brown, incarcerated at the Atlantic County
Justice Facility, Mays Landing, New Jersey seeks to bring this action
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Based on his affidavit of indigence, the
Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
The Court must now review the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint must be
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff seeks to sue three state court judges sitting in
Atlantic County (Judge Donio, Judge Michael Connor, and Judge Kyran
Connor), three Atlantic County prosecutors (Julie Horowitz, Jason
Wertzberger, and James McClain) and the Atlantic County vicinage Drug
Court Coordinator (Celeste Goodson). (Complt., Attachment,
Statement of Claims).
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants should
have moved his case from Atlantic County to Cumberland County, his
county of residence, and that they should not have denied him the
opportunity to have his case heard in drug court. Plaintiff claims
the judges denied him his constitutional rights and that his case
has been “tampered with by the whole Atlantic County criminal
system.” (Complt., Attachment, Statement of Claims). He argues that
his denial of entry to drug court was based on bias and “bogus
charges.” (Id.).
Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and asks
that this Court “move [this] case to another venue and resubmit [his]
drug court application.” (Complt., ¶ 5).
2
DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or
entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to
prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA directs district
courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
and is proceeding as an indigent.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening
for failure to state a claim,1 the complaint must allege “sufficient
1
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same
as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
3
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler
v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d
Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.
2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287
F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
4
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
SeeWest v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.
Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff seeks to sue three judges and three prosecutors in
this action.
However, these defendants are immune to suit under §
1983.
First, as to the Defendant Judges, “[i]t is a well-settled
principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune from a suit for
money damages.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991)). “A judge will
not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,
was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Furthermore, “[a] judge is
absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural
errors.” Id. at 359.
Judicial immunity also extends to suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967). “[Judicial]
immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.” Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11–12. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for
5
nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial
capacity.” Id.
In determining whether an act qualifies as a
“judicial act,” courts looks to “the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. “Second, a judge
is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
Plaintiff alleges that the judges in his case improperly denied
him a change of venue and the opportunity for his case to be heard
in drug court. Plaintiff does not allege that these actions were taken
outside of the Defendant Judges’ judicial capacity, nor that the
Judges acted without jurisdiction.
As such, the Complaint must be
dismissed as to Defendant Judges Donio, M. Connor, and K. Connor.
Second, with regard to the Defendant Prosecutors, in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for acts
that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process,” id. at 430–31, including use of false testimony
and suppression of evidence favorable to the defense by a police
fingerprint expert and investigating officer. Since Imbler, the
Supreme Court has held that “absolute immunity applies when a
prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding, or appears
6
in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant
application.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009)
(citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently confirmed prosecutorial immunity in § 1983 actions in
LeBlanc v. Stedman, 483 F. App’x 666 (3d Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Prosecutors improperly
denied him access to drug court as well as a change of venue. As this
sort of alleged misconduct consists of acts taken in their role as
advocates for the state, the § 1983 claims against the Defendant
Prosecutors Horowitz, Wertzberger, and McClain will be dismissed on
the ground of absolute immunity.
4.
Claim against Court Administrator
Plaintiff asserts that the Drug Court Coordinator, Defendant
Celeste Goodson, denied him access to drug court based on bias and
bogus charges in violation of his constitutional rights.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has extended
quasi-judicial immunity to court clerks who are alleged to have acted
incorrectly or improperly in carrying out their official duties. See,
e.g., Wicks v. Lycoming Co., 456 F. App'x 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2012)
(finding that court administrator was entitled to absolute immunity
for transferring case from one judge to another); Wallace v. Abell,
217 F. App'x 124 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding Clerk of Court absolutely
immune from a suit for damages for discretionary acts, and that court
7
personnel are qualifiedly immune for nondiscretionary acts such as
entering orders and notifying parties); see also Alfred v New Jersey,
2013 WL 4675536 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2013)(slip copy)(holding that Court
Administrator is entitled to “at least” qualified immunity for his
authorization of an arrest warrant issued by a judge, as the action
is “integral to the judicial function and within the responsibility
assigned to court personnel”).
Likewise, in this case, Defendant Goodson’s action in denying
a transfer to drug court appears integral to the judicial function
and within the responsibility assigned to court personnel, and this
Defendant should be entitled to at least, qualified immunity.
5.
Abstention
To the extent Plaintiff's Complaint seeks this Court's
intervention in his state prosecution, such intervention is
unwarranted under the doctrine of abstention. The doctrine has
developed since Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and it
“espoused a strong federal policy against federal-court interference
with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982).2 This Court will not interfere
2
This Court also notes that if Plaintiff is convicted, he may
not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement by means of
an action under § 1983; rather he must exhaust his state remedies
and then, if appropriate, file a federal habeas application. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Nor can he seek monetary
8
with Plaintiff’s ongoing state court criminal matter, as Plaintiff
has shown no extraordinary circumstances for doing so.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be
dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and
§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2), for seeking relief from immune defendants and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
An
appropriate Order follows.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated:
October 8, 2014
relief under § 1983 if this Court's adjudication would call into
question the validity of his criminal conviction, unless his
conviction first has been overturned on appeal or in state or federal
collateral proceedings. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?