HOYLE v. PORTO
Filing
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OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/10/14. (js)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
________________________________
:
ARTHUR LEE HOYLE,
:
: Civil Action No. 14-5726 (RMB)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
JOHN C. PORTO, J.S.C,
:
:
Defendant.
:
_______________________________________
:
BUMB, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s
submission of a civil complaint, executed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, see Docket Entry No. 1 (“Complaint”), that arrived
accompanied by Plaintiff’s duly executed application to proceed
in this matter in forma pauperis.
See Docket Entry No. 1-1.
In
light of the in forma pauperis application and the absence of
three disqualifying strikes, the Court will grant Plaintiff in
forma pauperis status and order the Clerk to file the Complaint.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires
this Court to screen the Complaint and sua sponte dismiss any
claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
relief from a defendant immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff is a pretrial
detainee suing the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division,
judge presiding over Plaintiff’s currently ongoing criminal
prosecution.
See Docket Entry No. 1, at 4-5.
Specifically,
Plaintiff states that the “judge violated [Plaintiff’s] rights by
not giving [Plaintiff] a fair chance, [by] show[ing] racial acts,
never stand[ing] for the law[,] always work[ing] around the law
and with the [S]tate [prosecutor,] so [Plaintiff] had no rights.”
Id. at 5,.
These allegations make it abundantly clear that Plaintiff:
(a) is suing his presiding judge solely in the judge’s official
capacity; and (b) has no claims against other individuals.
Plaintiff’s claims raised in the Complaint are subject to
sua sponte dismissal.
“A judicial officer in the performance of
his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable
for his judicial acts.”
Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Azubuko v.
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)).
“A judge will not be
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he
will be subject to liability only when he has acted ‘in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’”
Id. (citations omitted).
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Here the Complaint contains no allegations suggesting, even
vaguely, that Plaintiff’s presiding judge had been acting outside
the scope of his judicial capacity, or in the absence of his
jurisdiction.
Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
presiding judge’s judicial immunity: to the extent Plaintiff
intends to seek damages.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s application for injunctive relief, see
Docket Entry No. 1, at 6 (“[Plaintiff] want[s] the [S]tate to
remove [the presiding judge] from [Plaintiff’s criminal] case,
[and to] look into how [the presiding judge] look[s] over other .
. . cases [where the defendants are African-American or
Hispanic]”), is unavailing.1
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Azubuko, 443 F.3d at
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This Court has no capacity to direct the State to take
any action, since the State is not a party to this matter. In
addition, this Court, having its mandate limited to the powers
granted under Article III, has no capacity to conduct any form of
“investigation.” “‘[C]ourts are only empowered to decide cases
and controversies’ as our Article III jurisprudence defines
them.” Birdman v. Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 173, 56
V.I. 973 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Felmeister v. Office of Att’y
Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2 (vesting federal “judicial Power” to adjudicate of
“Cases” and “Controversies,” not to conduct “investigations”).
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303-04.
Here, “the Complaint relies on judicial acts as the
basis for the claims of discrimination[, and] the actions taken
by [the presiding judge] were actions taken squarely within the
judge[’s] official capacity.
. . .
Inasmuch as [P]laintiff[]
did not allege that a declaratory decree
was violated or that
declaratory relief was unavailable, [his] claims for injunctive
relief are barred.”
Dahl v. Johnston, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128573, at *6-7 (D. Del. Sept. 15, 2014) (citing, inter alia,
Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 304).
“Therefore, the [C]ourt [is obligated
to] dismiss the claims against the [presiding judge] as they are
legally frivolous[,] and the Judge[ is] immune from suit pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and
(2).”
Id. at *7.
Put another way, in the event Plaintiff wishes to seek
recusal of his presiding judge, his avenue toward that remedy
cannot be a federal civil action in this District: it should be:
(a) a motion (filed under the state court rules) to the presiding
judge; and (b) if Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the outcome of
his motion, an appellate application filed in the Appellate
Division.
“Rule 1:12-2 provides that ‘any party, on motion made
to the judge before trial and stating the reasons therefor, may
seek that judge’s disqualification.’”
Chandok v. Chandok, 406
N.J. Super. 595, 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (brackets
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and ellipsis omitted) (reversing the decision of the Law
Division’s judge who denied a motion for recusal).
Correspondingly, the Complaint will be dismissed.
[Where] the District Court . . . conclude[s] that [the
plaintiff’s] filings [are] inadequate, . . . [leave to
amend] must be granted in the absence of . . . futility
of amendment. [See] Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
Since, here, Plaintiff’s claims are expressly limited to the
challenges based on the acts taken by Plaintiff’s presiding judge
in the judge’s official capacity, it is apparent that granting
Plaintiff leave to amend those claims would be futile.
Therefore, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: October 10, 2014
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