R. et al v. HADDONFIELD FRIENDS SCHOOL
Filing
63
OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/31/2016. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SKY R., a minor, by and through his
parent & natural guardian, Angela R.,
and ANGELA R., individually,
Plaintiffs,
:
Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez
:
Civil Action No. 14-5730
:
v.
OPINION
:
HADDONFIELD FRIENDS SCHOOL,
Defendant.
:
:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion [Doc. 31] for
partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 seeking dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA and NJLAD. Oral argument was heard
on the motion on January 14, 2016 and the record of that proceeding is
incorporated here. For the reasons placed on the record that day, and those
set forth below, Defendant’s motion will be granted.
Background
At the time this lawsuit was commenced, Plaintiff Sky R. was a ten
year old boy diagnosed with attention dysfunction and dyslexia. (Compl. at
¶¶ 1, 8.) He attended Defendant Haddonfield Friends School (“HFS”) from
September 2012 until February 13, 2014, at which time he was in fourth
grade. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Angela R. is Sky’s mother. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
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Plaintiffs allege that HFS discriminated against Sky by failing to allow
appropriate, reasonable modifications for his disabilities and by subjecting
him to public humiliation and shaming due to his disabilities. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
They further contend that HFS improperly retaliated against Sky and his
parents in response to the vigorous advocacy of the parents in attempt to
secure appropriate, reasonable modifications to allow Sky access to the
education offered by HFS. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert that HFS expelled
Sky for discriminatory reasons and unlawfully terminated his enrollment
on February 13, 2014. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 82.)
Angela R. initiated this lawsuit on September 15, 2014, individually
and on Sky’s behalf. The Complaint states claims for discrimination and
retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794 1 (Counts I and IV), Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (“ADA”) (Counts II and V), and New Jersey’s Law
Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. §10:5-1 (“NJLAD”) (Counts III and
VI).
Section 504 prohibits programs that receive federal funds from
discriminating against an individual based on disability: “No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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2
Motion to Amend
After briefing and argument on HFS’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
ADA claims, which was denied without prejudice on April 22, 2015
subject to further discovery, [Doc. 15], HFS filed an Answer to the
Complaint on May 19, 2015. HFS asserted no counterclaims against
Plaintiffs or third-party complaints in the original Answer. [Doc. 20.]
On July 9, 2015, HFS filed a motion to amend its Answer to include
a Counterclaim against Plaintiff Angela R. and to join Richard Londen as
a Third-Party Defendant. [Doc. 26.] HFS alleges that Angela and Richard
attended a town hall meeting at HFS on June 9, 2015, and distributed a
defamatory letter to attendees along with a copy of the Complaint in this
matter. (Def. Br., Ex. A, Counterclaim at ¶¶ 5-6, 12; Ex. B, Third Party
Compl. at ¶¶ 5-6, 12.) According to HFS, the letter contained false
statements about HFS, its administration, staff, and Board of Trustees
causing HFS to incur damage to its reputation and character, as well as
humiliation and embarrassment. (Def. Br., Ex. A, Counterclaim at ¶¶ 1617; Ex. B., Third Party Compl. at ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiffs have opposed
allowing amendment of the Answer to assert the Counterclaim against
Angela and Third Party Complaint against Richard. The Court decides
this issue on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).
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Defendant argues, relying primarily on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a), that leave to amend should be liberally granted and none
of the circumstances warranting denial of a motion to amend are present
here-undue delay, prejudice, bad faith or futility. Indeed, Defendant argues
that this Motion was filed within the Court’s deadline to amend the
pleadings and one month after the precipitating events. Thus, its Motion,
which seeks to add a defamation counterclaim against Angela and file a
third-party complaint against Richard for the same, should be granted.
To the contrary, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 15(d) governs Defendant’s
Motion because it attempts to supplement its pleading with an afteracquired counterclaim for defamation. Plaintiffs argue that the defamation
claim governed by state law is a permissive counterclaim unrelated to the
original complaint and Defendant fails to demonstrate that this Court has
jurisdiction over same. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that the defamation
claim is asserted in bad faith, will increase expenses and delay proceedings
on its federal civil rights claims and the claim is futile. Thus, the Court
should exercise its discretion and deny Defendant’s Motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings
and provides that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so
requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, here, Defendant seeks to
4
supplement its pleading. Thus, Rule 15(d) governs this dispute. The Rule
provides:
On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms,
permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date
of the pleading to be supplemented. The court may permit
supplementation even though the original pleading is defective
in stating a claim or defense. The court may order that the
opposing party plead to the supplemental pleading within a
specified time.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Courts within the Third Circuit have found that leave
to supplement a pleading is within the sound discretion of the court and
should be granted “if it will promote the just disposition of the case, will not
cause undue prejudice or delay and will not prejudice the rights of any
parties.” Medeva Pharma Ltd. v. American Home Products Corp., 201
F.R.D. 103, 104 (D. Del. 2001) (citing The Proctor & Gamble Co. v. McNeilPPC, Inc., No. 98-361, 1998 WL 1745118 (D. Del Dec. 7, 1998)); see also
United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 694 F. Supp. 1158, 1187 (D.N.J. 1998).
Moreover, because Defendant is seeking to include a counterclaim
with its proposed amended answer, Rule 13 is also implicated and provides
that “[t]he court may permit a party to file a supplemental pleading
asserting a counterclaim that matured or was acquired by the party after
serving an earlier pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e). “Courts have found that
‘Rule 13(e) is to be read in conjunction with Rule 15(d), which governs the
5
filing of supplemental pleadings.’” Board of Trustees of Nat. Elevator
Indus. Health Ben. Plan v. McLaughlin, No. 12-4322, 2013 WL 4788190, at
*3 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2013).
Finally, with regard to the proposed third-party complaint, Rule 14
states, in pertinent part, that a third-party plaintiff must “by motion, obtain
the court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 10 days after
serving its original answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). The decision to permit
the filing of a third-party complaint is within the discretion of the court.
See Spencer v. Cannon Equipment Co., No. 07–2437, 2009 WL 1883929,
*2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2009); United States v. SB Building Associates, Limited
Partnership, No. 08-5298, 2009 WL 2392098, *1 (D.N.J. August 3, 2009).
Courts have considered the following factors in determining whether to
permit filing of the third-party complaint: “(1) the timeliness of the motion;
(2) the probability of trial delay; (3) the potential for complication of issues
at trial; and (4) prejudice to the original plaintiff.” Spencer, 2009 WL
1883909 at *2 (citing Ronson v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (D.N.J.
1999)).
As an initial matter, based on the facts before the Court, Defendant’s
request to amend its Answer to include a counterclaim would not cause
undue prejudice or delay. This Motion was filed within the Court’s deadline
6
to amend the pleadings or add new parties, discovery is ongoing, and this
Motion was filed within one month of the events giving rise to the proposed
counterclaim. For the same reasons, based on the current posture of this
case, Defendant’s request to file a third-party complaint is timely and will
not cause any appreciable trial delay as the parties are still engaged in
pretrial discovery. Moreover, based on the foregoing and the largely
unsupported assertions of increased expense and delay, the Court cannot
find that Plaintiff will be unduly prejudiced by the inclusion of this claim.
However, these findings do not end the Court’s inquiry because
Plaintiffs also raise futility arguments. 5 First, Plaintiffs argue that
Defendant’s proposed counterclaim and third-party complaint would be
futile because the Court lacks jurisdiction over same. The Court finds,
based on review of the proposed pleadings, that the Court would have
The Court may deny leave to amend if the amendment would be futile.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Stallings v. IBM Corp., No. 083121, 2009 WL 2905471, at *15 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2009). In determining
whether a proposed amendment would be futile, the Court applies the same
standard of legal sufficiency that applies to a motion to dismiss filed under
Rule 12(b)(6). Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238,
243 (3d Cir. 2010). When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
5
7
jurisdiction over the defamation claim. Defendant’s proposed counterclaim
in its Answer and its proposed third-party complaint both allege
supplemental jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) which provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Courts will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
lacking an independent jurisdictional basis if same are so related to the
claims conferring original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy. Troncone v. Velahos, No. 10-2961, 2012 WL 3018061, at *7
(D.N.J. July 23, 2012) (citing HB General Corp. v. Manchester Partners,
L.P., 95 F.3d 1185, 1197 (3d Cir. 1996)) “Courts generally construe § 1367 to
indicate that a claim is part of the same case or controversy if they share
significant factual elements.” Id.
In this regard, the Third Circuit has held that supplemental
jurisdiction is proper if the claims derive from a common nucleus of
operative facts and if the claims are such that one would expect that all
claims would be tried in a single proceeding. Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d
8
758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995); Troncone, 2012 WL 3018061, at *7. Determining
whether claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact test is
highly fact-sensitive. Lyon, 45 F.3d at 760. As noted by Plaintiffs, the
Third Circuit has addressed the issue of supplemental jurisdiction and the
nucleus of operative fact test in relation to state-based slander/defamation
claims in at least two instances: Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp.,
857 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1988) and PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir.
1974). Notably, in Lyon v. Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995), the
Third Circuit distinguished these two cases while highlighting the factsensitive nature of supplemental jurisdiction determinations. The Third
Circuit provided:
In Nanavati, we found that the district court had the power to
adjudicate a slander claim asserted by an antitrust defendant,
noting that “a critic al background fact (the enmity between the
two physicians) is common to all claims.” We concluded that
the alleged slanders naturally would become part of the
antitrust trial since the slander victim might use the slanderer's
allegedly wrongful behavior to justify the victim's conduct
which the other party contended was actionable under the
antitrust laws. In PAAC, however, we ruled that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over a state defamation claim in a suit
brought under the Economic Opportunity Act charging the
defendant with unlawfully interfering with the agency
established under that law. In PAAC we recited the operative
language of Gibbs and found that the state claims were not
related sufficiently to the federal claim to permit the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 760-61 (internal citations omitted).
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Here, because the circumstances presented are more similar to those
presented in Nanavati than in PAAC, the Court finds that the proposed
defamation claim derives from the same nucleus of operative facts,
therefore, the Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is proper.
While Plaintiffs’ claims are federal civil rights claims and Defendant’s
proposed claim is a state defamation claim, the claims share the same
factual underpinnings: the environment at HFS while Sky was a student,
the treatment of Sky while a student at HFS and his ultimate expulsion.
The letter distributed by Angela and Richard contained statements that
flow largely from the allegations in the Complaint, and, additionally, they
attached a copy of the Complaint to the letter. Indeed, in proving the
defamation claim, Defendant would need evidence establishing the falsity
of the statements by Angela and Richard, statements which are directly
related to the factual allegations in this litigation. Thus, while it is true, as
argued by Plaintiffs, that there are additional elements of the defamation
claim and, as a result, additional facts necessary to establish, for instance,
harm to HFS’s reputation, the Third Circuit does not require total congruity
between the operative facts, just more than a mere tangential overlap.
Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 105. It is this Court’s conclusion that a state claim
that is derived entirely and exists solely because of the underlying federal
10
litigation demonstrates more than a mere tangential overlap and, thus, not
only does the defamation claim derive from the same nucleus of operative
facts but the claim is such that a party would expect same to be tried in one
judicial proceeding.
Next, however, Plaintiffs argue that allowing the proposed
amendment would be futile because it fails to state a claim for defamation.
A motion for leave to amend will be denied for futility if the proposed
amended complaint “would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, “[i]n
assessing ‘futility’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal
sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. To survive dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Whether [a] statement is susceptible of a defamatory meaning is a
question of law for the court.” DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1268 (N.J.
2004) (quoting Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978 (N.J. 1994). To state
a claim for defamation under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show: “(1)
the assertion of a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2)
11
the unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party; and (3) fault
amounting at least to negligence by the publisher.” DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at
1267-68 (internal citation omitted). A defamatory statement tends to harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.
Lynch v. New Jersey Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129, 1135 (N.J. 1999). To
determine whether a statement is defamatory, a court must examine three
factors: (1) content, (2) verifiability, and (3) context. DeAngelis, 847 A.2d
at 1267-68 (citing Ward, 643 A.2d at 978).
In analyzing the content, courts should “consider the fair and natural
meaning that will be given [to the statement] by reasonable persons of
ordinary intelligence.” DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at 1268 (alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted). Verifiability requires the determination of
“whether the statement is one of fact or opinion.” Id. at 1269. “A factual
statement can be proved or disproved objectively while an opinion
statement generally cannot. Id. That is, “[o]pinion statements . . . are
generally not capable of proof of truth or falsity because they reflect a
person’s state of mind. Hence, opinion statements generally have received
substantial protection under the law.” Ward, 643 A.2d at 979. However, a
plaintiff has a cause of action for harm from a defamatory opinion
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statement “when the statement implies underlying objective facts that are
false.” Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20
(1990)). Where the statement contains “[l]oose, figurative or hyperbolic
language,” it is more likely to be non-actionable. DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at
1269 (quoting Ward, 643 A.2d at 980 (alteration in original)). With regard
to context, courts must consider, in addition to the language used, “[t]he
listener’s reasonable interpretation . . . [within] the context in which the
statement appears[.]” Id.
As described in HFS’s proposed Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint, the alleged factual assertions of concern are: (1) “[t]he letter
accuses HFS and its Board of Trustees of abusing a child and/or not taking
action to stop the alleged abuse he was receiving,” (2) “[t]he letter also
accuses HFS of “sabotaging Sky R.’s efforts to gain admittance to another
school,” “straying from its values and not being Quakerly.” (Def.’s Br., Ex.
A, Counterclaim at ¶¶ 8-9; Def.’s Br., Ex. B, Third Party Complaint at §§ 89.) HFS asserts that as a result of the complained about actions, it suffered
“damage to its reputation and character” and will continue to suffer
“humiliation and embarrassment.” (Def.’s Br., Ex. A, Counterclaim at ¶¶ 1617; Def.’s Br., Ex. B, Third Party Complaint at §§ 16-17.)
In fact, the letter in question begins: “Hello Parents! We believe you
13
are here tonight because we the parents of Sky R. a former HFS student
sued the school.” It continues:
We could not sit by and allow what we believe HFS did to our
child to be forgotten. We are suing because someone had to
take a stand and effect change. Our suit brought to the
forefront alleged discrimination, mismanagement, substandard
teachers and parent complaints that have existed for many
years. We believe the suit finally forced someone to take action.
Defendant specifically objects to a subsequent line: “We believe that HFS
has strayed from the values that brought you to this school . . . HFS has
been anything but ‘Quakerly.’” Angela and Richard followed that line with
“It is our position that the board has known about Sky and many other
issues over the years but chose to ‘not get involved.’”
Next, the letter outlines Sky’s alleged learning disabilities, states
“[w]e believed that Sky might need to attend a special school,” and explains
that he was expelled from HFS within two weeks of their raising a request
for “minor accommodations” in the interim. The authors concluded: “We
believe that HFS purposely sabotaged the process [of finding a new
school], making our search more difficult.”
The last page of the letter contains a list of eight “suggestions” for
improvement. Fifth was “Replace the entire board.” It is followed by the
following elaboration:
14
Most are there in name only and do little to nothing. Every new
board member must have important responsibilities and be on
committees. Many larger condo associations require this and
will not accept “name only” board members. There are two
board members, one a child psychiatrist and the other a Quaker
who knew Sky and what a fine and upstanding boy he is. We
believe they chose to sit by while he was being abused and then
expelled. We were told that the board does not know which
children are asked to leave or why. Do you want a board like
that? Board members should be an integral part of the school.
The Court finds that these statements constitute opinion and are not
actionable as defamation. The letter was accompanied by a copy of the
Complaint filed in this matter (which was the subject of the meeting at
HFS) and is replete with sentences that begin, “We believe.” Further,
Defendant has alleged no facts that would lead a factfinder to conclude that
Angela and Richard acted with actual malice. See Leang v. Jersey City Bd.
Of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097, 1114 (N.J. 2009) (reiterating that “speech relating
to teachers in their role as educators implicates a matter of public concern,
thus calling for the highest level of protection”). Finally, these statements
occurred in the context of a litigant characterizing the opposing party’s
case. “[T]hese statements are examples of absolutely routine,
commonplace public statements made by litigants about their opponents
and their opponents’ cases. Characterizing such statements as actionable
defamation would create serious problems.” Jewett v. IDT Corp., No. 041454, 2007 WL 2688932, *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2007).
15
In concluding on this issue, this Court finds instructive dicta from a
case in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that reputational or
pecuniary harm could be presumed absent actual malice in a defamation
case brought by a teacher, as such was a matter of public concern. Rocci v.
Ecole Secondaire MacDonald–Cartier, 755 A.2d 583 (N.J. 2000). There, a
teacher brought a defamation action against her school and a school trip
chaperone, who also was a teacher, alleging that the chaperone’s letter to
the teacher’s principal, which criticized the teacher’s behavior around her
students, was defamatory. Id. at 584. The Court found “a strong public
interest in the behavior of teachers, especially concerning their conduct
with and around their students” and noted that the plaintiff acknowledged
her role “as a fiduciary charged with the care of her students.” Id. at 587.
The Court wrote:
In view of that fiduciary role and the public interest, we believe
that there must be free discourse, commentary, and criticism
regarding a teacher’s professionalism and behavior during a
school-sponsored event. That principle, which is at the heart of
this case, tips the scale in favor of requiring plaintiff to allege
more than mere embarrassment.
Id. This Court’s decision to deny Defendant’s motion comports with the
Rocci Court’s concern that “we must ensure that our jurisprudence does not
act to chill complaints about a teacher’s behavior in the presence of
students or similar matters involving the public interest.” Id.
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
In addition, the Court previously denied without prejudice
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment [Doc. 9], which argued that the Defendant is exempt
from the Americans with Disabilities Act and New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination invoked by Plaintiff. Rather, the Court allowed limited
discovery to explore whether the exemption based upon control by a
religious organization applies. With that discovery complete, Defendant has
filed a motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. 31] based on the
religious exemption. Defendant seeks dismissal of Counts II, III, V, and VI.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary
judgment should be granted if “pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the court must construe all facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Allegheny Pa., 139
F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of
17
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is material only if it will
affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the applicable law, and a dispute of a
material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252.
The nonmoving party must present “more than a scintilla of evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Woloszyn v. County of
Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). “If the evidence is merely
colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be
granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). The
court’s role in deciding the merits of a summary judgment motion is to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial, not to determine the
credibility of the evidence or the truth of the matter. Id. at 249.
As a private school with a religious affiliation with the Religious
Society of Friends (“Quakers”) and under the control of the Haddonfield
Monthly Meeting (“HMM”), HFS is excluded from the ADA and NJLAD.
The ADA provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
18
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III of the ADA
contains an exemption for “religious organizations or entities controlled by
religious organizations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12187.
The ADA’s exemption of religious organizations and religious
entities controlled by religious organizations is very broad,
encompassing a wide variety of situations. Religious
organizations and entities controlled by religious organizations
have no obligations under the ADA. Even when a religious
organization carries out activities that would otherwise make it
a public accommodation, the religious organization is exempt
from ADA coverage. Thus, if a church itself operates a day care
center, a nursing home, a private school, or a diocesan school
system, the operations of the center, home, school, or schools
would not be subject to the requirements of the ADA or this
part. The religious entity would not lose its exemption merely
because the services provided were open to the general public.
The test is whether the church or other religious organization
operates the public accommodation, not which individuals
receive the public accommodation’s services.
Religious entities that are controlled by religious organizations
are also exempt from the ADA’s requirements. Many religious
organizations in the United States use lay boards and other
secular or corporate mechanisms to operate schools and an
array of social services. The use of a lay board or other
mechanism does not itself remove the ADA’s religious
exemption. Thus, a parochial school, having religious doctrine
in its curriculum and sponsored by a religious order, could be
exempt either as a religious organization or as an entity
controlled by a religious organization, even if it has a lay board.
The test remains a factual one—whether the church or other
religious organization controls the operations of the school or of
the service or whether the school or service is itself a religious
organization.
19
28 C.F.R. § Pt. 36, App. C.
Similar to the plaintiffs in Doe v. Abington Friends School, 480 F.3d
252, 254 (3d Cir. 2007), Plaintiffs here argue that HFS has strayed from its
religious foundation and, therefore, is not eligible for the ADA exemption.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply the factors set forth by the Third Circuit to
determine whether an entity has a purpose and character that is primarily
religious so as to be exempt from Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions.
They are:
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it
produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity's articles of
incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious
purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or financially
supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or
synagogue, (5) whether a formally religious entity participates
in the management, for instance by having representatives on
the board of trustees, (6) whether the entity holds itself out to
the public as secular or sectarian, (7) whether the entity
regularly includes prayer or other forms of worship in its
activities, (8) whether it includes religious instruction in its
curriculum, to the extent it is an educational institution, and (9)
whether its membership is made up by coreligionists.
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir.
2007). The Circuit cautioned, “not all factors will be relevant in all cases,
and the weight given each factor may vary from case to case.” Id. at 227.
Further, “whether an organization is ‘religious’ for purposes of the [Title
VII] exemption cannot be based on its conformity to some preconceived
20
notion of what a religious organization should do, but must be measured
with reference to the particular religion identified by the organization.” Id.
at 226-27.
The Court finds that HFS is controlled by a religious organization,
similar to the example provided in the ADA regulations, “a parochial
school, having religious doctrine in its curriculum and sponsored by a
religious order, could be exempt either as a religious organization or as an
entity controlled by a religious order, even if it has a lay board.” 28 C.F.R. §
Pt. 36, App. C.
The governing documents of HFS establish HFS as a non-profit entity
“[t]o establish and maintain a Friends School in accordance with the
principles of the Society of Friends including meetings for worship in the
manner of Friends” . . . and [t]o promote the principles, testimonies and
concerns of the Religious Society of Friends.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 3,
HFS Cert. of Inc.) The property leased to HFS by HMM is to be occupied
“exclusively as an independent Quaker school, as Quaker schools are
defined by the Friends Council on Education.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 4,
Lease Agmt.) These documents cede control to HMM, specifically to
distribute all assets to HMM upon dissolution of HFS, (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at
Ex. 3, HFS Cert. of Inc.), and to terminate the lease agreement with HFS
21
but retain the name Haddonfield Friends School if HFS is not operated as a
Quaker school, (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 4, Lease Agmt.).2
The Bylaws of HFS state that “the School exists under the spiritual
and nurturing care of Haddonfield Monthly Meeting of the Religious
Society of Friends, Inc.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 5, Bylaws.) “The mission
of the School is to provide a strong academic program rooted in Quaker
values and the belief that there is ‘that of God in everyone.’” (Id.) The
Bylaws also mandate that HFS is governed by a Board of Trustees
composed of at least 60% members of the Religious Society of Friends.
The circumstance that the New Jersey Association of Independent
Schools (“NJAIS”) required a change in HFS by-laws to make the HFS
board self-perpetuating for HFS to obtain re-accreditation did not deprive
HFS of its religious control. Rather, the change was required to have been
approved by HMM. (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 4, Addendum to Lease Agmt.)
Further, while HMM was deprived of authority to appoint Meeting
members or other Quakers to the HFS board when their numbers fall below
minimum requirements specified by the by-laws, (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 4,
Addendum to Lease Agmt.), the board membership still was required to
comply with the By-Laws as far as minimum number of Quakers, (id.).
Further, the Amendment to the Lease Agreement between HFS and HMM
gave HMM more power to terminate should HFS not comport with HMM’s
requirements. (Id.)
HFS also notes, as to the NJAIS visit, that the resulting report
concluded that HFS maintained a culture infused with the values and tenets
of Quakerism throughout the school day. (Doc. 37, Def. Reply at Ex. 18,
NJAIS Report of HFS Visiting Team, April 17-20, 2011, p. 11 (“Teachers
address the Quaker testimonies and the Mission of the school, although
with a less structured/academic approach, throughout the school day.”); 12
(“Tenets of Quakerism, although not taught in any formal way, are threaded
through the Middle School program.”); 26-27.)
2
22
(Id.) 3 The Bylaws further provide for a Quaker Life Committee to handle
the School’s Religious Education curriculum and its implementation in the
classroom. (Id.) That committee is responsible to arrange for second
graders and up to attend “a full half-hour Meeting for Worship on a weekly
basis instead of the monthly shortened version.” (Id.)
The Board of Trustees of HFS hires the Head of School and develops
the budget for HFS. The Clerk of the Board of Trustees of HFS, a member
of the HMM, testified, as to Quaker decision-making, “decisions are
determined by the sense of the meeting, which is a form of consensus, but
it’s spirit-led. If any one person disagrees with the decision, then the
decision won’t be made that day.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 7, Senopoulus
Dep., p. 12.) This method of collaborative decision-making is practiced by
the Board of Trustees.
HFS requires two days per year of professional development for every
administrator and every teacher. (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 8, Dreese Dep., p.
30.) “[T]hat professional development could be in any area. It could be
During the 2012-13 school year, 10 of the 18 board members (55%) were
Quaker with 7 of them being from Haddonfield Monthly Meeting (“HMM”).
(Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 6.) During the 2013-14 school year, 6 of the 13
Trustees (46%) were Quaker, with 5 from the HMM. (Id.) For the 2014-15
term, 8 of the 15 Trustees (53%) were Quaker, with 6 being from HMM.
(Id.)
3
23
having to do with Quaker education, Quaker testimonies, it could also . . .
be workshops in finance and leadership and admissions. (Id.) “Teachers
who come in and are not Quaker attend a [two-day] workshop at Pendle
Hill called [Educators] New to Quakerism.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 7,
Senopoulus Dep., p. 38; accord Ex. 8, Dreese Dep., p. 30.) The Head of
School, along with other “Heads,” attends a three-day gathering run by the
Friends Council on Education twice per year. (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 8,
Dreese Dep., p. 16-17.) She also regularly has attended workshops and
seminars run by the Friends Council on Education, part of the Religious
Society of Friends, at Friends Center. (Id., p. 17-18.)
Again, the school has weekly forty-five minute Meetings for Worship,
always attended by the Head of School. (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 8, Dreese
Dep., p. 60, 149.) When questioned whether these are merely forty-five
minutes of silence, the Head of School testified, “The way we do it is one of
the middle school kids presents a query. A query could be how do you build
your community in your classroom or in your school, and it gives kids
something to reflect on, and if they are moved to speak, they can speak to
that. Usually they speak to the query. Other kids will just talk about
something that’s personal to them. . . . There’s no set program, but there
certainly is protocol.” (Id., p. 73-74.)
24
The Head of School also makes a State of School presentation
annually at the Haddonfield Monthly Meeting, where students have
performed. (Id., p. 61.) Further, students have silence before their meals to
allow for reflection. (Id., p. 62.) The Head of School has characterized HFS
as a faith-based school: “Quakerism is a spiritual underpinning of the
school and all that is included in that, all that is woven in that. It’s a faith
that there is that of God in every person, and on that basis, kids are taught
to respect, to listen, to embrace diversity.” (Id., p. 67.)
The Quaker Testimonies are simplicity, peace, integrity, which
is telling the truth, community, which is shown in their service
projects, equality, which I think is very clear with the diversity
we have at the school, and stewardship, which is stewardship of
the earth, and I think which is very clear in the environmental
projects that the school does.
(Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 7, Senopoulus Dep., p. 44.)
As explained by the Clerk of the Board of Trustees of HFS, a member
of the HMM, “Quaker education is a method of teaching. We’re not trying
to create Quakers. Quakerism was founded on the acceptance of all
religions.” (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 7, Senopoulus Dep., p. 44.) The Head of
School testified, “[The students] are taught Quaker principles and expected
to abide by those Quaker principles at the school.” And those principles are
simplicity, peace, integrity, community, equality, and stewardship. (Doc. 31,
Def. Br. at Ex. 8, Dreese Dep., p. 64.) Further, HFS “teaches them about
25
Quakerism. . . . Quakers are pacifistic, so they teach kids in that context . . .
skills for conflict resolution, peacefully, . . . . you know, that’s imbedded in
every academic discussion that they have, whether it’s within the context of
social studies or any other areas of humanities, literature. (Id.)
Again, the Head of School testified to her belief, “absolutely,” that
HFS is a “religious” school and part of the Religious Society of Friends,
(Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 8, Dreese Dep., p. 62-64):
I’ve been working with Friends schools for 25 years, and in
every aspect, those testimonies are integrated into every aspect
of the curriculum. It is a Friends school in every – every
constituency from our membership at Friends Council [on
Education 4] and the workshops and the professional
development, we have opportunities to embrace, from the
board of directors, Meeting members, our relationship with
Meeting members and our Quaker life is a huge piece of that
school, our outreach – student outreach, community outreach,
social action. . . . Those Quaker testimonies are embedded in
every aspect of school life including the academics. . . . Quaker
schools, Friends schools are religious schools.
(Id., p. 62-63.) In addition, even before a written Quaker curriculum was
implemented at HFS, Quaker beliefs
were identified when they appeared within academia, whatever
they were studying. For example, if middle school kids were
studying World War II, that was always meshed with questions
like how would you reconcile Quaker testimony of peace with
what was going on in the world. An there would be a question
The Friends Council on Education restricts its members to schools that are
comprised only of religious schools based on the faith and practice of the
Religious Society of Friends. (Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 12.)
4
26
for discussion or debate, questions around building community,
how do you create a community within your classroom, how do
you create that in the school, where does it start, does it start
with your family. . . . And everything that the kids write, study,
read reflects Quaker testimonies and they are extracted and
discussed and focused on.
(Id., p. 150.)
Moreover, the Chair of Haddonfield Monthly Meeting testified that
HMM takes steps to ensure that HFS includes Quakerism in its curriculum.
(Doc. 31, Def. Br. at Ex. 14, Owens Dep., p. 10.)
The status and health of the school is of interest to everyone in
the Meeting. To those of us who are particularly dealing with
the worshipfulness of the community, the school has particular
concern. . . . We have annual reports on the school. We have
members, I’m one, who are adopted by the school, and we
attend worship with the children. Our members who are on the
school board also let us know how things are going. We ask
them. . . . [T]he Head of School comes and speaks to us, as a
community. . . . She lets us know what kind of Quaker
education is going on, she lets us know how the Testimonies are
being taught.
(Id.)
The Court is satisfied under these circumstances that HFS is a
religious organization or controlled by a religious organization. See also
Marshall v. Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F. Supp. 2d 597,
605-07 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Woods v. Wills, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1159-62
(E.D. Mo. 2005); White v. Denver Seminary, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173-74
(D. Colo. 2001). Counts II and V will therefore be dismissed.
27
The Court has carefully considered Plaintiffs’ arguments but finds
that they either simply disagree with the record evidence produced during
discovery or take issue with whether the Quaker teachings are, basically,
religious enough. For example, Plaintiffs do not agree that a moment of
silence, by itself, could be construed as keeping with a “religion.” See Tr. of
Jan. 14, 2016 Oral Arg. at p. 36. Yet both the United States Supreme Court
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have found that a moment of silence
in school has religious connotations. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985) (holding that Alabama’s moment of silence statute lacked any
secular purpose and therefore was unconstitutional); May v. Cooperman,
780 F.2d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey moment of silence law
likewise violated the Establishment Clause). It is not the Court’s role in this
matter to question the beliefs or practices of any religion. While the Court
appreciates Plaintiffs’ position, it is not persuaded to deny HFS the
religious exemption provided for by the ADA.
28
Finally, the NJLAD also exempts organizations that are 0perated or
maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution. N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:5-5(l). See also Romeo v. Seton Hall Univ., 875 A.2d 1043 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005). As such, Counts III and VI will be dismissed.
Counts I and IV survive this Motion.
An Order will be entered.
Dated: March 31, 2016
/s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
U.S.D.J.
29
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