MALIK v. DONIO
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/6/2014. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ZAINAB MALIK,
Plaintiff,
v.
HON. MICHAEL DONIO,
Defendant.
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Civil No. 14-5906 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Zainab Malik, Pro Se
223862
Atlantic County Justice Facility
5060 Atlantic Avenue
Mays Landing, NJ 08330
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
Plaintiff, Zainab Malik, incarcerated at the Atlantic County
Justice Facility, Mays Landing, New Jersey seeks to bring this action
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Based on his affidavit of indigence, the
Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
The Court must now review the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint must be
dismissed for seeking relief from an immune defendant.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff seeks to sue a state court judge, Defendant Michael
Donio, alleging that the judge has unconstitutionally refused to
transfer his state court criminal case to drug court. Plaintiff
contends that the judge used falsified records to deny him the
opportunity to have his case heard in drug court, which he feels he
needs. Plaintiff also argues that Judge Donio violated his
constitutional rights by “putting [him] in a situation of conflict
of interest with an alleged victim in [his] case.” (Complt., ¶ 4,
Statement of Claims).
Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and asks
this Court to order a change of venue and direct that a new judge
be assigned to his case. (Complt., ¶ 5, Relief).
DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
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which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or
entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to
prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA directs district
courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner
and is proceeding as an indigent.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening
for failure to state a claim,1 the complaint must allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler
v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same
as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d
Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.
2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287
F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
SeeWest v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
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3.
Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff seeks to sue Judge Michael Donio, a New Jersey
Superior Court Judge sitting in Atlantic County.
It is well-established that judicial immunity extends to suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553–55 (1967). “[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two sets of
circumstances.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). “First,
a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e.,
actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.” Id. In
determining whether an act qualifies as a “judicial act,” courts
looks to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectation of the parties,
i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”
Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. “Second, a judge is not immune for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
Additionally, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or
was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356 (1978). Furthermore, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from
liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority
is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. at 359.
Plaintiff allegations do not contend that Judge Donio is acting
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outside of his jurisdiction or beyond his judicial capacity; rather,
Plaintiff is unsatisfied with the decisions Judge Donio has made.
As such, the complaint must be dismissed.
To the extent Plaintiff's Complaint seeks this Court's
intervention in his state prosecution, such intervention is
unwarranted under the doctrine of abstention. The doctrine has
developed since Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and it
“espoused a strong federal policy against federal-court interference
with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982).2 This Court will not interfere
with Plaintiff’s ongoing state court criminal matter, as Plaintiff
has shown no extraordinary circumstances for doing so.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be
dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and
§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2), for seeking relief from an immune defendant
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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This Court also notes that if Plaintiff is convicted, he may
not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement by means of
an action under § 1983; rather he must exhaust his state remedies
and then, if appropriate, file a federal habeas application. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Nor can he seek monetary
relief under § 1983 if this Court's adjudication would call into
question the validity of his criminal conviction, unless his
conviction first has been overturned on appeal or in state or federal
collateral proceedings. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated:
October 6, 2014
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