LEGALIZE MARIJUANA PARTY et al v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/7/2014. (bdk, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEGALIZE MARIJUANA PARTY,
EDWARD FORCHION,
Plaintiff,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 14-6032 (JBS/AMD)

v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
LT GOVERNOR GAUDAGNO,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this action, pro se Plaintiff Edward Forchion and his
party, the Legalize Marijuana Party, allege that the State of
New Jersey and Lt. Gov. Kimberly Gaudagno have committed
“election fraud” by not including Mr. Forchion and the Legal
Marijuana Party on the ballot for the upcoming election for
representative of New Jersey’s 3rd Congressional District.
Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin the printing of the ballot
until a recount can be ordered. Because Plaintiff seeks to bring
this action in forma pauperis, the Court has an obligation to
screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court
finds as follows:
1.

Because Plaintiff’s application affidavit states that

he is indigent, the Court will, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

permit the Complaint to be filed on behalf of Edward Forchion
only, without prepayment of fees, and will direct the Clerk of
Court to file the Complaint.
2.

Filing in forma pauperis is not available to the

“Legalize Marijuana Party,” if that entity exists. In the
Complaint, Forchion has placed “Legalize Marijuana Party” into
the caption as if it were a plaintiff, but he does not identify
it as a plaintiff in the body of the Complaint. Instead, he
asserts that the Legalize Marijuana Party is just himself,
stating, “The NJ Appeals court is not acting to ensure democracy
is protected, instead [it] is choosing to help state officials
censor the Legalize Marijuana Party (myself) by inaction.”
Compl. at 3. In other words, it appears that “Legalize Marijuana
Party” is not an entity separate from Mr. Forchion himself. If
it is a separate entity, it must pay the filing fee as it is not
eligible for in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1), which permits the in forma pauperis commencement
of a civil action only by a “person [who] is unable to pay such
fees . . . .” A political party is not a “person” under this
statute, Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory
Council, 506 U.S. 194, 196 (1993), and therefore any request for
waiver of filing fees by the “Legalize Marijuana Party” must be
denied.

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3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a

claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(1). The Court may dismiss a
complaint that lacks such a statement. Jackson v. Sec’y Pa.
Dept. of Corr., 438 Fed. Appx. 74, 75 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming
district court’s dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s complaint in
part because it lacked a short and plain statement of the
court’s jurisdictional grounds). Because Plaintiff Forchion has
stated no grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, the Complaint
must be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(1).
Benvenuto v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 678 F.Supp. 469, 471
(D.N.J. 1988).
4.

Plaintiff’s Complain also requires dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), a court
must dismiss a case if it determines that the action fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se

complaint, the Court must liberally construe the allegations in
favor of the plaintiff, and must accept as true all factual
allegations.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).

The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter which,
accepted as true, would state a claim for relief that is
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plausible on its face. A claim is facially plausible when the
plaintiff pleads enough factual content to allow the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The court will not credit legal conclusions or “recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Id. at 678 (2009); Santiago v.
Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (2010).
5.

Plaintiff’s Complaint as presently written fails to

state a claim over which a federal court would have subject
matter jurisdiction. State or local election law matters are
“for the most part a preserve that lie[] within the exclusive
competence of the state courts.” Bonas v. Town of North
Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001). The “general rule”
is that “federal courts do not superintend the administration of
local electoral contests.” Afran v. McGreevey, 115 Fed. Appx.
539, 544 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84,
86 (2d Cir. 1970) (declining to hear plaintiff’s claims of
irregular voting because “[a]bsent a clear and unambiguous
mandate from Congress, we are not inclined to undertake such a
wholesale expansion of our jurisdiction into an area which, with
certain narrow and well-defined exceptions, has been in the
exclusive cognizance of the state courts.”). There are a few
narrow exceptions under which federal courts may intervene in
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electoral disputes. In Afran v. McGreevey, the Third Circuit
recognized two such exceptions: when a group of voters suffer a
denial of equal protection, and when “a colorable claim lies for
a violation of substantive due process” because “organic
failures in a state or local election process threaten to work
patent and fundamental unfairness.” Afran, 115 Fed. Appx. at
544. But generally, “where adequate state corrective procedures
exist,” “local election irregularities, including even claims of
official misconduct, do not usually rise to the level of
constitutional violations.” Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065,
1077 (1st Cir. 1978).
6.

Plaintiff states that he submitted 208 signatures to

support his petition for nomination of his party to the ballot,
but that his party was excluded from the ballot because only 97
signatures were determined to be valid. On October 3, 2014,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Emergency Review requesting that
this Court review his Complaint. [Docket Item 2.] Plaintiff
attached two newspaper articles to his motion, both published by
the Times of Trenton. Both articles stated that Plaintiff had
participated in a 15-hour administrative law hearing on the
signatures he collected, during which more than half of the
signatures were invalidated by an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). Such facts are insufficient to show that there was an
equal protection violation, or that “broad-gauged unfairness”
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permeated the process. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077. Nor does the
invalidation of signatures by the ALJ indicate that the state’s
administrative and judicial corrective process has failed to
provide fundamental fairness. Id. at 1078. As currently written,
Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a constitutional
violation, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Powell, 436 F.2d at 86.
7.

Even if this Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claim, the Younger doctrine would likely bar the present action
because Plaintiff has a pending case before the Superior Court
Appellate Division. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Appellate Division on June 19,
2014.1 The Complaint states, “[t]he New Jersey Appeals court
instead opting to –- time to expire.” There is no indication
that Plaintiff’s case has been dismissed.
8.

According to the latest newspaper article from the

Times of Trenton, dated September 26, 2014, attached with
Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion, Plaintiff filed an appeal with the
Superior Court Appellate Division, but his appeal ”stalled until
[Plaintiff] could produce more than $3,500 worth of transcripts”

1

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state the year in which the
appeal was filed, but because the filing of the appeal appears
at the end of a chronology of facts beginning on June 9, 2014,
the Court will construe the date as June 19, 2014.
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from the administrative hearing. Plaintiff’s case therefore
still appears to be pending in state court.
9.

Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from

enjoining state civil proceedings that implicate important state
interests. The Younger doctrine reflects “a strong federal
policy against federal-court interference with pending state
judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 467 U.S.
423, 431 (1982). Although the doctrine was first articulated to
prevent federal courts from enjoining state criminal
prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme
Court has since expanded its reach to noncriminal judicial
proceedings in which important state interests are involved.
Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm., 467 U.S. at 432. The Third Circuit
has articulated three requirements which must be met for a
federal court to invoke the Younger abstention doctrine: (1)
there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature;
(2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests;
and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 Fed. Appx. 232 (3d Cir.
2009).
10.

The requirements appear to have been met in this case.

First, there are ongoing state proceedings -- Plaintiff’s case
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is still pending before the state appellate court. Second,
Plaintiff’s state proceeding implicates important state
interests. Each State “‘has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they
shall be chosen,’” Shelby Cnty, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2623 (2013) (quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S.
135, 161 (1892)), and New Jersey election laws prescribe the
specific mechanisms by which a candidate may appear on the state
primary ballot. See N.J. Stat. 19:13 (nomination of candidates).
Moreover, states have “important regulatory interests” in
maintaining the integrity of election schemes that govern the
selection and eligibility of candidates for office. Anderson v.
Calebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). That interest is
“appreciably greater” when it comes to regulating statewide and
local elections. Council of Alternative Political Parties v.
Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1999). Finally, to the extent
Plaintiff’s complaint raises any federal claims, they would be
adequately addressed by the Appellatse Division’s review of the
administrative proceeding. Ocean Grove, 339 Fed. Appx. at 239
(“To satisfy the third prong of Younger, it is sufficient ‘that
constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial
review of the administrative proceeding.’”) (citing Ohio Civil
Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
629 (1986)). It appears that once Plaintiff provides the
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Appellate Division with a transcript of the administrative
hearing, or obtain a waiver of that requirement, the state
appeals court will be able to review his claims.
11.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Emergency Review invites this federal tribunal to do exactly
what the Younger doctrine and its progeny prohibit: to interfere
with an ongoing State court proceeding for judicial review of
State administrative action. That motion, like the Complaint
itself, will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and alternatively as barred by Younger abstention.
12.

In sum, and for all of the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(1), and for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The accompanying Order is entered.

October 7, 2014
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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