JOYNER v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 4

OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/25/2015. (drw)n.m.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Ernest Joyner,
Petitioner,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civ. Action No. 14-6303 (RMB)

OPINION

BUMB, District Judge
I.

BACKGROUND
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s

submission of a motion for reconsideration from a judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (ECF No. 3.)
Petitioner seeks reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated
February 6, 2015 (ECF No. 2.), dismissing Petitioner’s Rule
60(b) motion (ECF No. 1), for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction or alternatively as improperly filed outside the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Petitioner
seeks to challenge his murder conviction that occurred in the
District of Columbia in 1997.

II.

ANALYSIS
“A court may grant a motion for reconsideration if the

moving party shows one of the following: (1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence that was not available when the court issued its order;
or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice.” Johnson v. Diamond State Port.
Corp., 50 F.App’x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citing
Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999). The first two bases for reconsideration are not present
here. Petitioner’s claim is based on the need to correct a clear
error of law. (ECF No. 3 at 4.)
In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner contends this
Court may vacate the judgment of another District Court under
the catch-all provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6). (ECF No. 3 at 5.) Petitioner argues this Court should
assert jurisdiction over his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6) motion based on “the failure of the D.C. Courts to
adjudicate ‘on the defect in the integrity of the initial
collateral review proceeding,’ the refusal to review the
petitioner’s claims on the merits, and to prevent a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice.” (Id. citing Budget Blinds Inc. v.
White, 536 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2008)).
In Budget Blinds, the Third Circuit stated:
2

when a registering court considers the
judgment of a different district court, the
use of Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate another
court's judgment implicates an additional
interest in comity, even if the judgment was
a default judgment. If the circumstances of
a case are not sufficiently “extraordinary”
to outweigh the interest in the finality of
judgments, then it follows that the
circumstances cannot outweigh the interest
in finality combined with the interest in
comity. We have explained that a showing of
extraordinary circumstances involves a
showing that without relief from the
judgment, “an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’
hardship will result.” Mayberry [v.
Maroney], 558 F.2d [1159] at 1163 [3d. Cir.
1977]. This “hardship” requirement may
sometimes be satisfied when the judgment
“precluded an adjudication on the merits.”
Boughner v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir.1978).
But extraordinary circumstances rarely exist
when a party seeks relief from a judgment
that resulted from the party's deliberate
choices. See, e.g., Coltec [Industries Inc.
v. Hobgood], 280 F.3d 262]at 274 [3d Cir.
2002] (“[C]ourts have not looked favorably
on the entreaties of parties trying to
escape the consequences of their own
‘counseled and knowledgeable’ decisions.”);
see also Ackermann [v. United States], 340
U.S. [193] at 198–99, 71 S.Ct. 209 [1950]
(petitioner could not show the existence of
extraordinary circumstances when he
voluntarily chose not to appeal due to the
modest expenses that an appeal would
require).
536 F.3d at 255 (footnote omitted).
Petitioner also relies on Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113 (3d.
Cir. 2014), asserting that the holding of the Supreme Court in
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) “together with other

3

factors on a case-by-case basis - - could justify 60(b) relief.
. .”

(ECF No. 3 at 6.)
In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court held that

ineffective assistance of counsel at the initial collateral
review proceeding may establish cause for a prisoner’s
procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim. 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). Thus, under Martinez,
Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel deprived him of
the opportunity to raise a valid and meritorious issue in the
initial collateral review proceeding. (ECF No. 3 at 6.) He
asserts the record was insufficient for the D.C. courts to
address the evidence of trial counsel’s conflict of interest.
(Id.)
Petitioner’s reliance on Martinez is misplaced. Martinez
applies when a state collateral review scheme prevents a
petitioner from raising an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim on direct review, and instead allows him to raise
such a claim for the first time in a collateral proceeding.
Martinez, 132 S.Ct at 1315. Under those circumstances,
ineffective assistance of counsel in the initial collateral
review proceeding may establish cause to excuse procedural
default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Id.
In the District of Columbia, a petitioner can raise an

4

ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
Richardson v. United States, 999 F.Supp.2d 44, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).
Here, Petitioner alleged the D.C. courts failed to
“adjudicate on the defect in the integrity of the initial
collateral review proceeding,” and refused to review the
petitioner’s claims on the merits. (ECF No. 3 at 6.) The Court
takes judicial notice of Petitioner’s habeas proceeding in the
District of Columbia, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
First, the court noted that Petitioner expressly stated he
was not asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. Joyner v. O’Brien, Civil Action No. 09-913 (JDB), 2010
WL 199781, at *1 n. 1 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2010). This is
significant because the D.C. Code provision1 that otherwise
rendered Petitioner’s habeas claim procedurally defaulted did
not apply to bar ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

1

D.C. Code § 23-110(g) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus
in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to
apply for relief by motion pursuant to this
section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State
court if it appears that the applicant has
failed to make a motion for relief under
this section or that the Superior Court has
denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
5

claims. (Id.) In other words, Petitioner chose not to make the
claim he now asserts.
On appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas
claim, the D.C. Circuit held:
Joyner may not challenge his District of
Columbia convictions in federal court unless
his remedy under D.C.Code § 23-110 is
inadequate or ineffective, and the district
court correctly held that Joyner had not
shown that that remedy was inadequate or
ineffective. In this regard, we note that
Joyner claims ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, not appellate counsel, that
the District of Columbia courts reached the
merits of his claims, and that mere denial
of relief does not render the local remedy
inadequate or ineffective.
Joyner v. O’Brien, No. 10-5083, 2010 WL 5558285, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 5, 2010). Petitioner made a deliberate choice not to
raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in
the District of Columbia. This fact weighs against this Court
exercising jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion
challenging the judgment entered by the D.C. Court.
Second, “[i]t is appropriate for a district court, when
ruling on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion where the merits of the
ineffective assistance claim were never considered prior to
judgment, to assess the merits of that claim.” Cox, 757 F.3d at
124. Petitioner alleges he suffers from a fundamental
miscarriage of justice because his ineffective assistance of

6

trial counsel claim “became lost outside of the four corners of
the record.” (ECF No. 3 at 6.)
The Court takes judicial notice of the decision on
Petitioner’s direct appeal. Joyner v. United States, 818 A.2d
166, 174 (D.C. 2002) cert. denied 541 U.S. 1005 (Apr. 19, 2004).
There, the Court held:
We . . . consider whether trial counsel's
performance was deficient and whether that
deficiency prejudiced the defendant. . . In
the present case, the trial court requested
that the government respond to appellant's
discovery request regarding [trial
counsel's] alleged drug use and psychiatric
problems during her representation of
appellant at trial in 1997. After
considering the government's reasoning that
the drug usage and psychiatric problems
occurred well after trial, in 1999, and the
lack of evidence presented by appellant
demonstrating that trial counsel was
deficient, the court ruled it would “not
permit [appellant] to delve into the
irrelevant question of trial counsel's
alleged drug problem.” We agree that no
hearing was necessary where the basis of
appellant's argument rested solely on
allegations of [trial counsel’s] drug use
and psychiatric treatment in 1999, and where
appellant failed to point to any particular
examples of alleged deficient representation
by his counsel which prejudiced the outcome
of his trial.
(internal citations and footnotes omitted).
A petitioner cannot succeed on an ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim without showing that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the result of the proceeding. See

7

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“The
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”) The D.C. courts
considered the merits of the prejudice prong of Petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and found no prejudice.
Therefore, the merits of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim weighs against asserting jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court does not find extraordinary circumstances
justifying exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(6). As
discussed above, Petitioner did not raise his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim in the court that rendered
judgment against him, and he was not precluded from doing so.
Additionally, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim has little merit because he is unlikely to show
prejudice by trial counsel’s alleged error. Therefore,
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration will be denied.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: August 25, 2015

8