OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO. LTD. v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. et al
Filing
105
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/16/15. (dd, )
“Not Filed Under Seal”
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORRENT PHARMACEUTICALS
LIMITED, INC., TORRENT PHARMA
INC., and HETERO LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS
LIMITED, ALEMBIC LIMITED,
ALEMBIC GLOBAL HOLDING SA, and
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil Action Nos.
14-1078 (JBS/KMW)
14-2982 (JBS/KMW)
14-3168 (JBS/KMW)
14-4307 (JBS/KMW)
14-4671 (JBS/KMW)
14-5878 (JBS/KMW)
14-6397 (JBS/KMW)
14-6398 (JBS/KMW)
14-7106 (JBS/KMW)
14-7405 (JBS/KMW)
14-8074 (JBS/KMW)
15-161 (JBS/KMW)
15-1716 (JBS/KMW)
REDACTED OPINION
ZYDUS PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
INC. and CADILA HEALTHCARE
LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES
LTD., SUN PHARMA GLOBAL INC.,
SUN PHARMA GLOBAL FZE, SUN
PHARMA USA, SUN
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES,
INC., and CARACO
PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES,
Defendants.
[Caption Continues]
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TORRENT PHARMACEUTICALS
LIMITED, INC., TORRENT PHARMA
INC., and HETERO LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
INC.,
Defendant.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES
LTD., SUN PHARMA GLOBAL INC.,
SUN PHARMA GLOBAL FZE, SUN
PHARMA USA, SUN
PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRIES,
INC., and CARACO
PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA,
INC.,
Defendant.
[Caption Continues]
2
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ACTAVIS ELIZABETH LLC,
ACTAVIS, INC., ACTAVIS PLC,
JUBILANT LIFE SCIENCES
LIMITED, JUBILANT GENERICS
LIMITED, and JUBILANT LIFE
SCIENCES (USA) INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS
LIMITED, ALEMBIC LIMITED,
ALEMBIC GLOBAL HOLDING SA, and
ALEMBIC PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
APOTEX CORP., APOTEX INC.,
APOTEX PHARMACHEM INC., and
HETERO LABS LIMITED,
Defendants.
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
HETERO DRUGS LIMITED, HETERO
LABS LIMITED, and HETERO USA,
INC.,
Defendants.
[Caption Continues]
3
OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,
LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
SANDOZ INC., SANDOZ PRIVATE
LTD., and SANDOZ INTERNATIONAL
GMBH,
Defendants.
Appearances:
Melissa A. Chuderewicz, Esq.
Christopher P. Soper, Esq.
Brian R. Zurich, Esq.
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
301 Carnegie Center, Suite 400
Princeton, New Jersey 08543
-andPaul W. Browning, Esq. (argued)
Eric J. Fues, Esq. (argued)
James B. Monroe, Esq.
Denise Main, Esq.
Jeffrey A. Freeman, Esq.
Samhitha C. Muralidhar, Esq.
Eric J. Fues, Esq. (argued)
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
901 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
Attorneys for Otsuka Plaintiffs
James E. Cecchi, Esq.
Michael Cross, Esq.
CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEIN, BRODY & AGNELLO, PC
5 Becker Farm Road
Roseland, New Jersey 07068
-andClaire J. Evans, Esq. (argued)
James. H. Wallace (argued)
A. Neal Seth, Esq.
Lawrence M. Sung, Esq.
Matthew J. Dowd, Esq.
WILEY REIN LLP
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Torrent Defendants
4
Lisa J. Rodriguez, Esq.
SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS, LLP
220 Lake Drive East, Suite 200
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002-1165
-andDennies Varughese, Pharm.D., Esq. (argued)
Chandrika Vira, Esq.
H. Keeto Sabharwal, Esq.
Uma Everett, Esq.
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX
1100 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
Attorneys for Alembic Defendants
Trent S. Dickey, Esq.
Vincent R. Lodato, Esq.
Amy Megan Handler, Esq.
SILLS, CUMMIS, & GROSS, PC
One Riverfront Plaza
Newark, New Jersey 07102
-andDelphine Knight Brown, Esq.
Chad A. Landmon, Esq. (argued)
AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER, LLP
114 West 47th Street
New York, New York 10036
Attorneys for Zydus Defendants
Gregory D. Miller, Esq.
PODVEY, MEANOR, CATENACCI, HILDNER, COCOZIELLO & CHATTMAN, P.C.
One Riverfront Plaza, Suite 800
Newark, New Jersey 07102
-andMartin B. Pavane, Esq. (argued)
Julia S. Kim, Esq.
Darren S. Mogil, Esq.
COZEN O’CONNOR
277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10172
Attorneys for the Sun Defendants
Michael E. Patunas, Esq.
Mayra V. Tarantino, Esq.
LITE, DEPALMA & GREENBERG, LLC
Two Gateway Center, 12th Floor
Newark, New Jersey 07102
-and5
Christopher T. Holding, Esq. (argued)
Srikanth K. Reddy, Esq. (argued)
Elizabeth J. Holland, Esq.
Naomi Birbach, Esq.
GOODWIN PROCTOR, LLP
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018
Attorneys for the Teva Defendants
Liza M. Walsh, Esq.
Christine Intromasso Gannon, Esq.
Christopher J. Borchert, Esq.
Eleonore Ofosu-Antwi, Esq.
Rukhsanah L. Singh, Esq.
CONNELL FOLEY, LLP
86 Livingston Avenue
Roseland, New Jersey 07068
-andB. Jefferson Boggs, Jr., Esq. (argued)
Christopher J. Soreson, Esq.
Rachel C. Hughley, Esq.
Matthew L. Fedowitz, Esq.
MERCHANT & GOULD
80 South Eighth Street
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402
Attorneys for the Actavis Defendants
David Leit, Esq.
Lawrence Bluestone, Esq.
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, PC
65 Livingston Avenue
Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1791
-andWilliam A. Rakoczy, Esq. (argued)
Joseph T. Jaros, Esq.
Deanne M. Mazzochi, Esq.
Yixin H. Tang, Esq.
Neil B. Mclaughlin, Esq.
RAKOCZY, MOLINA, MAZZOCHI, SIWIK, LLP
6 West Hubbard Street
Chicago, Illinois 60654
Attorneys for the Apotex Defendants
David Leit, Esq.
Lawrence Bluestone, Esq.
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, PC
65 Livingston Avenue
6
Roseland, New Jersey 07068-1791
-andMargaret E. Ives, Esq.
Phoebe Fischer-Groban, Esq.
Vanessa A. Arslanian, Esq.
CHOATE, HALL & STEWARD, LLP
Two International Place
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Attorneys for the Hetero Defendants
Kegan A. Brown, Esq.
Daniel G. Brown, Esq. (argued)
Roger J. Chin, Esq.
LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP
885 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Attorneys for the Sandoz Defendants
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION.............................................. 8
BACKGROUND............................................... 13
Factual and Procedural Background ...................... 13
PRELIMINARY ISSUES ..................................... 18
Otsuka’s Motions to Amend .............................. 18
Informal Applications to Strike ........................ 21
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER............................................. 24
DISCUSSION............................................... 25
Likelihood of Success .................................. 25
1.
Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success on
its Induced Infringement Claims ........................... 27
a.
Standard for Induced Infringement ................... 30
i. Claim Construction: Claim 1 of the ’350 Patent
Discloses a Composition, Namely a Tablet, Comprised of a
Single Dosage that Contains At Least Two Active
Ingredients ............................................ 31
ii.
Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated That Defendants’
Proposed ANDA Products Directly Infringe Construed Claim 1
of the ’350 Patent ..................................... 44
7
iii. Otsuka Has Not Shown that Defendants Actively and
Purposefully Encouraged Infringement ................... 46
a. Defendants’ “Carve Out” of the Relevant Indication
Significantly Diminishes Any Suggestion of Sufficiently
Intentional Action ................................... 48
b. Defendants’ Proposed Labels Do Not Reflect Actual
Instruction in Furtherance of Inducing Infringement .. 51
c. The Substantial Non-Infringing Uses Further Diminish
Any Inference of the Requisite Specific Intent to Induce
Infringement ......................................... 70
2.
Defendants Have Raised a Substantial Question of
Invalidity ................................................ 72
Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated that it Will Suffer Immediate
and Irreparable Harm in the Absence of an Injunction as a
result of the Market Entry of these Defendants’ Aripiprazole
Products .................................................... 80
1.
Otsuka’s Alleged Harms Are Quantifiable .............. 81
2.
Otsuka Has Not Met the “Causal Nexus” Requirement .... 86
3.
Otsuka’s Delay in Requesting Injunctive Relief Suggests
Lack of Urgency ........................................... 91
The Balance of Hardships Favors these Defendants ....... 95
The Public Interest Counsels against the Issuance of an
Injunction .................................................. 98
CONCLUSION.............................................. 100
INTRODUCTION
These related patent infringement actions under the HatchWaxman Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281, generally concern Plaintiff
Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co, Ltd.’s (hereinafter, “Otsuka”)
position that various defendants’ submissions of abbreviated new
drug applications (hereinafter, “ANDAs”) infringe one or more
claims of the various patents covering Otsuka’s Abilify®
8
aripiprazole product, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,006,528 (“the ’528
patent”), 7,053,092 (“the ’092 patent”), 8,017,615 (“the ’615
patent”), 8,580,796 (“the ’796 patent”), 8,642,600 (“the ’600
patent”), 8,642,760 (“the ’760 patent”), and 8,759,350 (“the
’350 patent”).
As the lengthy exclusivity period for the original compound
patent covering Abilify®, the ’528 patent, comes to close on
April 20, 2015, Otsuka moves to enjoin these Defendants1 from
launching generic aripiprazole products on or after April 20,
2015.
Otsuka’s present motions for a Temporary Restraining
Order and preliminary injunctive relief concern, in particular,
the following generic Defendants and their requests for FDA
approval of the following ANDAs:
1.
2.
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited, Inc., Torrent Pharma
Inc., and Hetero Labs Limited (collectively,
“Torrent”), Civil Action Nos. 14-1078 (JBS/KMW), 144671 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
;
Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited, Alembic Limited,
Alembic Global Holding Sa, and Alembic Pharmaceuticals
Inc. (collectively, “Alembic”), Civil Action Nos. 142982 (JBS/KMW), 14-7405 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval
to sell generic aripiprazole
;
1
Otsuka originally sought injunctive relief in these and ten
other related cases. However, because certain defendants filed
notices, in lieu of oppositions to Otsuka’s motions for
temporary restraining order, stating that each defendant did not
intend to launch a generic aripiprazole product prior to June
20, 2015, the Court dismissed Otsuka’s motions as against those
opt-out defendants as moot on March 30, 2015.
9
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Zydus Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., and Cadila Healthcare
Limited (collectively, “Zydus”), Civil Action No. 143168 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
;
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Sun Pharma Global
Inc., Sun Pharma Global Fze, Sun Pharma USA, Sun
Pharmaceuticals Industries, Inc., and Caraco
Pharmaceutical Laboratories (collectively, “Sun”),
Civil Action Nos. 14-4307 (JBS/KMW), 14-6397
(JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
;
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (hereinafter, “Teva”),
Civil Action Nos. 14-5878 (JBS/KMW), 14-6398
(JBS/KMW), seeks FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
;
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Actavis, Inc., Actavis PLC,
Jubilant Life Sciences Limited, Jubilant Generics
Limited, and Jubilant Life Sciences (USA) Inc.
(collectively, “Actavis”), Civil Action No. 14-7106
(JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
;
Apotex Corp., Apotex Inc., Apotex Pharmachem Inc., and
Hetero Labs Limited (collectively, “Apotex”), Civil
Action No. 14-8074 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to
sell generic aripiprazole
;
Hetero Drugs Limited, Hetero Labs Limited, and Hetero
USA, Inc. (collectively, “Hetero”) Civil Action No.
15-161 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to sell generic
aripiprazole
; and
Sandoz Inc., Sandoz Private Ltd., and Sandoz
International Gmbh. (collectively, “Sandoz”), Civil
Action No. 15-1716 (JBS/KMW), seek FDA approval to
sell generic aripiprazole
.
In support of its request for temporary restraining orders,
Otsuka claims that Defendants’ generic aripiprazole tablets
and/or orally disintegrating tablets infringe Claim 1 of the
10
’350 Patent, a follow-on composition patent indicated for the
treatment of major depressive disorder.
Br. at 4-5; see also Ex. 4 to Fues Dec.)
(See generally Otsuka’s
Claim 1, however,
discloses only a combination aripiprazole and
escitalopram/citalopram product, and each of these Defendants
seek approval for a generic product containing only
aripiprazole.
(See generally Ex. 4 to Fues Dec.)
Nevertheless, in relying upon Claim 1 in connection with
its request for a temporary restraining order, Otsuka argues
that Defendants’ proposed generics will induce infringement of
Claim 1 of the ’350 patent, because Defendants’ proposed package
inserts or labels2 amply “teach[] and encourage[]” the coadministration of aripiprazole with an antidepressant like
citalopram and escitalopram for the treatment of major
depressive disorder.
(Otsuka’s Reply at 4.)
In addition,
Otsuka argues that the entry of Defendants’ infringing generic
aripiprazole products would result in the severe loss of
Otsuka’s market share, permanent and irreversible erosion of
Abilify®’s price, and potentially a partial or complete
cessation of Otsuka’s Abilify®-oriented operations.
(See
generally Otsuka’s Br. at 13-29; Otsuka’s Reply at 3-12.)3
2
The Court will refer to Defendants’ “package inserts” and/or
“labels” interchangeably.
3 Otsuka filed individual briefs in each of these thirteen
actions with pending motions. Though the submissions contain,
11
These generic Defendants have mounted substantively
identical oppositions to Otsuka’s motions, and indeed argued
their opposition collectively through designated counsel at the
April 10, 2015 hearing.4
These Defendants, in particular,
uniformly argue that Otsuka’s infringement theory reads a
critical element out of Claim 1, and ignores the fact that Claim
1’s plain language purportedly covers only a single dosage form,
i.e., a single drug product, containing aripiprazole in
combination with escitalopram and/or citalopram.
(See, e.g.,
Actavis’s Opp’n at 7; Teva’s Opp’n at 10-12; Apotex’s Opp’n at
4-8.)
As a result, because each Defendant seeks to market only
an aripiprazole tablet, and not an aripiprazole tablet coupled
with the additional active ingredients of escitalopram and/or
citalopram, Defendants insist that Otsuka cannot, under any set
of facts, prove a claim of induced infringement of its ’350
patent as against any of them.
(See, e.g., Torrent’s Opp’n at
2; Actavis’s Opp’n at 19; Hetero’s Opp’n at 8 n.10; Zydus’s
Opp’n at 19-20; Alembic’s Opp’n at 9-13.)
in part, some argument tailored to a specific defendant,
Otsuka’s submissions remain substantively identical, and seek
injunctive relief based upon the identical arguments in each
case.
4 Therefore, the Court will consider these Defendants’ positions
in unison, unless otherwise indicated. Any argument with
relevance to only one particular Defendant will, of course, be
specifically indicated and addressed separately.
12
In addition, and in the alternative, Defendants argue that
their respective package inserts deliberately “carved out” the
basis for Otsuka’s claim of induced infringement by omitting the
treatment indication claimed by the ’350 patent, and omitting
instruction on the use of aripiprazole in conjunction with
either citalopram or escitalopram, thereby negating the intent
prerequisite for inducing infringement, and otherwise
eliminating any active or implied instruction or encouragement
of any infringing aripiprazole composition and/or use.
The primary issues before the Court concern whether Otsuka
has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claims of
induced infringement, and whether Otsuka has demonstrated that
it will, in the absence of an injunction, suffer irreparable
harm as a result of these generic Defendants’ entry into the
aripiprazole market.
For the reasons that follow, Otsuka’s motion for a
temporary restraining order will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Factual and Procedural Background
Otsuka, a pharmaceutical company organized and existing
under the laws of Japan, holds New Drug Application
(hereinafter, “NDA”) No. 21-436, approved by the FDA, for
aripiprazole tablets, which Otsuka markets under the trademark
Abilify®.
13
In connection with Abilify’s® listing in the Orange Book,
the FDA’s book of drug products approved under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter, the “Orange Book”), 21 U.S.C. §
355(j), Otsuka identifies the ’528 patent, the ’092 patent, the
’615 patent, the ’796 patent, the ’600 patent, the ’760 patent,
and the ’350 patent, all of which Otsuka owns by virtue of
assignment.
Prior litigation involving these and related generic
defendants, and concerning the ’528 patent covering the
aripiprazole compound, compositions, and methods of treatment,
resulted in a decision that, in effect, precludes any generic
competition in aripiprazole market prior to the expiration of
the ’528 patent (inclusive of its pediatric exclusivity period)
on April 20, 2015.
See generally Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz,
Inc., No. 07-1000 (MLC), 2010 WL 4596324, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Nov.
15, 2010).
As a result of this exclusivity, Otsuka has enjoyed
an extended and incredibly lucrative monopoly over the
aripiprazole market.
Moreover, in the aftermath of that decision (and indeed
during the litigation), Otsuka sought and obtained FDA approval
for an array of “follow on” patents, all of which generally
concern the aripiprazole drug substance, and seek to elongate
Otsuka’s long-held monopoly over the aripiprazole market.
As
relevant here, the ’350 patent, a product patent which the FDA
14
issued on June 24, 2014, generally discloses a combination
aripiprazole product comprised of aripiprazole together with
serotonin reuptake inhibitors in a pharmaceutically acceptable
carrier, for the “Adjunctive Treatment of Major Depressive
Disorder.”
As Otsuka’s patent plateau approached, a flurry of generic
Defendants, many if not all of which are implicated in these
related patent infringement actions, filed ANDAs seeking
approval to market an array of aripiprazole products.
As a
result of the ANDA filings, Otsuka filed Complaints in this
District, alleging that these Defendants proposed generic
aripiprazole products will, if approved and marketed, infringe
some combination of the follow on patents, e.g., at least one
specific claim of the ’615, ’796, ’760, ’092, ’600, and/or the
’350 patents.
After nearly one year of litigation in certain cases, see,
e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharm. Ltd., Civil Act.
No. 14-1078 (filed March 18, 2014); Otsuka Pharma Co., Ltd. v.
Alembic Pharm. Ltd., Civil Act. No. 14-2982 (filed May 9, 2014),
and despite long knowing the April 20, 2015 date certain of the
’528 patent’s expiration, Otsuka first referenced its proposal
in these related cases to file motions for temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions on March 9, 2015.
15
Faced with the prospect of such motions with regard to
potential at-risk launches by as many as two-dozen Defendants on
or after April 20, 2015, the Court promptly convened an inperson conference with all counsel in the related actions on
March 16, 2015, in order to enter a global schedule for Otsuka’s
seemingly long-anticipated motions for preliminary injunctions.
During the conference, the nature of Otsuka’s proposed
motions came into focus.
Critically, despite these related
Defendants’ ANDA filings, Otsuka did not know which, if any, of
the generic defendants intended to launch generic aripiprazole
products “at risk” at the expiration of the ’528 patent’s
pediatric exclusivity on April 20, 2015, and therefore did not
know against whom to seek injunctive relief.
The Court, in
turn, faced the prospect (for generic defendants not intending
to launch at this time) of addressing motions without live
controversies, but recognized the confidential and sensitive
nature of these defendants’ launch intentions.
Therefore,
following arguments of counsel, the Court entered a Scheduling
Order on March 17, 2015, that observed the principle that the
generic defendants would not be required to provide notice of
intent to launch at risk, all while avoiding unnecessary
adjudication by permitting defendants without intention to
launch at risk to opt out of the briefing associated with
16
Otsuka’s motion for temporary restraining order.
[See, e.g.,
Docket Item 76 in 14-1078.]
The Scheduling Order, in particular, permitted any
defendant to file, in lieu of opposition to Otsuka’s motion, a
statement that such defendant did not intend to launch its
aripiprazole product prior to June 20, 2015, in which case
Otsuka’s motion would be dismissed without prejudice to renewal,
and that opt out defendant would be deemed precluded from
launching prior to June 20, 2015, unless otherwise ordered by
the Court.
[See id. at ¶ 2.]
In accordance with the Court’s
Scheduling Order, briefing followed in these cases.5
The Court heard arguments and proffers of evidence on
behalf of all parties at the hearing upon these motions for
temporary restraining order on April 10, 2015, in which the
parties have amassed a record of thousands of pages spanning the
13 above-captioned dockets.6
5
As stated above, generic defendants in ten related actions
opted out of this motion practice.
6 Indeed, the record developed in these Hatch-Waxman Act cases
includes lengthy opening briefs, opposition briefs, reply
briefs, and sur-replies, together with the fact and expert
declarations and supplemental declarations of Aaron Deves, John
C. Jarosz, Bryan L. Roth, M.D., Ph.D, Ira S. Halper, M.D.,
Anthony Palmieri III, Ph.D., R.Ph., Philip B. Nelson, Ph.D., S.
Shane Konrad, M.D., Jeffrey Hampton, Robert J. Orr, Ph.D.,
Christopher A. Ross, M.D., Ph.D., Christopher H. Spadea, Gilbert
Block, M.D., Ph.D., David Blackburn, Ph.D., Harinath Gangasani,
Joseph R. Calabrese, M.D., and Sumanth Addanki, M.D.
17
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Prior to addressing Otsuka’s motions for a temporary
restraining order, the Court must address two threshold issues.
Otsuka’s Motions to Amend
First, Otsuka has very recently7 moved to amend its
Complaints in Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharm., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 14-4671 (JBS/KMW), Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 14-3168 (JBS/KMW), Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 147252 (JBS/KMW), Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc., Civil Action No. 14-5878 (JBS/KMW), and Otsuka Pharm. Co.,
Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-6398
(JBS/KMW), in order to assert the ’350 patent, for the first
time, against Torrent, Zydus, and Teva.8
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend
should be “freely give[n] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 15(a)(2).
Therefore, in the absence of undue prejudice,
unfair prejudice, or futility, motions to amend must be granted.
7
These motions, filed on March 19, 2015, were a surprise because
Otsuka had made no mention of its intent to amend to assert the
’350 patent against these parties just three days before at the
conference of March 16, 2015, which the Court called
specifically to plan for this injunctive motion practice.
8 Similar motions were brought against Mylan, Inc., Zhejiang
Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and Ajanta Pharma Limited,
which were unopposed by those parties, and Otsuka has, as a
result, filed the amended pleading in those respective cases.
18
See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating that generally, leave to amend should be granted
“unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.”).
Torrent, Zydus, and Teva, challenge Otsuka’s motions to
amend on futility, prejudice, and delay grounds.
(See Torrent’s
Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 2-5; Zydus’s Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at
6-13; Teva’s Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 6-19.)
The Court,
however, finds that Otsuka’s proposed amendments provide
sufficient factual matter, if accepted as true, to state
plausible, non-futile claims for relief.
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
The Court is reluctant to conclude in
expedited motion practice on these amendments that Otsuka could
never prevail on such claims under its ’350 patent.
There is
further the practical consideration that the contours of the
’350 patent and the defendants’ products are being explored in
detail in those other closely related cases, with the benefit of
an elaborate record.
In addition, the Court does not find that Otsuka unduly
delayed in seeking to amend, nor that its motions have caused
unfair prejudice to these Defendants in connection with Otsuka’s
motions for temporary restraining orders.
Delay was not undue
in these cases because Otsuka had asserted the ’350 patent,
among others, against all ANDA-filers in the many companion
cases which had filed Paragraph IV certifications under 21
19
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), asserting their positions that their
ANDAs would not infringe the patents at issue, and/or their
position on the invalidity of the patents at issue.9
Otsuka
claims it did not initially assert the ’350 patent against these
remaining ANDA filers because they had instead filed section
viii statements under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), certifying
that they only intended to offer an aripiprazole product, and
had not requested approval for any patented indications,
particularly any approval related to the combination of
aripiprazole with antidepressants citalopram and/or
escitalopram.
Otsuka claims that it asked for clarification
from these section viii filers of exactly what their product and
labels/package inserts would entail, and that Otsuka never
received the desired clarifications thus prompting the need to
9
See Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Sun Pharma. Indus., Ltd., Civil
Action No. 14-6397 (JBS/KMW) (filed October 6, 2014); Otsuka
Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Civil Action No. 146890 (JBS/KMW) (filed October 31, 2014); Otsuka Pharma. Co.,
Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-7105 (JBS/KMW) (filed
November 3, 2014); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Actavis Elizabeth
LLC, Civil Action No. 14-7106 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 10,
2014); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Alembic Pharma., Ltd., Civil
Action No. 14-7405 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 26, 2014); Otsuka
Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Apotex Corp., Civil Action No. 14-8074
(JBS/KMW) (filed December 24, 2015); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v.
Hetero Drugs, Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-161 (JBS/KMW) (filed
January 8, 2015); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Amneal Pharma. Co,
Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-1585 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 2, 2015);
Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz Inc., Civil Action No. 151716 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 9, 2015); Otsuka Pharma. Co., Ltd.
v. Indoco Remedies Ltd., Civil Action No. 15-1967 (JBS/KMW)
(filed March 17, 2015)
20
assert the ’350 patent against them in these motions to amend.
By holding their cards so close to the vest as litigation
progressed, these defendants contributed to Otsuka’s delay in
joining the ’350 patent to this litigation.
With respect to prejudice, the Court notes that, despite
the short notice, these Defendants have shown the ability to
address these claims through their filing of oppositions and
sur-replies equivalent and substantively identical to those of
the generic defendants against whom Otsuka asserted the ’350
patent far earlier.
Given this, it can fairly be concluded that
these parties anticipated that the ’350 patent would be in play
just as it was in the related cases.
Consequently, for the reasons stated above and on the oral
argument record on April 10, 2015, Otsuka’s motions to amend
will be granted.
Informal Applications to Strike
Second, the Court addresses Defendants’ application to
strike the supplemental declarations of Otsuka’s experts, Dr.
Roth and Mr. Jarosz [see, e.g., Docket Item 103 in 14-1078],10
and Otsuka’s application to strike Defendants’ “improperly”
raised claim construction arguments.
10
[See, e.g., Docket Item
Counsel for Alembic moved to strike Otsuka’s supplemental
declarations on behalf of all Defendants by letter dated April
8, 2015.
21
104 in 14-1078.]
Defendants, in particular, challenge Otsuka’s
supplemental declarations to the extent Dr. Roth’s and Mr.
Jarsoz’s supplemental declarations present new factual and legal
arguments concerning claim construction, patent validity, and
the financial harm to Otsuka in the absence of an injunction.
[See, e.g., Docket Item 103 in 14-1078.]
Otsuka, in turn, seeks
to strike Defendants’ sur-replies and accompanying supplemental
declarations, principally to the extent Defendants’ sur-replies’
“distort[] and misrepresent[] the prosecution history” of the
’350 patent.
[See, e.g., Docket Item 104 in 14-1078.]
In that respect, both applications concern, at their cores,
the purportedly improper expansion of the factual record on
substantive issues implicated in Otsuka’s pending motions.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that all issues relevant to
Otsuka’s pending motions for temporary restraining orders,
including, all issues with respect to claim construction,
invalidity, and irreparable harm, have been amply dealt with in
the parties’ voluminous submissions, and through counsels’
lengthy presentations at the April 10, 2015 hearing.
Indeed,
counsels’ comprehensive oral arguments mitigated any arguable
prejudice associated with the new assertions in supplemental
declarations and/or sur-replies.11
11
The Court will, however,
On the oral argument record, counsel for Apotex argued that
Otsuka’s supplemental declarations prejudiced the record (here
22
strike Otsuka’s supplemental declarations to the extent the
experts, in their declarations, set forth their own legal
conclusions (as opposed to a reiteration of a legal conclusion).
See L. CIV. R. 7.2(a) (“Legal arguments and summation in
[affidavits, declarations, and certifications] will be
disregarded by the Court and may subject the signatory to
appropriate censure, sanctions or both.”).
For these reasons, and those set forth during the April 10,
2015 hearing, Defendants’ application to strike will be granted
in part only with respect to certain legal arguments of Otsuka’s
experts and denied with respect to Defendants’ remaining
challenges, and Otsuka’s application to strike will be denied in
its entirety.
and potentially on appeal), by enabling Otsuka to cure an
initial deficiency in Otsuka’s opening submission, namely, the
alleged lack of argument on claim construction. As stated
below, Otsuka’s opening submission gave little attention to
claim construction. Nevertheless, the Court does not find any
prejudice to the record. Indeed, given the substantive nature
of the issues presented in Otsuka’s motions for temporary
restraining orders, there could be little mystery about the need
for claim construction and, in that respect, the only new aspect
of Otsuka’s supplemental declarations concerned the fact that
Otsuka did indeed have an expert on claim construction. Given
the volume of expert opinions, these Defendants cannot be heard
to claim any surprise in the late introduction of certain,
limited expert opinion.
23
Therefore, the Court turns to the merits of Otsuka’s
motions for temporary restraining orders to prohibit at-risk
launches by these generic product defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
“The decision to grant or deny ... injunctive relief is an
act of equitable discretion by the district court.”
eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see also 35
U.S.C. § 283 (generally providing that courts “may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable”).
Injunctive relief,
however, remains “‘an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
right.’”
Wind Tower Trade Coalition v. United States, 741 F.3d
89, 95 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
A party seeking a temporary or preliminary injunction must
therefore demonstrate: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable harm in the absence
of an injunction; (3) that this harm would exceed harm to the
opposing party; and (4) that the public interest favors such
relief.
See, e.g., Sciele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 684 F.3d
1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac
Pharma, Inc., No. 14–270, 2014 WL 3374614, at *2 (D. Del. July
10, 2014).
These considerations apply equally to requests for
24
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.
See
Takeda Pharm. USA, Inc. v. West-War Pharm. Corp., No. 14-1268,
2014 WL 5088690, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2014) (“A request for a
TRO is governed by the same general standards that govern the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.”) (citation omitted).
In determining whether to issue injunctive relief, no one
factor, taken individually, proves dispositive.
See Hybritech
v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also
AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587 (D.N.J.
2009).
Rather, the Court “must weigh and measure each factor
against the other factors and against the form and magnitude of
the relief requested.”
Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1451.
Nevertheless, no injunction will issue, temporary or otherwise,
unless the movant “‘establishes both of the first two factors,
i.e., likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable
harm.’”
PHG Tech., LLC v. St. John Cos., Inc., 469 F.3d 1361,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
The Court will address each of the four factors in turn.
DISCUSSION
Likelihood of Success
Otsuka claims that nine groups of generic Defendants in
these 13 cases should be enjoined from launching their
aripiprazole products on or after April 20, 2015 because their
25
aripiprazole products will infringe Claim 1 of the ’350 patent,
the only patent asserted in these preliminary injunction
motions.
In order to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits, the “patentee seeking a preliminary injunction in a
patent infringement suit must show that it will likely prove
infringement, and that it will likely withstand challenges, if
any, to the validity of the patent.”
Titan Tire v. Case New
Holland, 566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
As relevant here, Otsuka must demonstrate that, “in light
of the presumptions and burdens that will inhere at trial on the
merits,” it will likely prove that these generic Defendants’
aripiprazole products infringe the ’350 patent and that Otsuka
will withstand these generic Defendants’ challenges to the
validity of the ’350 patent.
1259.
Sciele Pharma Inc., 684 F.3d at
If, however, these generic Defendants raise “substantial
question[s] concerning either infringement or validity, i.e.,
assert[] an infringement or invalidity defense[s] that [Otsuka]
cannot prove ‘lack[] substantial merit,’ the preliminary
injunction should not issue.”
Amazon.com, Inc., 239 F.3d at
1350-51 (citation omitted); see also Trebro Mfg., Inc. v.
Firefly Equipment, LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(same).
26
Here, the Court will first address the issue of
infringement, prior to turning to invalidity.
1. Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated a Likelihood of Success
on its Induced Infringement Claims
For purposes of these requests for injunction relief,
Otsuka argues that it will likely prevail at trial on its
position that all of Defendants’ labels induce infringement of
Claim 1 of the ’350 patent.12
(Otsuka’s Reply at 1-2.)
Otsuka,
in particular, insists that Defendants’ inserts unquestionably
instruct physicians “to prescribe aripiprazole in combination
with an antidepressant like citalopram and escitalopram” and
provide “information” concerning “issues to consider” when
prescribing such a combination.
(Otsuka’s Reply at 4-5.)
In so
arguing, Otsuka recognizes that these Defendants’ proposed
labels have “carved out” the indication covered by the ’350
patent, i.e., the use of aripiprazole for the adjunctive
treatment of major depressive disorder, that Defendants’ labels
12
In these actions, Otsuka claims that Defendants’ generic
aripiprazole tablets infringe one or more claims of the ’615,
’796, ’760, ’600, and/or the ’350 patents. Nevertheless,
according to Otsuka, because the infringement issues related to
the ’615, ’796, ’760, and/or the ’600 patents “raise complex
technical issues that may require expert analysis” and implicate
“ongoing” discovery, Otsuka solely relies upon “infringement
issues” associated with the ’350 patent in support of its
request for preliminary injunctive relief. (Otsuka’s Br. at 2.)
This Opinion will therefore make no further reference to the
’615, ’796, ’760, and the ’600 patents, because only the ’350
patent is in play.
27
do not specifically direct or prescribe the adjunctive
administration of aripiprazole with escitalopram and/or
citalopram, and that none of the labels contain any reference to
citalopram.
(See generally Otsuka’s Reply at 10-12, 15-17.)
Nevertheless, based upon certain warning and safety
information concerning the coadministration of aripiprazole with
antidepressants, particularly in the Defendants’ various “‘black
box’ warning[s],” Otsuka submits that each label implicitly
teaches and encourages the beneficial nature of coadministering
aripiprazole in the manner protected by the ’350 patent.
(Otsuka’s Br. at 11, 15-17; Otsuka’s Reply at 4-6; see also Roth
Dec.)
As a result, Otsuka asserts that Defendants’ package
inserts induce infringement of Claim 1 of the ’350 patent,
because Claim 1 purportedly “discloses and claims novel
pharmaceutical compositions comprising aripiprazole in
combination with serotonin reuptake inhibitors” (as opposed to
only escitalopram and/or citalopram), and “encompasses any use
of that composition,” particularly the use of the composition
“as an adjunctive therapy for major depressive disorder.”
(Otsuka’s Br. at 4-5 (emphasis added).)
These Defendants, however, uniformly counter that Otsuka’s
inducement claim fails, even at this preliminary stage, and
would ultimately fail at a trial on the merits, for at least two
reasons.
28
First, Defendants claim that Otsuka’s infringement claim
lacks merit, because Defendants’ ANDA products seek only to
market aripiprazole, without any accompanying ingredient.
Therefore, because no Defendant seeks to market and/or
distribute a “pharmaceutical composition” comprised of
aripiprazole and citalopram and/or escitalopram, Defendants
argue that they will not make, use, offer for sale or sell a
product within the scope of Claim 1 (See, e.g., Actavis’s Opp’n
at 6; Sun’s Opp’n at 9-10; Sandoz’s Opp’n at 1, 15; Hetero’s
Opp’n at 8 n.10; Apotex’s Opp’n at 8-9), and, as a result, could
never directly infringe the ’350 patent, a threshold requirement
for a finding of inducement.
(See, e.g., Alembic’s Opp’n at 10-
13; Torrent’s Opp’n at 8-10; Zydus’s Opp’n at 19-21; Sandoz’s
Sur-reply at 1-3.)
Second, Defendants argue that Otsuka has
failed to demonstrate that their package inserts or prescribing
information reflect the requisite specific intent to induce
infringement.
(See, e.g., Actavis’s Opp’n at 13-18; Hetero’s
Sur-reply at 2-4.)
In order to properly frame the issues implicated by the
pending motions—namely, the parties’ disputes concerning whether
Otsuka sufficiently demonstrated the threshold elements of an
induced infringement claim–the Court must briefly discuss the
relevant framework.
29
a. Standard for Induced Infringement
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (emphasis added). In
order to establish inducement, the patentee must show “direct
infringement, and that the alleged infringer ‘knowingly induced
infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage
another’s infringement.’ ” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
598 F.3d 831, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
In other words, Otsuka’s
theory of induced infringement will be viable “if, but only if,”
Otsuka demonstrates “direct infringement,” Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014)
(citation omitted), and if Otsuka presents affirmative evidence
that any Defendant knowingly induced infringing acts and
possessed a specific intent to encourage another to infringe the
’350 patent.
See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581
F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Warner–Lambert Co. v. Apotex
Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In that regard,
induced infringement premises liability upon “purposeful,
culpable expressions and conduct” and “active steps” taken to
encourage direct infringement, including advertising and/or
instructions. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 13051306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part).
As relevant here, in order to obtain a preliminary
injunction, Otsuka must prove that it will “‘more likely than
30
not’” succeed in establishing the elements of induced
infringement.
Trebro Mfg., Inc., 748 F.3d at 1166 (citation
omitted). Given the parties’ dispute, the infringement analysis
for purposes of the pending motion requires two steps.
See
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
First, the Court must construe the disputed claim of the
’350 patent, in order to determine the scope of the claimed
infringement.
Second, the Court must compare the generic
Defendants’ proposed product with the relevant portion of the
construed ’350 patent.
Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg.,
Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. Del. 2002) (conducting the twopart inquiry), aff’d, 363 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The Court
will address each step in turn.
i.
Claim Construction: Claim 1 of the ’350
Patent Discloses a Composition, Namely a
Tablet, Comprised of a Single Dosage that
Contains At Least Two Active Ingredients
In its submissions, Otsuka makes little mention of the need
to construe Claim 1 of the ’350 patent.13
13
(See Otsuka’s Br. at
Indeed, in its opening briefs, Otsuka sets forth no discussion
of the standard applicable to claim construction (see generally
Otsuka’s Br. at 4-5), and only cursorily introduces one selfserving portion of the claim construction standard in its reply
briefings. (See Otsuka’s Reply at 4 (asserting that “a court
should give a claim term the full range of its ordinary meaning
as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art) (citing
Rexnord Corp v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2001).) Otsuka has presented expert testimony of Dr. Roth, in
his supplemental declaration, regarding Otsuka’s proposed
31
4-5, 10.)
Rather, Otsuka asserts, without explanation, that
Claim 1 of the ’350 patent discloses “novel pharmaceutical
compositions comprising aripiprazole in combination with
serotonin reuptake inhibitors,” and argues that, despite the
claim language, the specification of the ’350 patent clarifies
the “understanding that the claimed pharmaceutical composition”
claim broadly discloses “multiple dosage forms,” and that
aripiprazole and the relevant serotonin reuptake inhibitors
“need not be present in the same pill or dosage form.”
(Id. at
4-5; see also Otsuka’s Reply at 3-4 (arguing that, “the
specification unambiguously explains that aripiprazole and at
least one SRI may be in the same dosage form or in separate
dosage forms”).)
These generic Defendants, however, uniformly characterize
Otsuka’s proposed construction as untenably broad, and argue,
based upon the plain claim language, that Claim 1 should be
construed to require a single pharmaceutical composition or
dosage form, i.e., a single tablet, comprised of at least two
different active ingredients: (a) aripiprazole and (b) either
citalopram or escitalopram.
(See, e.g., Apotex’s Opp’n at 6;
Sandoz’s Opp’n at 7-15; Teva’s Br. at 10-12; Hetero’s Br. at 917; Actavis’s Opp’n at 7-9.)
construction of Claim 1 for purposes of this motion, which the
Court has considered. (See Roth Supplemental Dec. at ¶¶ 12-17.)
32
In construing claim terms, courts “look to, and primarily
rely on, the intrinsic evidence, including the claims
themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history of
the patent.”14
Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 731 F.3d at 1276.
Generally, however, claim terms are “given their plain and
ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the
context of the specification and prosecution history.”15
14
Golden
The construction of claim terms constitutes a question of law,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), and the Court need not
follow the parties’ proposed constructions. See Marine Polymer
Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1359 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc).
15 The parties all proffer expert opinion concerning the proper
construction of Claim 1. (See, e.g., Roth Dec. at ¶¶ 13-17
(Otsuka’s psychopharmacology expert); Palmieri Dec. at ¶¶ 24-55
(Alembic’s, Zydus’s, Sun’s, Teva’s, Apotex’s, and Hetero’s
pharmaceutical formulator expert).) Nevertheless, because the
intrinsic evidence, namely, the plain claim language, discloses
the meaning of the disputed claim, the Court need not examine
any extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony. Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1318 (explaining that courts need only resort to
extrinsic evidence, in the event that the intrinsic evidence
fails to disclose the relevant meaning of the disputed claim(s)
and/or term(s)). Nevertheless, the Court notes that Otsuka’s
expert, Dr. Roth, asserted his opinion “that the ‘pharmaceutical
composition’ described in claim 1 of the ’350 patent includes
situations where aripiprazole and citalopram/escitalopram (and
salts thereof) appear in the same dosage form and also in
circumstances wherein aripiprazole and citalopram/escitalopram
(and salts thereof) appear in two or more dosage forms.” (Roth
Supplemental Dec. at ¶ 13.) In rendering this opinion, however,
Dr. Roth relied exclusively upon the sections of the
specification summarized below, and provided no discussion of
the plain claim language, nor attempted to reconcile his opinion
with the plain claim language. (See id. at ¶¶ 12-17.) Therefore,
even if the Court reached Otsuka’s expert opinion on claim
construction, which it need not given Claim 1’s use of commonly
understood words, the Court finds Dr. Roth’s claim construction
33
Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–17
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
Nevertheless, “‘[t]he construction
that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns
with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the
end, the correct construction.’” Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 746 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316).
The disputed composition claim in this instance, Claim 1 of
the ’350 patent, requires no complex construction.
Indeed, the
limited claim language leaves little to the imagination, and
requires no more than “the application of the widely accepted
meaning of commonly understood words.”16
Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1314.
Claim 1 of the ’350 patent specifically discloses, in its
entirety, as follows: “A pharmaceutical composition comprising
opinion of little weight. Moreover, in reaching opposite
conclusions, Defendants’ experts, by contrast, began, as they
must, with the plain and ordinary meaning of Claim 1. (See,
e.g., Palmieri Dec. at ¶¶ 21-26; Halper Dec. at ¶¶ 28-29; Orr
Dec. at ¶¶ 13-16; Ross Dec. at ¶¶ 20-23.)
16 Indeed, Otsuka conceded in at least four of these related
actions that phrases “a/the pharmaceutical composition” and “in
combination with” should be construed in accordance with the
phrases’ “plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person
of ordinary skill in the art.” (Ex. 11 to Tang Dec.) For that
reason, the Court rejects Otsuka’s suggestion on the April 10,
2015 oral argument record that Claim 1 arguably possesses any
special definition.
34
(a) aripiprazole in combination with (b) at least one serotonin
reuptake inhibitor selected from citalopram, escitalopram and
salts thereof.”
(’350 patent, reprinted at Ex. 4 to Fues Dec.
at col. 28, ln. 64-67 (emphases added).)
In that regard, Claim
1 discloses, on its face, only a composition product comprised
of the identified active pharmaceutical ingredients, but not any
method of administration, particular molecular structure, nor
any method of use.
Moreover, despite the brevity of the claim language,
several features critically relevant to construction immediately
emerge from even an cursory review of Claim 1’s brief language,
namely, the inclusion of “a pharmaceutical composition” in the
singular, followed by grammatically uninterrupted identification
of the composition’s at least two component parts.
(Id.
(emphasis added).) See Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (stating that “grammatical structure and syntax” of
the claim can be important evidence for claim construction).
Taken together, the phrases “a pharmaceutical composition” and
“in combination with,” when followed by a lettered delineation
of the required parts (Ex. 4 to Fues Dec. at col. 28, ln. 64-67
(emphasis added)), provide a clear indication that the claim
refers to a single pharmaceutical composition or dosage
comprised of multiple active pharmaceutical ingredients.
Indeed, given the grammatical structure and use of commonly
35
understood terms, a lay person would immediately understand that
“[a] pharmaceutical composition” comprised of “(a)” and “(b)”
means that the claimed “composition” requires a single dosage of
the identified ingredients—specifically, aripiprazole as the
first ingredient, and citalopram, escitalopram and salts
therefore as the second ingredient.
28, ln. 64-67.)
(Ex. 4 to Fues Dec. at col.
A plain reading of the Claim language permits
no broadened interpretation.17
Moreover, the Court’s commonsense, plain language
construction finds further support in dependent Claim 18, which
discloses “[t]he composition of Claim 1, wherein the amount of
(a) aripiprazole in combination with (b) at least one serotonin
reuptake inhibitor selected from citalopram, escitalopram and
salts thereof is 1 to 70 parts by weight of the total
composition.” (’350 patent at col. 30, ln 44-48 (emphasis
added).)
Claim 18 therefore describes the single
“pharmaceutical composition” of Claim 1 in terms of the combined
17
In arguing for a construction with greater breadth, Otsuka
implicitly acknowledges that its proposed construction finds
little support in the plain claim language (see Otsuka’s Br. at
4 (arguing that Claim 1 of the ’350 patent “is directed
generally to a pharmaceutical composition,” and then quickly
turning to the specification)), and entirely ignores the “in
combination with” language. (See Otsuka’s Reply at 3; see also
Roth Supplemental Dec. at ¶¶ 12-15 (suggesting, based upon the
specification, that the composition disclosed by Claim 1 could,
in certain “circumstances,” appear in two or more dosage
forms).)
36
weight of its active ingredients formulated together in a “total
composition.”
(Id. (emphases added).)
By claiming a specific
weight ratio (i.e., “1 to 70 parts”), dependent Claim 18 recites
subject matter admittedly narrower than Claim 1.
Nevertheless,
the Claims’ consistent language makes clear that both disclose
aripiprazole and citalopram or escitalopram formulated together
in a single dosage form, even if at slightly varied weights.
Indeed, Claim 18’s disclosure of a specific ingredient ratio
explicitly teaches that Claim 1’s “pharmaceutical composition”
necessarily occurs in a single dosage format.
See, e.g.,
Research Plastics, Inc. v. Fed. Packaging Corp., 421 F.3d 1290,
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[C]laim terms are presumed to be used
consistently throughout the patent, such that the usage of a
term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same
term in other claims.”); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314
(noting that “the use of a term within the claim [can] provide a
firm basis for construing the term”).
The overall structure of the patent, throughout its various
sequential components, then consistently and repeatedly teaches
that the claimed invention concerns a single dosage form,
comprised of two active ingredients.
Indeed, the ’350 patent describes the invention at the
outset in its abstract as a “pharmaceutical composition”
comprised of “(1) a carbostyril derivative,” either
37
“aripiprazole or a metabolite,” together with “(2) a serotonin
reuptake inhibitor,” e.g., citalopram and/or escitalopram, “in a
[single] pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.”
Fues Dec. at Abstract (emphasis added).)
(See Ex. 4 to
In the disclosure of
the invention, the ’350 patent then reiterates that the claimed
invention consists of at least two ingredients “in a
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.”
(Id. at col. 2, ln. 66 to
col. 6, ln. 17.)
Identical disclosures appear in the Detailed Description,
which describes in detail the “first” and “second” ingredients,
“contained,” “combined,” or “mixed” in the single
“pharmaceutical composition.” (See, e.g., id. at col. 6, ln. 4755; col. 10, ln. 52-57; col. 11, ln. 47-48 (“Combination of the
First Ingredient with the Second Ingredient”); col. 13, ln. 5662 (“the amounts of the first ingredient and the second
ingredient to be contained in the pharmaceutical composition of
the present invention...”); col. 20, ln. 27-41 (describing
aripiprazole in a combined administration with citalopram and/or
escitalopram).)
Indeed, the introduction of the Detailed
Description states that, “[t]he pharmaceutical composition of
the present invention comprises a first ingredient comprising a
carbostyil derivative active as a dopamine-serotonin system
stabilizer and a second ingredient comprising a serotonin
reuptake inhibitor, in a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.”
38
(Id. at col. 6, ln. 47-51 (emphasis added).)
In that regard,
the syntax of the introduction alone indicates that the single
“pharmaceutically acceptable carrier” describes and limits the
preceding composition to a carrier, or dosage, comprised of two
ingredients.
Even more, however, the Detailed Description
contains the following illustrative subheadings: “The
Pharmaceutical Composition: The First Ingredient,” i.e.,
aripiprazole, “The Pharmaceutical Composition: The Second
Ingredient,” i.e., a serotonin reuptake inhibitor, and
“Combination of the First Ingredient with the Second
Ingredient,” i.e., a combination of aripiprazole and an SRI, and
preferably “a combination of aripiprazole/citalopram.”
(Id. at
col. 6, ln. 56, col. 10, ln. 52, col. 11, ln. 47-59.) Imbedded
within these six columns, the Patent uniformly treats the
claimed invention as a single “combination” dosage, and
specifically delineates the preferred weight ratio “of the first
ingredient to the second ingredient” as generally, “about 1 to
70 parts by weight, preferably about 1 to 30 parts by weight of
the first ingredient and the second ingredient in the total
amount on the basis of the pharmaceutical composition.”
(See
id. at col. 11, 58-59, col. 12, ln. 61-63, col. 13, ln. 59-61.)
The eighteen “non-limiting formulation examples of
aripiprazole” then uniformly disclose formulations for “the
[claimed] tablet” that contain multiple active pharmaceutical
39
ingredients, namely aripiprazole combined with at least one SRI,
together in a single “tablet.”
(Id. at Col. 20, ln. 46 – Col.
25, ln. 17 (emphases added); see also Col. 11, ln. 54-58
(setting forth a non-exhaustive list of the relevant SRIs).)
Given the volume and pervasiveness of these consistent
references to a composition in a single dosage form, the Court
finds no support for Otsuka’s position that the “pharmaceutical
composition” of Claim 1 should be construed, for purposes of the
pending motions, to teach that aripiprazole and the at least one
SRI (namely, escitalopram and/or citalopram) may be presented in
separate and/or multiple dosage forms.
(See Otsuka’s Br. at 4;
Otsuka’s Reply at 3.)
Nor does Otsuka’s citation to limited portions of the
specification support any contrary construction.
At the outset,
the Court notes that Otsuka cannot cherry pick portions of the
specification to support its argument that the ’350 patent
teaches a broadened definition of Claim 1’s “pharmaceutical
composition,” all while ignoring the actual wording of Claim 1
and the other and numerous portions of the specification that
provide a clear contrary indication that better comports with
the plain claim language.
Moreover, when viewed in context, the
relied-upon passages lend additional support to the position
that Claim 1 refers to a single composition or tablet comprised
of two active ingredients.
40
Otsuka, in particular, relies upon the following portions
of the specification:
The novel compositions of [the] present invention
comprising at least one carbostyril derivative ... and
at least one serotonin reuptake inhibitor in a
pharmaceutically acceptable carrier may be combined in
one dosage form, for example a pill. Alternatively the
at least one carbostyril derivative ... and the at
least one serotonin reuptake inhibitor may be in
separate dosage forms, each in a pharmaceutically
acceptable carrier.
(Id. at col. 3, ln. 52-60 (emphases added).)
Administration forms of the pharmaceutical composition
of the present invention may be any type by which the
effective levels of both carbostyril derivatives and
serotonin reuptake inhibitors can be provided in vivo
at the same time. In one embodiment, a carbostyril
derivative together with a serotonin reuptake
inhibitor are contained in one pharmaceutical
composition and this composition may be administered.
On the other hand, each one of carbostyril derivative
and a serotonin reuptake inhibitor are contained
individually in a pharmaceutical preparation
respectively, and each one of these preparations may
be administered at the same time or in suitable
intervals.
(Id. at col. 14, ln. 17-21 (emphases added).)
The aripiprazole can be administered in one dosage
form, for example a tablet, and the serotonin reuptake
inhibitor may be administered in a separate one dosage
form, for example a tablet. The administration may
occur at about the same time or at different times
during the day.
Alternatively, a dosage form containing aripiprazole
in combination with at least one serotonin reuptake
inhibitor may be administered. Such combinations
include without limitation the following:
aripiprazole/fluoxetine, aripiprazole/duloxetine,
aripiprazole/venlafaxine, aripiprazole/milnacipran,
aripiprazole/citalopram, aripiprazole/fluvoxamine,
aripiprazole/paroxetine, and aripiprazole/sertraline.
41
A preferred embodiment comprises a combination of
aripiprazole and citalopram.
(Id. at col. 26, ln. 15-20 (emphases added).)
These passages, particularly the emphasized portions, make
plain a distinction between the preferred “combined”
composition, e.g., the composition otherwise disclosed in the
remainder of the specification, and an alternative composition
in which the aripiprazole and the at least one SRI exists “in
separate dosage forms, each in a pharmaceutically acceptable
carrier.”
(Id.)
Beyond recognizing this critical distinction,
these passages further reflect the patent drafter’s appreciation
of the language necessary to disclose the potential for separate
or multiple administrations.
Nevertheless, the patent drafter
included no sufficiently flexible or broad language in Claim 1
or in the “Detailed Description,” choosing instead to refer to
the singular claim term “pharmaceutical composition.”
In that
respect, these passages appear to disclose, at most,
“alternative” or “on the other hand” embodiments.
The Court,
however, need not credit alternatively disclosed embodiments
that, as here, “contradict” the relevant claim language.
TIP
Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (declining to include alternatively
disclosed embodiment because it “would contradict the language
of the claims”); Rolls- Royce, PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 603
F.3d 1325, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (omitting certain disclosed
42
embodiments to avoid a construction that “outweighs the language
of the claim.”).
Moreover, even if the Court otherwise accepted
Otsuka’s interpretation of these specific portions of the
specification, the specification itself cannot be “a substitute
for, nor can [it] be used to rewrite, the chosen claim
language.” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirectTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d
870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[s]pecifications teach,” “[c]laims
claim”).
As stated above, the amount of intrinsic evidence that
consistently discloses that Claim 1 refers to a single dosage
form can hardly be described as anything less than substantial,
and the Court finds Otsuka’s broadened construction without
support in the Claim language.18
For all of these reasons, the
Court construes Claim 1 for the purposes of the pending motion
18
Otsuka’s new argument concerning Claim 9, which Otsuka raised
for the first time in its reply briefings and supplemental
declarations, requires no different conclusion. (See Roth
Supplemental Dec. at ¶ 17.) Otsuka, in particular, argues that
Claim 9 supports its position that Claim 1 “can be in one or
more dosage forms,” to the extent Claim 9 discloses “a ‘method
of treating a mood disorder ... comprising administration of an
effective amount of a pharmaceutical composition which
comprise(s) aripiprazole in combination [with] (b) at least one
serotonin reuptake inhibitor.’” (Roth Supplemental Dec. at ¶ 17
(citation omitted).) Nevertheless, the Court finds this new
position unconvincing for two reasons. Critically, Claim 9
constitutes an independent claim, thereby diminishing its
relevance to the interpretation of Claim 1. (See Ex. 4 to Fues
Dec. at Col. 9, ln. 26-40.)
Second, and relatedly, Claim 9
discloses a “method of treatment,” while Claim 1 concerns, on
its face, only a pharmaceutical composition. (Compare id. at
col. 28, ln. 64-67, with id. at col. 29, ln. 26-40.)
43
to refer to a single dosage form, or “pharmaceutical
composition,” containing at least two active ingredients: (a)
aripiprazole and (b) at least one of citalopram, escitalopram
and salt thereof.19
The Court turns to whether this construed
Claim preliminarily supports Otsuka’s infringement claims.
ii.
Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated That
Defendants’ Proposed ANDA Products
Directly Infringe Construed Claim 1 of the
’350 Patent
A claim of induced infringement requires Otsuka, as stated
above, to make a threshold showing of direct infringement—
through either evidence “of specific instances of direct
infringement” or through evidence “that the accused products
19
The Court’s construction also finds support in the weight of
authority that has construed the term “pharmaceutical
composition,” and consistently concluded that this term of art
refers to a single, aggregated product. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil
Pharm. v. Kali Labs., No. 06-3533, 2008 WL 1782283, at *3-4
(D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2008) (“A ‘pharmaceutical composition’ is a
term of art used to describe a medicinal preparation comprising
a mixture, prepared outside of the body, generally in the form
of a dosage unit, such as a tablet or capsule.”), vacated on
other grounds, 344 F. App’x 595 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Takeda Pharm.
Co Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348-49 (D.
Del. 2008) (construing “pharmaceutical composition” as “a
medicinal product formed from two or more substances for use as
a drug in medical treatment”); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Kali
Labs., 482 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 2007), vacated on other
grounds, 344 F. App’x 595 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (construing
“pharmaceutical composition” to mean a single dosage form and
not separate administration of the component drugs); Abbott
Labs. v. Sandoz, 529 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(explaining the phrase “pharmaceutical composition” has its
“plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a skilled artisan”
as “an aggregated product formed from two or more substances for
use as a drug in medical treatment”).
44
necessarily infringe.”
Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc.,
550 F.3d 1325, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Meyer
Intellectual Props. Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1354, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a finding of
direct infringement is a prerequisite to a finding of
inducement.”) (citation omitted).
Here, while the Court has preliminarily determined that
Claim 1 requires a single composition, or tablet, containing
aripiprazole in combination with either citalopram and/or
escitalopram, Defendants’ proposed generic products indisputably
contain, as stated above, only one active ingredient—
aripiprazole.
(See, e.g., Torrent’s Opp’n at 8; Alembic’s Opp’n
at 2; Zydus’s Opp’n at 1; Sun’s Opp’n at 3; Teva’s Opp’n at 1-3;
Actavis’s Opp’n at 6; Apotex’s Opp’n at 8; Hetero’s Opp’n at 8
n.10; Sandoz’s Opp’n at 1.)
As a result, Defendants’ proposed
products fundamentally cannot, on their face, directly infringe
Claim 1, and Otsuka has failed to identify any other underlying
act of direct infringement—an express requirement for
establishing inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
See Limelight
Networks, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2117 (noting that induced
infringement lies “if, but only if,” the patentee makes a
showing of direct infringement); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
45
(1997) (noting that a direct infringement claim only lies where
the patentee shows that the infringing product contains each and
every claim limitation).
For that reason alone, Otsuka has not
met its burden of demonstrating it is ultimately likely to
succeed in demonstrating this critical, first element of its
theory of induced infringement.
Stated differently, these
Defendants have raised a powerful showing that Otsuka’s theory
of infringement is incorrect.
Nevertheless, even if Otsuka could meet this threshold
requirement, Otsuka has not established that any of these
Defendants specifically and actively intend to induce
infringement of asserted Claim 1, the second requirement of an
induced infringement claim, for reasons next discussed.
iii.
Otsuka Has Not Shown that Defendants
Actively and Purposefully Encouraged
Infringement
Otsuka argues that Defendants’ proposed package inserts or
labels teach that aripiprazole should be co-administered with an
antidepressant like citalopram20 and/or escitalopram, thereby
inducing infringement of Claim 1 of the ’350 patent.
(See
Otsuka’s Br. at 13-17; Otsuka’s Reply at 4-6.)
The Court, however, need not belabor Otsuka’s position,
because the Defendants’ labels fail to contain, even under the
20
Indeed, citalopram does not appear, at all, on Otsuka’s
Abilify® label.
46
reading most generous to Otsuka, any sufficiently significant
specific and active instruction to, and/or encouragement of, an
infringing use.
Inducement requires, as stated above, that the alleged
infringer “‘knowingly induced infringement and possessed [the]
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.’”
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1219 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Critically, however, “mere
knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to
inducement.”
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Rather, the patentee must produce
evidence of active steps “taken to encourage direct
infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or
instructing how to engage in an infringing use.”
MGM Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005) (citation
omitted).
The relevant inquiry for purposes of inducement is
not, however, “whether a user following the instructions may end
up using the device in an infringing way.”
Vita–Mix Corp. v.
Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1329 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(emphasis added).
Rather, the operative inquiry concerns
“whether [the] instructions [actively] teach an infringing use
of the [product] such that [courts can] infer from those
instructions an affirmative intent” that the product be used to
infringe.
Id.; see also AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633
47
F.3d 1042, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that the “pertinent
question” concerns “whether the proposed label instructs users
to perform the patented method”) (emphasis added).
As generics of Abilify®, these Defendants’ ANDA products
have the same active ingredient (aripiprazole), dosage
strengths, and route of administration (oral or oral
disintegrating tablets) as Abilify®.
Nevertheless, these
generic Defendants’ proposed package inserts differ, in material
respects, from the approved Abilify® label for at least two
reasons, both of which prove fatal to Otsuka’s assertions of
intentional action.
a. Defendants’ “Carve Out” of the
Relevant Indication Significantly
Diminishes Any Suggestion of
Sufficiently Intentional Action
Critically absent from each proposed label is any
indication that the generic aripiprazole products should be used
for adjunctive treatment of major depressive disorder, the
primary indication for the ’350 patent.
Indeed, each generic
Defendant specifically “carved-out” the pertinent indication
(e.g., “adjunctive treatment for major depressive disorder”)
from their respective generic Abilify® labels, affirmatively
relinquishing the right to actively promote use of their
aripiprazole products with any antidepressants, including
48
citalopram and escitalopram.21
(See, e.g., Torrent’s Opp’n at 1-
2; Alembic’s Opp’n at 2, 3, 6, 14, 18; Zydus’s Opp’n at 22-23;
Sun’s Opp’n at 12; Teva’s Opp’n at 2, 13-14; Actavis’s Opp’n at
13-14; Apotex’s Opp’n at 11-12; Hetero’s Opp’n at 17-18;
Sandoz’s Opp’n at 4, 18.)
Indeed, given these Defendants’
“carve outs,” Defendants cannot, as a matter of law, instruct
patients and/or prescribers to use their aripiprazole products
for purposes of “adjunctive treatment for major depressive
disorder,” a use or indication for which only Otsuka holds
approval.
See Caraco Pharm. Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (noting
that, following the FDA’s acceptance of the carve-out label, the
generic company may “place its drug on the market, (assuming the
[applicant] meets other requirements), but only for a subset of
approved uses – i.e., those not covered by the brand’s patents”)
(emphasis added); see also Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin,
Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (generally noting
that the applicable FDA regulations prohibit generic
21
The carve-out provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) and
21 C.F.R. § 314.94 (a)(12)(iii)(A), specifically permit an ANDA
applicant to submit a “section viii statement” certifying that
the applicant does not seek approval for any indications or uses
asserted to be covered by a patent from the proposed label in
the ANDA. See Caraco Pharm. Labs. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S.
Ct. 1670, 1676-77 (2012). In connection with the submission of
a section viii statement, “the ANDA applicant must include [for
approval] a proposed label that removes or ‘carves out’ the
claimed method of use.” Bayer Schering Pharma AG. v. Lupin,
Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
49
pharmaceutical companies from implying or suggesting that the
generic product has indications or uses other than those
approved by the FDA).
The fact that all of these Defendants actively and
voluntarily removed any reference to the allegedly infringing
indication, in turn, belies any suggestion that these Defendants
acted with the specific intention to encourage infringement.
Indeed, this affirmative action would seem to negate any
reasonable inference of an active intent to induce infringement.
See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 07-4937, 2011
WL 4074116, at *16 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011), aff’d, 476 F. App’x
746 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
For that reason, Otsuka has not
demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that these
Defendants induce infringement of Claim 1 of the ’350 patent.
See AstraZeneca, 669 F.3d at 1377-78 (“[a] patented method of
using a drug can only be infringed under § 271(e)(2) by filing
an ANDA that seeks approval to market the drug for that use.”);
Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at 1364-65 (“[T]he request to make
and sell a drug labeled with a permissible (non-infringing) use
cannot reasonably be interpreted as an act of infringement
(induced or otherwise) with respect to a patent on an unapproved
use” (emphasis added)).
50
b. Defendants’ Proposed Labels Do Not
Reflect Actual Instruction in
Furtherance of Inducing
Infringement
In addition, the Court also finds significant deficiencies
in Otsuka’s positions concerning the substance of Defendants’
actual labels.
Critically, Otsuka does not claim that any
individual Defendant instructs and/or encourages the infringing
use of its aripiprazole product in either of the key sections of
the package inserts: “INDICATIONS AND USAGE” or “DOSAGE AND
ADMINISTRATION.”
See Bayer Schering Pharma AG, 676 F.3d at 1321
(discussing the substantive importance of the “Indications and
Usage” portion of a product label).
Nor does Otsuka dispute
that none of the Defendants’ labels even refer to citalopram,
much less the coadministration of aripiprazole with citalopram.
Rather, Otsuka’s position on induced infringement hinges
upon the fact that the black box warnings and related sections
of Defendants’ labels purportedly imply that the adjunctive use
of aripiprazole with any antidepressant results in reduced rates
of suicidality in patients aged 65 and older; identify
escitalopram and/or “substrates of CYP2C19” as drugs without any
clinically important interactions with aripiprazole; and
otherwise discuss and/or reference the use of antidepressants,
generally, in conjunction with aripiprazole.
51
mixed/manic episode in
patients at risk for bipolar
disorder. Whether any of the
symptoms described above
represent such a conversion
is unknown. However, prior to
initiating treatment with an
antidepressant, patients with
depressive symptoms should be
adequately screened to
determine if they are at risk
for bipolar disorder; such
screening should include a
detailed psychiatric history,
including a family history of
suicide, bipolar disorder,
and depression.
mixed/manic episode in
patients at risk for bipolar
disorder. Whether any of the
symptoms described above
represent such a conversion
is unknown. However, prior to
initiating treatment with an
antidepressant, patients with
depressive symptoms should be
adequately screened to
determine if they are at risk
for bipolar disorder; such
screening should include a
detailed psychiatric history,
including a family history of
suicide, bipolar disorder,
and depression.
It should be noted that
aripiprazole is not approved
for use in treating
depression in the pediatric
population.
Metabolic Changes
Weight Gain
25
In the trials adding aripiprazole to antidepressants, patients
first received 8 weeks of antidepressant treatment followed by 6
weeks of adjunctive aripiprazole or placebo in addition to their
ongoing antidepressant treatment. The mean change in body weight
in patients receiving adjunctive aripiprazole was + 1.7 kg
(N=347) compared to +0.4 kg (N=330) in patients receiving
adjunctive placebo.
ADVERSE REACTIONS
6.1 Overall Adverse Reactions Profile
The conditions and duration of treatment with aripiprazole
(monotherapy and adjunctive therapy with antidepressants or mood
stabilizers) included (in overlapping categories) double-blind,
comparative and noncomparative open-label studies, inpatient
25
On the oral argument record on April 10, 2015, counsel for
Otsuka argued that
label contains this, or a
substantially similar, provision. The Court, however, located
no such language in
label in the present record.
54
have a particularly high risk of having suicidal thoughts or
actions. These include people who have (or have a family history
of) bipolar illness (also called manicdepressive illness) or
suicidal thoughts or actions.
3. How can I watch for and try to prevent suicidal thoughts and
actions in myself or a family member?
• Pay close attention to any changes, especially sudden changes,
in mood, behaviors, thoughts, or feelings. This is very important
when an antidepressant medicine is started or when the dose is
changed.
• Call the healthcare provider right away to report new or sudden
changes in mood, behavior, thoughts, or feelings.
• Keep all follow-up visits with the healthcare provider as
scheduled. Call the healthcare provider between visits as
needed, especially if you have concerns about symptoms.
Call a health care provider right away if you or your family
member has any of the following symptoms, especially if they are
new, worse, or worry you:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
thoughts about suicide or dying
attempts to commit suicide
new or worse depression
new or worse anxiety
feeling very agitated or restless
panic attacks
trouble sleeping (insomnia)
new or worse irritability
acting aggressive, being angry, or violent
acting on dangerous impulses
an extreme increase in activity and talking (mania)
other unusual changes in behavior or mood
What else do I need to know about antidepressant medicines?
• Never stop an antidepressant medicine without first talking to
a healthcare provider. Stopping an antidepressant medicine
suddenly can cause other symptoms.
• Antidepressants are medicines used to treat depression and
other illnesses. It is important to discuss all the risks of
treating depression and also the risks of not treating it.
Patients and their families or other caregivers should discuss
all treatment choices with the healthcare provider, not just the
use of antidepressants.
• Antidepressant medicines have other side effects. Talk to the
healthcare provider about the side effects of the medicine
prescribed for you or your family member.
57
• Antidepressant medicines can interact with other medicines.
Know all of the medicines that you or your family member takes.
Keep a list of all medicines to show the healthcare provider. Do
not start new medicines without first checking with your
healthcare provider.
• Not all antidepressant medicines prescribed for children are
FDA approved for use in children. Talk to your child’s healthcare
provider for more information.
As illustrated above, Otsuka’s theory of induced
infringement turns, in its entirety, upon fleeting references to
antidepressants, certain generic Defendants’ single reference to
the coadministration of their respective aripiprazole products
with escitalopram, and Defendants’ general reference to
antidepressants.
In these respects, Otsuka’s position
principally relies upon contraindications and language tending
to warn about aripiprazole’s potential effects and/or adverse
reactions/interactions.
But, a warning is just that—a warning.
It is not an instruction to coadminister aripiprazole with any
particular drug, much less escitalopram or citalopram, the only
antidepressants covered by Claim 1.
Indeed, courts have repeatedly found incidental references
to even infringing uses in these sections insufficient to
constitute instruction or encouragement, as opposed to mere
permission, and have consistently rejected safety discussions as
a basis for inducement liability.
See, e.g., United
Therapeutics Corp., 2014 WL 4259153, at *18 (noting that “there
is a rather significant difference between a warning and an
58
instruction”); Shire LLC v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, No. 11-3781,
2014 WL 2861430, at *3-6 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014) (noting the
difference between “permission” and the “encouragement” required
to show inducement, and granting summary judgment of the issue
of inducement where the accused product package insert could, at
most, “be understood to permit an infringing use”); Aventis, 355
F. Supp. 2d at 598-99.
Otsuka fares no better in this case,
because Defendants’ labels do not manifest any intention to
induce infringement, much less the active and specific intention
required to support its theory of inducement.
Nevertheless, the Court finds the deficiency in Otsuka’s
argument best illustrated by the following side-by-side
comparison of relevant sections of Otsuka’s Abilify® insert to
that of each of these generic Defendants:
Otsuka’s ABILIFY® (aripiprazole)
Tablets label (Ex. B to Roth
Dec.)
Torrent’s Aripiprazole
Label (Ex. 1 to Hunnicut Dec.)
1. No reference to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder,
other than in black box
warning.
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
3. Only one reference to
escitalopram in section 7.3,
entitled “Drugs Having No
Clinically Important
Interactions with
Aripiprazole”]
BLACK BOX WARNINGS
1 INDICATIONS AND USAGE
ABILIFY is an atypical
antipsychotic. The oral
formulations are indicated for...
...
Adjunctive Treatment of Major
Depressive Disorder
...
59
Adjunctive Treatment of Major
Depressive Disorder [see CLINICAL
STUDIES (14.3)]
Alembic’s Aripiprazole Label
(Alembic’s Br. at 15-16.)
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
3. Escitalopram appears twice,
once in section 7, “DRUG
INTERACTIONS,” and again in
section 12, “CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY”
2 DOSAGE AND ADMINISTRATION
...
2.3 Adjunctive Treatment of Major
Depressive Disorder
Adults
The recommended starting dose for
ABILIFY as adjunctive treatment
for patients already taking an
antidepressant is 2 mg/day to 5
mg/day. The recommended dosage
range is 2 mg/day to 15 mg/day.
Dosage adjustments of up to 5
mg/day should occur gradually, at
intervals of no less than 1 week
[see CLINICAL STUDIES (14.3)}.
Patients should be periodically
reassessed to determine the
continued need for maintenance
treatment.
6 ADVERSE REACTIONS
...
6.1 Clinical Trials Experience
Zydus’s Aripiprazole
Label
(Exs. 1 & 2 to Srinivas Dec.)
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to the
coadministration of
aripiprazole with any
antidepressant
3. Escitalopram appears once in
section 7.2, “Drugs Having
No Clinically Important
Interactions with
Aripiprazole”
Sun’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex. 2
to Gangasani Dec.)
Adult Patients Receiving ABILIFY
as Adjunctive Treatment of Major
Depressive Disorder
The following findings are based
on a pool of two placebocontrolled trials of patients
with major depressive disorder in
which ABILIFY was administered at
doses of 2 mg to 20 mg as
adjunctive treatment to continued
antidepressant therapy.
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
or escitalopram
Teva’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex. 2
to Birbach Dec.)
Adverse Reactions Associated with
Discontinuation of Treatment
1. No reference to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder,
60
other than in black box
warning.
2. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
3. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
or escitalopram, only more
generally to
antidepressants.
The incidence of discontinuation
due to adverse reactions was 6%
for adjunctive ABILIFY-treated
patients and 2% for adjunctive
placebo-treated patients.
Commonly Observed Adverse
Reactions
The commonly observed adverse
reactions associated with the use
of adjunctive ABILIFY in patients
with major depressive disorder
(incidence of 5% or greater and
ABILIFY incidence at least twice
that for placebo) were:
akathisia, restlessness,
insomnia, constipation, fatigue,
and blurred vision.
Actavis’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex.
D to Gannon Dec.)
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
or escitalopram
Less Common Adverse Reactions in
Adult Patients with Major
Depressive Disorder
...
7 DRUG INTERACTIONS
Apotex’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex.
1 to Halper Dec.)
...
1. No reference to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder,
other than in black box
warning.
2. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
3. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
4. Escitalopram appears once in
section 7.2, “Drugs Having
No Clinically Important
Interactions with
Aripiprazole”
7.2 Drugs Having No Clinically
Important Interactions with
ABILIFY
...
no dosage adjustment is necessary
for substrates of CYP2D6 (e.g.,
dextromethorphan, fluoxetine,
paroxetine, or venlafaxine),
CYP2C9 (e.g., warfarin),
CYP2C19 (e.g., omeprazole,
warfarin, escitalopram), or
CYP3A4 (e.g., dextromethorphan)
when co-administered with
ABILIFY...
...
Hetero’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex.
6 to Ives Dec.)
61
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
or escitalopram
14.3 Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
Adults
The efficacy of ABILIFY in the
adjunctive treatment of major
depressive disorder...
MEDICATION GUIDE
Sandoz’s Aripiprazole Label (Ex.
5 to Fues Dec.)
...
1. No references to the use of
the generic for the
Adjunctive Treatment of
Major Depressive Disorder
2. No reference to
coadministration of
aripiprazole with citalopram
or escitalopram
WHAT IS ABILIFY?
ABILIFY Oral Tables, OrallyDistintegrating Tablets, and
Oral Solution are prescription
medicines used to treat:
...
o major depressive disorder
(MDD) when ABILIFY is
used with antidepressant
medicines
Critically, in arguing that Defendants’ labels contain
“compelling encouragement” to prescribe aripiprazole in a manner
that infringes Claim 1, i.e., in conjunction with escitalopram
and/or citalopram, Otsuka entirely ignores the context in which
the warning language appears and relies upon language too
general to constitute active encouragement to prescribe an
infringing combination aripiprazole product.
Indeed, in insisting that these Defendants’ labels induce
infringement, Otsuka relies, almost exclusively, upon language
that warns of the potential risks associated with the
interaction between aripiprazole and antidepressants, generally.
The term “antidepressants,” however, identifies a general class
of “different drugs,” comprised of “about two dozen” varieties.
62
(Calabrese Dec. at ¶ 33.)
Claim 1, however, only concerns one
limited and narrow subset of antidepressants, namely, citalopram
and escitalopram.
In that respect, Otsuka argues that a
reference to the broad and far larger class of antidepressants
necessarily amounts to substantial encouragement of an
infringing combination product.
The Court, however, can hardly
imagine that a general reference to antidepressants will
inevitably encourage the combination of aripiprazole and
escitalopram and/or citalopram, the only relevant combination
for purposes of Otsuka’s theory of induced infringement.
As a
result, any discussion of antidepressants generally cannot be
taken as active instruction to encourage users to perform a
patented method that, on its face, concerns only citalopram and
escitalopram. AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1060.
Rather, only
references to aripiprazole in combination with escitalopram
and/or citalopram (of which Defendants’ labels contain almost
none), provide the only arguable support for even a preliminary
finding in Otsuka’s favor on inducement.
Moreover, even if the Court accepted Otsuka’s position that
a reference to “antidepressants” would necessarily evoke
escitalopram and/or citalopram in the mind of any reader, the
Court cannot find that the information admittedly contained only
in the warning provisions of Defendants’ labels demonstrates the
63
active instruction necessary for purposes of inducement.
(See
generally Roth Dec.)
Indeed, the weight of authority has deemed warning and
safety information insufficient to constitute inducement,
requiring instead that the information be set forth in the “Uses
and Indication” or “Dosing and Administration” sections of the
allegedly offending labels.
See, e.g., Shire, 2014 WL 2861430,
at *3-6; Takeda, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2014 WL 5780611, at *5-6;
United Therapeutics Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 12-1617, 2014 WL
4259153, at *16-21 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2014); Aventis Pharma
Deutschland GmbH v. Cobalt Pharm., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 586,
598-99 (D. Mass. 2005).
One court in this District has in fact persuasively noted
the “rather significant difference between a warning and an
instruction.”
*18.
United Therapeutics Corp., 2014 WL 4259153, at
“A warning provides information regarding a potential
risk,” but stops short of prescribing a specific “course of
action.”
Id.
An instruction, on the other hand, specifically
directs that a particular action, or series of actions be taken.
Id.
In that regard, the United court concluded, in essence,
that if a patentee must engage in a “scholarly scavenger hunt”
through the label to identify statements that may inferentially
but not inevitably tie to a physician’s thoughts or acts, the
inducement theory necessarily fails.
64
United, 2014 WL 4259153,
at *19 (rejecting the argument that, “a scholarly scavenger
hunt—which may be incited by a reference in Sandoz's proposed
label, which may be undertaken by some physicians, and may
ultimately result in a discovery which leads some physicians to
prescribe SDF as a diluent for [d]efendant's generic product,
despite [d]efendant’s carve out—may constitute evidence of [the
defendant’s] intent to induce physicians to engage in infringing
conduct” suffices for purposes of induced infringement); see
also Takeda, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2014 WL 5780611, at *5-6
(relying upon United, and rejecting inducement theory when
generic label’s warning and safety information would not
“inevitably” lead to infringing acts), aff’d, Nos. 15-1139, 151142 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
Another court in this district
has similarly—and also persuasively—noted, in the context of an
induced infringement claim, that “permit[ting] an infringing”
use differs, in significant respects, “from encouragement.”
Shire, 2014 WL 2861430, at *5.
The disputed warnings in this instance do far less, and do
not, by their very natures, encourage underlying, infringing
behavior.
Indeed, in their black box warnings, Defendants uniformly
disclose that “short-term studies” indicate that the use of
aripiprazole in conjunction with antidepressants increases the
risk of suicidality in children, adolescents, and young adults;
65
has no impact on the risk of suicidality in patients over age
24; and results in a decreased risk of suicidality in patients
aged 65 and older.
Nevertheless, Otsuka argues that these
provisions constitute active encouragement to prescribe an
infringing product, to the extent the language discloses that
the adjunctive use of aripiprazole results in a decreased risk
of suicidality in a certain population.
As a result, Otsuka
asserts that these Defendants’ labels actively instruct the
beneficial combination of aripiprazole with escitalopram and/or
citalopram at least with respect to those older than 64.
In so arguing, however, Otsuka mischaracterizes the
fundamental nature and placement of this information.
Indeed,
placed in context, the language does not actively instruct
and/or encourage the use of an infringing aripiprazole
combination, nor does it actively tout the benefits of
aripiprazole’s adjunctive use.
Rather, due to increased
suicidality, the language plainly discourages the use of
aripiprazole in combination with any other antidepressant
because the combination places “[c]hildren, adolescents, and
young adults ... at increased risk of suicidal thinking.” (See,
e.g.,
The warning therefore cautions that, “[a]nyone considering the
use of adjunctive aripiprazole or any other antidepressant in” a
66
pediatric patient should “balance this risk with clinical need,”
but discloses that the combination reduces the risk of
suicidality in “adults aged 65 and older.”
Given this context,
namely the fact that the combination of aripiprazole and
antidepressants results in some increased risk of suicidality,
the notation to a possibly reduced risk of suicidality in the
over-65 population can hardly be described as a ringing
endorsement of the adjunctive use of aripiprazole.
Rather, these warnings, as a whole, serve to discourage
adjunctive use in certain populations, by specifically placing
physicians on notice of the potential harmful side effects and
contraindications.
Against this backdrop, the remaining
statements convey, at most, indifference to the administration
of the ANDA products in conjunction with an antidepressant, and
imply that aripiprazole could be administered with an
antidepressant, without any increased risk of suicide in adults
aged 65 and older.
They do not, however, actively encourage or
direct such administration.
Takeda, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2014
WL 5780611, at *5 (noting that the relevant question is “whether
the proposed label is a sufficient catalyst to constitute active
steps taken to encourage direct infringement of the [patents at
issue]”), aff’d, Nos. 15-1139, 15-1142 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
Rather, they specifically warn of the potential pitfalls and
risks of the combination, in recognition of the primary market
67
to which these generic aripiprazole products may be prescribed,
namely, to individuals with multiple and perhaps overlapping
psychological and/or emotional disorders, and who may happen to
be taking an antidepressant.
In that respect, this safety
information must necessarily be inclusive because, despite
having carved out any indication of major depressive disorder,
Defendants cannot prevent their aripiprazole products from being
prescribed in connection with antidepressants.
And, in that
respect, Defendants’ black box warnings convey little more than
the knowledge of possible infringement, not the specific intent
and action to induce required for infringement.
Warner-Lambert,
316 F.3d at 1364.
Nor can the Court conclude that the isolated references to
escitalopram in the Clinical Pharmacology and Drug Interactions
sections of certain Defendants’ labels compel any different
conclusion.
Indeed, escitalopram appears amongst references to
a laundry list of disparate drugs used to treat conditions far
removed from that indicated by the ’350 patent like, for
example, high blood pressure (warfarin) or excess stomach acid
(omeprazole), and Otsuka has provided no sufficient explanation
as to how this information might induce anyone to do anything.
As a result, these limited references in labels that each exceed
50 pages can hardly be described as an indication of these
Defendants’ active encouragement of infringement.
68
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that these
Defendants’ labels provide no sufficient indication that the
information cited by Otsuka will inevitably and necessarily lead
to infringing acts, an essential showing for Otsuka’s inducement
claim.29
The Court finds, therefore, that it is highly unlikely
that Otsuka will be able to demonstrate that Defendants’
proposed labels for generic aripiprazole instruct or encourage
an infringing use because nothing therein suggests combining
aripiprazole and either citalopram or escitalopram in a single
dose.
See, e.g, id. (finding that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated that the label would “‘inevitably lead to
infringing acts.”); Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin, Ltd., 676
F.3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (statements in the label did
not show that the product was safe and effective for the
purposes of inducing the three claimed effects); Acorda, 2011 WL
4074116, *17-19 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011), aff’d, 476 F. App’x 746
29
Nor does Otsuka’s reliance upon AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex,
Inc., 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010), require any different
result. (See Otsuka’s Br. at 14, 15, 17.) Critically, in
affirming the district court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction, the AstraZeneca court relied upon the fact that the
generic’s label contained explicit instructions in the “Dosage
and Administration” section to administer the product in an
infringing manner. Id. at 1057-59. Here, however, and as stated
above, these Defendants’ labels contain no similar, explicit
instruction to administer aripiprazole with “citalopram,
escitalopram, [or] salts thereof” as required by the asserted
Claim 1. Nor does any even remotely analogous warning language
appear in the “Dosage and Administration” portions of
Defendants’ labels.
69
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (where label only alerted users to the issues
related to switching between tablets and capsules, label did not
show the generic defendant’s intent to induce infringement);
Shire, 2014 WL 2861430, at *5-6 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014) (finding
no inducement where “[t]he labels [did] not say that the
products are indicated for the [infringing] treatment of
amphetamine abuse,” despite including information regarding
human abuse liability studies).
c. The Substantial Non-Infringing
Uses Further Diminish Any
Inference of the Requisite
Specific Intent to Induce
Infringement
The “existence of a substantial non-infringing use does
not,” as a matter of law, “preclude a finding of inducement.”
Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (finding that the district court erred, as a matter of
law, in holding that the existence of a substantial noninfringing use preclude[d] a finding of induced infringement).
Nevertheless, in the event a product has substantial noninfringing uses, the Court cannot infer intent to induce
infringement, even if these Defendants had “actual knowledge”
that some of their products would infringe the ’350 patent.
Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1365.
The overwhelmingly predominant use of Abilify® is as a
tablet containing only aripiprazole as the active ingredient,
70
which is not the combination drug claimed by the ’350 patent.
Likewise, the Defendants’ proposed generic aripiprazole contains
only aripiprazole as repeatedly noted above.
The undeniably
non-infringing use of aripiprazole’s generic dosage will thus
constitute the substantial and dominant usage having nothing to
do with co-administration of aripiprazole and citalopram or
escitalopram antidepressants.
Moreover, although the parties dispute the exact percentage
of non-infringing use, the record contains no dispute that the
non-infringing uses remain, under any parties’ estimation,
substantial.
(Compare Hetero’s Opp’n at 3-4 (arguing that the
“peripheral” material covered by the ’350 patent concerns
of Otsuka’s overall market), with Otsuka’s Reply at 10
(arguing that product covered by the ’350 patent results in
of Otsuka’s overall market).)
Moreover, because
none of these Defendants intend to launch the product claimed by
Claim 1 of the ’350 patent, 100% of these Defendants’ proposed
sales would constitute non-infringing uses.
Therefore, for this additional reason, the Court finds that
Defendants’ labels provide no basis from which to infer a
specific intent to encourage infringement.
See Vita-Mix Corp.,
581 F.3d at 1329 (“The amended product instructions teach an
undisputedly non-infringing use, evidencing intent to discourage
infringement.”); see also Takeda Pharm. USA, Inc. v. West-War
71
Pharm. Corp., ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, No. 14-1268, 2014 WL
5780611, at *3 (finding substantial 43.75% non-infringing use).
In conclusion, Otsuka has failed to prove likelihood of
success on its claim for direct infringement or induced
infringement in the event these generic products are launched
after April 20, 2015.
2. Defendants Have Raised a Substantial Question of
Invalidity
In addition to concluding that Otsuka has not demonstrated
a likelihood of success on its theory of induced infringement,
the Court additionally, and in the alternative, concludes that
these Defendants have raised a substantial question of
invalidity.
As relevant here, these Defendants,30 argue that certain
“prior art” references, namely, U.S. Patent No. 7,973,043
30
Though only Alembic, Apotex, Hetero, Torrent, and Sandoz (by
sur-reply) substantively briefed the issue of invalidity, Sun,
Teva, and Actavis specifically incorporated those discussions by
reference into their oppositions, and restated their intentions
to rely upon Alembic’s, Apotex’s, and Hetero’s invalidity
positions on the oral argument record on April 10, 2015. At the
hearing, counsel for Otsuka objected to these Defendants’
incorporation. Nevertheless, because the question of invalidity
presents a common question of law with equal application to all
joining Defendants, the Court will, in its discretion, consider
the invalidity arguments as if fully set forth in each
Defendant’s briefing. The Court will, however, exclude Zydus,
the only Defendant which expressed “no position” concerning
invalidity, and instead “reserve[d] the right to assert any and
all” invalidity defenses in the event the Court granted Otsuka’s
motion to amend. (Zydus’s Opp’n at 3 n.1)
72
(hereinafter, “Migaly ’043 patent”), anticipated Claim 1 and/or
rendered Claim 1 obvious.31 (See Alembic’s Opp’n at 19-22;
Apotex’s Opp’n at 15-17; Hetero’s Br. at 21-24.)
Otsuka, for
its part, does not dispute the substantive identity between the
elements claimed by the ’350 patent and those disclosed in the
Migaly ’043 patent.
(See Otsuka’s Reply at 7.)
Rather, Otsuka
argues that the Migaly ’043 patent, which issued on July 5,
2011, cannot claim priority based upon the July 30, 2002 filing
of Provisional Application No. 60/319,436 (hereinafter, the
“Migaly Provisional”), because the Migaly ’043 patent differs in
material and substantial respects from the Migaly Provisional.
(Id.; see also Roth Supplemental Dec. at ¶¶ 7-15.)
A patent is invalid if “the invention was patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of application for patent in the United
31
Additionally, and in the alternative, these Defendants argue
that International Application Publication No. WO 99/62522
(hereinafter, “Tollefson”), and U.S. Patent Publication No.
2002/0156067 (hereinafter, “Wong”), taken together, render Claim
1 invalid on obviousness grounds, and/or demonstrate that the
product claimed by the ’350 patent was otherwise within the
public knowledge during the relevant period. (See, e.g.,
Alembic’s Br. at 23-24; Apotex’s Br. at 16-17; Hetero’s Br. at
22-23.) Nevertheless, because the Court concludes that these
Defendants have demonstrated a substantial question of
invalidity based upon the Migaly ’043 patent, the Court need not
reach Defendants’ alternative arguments concerning invalidity
based upon Tollefson in view of Wong, or the public knowledge.
73
States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).32
A prior art reference,
however, “can only anticipate a claim if it discloses all the
claimed limitations ‘arranged or combined in the same way as in
the claim.’”
Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co.,
___ F.3d ____, 2015 WL 1319364 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2015)
(quoting Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d
1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Net MoneyIN, Inc. v.
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
In
order to anticipate a subsequent claim, a reference need not
“expressly spell out” the limitations or combinations disclosed
the disputed claim.
Id.
Rather, a reference anticipates a
claim if a person of skill in the art would, upon reading the
reference, “‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or
combination.”
Id. (citation omitted).
In light of the presumption of patent validity, 35 U.S.C. §
282, and the related presumption that the USPTO “‘properly’”
performed its function in reviewing patent applicatons, generic
defendants must ordinarily prove invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence.
See Cadence Pharm. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci
32
The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (hereinafter, the “AIA”),
Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011),
subsequently amended this provision. However, because the
pending claims have an effective filing date prior to March 16,
2013, the pre-AIA § 102(b) applies. See Kennametal, Inc., ___
F.3d ____, 2015 WL 1319364, at n.3 (citing In re Giannelli, 739
F.3d 1375, 1376 n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
74
Inc., ___ F.3d ____, 2015 WL 1284235 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2015).
For purposes of a preliminary injunction, however, these generic
Defendants need not prove actual invalidity.
Rather, these
generic Defendants must demonstrate a substantial question of
invalidity, that is, they must show the potential vulnerability
of the ’350 patent, a showing far less rigorous than the clear
and convincing showing necessary to establish invalidity itself.
See, e.g., Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d
922, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting); Kimberly–
Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 431 F.
App’x. 884, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that,
“[v]ulnerability is the issue at the preliminary injunction
stage, while validity is the issue at trial”) (citations
omitted); Erico Int’l Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d 1350, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“a defendant must put forth a substantial
question of invalidity to show that the claims at issue are
vulnerable”); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that the generic defendant “raised and
substantially established that the validity of the [disputed
patent was] vulnerable”).
At the outset, the Court notes that Claim 1 of the ’350
patent and Claim 40 of the Migaly ’043 patent disclose, on their
faces, the same general combination:
Claim 1 of the ’350 Patent
75
Claim 40 of the Migaly ’043
Patent
A pharmaceutical composition
comprising (a) aripiprazole in
combination with (b) at least
one serotonin reuptake
inhibitor selected from
citalopram, escitalopram and
salts thereof
The method of claim 11, wherein
said antidepressant is selected
from the group consisting of
fluoxetine, norfluoxetine,
paroxetine, sertraline,
fluvoxamine, citalopram,
escitalopram, zimelidine,
indalpine, femoxetine,
alaproclate and
pharmaceutically acceptable
salts thereof, and wherein said
atypical antipsychotic drug is
selected from the group
consisting of risperidone,
quetiapene, olanzapine,
ziprasidone and aripiprazole.
Despite the obvious similarities, Otsuka’s expert asserts
that a person of skill in the art would not immediately envisage
the claimed combination, because the specific combination of
aripiprazole and escitalopram/citalopram appears amongst a
multiplicity of antipsychotics and antidepressants, which could
arguably “result in many 1000s of different, indeterminate and
in many cases combinations of drugs which exist only as
hypothesized entities.”
(Roth Validity Dec. at ¶ 16.)
In that
respect, however, Otsuka’s expert overstates the elements
disclosed by the Migaly ’043 patent.
The Migaly ’043 patent, in particular, discloses a “method
for treatment of a patient suffering from major depressive
disorder” (Ex. 13 to Ives Dec. at col. 32, ln. 2-3), through the
76
administration of a combination product comprised of an
antidepressant and an antipsychotic. (Id. at col. 33, ln. 1725.)
Claim 40 of the Migaly ’043 patent then delineates 11
specific antidepressants, including citalopram and escitalopram,
and 5 antipsychotics, including aripiprazole.
(Id.)
In that
regard, it appears that the Migaly ’043 patent discloses each
and every claimed element of Claim 1 of the ’350 patent.
Moreover, despite Otsuka’s expert’s contention that the “long
list[] of antipsychotics and antidepressants” clouds any clear
“recitation in the Migaly Patent that discloses the specific
combination of aripiprazole and escitalopram/citalopram” (Roth
Validity Dec. at ¶ 16),33 Defendants’ expert stated that he
“immediately envisioned a combination of aripiprazole with
either citalopram or escitalopram based [upon the Migaly ’043
patent] disclosure.”
(Calabrese Dec. at ¶ 39.)
Given the fact
that the Migaly ’043 patent limits its claimed combination to
the exact elements claimed by Claim 1 of the ’350 patent, the
33
Curiously, with respect to infringement, Otsuka argued, as
stated above, that any reference to “antidepressants” would
necessarily and immediately lead any reader to envision
citalopram and/or escitalopram, given their preeminence in the
category of antidepressants. With respect to invalidity,
however, Otsuka appears to distance itself from this argument,
claiming instead that a general reference to the category of
antidepressants proves insufficient to lead a reader to
immediately envision these antidepressants, despite the fact
that Claim 40 of the Migaly ’043 patent specifically identifies
escitalopram and citalopram.
77
Court finds that the Migaly ’043 patent raises a substantial
question concerning the validity of the ’350 patent.
See PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (“To anticipate a claim, a reference must disclose
every element of the challenged claim and enable one skilled in
the art to make the anticipating subject matter.”)
Moreover, based upon the submissions, the Court cannot
conclude that Otsuka’s priority-based challenge demonstrates
that these Defendants’ invalidity position lacks substantial
merit.
Indeed, Otsuka provides little support for its position
that the Migaly ’043 patent cannot clam priority based upon its
Provisional Application.
Roth Validity Dec.)
(See generally Otsuka’s Reply at 7-8;
Rather, Otsuka points to the unique nature
of the Migaly Provisional Application, and to the fact that it
discusses “a number of disparate and abstract concepts,”
including several pages concerning “motivational talks intended
to help people quit smoking.”
(Roth Validity Dec. at ¶ 8.)
Despite the Application’s certain unusual features, the Court
cannot ignore that the Provisional Application squarely states
that it concerns a combination antidepressant and antipsychotic
product for the treatment of depression.
Moreover, though the
Migaly ’043 patent ultimately issued on July 5, 2011, the Migaly
’043 patent discloses, on its face, the July 30, 2002
Provisional Application.
(See Ex. 13 to Ives Dec.)
78
The ’350
patent, by contrast, issued on June 24, 2014, and reflects a
provisional filing date of December 25, 2003.
Fues Dec.)
(See Ex. 4 to
These provisional filing dates, in turn, generally
provide the basis from which the patents “derive their priority
date.”
Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 1371-72 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
Here, the face of the patents themselves
demonstrate that the Migaly inventor filed the Provisional
Application more than a year before the ’350 patent’s initial
application.
This Court is not precluded from reviewing the
issue of patent validity anew, despite the fact that the Patent
Examiner ultimately appears to have rejected Migaly as a prior
art reference. (See Otsuka’s Reply at 7-8 (generally arguing
that the Patent Examiner considered and rejected Migaly as a
prior art reference); see Ex. 10 to Tang Dec.)
See also Medrad,
Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting that, “a court is not bound by the PTO's actions and
must make its own independent determination of patent validity”)
(citation omitted).
Given the substantial relation and overlap between the
claimed compounds, and the fact that the Migaly patent claims
priority to its provisional application on its face and in its
specification, the Court concludes that these Defendants (all
other than Zydus) have established a substantial question of
invalidity based upon the Migaly ’043 patent, and that Otsuka
79
has not shown that this question of invalidity lacks substantial
merit.
Thus, temporary injunctive relief premised upon the
vulnerable ’350 patent should not be granted.
Otsuka Has Not Demonstrated that it Will Suffer Immediate
and Irreparable Harm in the Absence of an Injunction as a
result of the Market Entry of these Defendants’
Aripiprazole Products
In order to demonstrate irreparable harm, Otsuka “must make
‘a clear showing’” that, in the absence of an injunction, (1)
“it will suffer [immediate and] irreparable harm,” and (2) “that
a sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the alleged harm to
the alleged infringement.”34
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
695 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hereinafter, “Apple
II”).
Here, Otsuka claims that it will be irreparably harmed in
the absence of an injunction, because the market entry of
“infringing” generic aripiprazole products will, necessarily,
result in irreversible price erosion, the loss of market share,
goodwill, research and development opportunities,35 and future
34
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the
Supreme Court “jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm”
and “abolishe[d]” the Federal Circuit’s prior rule “that an
injunction normally will issue when a patent is found to have
been valid and infringed.” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg.
Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
35 The Court rejects Otsuka’s claim of lost opportunity to
conduct research and development at the outset, because the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has expressly found
such a claim insufficient “to compel a finding of irreparable
harm.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1996). Indeed, because it would be “hard to imagine
any manufacturer with a research and development program that
80
and prospective business opportunities, in addition to
potentially requiring potential corporate restructuring and/or
employee layoffs.
9-10.)
(See Otsuka’s Br. at 22-28; Otsuka’s Reply at
Despite these arguments, however, the Court finds that
Otsuka has, upon this record, failed to demonstrate that these
Defendants’ market entry will result in irreparable harm.36
1. Otsuka’s Alleged Harms Are Quantifiable
As relevant here, “‘[p]rice erosion, loss of goodwill,
damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities’” all
constitute potential and “‘valid grounds for finding irreparable
harm.’”
Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 726 F.3d
1296, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Nevertheless, Otsuka still bears the burden to demonstrate these
harms are unquantifiable. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v.
could not make the same claim,” the Court of Appeals determined
that a showing of irreparable harm based upon research
opportunities would effectively “convert the ‘extraordinary’
relief of a preliminary injunction into a standard remedy
available whenever the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of
success on the merits.” Id.
36 At the outset, the Court notes that Apotex argues that Otsuka
“lacks standing to claim irreparable harm,” because its
“indirect subsidiary” and another entity directly market
Abilify®. (Apotex’s Opp’n at 17 n.10 (citing a number of cases
that disclose the revenues of Otsuka’s subsidiary).) Otsuka’s
Complaint identifies Otsuka as the holder of the ’350 patent by
assignment. (See Compl. at ¶ 47.) Because this action concerns
the harms caused by the alleged infringement of the ’350 patent,
the Court finds that Otsuka has standing to allege irreparable
harm.
81
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding that the district court erred in finding irreparable
harm based upon “clearly quantifiable” losses).
Here, however,
Otsuka has not demonstrated that the loss of market share,
sales, and/or price erosion, even if proven, constitute anything
other than purely economic and reparable loss; such losses are
insufficient to support a finding of irreparable harm.
Nor has
Otsuka demonstrated that these losses are incapable of
calculation.
Rather, Otsuka demonstrated, at most, that the
exact calculation of the damages may prove a difficult endeavor,
but that too fails to make a sufficient case for irreparable
harm.37
Indeed, Otsuka’s expert, John C. Jarosz, states that the
“general consequences of generic entry tend to be somewhat
predictable,” and has resulted, under parallel facts, in
“virtually the same [outcome]: rapid declines almost immediately
after the entry of the generic, followed by steady and
continuing declines thereafter.” (Jarosz Dec. at ¶¶ 33, 39.)
Moreover, although Mr. Jarosz ultimately concludes that the
purported injuries to Otsuka prove unquantifiable to “a
37
Otsuka does not dispute that it discontinued production of its
orally disintegrating Abilify® tablets. Therefore, the Court
cannot, at the outset, find that any irreparable harm will
result from
efforts to market orally
disintegrating aripiprazole tablets.
82
reasonable degree of accuracy and certainty” (id. at ¶¶ 61-67),
in the preceding portions of his declaration, he specifically
estimated and quantified these alleged harms in terms of
percentage losses, and he provided specific projections of
Otsuka’s losses in the face of generic competition. (Id. at ¶¶
41, 48-51.)
Mr. Jarosz further acknowledges that these harms
may prove reparable, even if “costly to reverse” or difficult to
“reverse[] instantly.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 36, 62.)
Finally, the Court must note that Mr. Jarosz bases his
initial estimations upon Otsuka’s overbroad and unsupported
construction of Claim 1, by discussing the impact of generic
competition on Abilify®’s overall performance.38
id.)
(See generally
In that regard, Mr. Jarosz and makes no reference to the
specific types of Abilify® sales presently in dispute, i.e.,
only those Abilify® products covered by Claim 1 of the ’350
patent.
(See generally id.)
Then, in his supplemental
declaration, which directly addresses Abilify®’s use in
38
The Court acknowledges that, under Otsuka’s construction of
Claim 1, the harm derived from these generic Defendants’
products would have affected the entirety of its market.
Nevertheless, Claim 1 would be infringed only if Otsuka showed
that Defendants’ products contained each and every claim
limitation, either literally or by equivalents. WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29
(1997). Otsuka cannot legitimately contend that any of these
Defendants’ products contain escitalopram and/or citalopram, nor
that Defendants’ products are specifically indicated for the
adjunctive treatment of major depressive disorder.
83
conjunction with citalopram and/or escitalopram, Mr. Jarosz
offers little more than speculation, and largely a reiteration
that a calculation of the supposed harms would prove challenging
to quantify.
(See generally Jarosz Supplemental Dec. at 36-74.)
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has, however,
expressly concluded that “neither the difficulty of calculating
losses in market share, nor speculation that such losses might
occur, amount to proof of special circumstances justifying the
extraordinary relief of an injunction prior to trial.”
Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (citation omitted).
Moreover, numerous courts have, based
upon similar showings, expressly found the precise types of
harms claimed by Otsuka—namely, loss of market share, lost
sales, price erosion, and even employee layoffs—reducible to a
dollar value, and therefore not irreparable.
See, e.g.,
Graceway Pharm., LLC v. Perrigo Co., 697 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608
(D.N.J. 2010) (“loss of market share and price erosion are
economic harms and are compensable by money damages .... [even]
in the context of generic competition in the pharmaceutical
industry”); FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Astroturf, LLC, 725 F. Supp.
2d 609, 616–617 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“[p]roof of lost market share
and lost sales alone are insufficient to establish irreparable
harm”) (citation omitted); Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Broadway
Ltd. Imports, LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (D. Md. 2010)
84
(“Because potential lost sales revenue is compensable through
damages, evidence of such losses is insufficient by itself to
support a finding of irreparable harm.”); Altana Pharma AG v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682 (D.N.J. 2007)
(finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated irreparable
harm despite contending loss of revenue, price erosion, decrease
in market share), aff’d, 566 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Novartis
Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 04–4473, 2007 WL 1695689, at
*26–28 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007) (finding that plaintiff failed to
establish irreparable harm, where the alleged harms were
calculable, the generic defendant had the ability to pay any
damages award, and because the possibility of loss of market
share and price erosion did not constitute irreparable harm);
Sanofi–Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., No. 07–
5855, 2010 WL 2428561, at *16-*17 (D.N.J. June 9, 2010)
(concluding that the “loss of market share and price erosion are
economic harms and are compensable by money damages”); Novartis
Pharm. Corp. v. Teva Pharm. Corp., No. 05-1887, 2007 WL 2669338,
at *14 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Litho Prestige v. News Am.
Publ’g, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 804, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that
even “immediate, wholesale layoffs” could “be reduced to money
damages”).
Otsuka’s submissions reflect, as stated above, a detailed
and nuanced ability to assess and calculate Otsuka’s sales and
85
market share, and an ability to project the potential impact of
Defendants’ entry.
(See Jarosz Dec. at ¶¶ 29-77; Jarosz
Supplemental Dec. at ¶¶ 36-74.)
Indeed, Otsuka’s experts
present at least some quantifiable measure for ascertaining
economic damages, by asserting that “potential revenue losses
could be
(Jarosz Dec. at ¶ 50.)
Moreover, though Mr. Jarosz purported to
identify “collectability” and “recovery” challenges in his
initial declaration (see Jarosz Dec. at ¶¶ 68-77), he
specifically acknowledges in his supplemental declaration that
these Defendants “likely” possess “the financial wherewithal to
satisfy a significant adverse judgment,” and indeed represents
that several Defendants’ revenues exceed Otsuka’s projected
damages by multiples of
at ¶¶ 71, 81.)
. (Jarosz Supplemental Dec.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that
Otsuka has, upon the present record, failed to demonstrate any
irreparable harm, the first and essential underlying
consideration with respect to this factor.
2. Otsuka Has Not Met the “Causal Nexus” Requirement
The Court also finds that Otsuka has failed to demonstrate
the second and “‘inextricably related’” irreparable harm
consideration, namely, a sufficient causal nexus between the
86
alleged infringement and Otsuka’s claimed harm.
See Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 735 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (hereinafter, “Apple III”).
Critically, the
causal nexus requirement specifically distinguishes “between
irreparable harm caused by patent infringement and irreparable
harm caused by otherwise lawful competition—e.g., ‘sales [that]
would be lost even if the offending feature were absent from the
accused product.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
In that respect,
the relevant inquiry for purposes of the causal nexus concerns
not whether there is some causal relationship between
the asserted injury and the infringing conduct, but to
what extent the harm resulting from selling the
accused product can be ascribed to the infringement.
It is not enough for the patentee to establish some
insubstantial connection between the alleged harm and
the infringement and check the causal nexus
requirement off the list.
Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1375.
As a result, in the face of
evidence that the allegedly infringing feature “does not drive
the demand for the product,” e.g., evidence that sales would be
lost even in the absence of the allegedly infringing product, “a
likelihood of irreparable harm cannot be shown.”39
39
Apple, Inc.
Otsuka appears to suggest that this requirement somehow
changes, or applies less forcefully, in connection with
“‘simple’” products, comprised of few distinguishable features.
(Otsuka’s Reply at 15.) “Contrary to [Otsuka’s] suggestion,
however, the causal nexus requirement applies regardless of the
complexity of the products,” Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1362, and
even if it did not, Otsuka has, under no circumstances,
demonstrated that Abilify® qualifies as a simple product, with
few, if any, features. To the contrary, Otsuka’s own
87
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (hereinafter, “Apple I”).
The allegedly infringing
product need not, however, be “the exclusive reason for consumer
demand.”
Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1364.
Rather, the infringing
feature must be one that makes the “product significantly more
desirable.”
Id.
As stated above, none of these generic Defendants’
aripiprazole products include either escitalopram and/or
citalopram and, as a result, none of these products will be
infringing.
Given this, none of Otsuka’s claimed harm can be
ascribed to, or be said to have a causal nexus with,
infringement of the ’350 patent.
See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton
Corp. v. Chongquing Rato Power Co., Ltd., No. 13-316, 2013 WL
3972391, at *22 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 23, 2013) (finding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causal nexus and,
therefore, did not satisfy their burden to show irreparable
harm).
To the contrary, all of the alleged harm appears
attributable to the approaching expiration of Otsuka’s ’528
patent, the primary patent that discloses the specific
aripiprazole compound utilized in Abilify®, in addition to its
primary compositions and indications.
In that respect, Otsuka
submissions demonstrate that Abilify® manifests in a great
number of varieties, forms, and dosages, all for a variety of
different purposes. (See, e.g., Ex. 3-A to Spadea Dec. (listing
twenty-one pages of Abilify® products).)
88
claims harm caused by otherwise lawful competition, namely, the
entry of these generic Defendants in the aripiprazole market,
and not by any even arguable infringement of the ’350 patent.
This claim, however, fails, on its face, from demonstrating the
required causal nexus.
See Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1361.
However, even if the Court accepted Otsuka’s infringement
theory — which it does not — the record in this instance
contains no dispute that at least
of the time,40 if not
more, consumers buy aripiprazole for reasons other than in
combination with a citalopram or escitalopram for treatment of a
mood disorder.
(See Otsuka’s Reply at 8-9; Jarosz Supplemental
Dec. at ¶ 35.) Although this percentage (for the combination
dosage of aripiprazole and citalopram or escitalopram) equates
to sizable annual revenues by amount, over
, this
sum can hardly be described as significant to Otsuka’s overall
Abilify® sales, which exceed $7.5 billion per year.
Otsuka’s Reply at 9.)
(See
Nor can this percentage of sales be
construed to reflect that the combination of aripiprazole,
together with escitalopram and/or citalopram, makes the product
40
Otsuka initially represented sales associated with the ’350
patent indication accounted for “approximately
%” of
Abilify®’s overall sales. (Otsuka’s Br. at 3, 26.) After these
Defendants uniformly challenged this assertion—and alleged that
’350 sales instead account for only
% of Abilify®’s overall
sales—Otsuka retreated from its initial position, and clarified
its position on the relevant position in reply.
89
“significantly more desirable” to consumers.
F.3d at 1364.
Apple III, 735
Indeed, this product appears to appeal to only a
minority of Abilify®’s overall market segment.
Jarosz Supplemental Dec.)
(See generally
Nevertheless, Otsuka’s argument in
support of this factor centers upon its contention that the
infringement of this narrow market will lead to catastrophic and
calamitous losses across Otsuka’s entire operation.
The alleged
harms in this instance, however, bear little, if any, relation
to the alleged infringement of Claim 1.
Therefore, rather than
demonstrate the necessary causal relationship, Otsuka instead
appears to seek to “leverage its patent for competitive gain
beyond that which the inventive contribution and value of the
patent warrant,” Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1375, a clearly
insufficient showing for purposes of this consideration.
For all of these reasons, the Court also finds that Otsuka
has failed to meet the causal nexus requirement.
See Merck &
Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (noting nexus to commercial success for a later patent was
“weak” given the existence of earlier blocking patents and
regulatory exclusivities).
The Court finds that Otsuka has not
shown a likelihood of irreparable harm to be caused by these
generic product launches.
90
3. Otsuka’s Delay in Requesting Injunctive Relief
Suggests Lack of Urgency
Finally, the Court turns to Otsuka’s delay—an important
factor bearing on the need for a preliminary injunction,
particularly irreparable harm.
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm.,
USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (generally
noting that delay “negates the idea of irreparability”);
Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1457 (noting that a “period of delay”
constitutes “one factor to be considered by a district court in
its analysis of irreparable harm”); T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v.
Consol. Medical Equip. Corp., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(finding that the plaintiff’s delay in seeking an injunction
negated any irreparable harm).
Delays, strategic or otherwise,
have plagued these actions from their inceptions.
Indeed, the
parties have, in both Court appearances and their briefing, all
decried the multitude of delays in service and the exchange of
discovery relevant to the parties’ various contentions, and the
parties in many of the older cases filed in 2014 have, despite
the default provisions of the Local Patent Rules,41 unduly
stalled this litigation through protracted disagreements on the
scope of discovery confidentiality orders.42
41
(See, e.g.,
See L. CIV. R. 2.2.
Otsuka, for its part, has prepared and submitted an incredibly
detailed spreadsheet describing the delays in these actions, all
of which Otsuka attributes, in relevant part, to these
Defendants. (See Ex. 7 to Fues Dec.)
42
91
Hetero’s Sur-reply at 1-2 (describing some of the global
delays).) Despite alleging that Defendants have obstructed
discovery, the record reflects few instances in which Otsuka
sought judicial intervention and a defendant was found in
default.
The delay most relevant for purposes of the Court’s
consideration of irreparable harm is Otsuka’s delay in
requesting injunctive relief when the inevitable April 20, 2015
expiration date of the ’528 patent approached.
In that respect,
the Court notes that Otsuka filed the first of these related
patent infringement actions more than 13 months ago on February
18, 2014, see Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharm., Inc.,
Civil Action No. 14-1078 (JBS/KMW), followed shortly thereafter
by a cascade of twenty-four related actions.43
43
See Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Alembic Global Holding SA,
Civil Action No. 14-2982 (JBS/KMW) (filed May 9, 2014); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 143168 (JBS/KMW) (filed May 16, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-3306 (JBS/KMW) (filed
May 23, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Intas Pharm. Ltd.,
Civil Action No. 14-3996 (JBS/KMW) (filed June 20, 2014); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action No. 143168 (JBS/KMW) (filed May 16, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-4307 (JBS/KMW)
(filed July 7, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc.,
Civil Action No. 14-4508 (JBS/KMW) (filed July 11, 2014); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Torrent Pharm., Inc., Civil Action No. 144671 (JBS/KMW) (filed July 25, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Zhejiang Huahai Pharm. Co., Civil Action No. 14-5537 (JBS/KMW)
(filed September 4, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Ajanta
Pharm. Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-5876 (JBS/KMW) (filed September
19, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
92
Despite having numerous pending, related actions in this
Court for more than one year, Otsuka first mentioned its
intention to file motions for preliminary injunctions by letter
dated March 9, 2015, in excess of thirteen months after the
filing of its first ANDA action.
Otsuka attempts to gloss over
its delays, by claiming that these Defendants have, at all
times, retained “exclusive[]” control over the timing of these
actions, and have “hampered” and “frustrated” Otsuka’s efforts
to “timely adjudicate its infringement claims” by delaying
service of paragraph IV certifications.
(Otsuka’s Reply at 2.)
Nevertheless, Otsuka has long known of the coming expiration of
Civil Action No. 14-5878 (JBS/KMW) (filed September 19, 2014);
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Intas Pharm. Ltd., Civil Action No.
14-6158 (JBS/KMW) (filed October 2, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co.,
Ltd. v. Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-6397
(JBS/KMW) (filed October 6, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-6398 (JBS/KMW) (filed
September 19, 2014) (filed October 10, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co.,
Ltd. v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-6890
(JBS/KMW) (filed October 31, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Lupin Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-7105 (JBS/KMW) (filed November
3, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC,
Civil Action No. 14-7106 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 10, 2014);
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Zydus Pham. USA Inc., Civil Action
No. 14-7252 (JBS/KMW) (filed November 20, 2014); Otsuka Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Alembic Pharm., Ltd., Civil Action No. 14-7405
(JBS/KMW) (filed November 26, 2014); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Apotex Corp., Civil Action No. 14-8074 (JBS/KMW) (filed December
24, 2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Hetero Drugs, Ltd., Civil
Action No. 15-161 (JBS/KMW) (filed January 8, 2015); Otsuka
Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Amneal Pharm. Co, Ltd., Civil Action No. 151585 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 2, 2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Sandoz Inc., Civil Action No. 15-1716 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 9,
2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Indoco Remedies Ltd., Civil
Action No. 15-1967 (JBS/KMW) (filed March 17, 2015).
93
its ’528 patent, has been preparing for the introduction of
generic versions of Abilify since no later than 2009, at which
time it advised investors of inevitable and temporary reductions
in revenues as a result of generic entry into the aripiprazole
market.
(See, e.g., Ex. 5 to Hunnicutt Dec. (press release
concerning anticipate drop in sales following the ’528 patent’s
expiration).)
Given these circumstances, absent a sufficient
explanation, not offered or found here, Otsuka’s delay proves
substantial.
See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New
Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding
that a 17 month delay militated “against the issuance of a
preliminary injunction by demonstrating that there [was] no
apparent urgency to the request for injunctive relief”).
Moreover, this delay undercuts the urgency that forms the
cornerstone of injunctive relief; indeed, it indicates a lack of
urgency.
See Quad/Tech, Inc. v. Q.I. Press Controls B.V., 701
F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 413 F. App’x 278 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).44
44
The Court nonetheless endeavored with all parties to set a
last-minute briefing and argument schedule on March 16, 2015,
accelerating Otsuka’s filing of motions with initial briefing,
Defendants’ oppositions, and Otsuka’s replies and Defendants’
sur-replies, all completed by April 6th, so that at least the
motions for TRO could be hearing on April 10th and decided before
April 20th. Otsuka was perhaps disadvantaged by its delay, since
it was required to complete its initial outlines of positions on
injunctive relief in the 25 related cases within just 3 days
after the March 16th conference. In the end, Otsuka and each
94
For this secondary reason, the Court finds that Otsuka has
not demonstrated the urgency in avoiding irreparable harm, and
turns to the balance of hardships.
The Balance of Hardships Favors these Defendants45
“The balance of hardships factor ‘assesses the relative
effect of granting or denying an injunction on the parties.’”
Apple III, 735 F.3d at 1371 (quoting i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d
at 862).
Therefore, the Court “must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of
the granting or withholding of the requested relief.”
Winter v.
Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
The hardship on a preliminarily enjoined generic which has
taken affirmative steps to enter the market can be devastating.
On the other hand, the hardship on a patentee denied an
injunction after showing a strong likelihood of success on
validity and infringement consists of an equally serious
generic Defendant intending to launch its product have had a
full and fair opportunity to be heard. Commendably, all parties
met these demanding deadlines, and the day-long TRO hearing
explored all issues.
45 Having concluded that Otsuka has failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success and irreparable harm, the Court need not
discuss the remaining equitable factors. See, e.g., McDavid
Knee Guard, Inc. v. Nike USA, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (“If the moving party fails to demonstrate
either [likelihood of success or irreparable harm], then a
district court considering a motion for preliminary injunction
need not proceed further with its analysis to deny the
preliminary injunction motion.”) Nevertheless, in the interests
of the completeness, the Court will continues its analysis.
95
impingement on its right to exclude. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc.
v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
In the
present case, however, Otsuka’s weak showing of likelihood of
success tips the balance of hardships towards these generic
Defendants.
See id.
It appears that these Defendants have all taken affirmative
steps to enter the aripiprazole market, by developing and
testing aripiprazole products, preparing ANDAs, seeking
regulatory approval from the FDA, ordering raw materials, and
preparing manufacturing and supply pipelines.
(See, e.g.,
Torrent’s Br. at 14; Alembic’s Br. at 27; Zydus’s Br. at 36-37;
Sun’s Br. at 14; Teva’s Br. at 38; Actavis’s Br. at 26-27;
Apotex’s Br. at 27-28; Hetero’s Br. at 27; Sandoz’s Br. at 29.)
The issuance of an injunction would seriously erode these and
related efforts.
Indeed, these generic Defendants would face
the loss of all of the “costly enterprises” made to prepare
their products “in readiness of ultimate FDA approval and
commercial launch” on April 20, 2015.
Graceway Pharm., 697 F.
Supp. 2d at 605.
In addition, the issuance of a TRO would deprive these
Defendants of the advantage of being an early market entrant,
and may force these Defendants to ultimately launch with
competitors that would otherwise have only been able to launch
after these early entrants. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc.
96
v. Shala/a, 963 F. Supp. 20, 29 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[T]here is a
significant economic advantage to receiving first approval and
being the first company to enter the market, an advantage that
can never be fully recouped through money damages or by ‘playing
catch-up.’”); see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shala/a, 140 F.3d
1060, 1066 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that party will be
"harmed by the loss of its 'officially sanctioned head start'");
Sandoz, Inc. v. FDA, 439 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2006)
(finding that delayed entry to market tilts the balance of
hardships).
The Court must, however, note that, unlike the majority of
these generic Defendants,
, thereby
limiting Otsuka’s ability to shoulder significant losses in
revenue.
(See Jarosz Dec. at ¶¶ 80-85.)
As a result, counsel
for Otsuka argued on the oral argument record on April 10, 2015,
that the balance of hardships favors Otsuka, because the
Defendants have the ability to absorb any harm caused by an
injunction by
.
Nevertheless, given that Otsuka’s
claimed harms derive from the natural expiration of the ’528
patent, and not from the patent at issue in these temporary
restraining order proceedings, the Court does not find any
97
absorption, accepted as true, a burden that these Defendants
should be required to face.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the balance
of hardships tips in favor of these generic Defendants.
The Public Interest Counsels against the Issuance of an
Injunction
The public interest factor requires Otsuka to demonstrate
that the entry of an injunction “‘will not disserve the public
interest.’”
Abbott Labs., 544 F.3d at 1366.
In enacting the Hatch–Waxman Act, Congress “‘struck a
balance between two competing policy interests: (1) inducing
pioneering research and development of new drugs and (2)
enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those
drugs to market.’”
Dey Pharma, LP v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677
F.3d 1158, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Andrx Pharm., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
The
public interest therefore encourages, on the one hand,
“get[ting] generic drugs into the hands of patients at
reasonable prices–fast.”
76 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72,
On the other, however, competition
enhances the public interest by encouraging generic drugs to
enter the market upon the conclusion of relevant patent
exclusivity.
See Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co.,
717 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“competition serves the
98
public interest”); see also Graceway Pharm., 697 F. Supp. 2d at
609.
The FDA approved Otsuka’s NDA 21-436 in 2002, and the
pediatric exclusivity period associated with the ’528 patent
expires on April 20, 2015.
Therefore, Otsuka has long enjoyed
the exclusive rights to the aripiprazole market in the United
States and has, in turn, been duly rewarded for bringing its
innovation to market.
In fact, Otsuka’s aripiprazole
exclusivity has generated, in the last eight years alone, over
$100 billion in revenue.
(See generally Jarosz Dec.)
The
public’s interest in encouraging and rewarding innovation has
been well served already.
Given this, Otsuka has had ample
opportunity to fully and completely realize a return on its
investment, many times over, and to adjust its business as it
deemed necessary in order to address the loss of exclusivity it
knew, for years, rested upon the horizon.
Given Otsuka’s monopoly in aripiprazole, the public
interest that at one point favored them has now tipped in favor
of Defendants, because although Hatch-Waxman seeks to foster
innovation, it also encourages finality upon the expiration of a
long protected pharmaceutical patent exclusivity.
Therefore,
there can be little question that extending Otsuka’s protection
from competition in the absence of Otsuka’s likelihood of
success on the merits would result in a disservice to the public
99
interest.
Indeed, under these circumstances, the public
interest would benefit from increased competition from these
generic Defendants that have waited patiently for the expiration
of the ’528 exclusivity period.
Finally, the Court must note that, “neither the public
interest nor equity favors the grant of an injunction against
one who does not infringe.” Novo Nordisk of N. Am. v. Genetech,
Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (vacating lower
court’s grant of preliminary injunction).
As stated above,
Otsuka, upon the present record, has not demonstrated that these
generic Defendants are likely to infringe the ’350 patent.
So,
for that reason too, the public interest would be particularly
disadvantaged by permitting Otsuka to extend its market
exclusivity based upon its assertion of the later-filed and
later-expiring ’350 patent.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that the public interest
counsels against the issuance of temporary restraints.
CONCLUSION
An injunction constitutes a drastic remedy and Otsuka bears
the burden of establishing an entitlement to such extraordinary
relief.
See, e.g., Nitro Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co.,
341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
For the reasons stated above,
the Court concludes that Otsuka has failed to meet its burden in
100
these instances.46
The record in these thirteen Hatch-Waxman Act
cases is sufficiently developed at this TRO stage that the Court
is confident that Otsuka has not shown a likelihood of success
on its induced infringement claims, nor has Otsuka demonstrated
it will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if it is later
determined that these generic competitors have wrongfully
entered the market.
Moreover, the Court has found that the
balance of hardships slightly favors the Defendants, and that
the public interest is better served by denying this Temporary
Restraining Order.
As a result, Otsuka’s motions for a
temporary restraining order will be denied, and these generic
Defendants shall, subject to regulatory approval, be permitted
to launch their generic aripiprazole products after April 20,
2015.
An accompanying Order will be entered.47
April 16, 2015
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
46
As a result, the Court need not reach the issue of an
appropriate bond.
47 This Opinion is being filed on the public docket in slightly
redacted form to protect certain confidential information, as
discussed in the TRO hearing on April 10, 2015 and in the
Sealing Order of today’s date. An unredacted version of the
Opinion is being filed under seal and will be available to those
attorneys who have signed the requisite stipulated
confidentiality agreements. The Order, on the other hand, has
not been redacted.
101
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?