VAUGHN v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 18 Motion for Reconsideration; the Respondent shall submit to this Court, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, either a brief in opposition to in camera review for institutional safety concerns, with a proposal for alternative relief or submit to this Court for in camera review the CCTV video footage described in the Discipline Hearing Officer Report (ECF No. 6-8 at 3). Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/9/15. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

Gary Vaughn,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Jordan Hollingsworth,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 14-6470(RMB)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BUMB, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration (ECF No. 18) of this Court’s opinion and
order dismissing his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, and Respondent’s opposition brief (ECF No.
19.) “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Max’s Seafood Café ex rel Lou-Ann Inc. v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). If a party
establishes one of the following grounds, a judgment may be
altered or amended on reconsideration: (1) an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence
that was not available when the court granted the motion for

summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of
law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Id. (citing North
River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d
Cir. 1995).
The first two grounds do not apply here. The Court will,
however, grant reconsideration to prevent manifest injustice. In
support of his motion, Petitioner distinguishes Pittman v.
Bledsoe, 442 F. App’x 639, 641 (3d Cir. 2011). In Pittman, the
Third Circuit held that the DHO’s refusal to permit a prisoner
to watch a video of the incident that led to the disciplinary
sanction did not violate the prisoner’s right to due process.
Id. However, as Petitioner noted, in Pittman the prisoner was
represented by a staff representative who viewed the video prior
to the hearing before the DHO. Id. at 641, n. 1.
Here, Petitioner signed a form waiving his right to a staff
representative. However, before he did so, he asked a staff
member who had watched the video, Burton, to act as his staff
representative. Burton declined because he had served on the
Unit Disciplinary Committee that considered Petitioner’s
incident report. Petitioner also requested several times to
watch the video, and he was denied.
Although Petitioner should have requested a different staff
representative before the hearing, he explained the situation to
the DHO at the hearing, and the DHO tried to reach Burton. When
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Burton could not be reached and Petitioner was not allowed to
watch the video, presumably for security reasons, the DHO should
have continued the hearing until another staff representative
could be found to watch the video on Petitioner’s behalf. Apart
from Petitioner’s testimony, the video was the only potentially
exculpatory evidence.
A petitioner has a right, albeit a limited one, to present
evidence in his defense at the hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 564–66 (1974); compare Anderson v. Bledsoe, 511 F.
App’x 143, (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (petitioner chose not to
appear at the hearing and did not present any exculpatory
evidence, including a video of the incident.) Petitioner
testified that he did not strike his attacker, he only bearhugged him to stop him from his attack, and they fell to the
ground.
There is nothing in the record describing the quality of
the video. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674. 679 (7th Cir.
2003) (“the record here does not demonstrate with any degree of
certainty that the tape lacked exculpatory value.”) For
instance, it may have been dark, grainy or at a bad angle.
Petitioner, or a staff representative on his behalf, was
deprived of the opportunity to explain how the video supported
Petitioner’s claims. Under these circumstances, “[m]inimal due
process requires that the district court conduct an in camera
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review ... to determine whether or not exculpatory information
existed.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Henman, 931 F.2d 1212, 1215
(7th Cir. 1991); Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808,
815 (10th Cir. 2007) (“the Bureau's refusal to produce and
review a videotape [that petitioner] asserts would refute
charges . . . violated his due process right to present
documentary evidence in his own defense.”) If Respondent
believes in camera review of the videotape by this Court unduly
threatens institutional safety concerns, they shall explain the
safety concerns and propose an alternative relief.
IT IS therefore on this 9th day of November 2015,
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court reopen this matter; and it
is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (ECF
No. 18) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondent submit to this Court, within
fourteen days of the date of this Order, either a brief in
opposition to in camera review for institutional safety
concerns, with a proposal for alternative relief or submit to
this Court for in camera review the CCTV video footage described
in the Discipline Hearing Officer Report (ECF No. 6-8 at 3); and
it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall send a copy of this Order to
Petitioner by regular U.S. Mail.
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s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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