VAUGHN v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 24

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/21/2015. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

Gary Vaughn,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Jordan Hollingsworth,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 14-6470(RMB)

OPINION

BUMB, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration (ECF Nos. 18, 23) of this Court’s October 5,
2015 Opinion and Order dismissing his Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On November 9, 2015, this
Court granted reconsideration for the purpose of in camera
review of videotape footage of the incident upon which
Petitioner was disciplined for fighting by loss of good conduct
time and other privileges. (ECF No. 20.) For the reasons
discussed below, this Court finds that habeas relief of a
curative disciplinary hearing is warranted under the unique
circumstances of this case.
I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner alleged a due process violation at his prison
disciplinary hearing on November 6, 2013, at F.C.I. Elkton,
Lisbon, Ohio. (ECF No. 1.) This Court denied habeas relief
because the DHO relied on the videotape footage as some evidence
that Petitioner was guilty of fighting.1 (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) As
this Court noted in its prior Order, the videotape was the best
evidence of the fight. Petitioner asked to see the videotape
footage before the hearing, and his request was denied.
Petitioner was not allowed to view the videotape before or
during the hearing, and his Case Manager, who had watched the
video, was unable to serve as Petitioner’s staff representative
because he served on the Unit Disciplinary Committee in
Petitioner’s case. Therefore, upon reconsideration of these
unique circumstances, this Court ordered Respondent to submit
the videotape for in camera review. (ECF No. 6-8 at 5.)
First, the Court notes that the Incident Report in this
matter contained Lieutenant Georgeoff’s statement that he
watched the videotape and it showed “[b]oth inmates are observed
striking each other to the upper and lower torso area.” (Id.)
Although one might infer the inmates were striking each other in
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In this case, the medical records cited in the DHO Report do
not support a charge that Petitioner fought back when Wilson
attacked him. Petitioner also argued the DHO misconstrued, as a
confession of guilt, his testimony that he only defended himself
against Wilson’s attack. Wilson did not testify at the hearing,
and there were no witnesses to the fight. The only evidence of
the fight was the videotape footage.
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the torso from this video, it does not clearly show that. The
videotape shows Inmate Wilson duck into Petitioner’s cube and
attack him. The video is shot from overhead and only the
inmates’ heads and their arms, when raised above shoulder level,
can be seen. The incident is very short, and it is not clear
whether Petitioner did more than defend himself against Wilson’s
attack. Petitioner and Wilson were the only people who were
present, and who could explain what was happening in the video.
I. DISCUSSSION
As this Court previously noted, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Pittman v. Bledsoe, held that the DHO’s refusal to
permit a prisoner to watch a video of the incident that led to
his disciplinary sanction did not violate the prisoner’s right
to due process. 442 F. App’x 639, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam). However, unlike here, in Pittman, the prisoner was
represented by a staff representative who viewed the videotape
prior to the hearing, and declined to present additional
argument. Id. at 641, n. 1.
Prisoners have a limited due process right to present
documentary evidence at a prison disciplinary hearing where
doing so is not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566
(1974). “While a disciplinary board need not give a reason for
the denial of an inmate’s request for potentially exculpatory
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evidence contemporaneously with the hearing, it may later be
required to provide reasons, and demonstrate that the ‘reasons
are logically related to ‘institutional safety or correctional
goals.’” O’Bryant v. Finch, No. 5:05cv111 (LAC/MD), 2008 WL
291689, at *14 (N.D. Fla. March 12, 2008) (quoting Ponte v.
Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985)). Defendants have not asserted
such here.
Where a videotape of the incident upon which an inmate is
disciplined with loss of good conduct time is the only evidence
supporting the charge of fighting, and the video is potentially
exculpatory, due process requires that the petitioner must be
allowed to watch the videotape and present argument at the
hearing. See Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir.
2003); Fernald v. Holt, 446 F. App’x 489, 492 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (“due process requires that the evidence be
produced unless the hearing officer makes an independent
determination that the evidence is not relevant”) (quoting Burns
v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 174 n. 11 (3d Cir.
2011)).
After in camera review, this Court has determined that
because the videotape footage is so unclear, Petitioner may be
able to explain how the video supports his testimony that he
only defended himself against attack. See Howard v. U.S. Bureau
of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 815 (10th Cir. 2007) (“the Bureau's
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refusal to produce and review a videotape [that petitioner]
asserts would refute charges . . . violated his due process
right to present documentary evidence in his own defense.”)
Indeed, a reasonable finding upon closer review of the video may
be that Vaughn's raising of his arm was only in defense. Under
these unique circumstances, Petitioner should have been allowed
to view the videotape footage and present argument about the
video at the hearing. See Keller v. Cross, 603 F. App’x 488, 491
(7th Cir. 2015) (remanding for district court to determine
whether a new prison hearing was required where the petitioner
alleged the hearing officer ignored his request to review
exculpatory evidence.)
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, in the accompanying Order
filed herewith, the Court will grant habeas relief, and order
Respondent to hold a curative disciplinary hearing within thirty
days of the date of this Order.

DATED:_December_21, 2015

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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