BEAKLEY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/29/2015. (tf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JANICE BEAKLEY,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No.
14-6502 (JBS-AMD)

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In these matters, pro se Plaintiff Janice Beakley alleges
that the United States Government failed to employ her and/or
provide her with housing due to her race, color, sex, religion,
and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”), 42 U.S.C §§ 3604(a) & 3613. Because Plaintiff seeks to
bring these actions in forma pauperis, the Court has an
obligation to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The Court finds as follows:
1.

Because Plaintiff’s application affidavit states that

she is indigent, the Court will, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
permit the Complaint to be filed without prepayment of fees,
and will direct the Clerk of Court to file the Complaint.1

1

Plaintiff initially filed the Complaint without an application
to proceed in forma pauperis, and the Court administratively

2.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to

review Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss sua sponte any claim
that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8, a claim for relief must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does
not require detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To prevent a summary
dismissal, a complaint must allege sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to show that the claim is plausible on its
face. A facially plausible claim is one that would “allow[] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

terminated this action on November 10, 2014, without prejudice
to reopening once Plaintiff paid the filing fee or submitted a
completed application to proceed without prepayment of fees
within thirty (30) days. [Docket Item 3.] Plaintiff
subsequently submitted an application to proceed in forma
pauperis on November 19th, and the Court will therefore reopen
the case and permit the Complaint to be filed.
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678). In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The court
will not credit legal conclusions or “recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Santiago v. Warminster Tp.,
629 F.3d 121, 128 (2010).
3.

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court

finds that it fails to conform to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) and fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted and is thus to be dismissed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
4.

First, Plaintiff’s claim for employment

discrimination under Title VII requires dismissal under Rules
8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Plaintiff’s Complaint contains
sparse allegations as to the nature of any adverse employment
action. She alleges only that she sought employment “all over,”
that unnamed employers failed to employ her “with substantial
employment,” and that she was discriminated against based on
her race, color, sex, religion, and national origin. (Compl.
[Docket Item 1] at 2, 4.) The Complaint provides no additional
detail about where she worked or applied for jobs, and fails to
allege what specific acts of discrimination occurred. Plaintiff
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also fails to specify when she was subject to discrimination
and whether any alleged discriminatory practice is ongoing.
Plaintiff claims she filed charges with the N.J. Division on
Civil Rights on January 1, 2000, but does not state the outcome
of the investigation, or whether she received a right-to-sue
letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
5.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that it is

unclear whether Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative
remedies. Prior to the filing of a civil action under Title
VII, a claimant must exhaust administrative remedies by first
filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or equivalent
state agency within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged
unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5; see also
Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465,
469 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018,
1020 (3d Cir. 1997)). The EEOC is required to investigate the
charge, and, if it has not resolved the charge within 180 days
of filing, must provide the complainant with a “right-to-sue”
letter authorizing the aggrieved person to bring a civil action
under Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28. A private right of
action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been
filed, Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S.
355, 361 (1977), and a complainant may not bring a Title VII
suit without having first received a right-to-sue letter. See
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Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999).
After receiving the letter, a complainant must file a civil
action within ninety (90) days from the date of receipt of the
letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Burgh, 251 F.3d at 470.
6.

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth little information

concerning her compliance with the statutory requirements.
Plaintiff alleges that she filed charges with the N.J. Division
on Civil Rights regarding Defendant’s alleged discriminatory
conduct on January 1, 2000. However, she does not identify a
date on which she received a right-to-sue letter, nor does she
attach any such letter to her Complaint. Notwithstanding the
fact that Plaintiff has provided no information pertaining to
the outcome of this charge, and assuming that the date of
filing that she alleges is accurate, the time that has passed
leading up to the filing of the present Complaint appears to
have exceeded the statutory limitation of ninety days.
Nevertheless, the Court, keeping in mind that pro se complaints
in particular should be construed liberally, will provide
Plaintiff with one more opportunity to demonstrate that she has
exhausted her administrative remedies. See Boyce v. Ancora
State Hosp., No. 14-185, 2015 WL 857573, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 27,
2015) (permitting pro se plaintiff opportunity to file an
amended complaint containing dates and documentation regarding
when she filed her charge with the EEOC to show exhaustion of
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administrative remedies); see also Small v. Conoco Phillips,
No. 06-4722, 2006 WL 2990370, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2006)
(permitting pro se plaintiff to file amended complaint to
correct defect where plaintiff failed to attach a copy of EEOC
charge showing exhaustion of administrative remedies).
7.

Even assuming Plaintiff has exhausted her

administrative remedies and has filed suit within the required
90-day time period, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for employment discrimination and must be
dismissed. To state a claim of employment discrimination under
Title VII, a plaintiff must show that she belongs to a
protected class; that she was subject to an adverse employment
action despite being qualified for the position; and that,
under circumstances that raise an inference of discriminatory
action, similarly situated persons who are not members of the
protected class were treated more favorably. See Sarullo v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); Abramson v. William
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2001);
Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 939
(3d Cir. 1997). Although a plaintiff “‘need not plead law or
match facts to every element of a legal theory,’” Krieger v.
Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Bennett v.
Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998))), she must present
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“enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]” of a cause of
action. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d
Cir. 2008).
8.

Plaintiff asserts that she was discriminated against

due to her race, color, sex, religion, and national origin, but
her Complaint lacks any facts purporting to support these
allegations. The Complaint is devoid of any specific facts
regarding any employment action at all. Plaintiff does not
provide the name of a federal agency or an address at which she
sought employment, but vaguely asserts that it was “all over.”
In addition, Plaintiff has not identified a discriminatory
statement or action by an agency or employee of the United
States in connection with her inability to secure employment.
Nothing in the Complaint supports that Plaintiff attempted to
secure employment, let alone that her failure to obtain a job
was somehow related to her race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin. Plaintiff does not point to a single
discriminatory act or instance in which she was denied an
opportunity to apply to or was rejected from a position offered
by Defendant, alleging only that Defendant failed to employ
Plaintiff “with substantial employment.” Although a complaint
of employment discrimination need not contain specific facts
establishing a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss,
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it must contain at least “sufficient factual matter” to support
a reasonable inference that Defendant engaged in discrimination
against Plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s
Complaint lacks sufficient factual matter to draw any
reasonable inference of employment discrimination, and must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Further, because of the
lack of any grounds for a claim of employment discrimination,
the Complaint fails to give notice to any defendant regarding
the contours of the conduct it would be called upon to defend.
9.

Plaintiff additionally attempts to assert a claim for

housing discrimination. On page four of her Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “fail[ed] to provide
[Plaintiff] with safe housing as they do everyone else as in
criminals and undocumented foreigners.” (Compl. at 4.)
Plaintiff attached two documents to her complaint in support of
this allegation. On the first attachment, which is titled “Top
25 Recipient Countries of U.S. Foreign Aid FY 2012,” Plaintiff
circled several of the countries and wrote, “2 reasons why
whites can’t get housing.” (Compl. at 5.) The second attachment
appears to be an excerpt from an article by the Press of
Atlantic City. Plaintiff circled and starred a sentence from
the article describing how an individual named Rashada Allencq
allegedly let the ‘Dirty Blok’ gang use her public housing unit
as a “trap house,” and wrote in the margin, “this is who they
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give it to” and “this BS is why white people can’t get
housing.” (Compl. at 6.)
10.

Although the Complaint does not specify a cause of

action, the Court liberally construes the Complaint as
attempting to allege a violation of the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”). The FHA makes it unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a). To make out a claim under § 3604(a),
Plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant denied or made
housing unavailable to her, and that the defendant’s actions
were based on her status in a protected class. Koorn v. Lacey
Twp., 78 F. App’x 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Edwards v.
Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.
1989)). “The FHA can be violated by either intentional
discrimination or if a practice has a disparate impact on a
protected class.” Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v.
Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Cmty. Serv., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Neither document attached to the Complaint offers
an ascertainable basis to support Plaintiff’s claim of housing
discrimination. There is no allegation that Plaintiff applied
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for and was denied housing, or that Defendant otherwise made
housing unavailable to her due to her race or other protected
status. There are no additional facts included in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that would lend plausibility to a legal conclusion of
housing discrimination. At most, Plaintiff is asserting only
some sort of generalized grievance that she lacks the housing
she feels that the federal government must provide to her; such
an allegation fails to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act
when unsupported by any allegations of the who, what, when,
where, and why of the circumstances of denied housing based on
race or other protected class. The claim requires dismissal
under Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
11.

In sum, and for all of the foregoing reasons,

Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rules 8(a)(2) and
12(b)(6). Plaintiff may file a motion for leave to file an
Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days, accompanied by a
proposed Amended Complaint. The proposed Amended Complaint
should attempt to cure the deficiencies described herein by
including clear and concise allegations of the grounds for
housing discrimination and employment discrimination, and, with
respect to employment discrimination, Plaintiff should include
allegations demonstrating that she has exhausted her
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administrative remedies. The accompanying Order will be
entered.

July 29, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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