JOHNSON v. JOHN DOE SHERIFF 1 et al

Filing 58

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 7/19/2016. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHANNON JOHNSON,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
DEPUTY SHERIFF STEVEN FIELDER,:
DEPUTY SHERIFF ROBERT TRAINOR,:
DEPUTY SHERIFF TIMOTHY DUFFY, :
DEPUTY U.S. MARSHAL MICHAEL
:
KENNEDY, N.J. STATE POLICE
:
TROOPER JOHN HAINES,
:
BURLINGTON COUNTRY, and
:
OCEAN COUNTY,
:
:
Defendants.
:

Civ. A. No. 14-6938 (NLH)(KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Stephen T. O’Hanlon
2 Penn Center, Suite 1850
1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19102
On behalf of Plaintiff
Mary Jane Lidaka
212 Hooper Avenue
P.O. BOX 757
Toms River, NJ 08754
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is the motion of Defendants
Robert Trainor, Timothy Duffy, and Ocean County (collectively,
“OC Defendants”) for a more definite statement. For the reasons
expressed below, OC Defendants’ motion will be denied.

1

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shannon Johnson, a resident of Burlington County,
New Jersey, alleges in her two-count complaint that on November
26, 2013 several law enforcement personnel, identified only as
“Sheriff Deputies/State Troopers/Deputy U.S. Marshall” [sic]
(presumably including Defendants Trainor and Duffy) entered her
apartment in Florence, New Jersey. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶ 7 [Doc. No.
35].) Upon entry, Plaintiff alleges she requested that the law
enforcement personnel present a warrant, but they failed to
provide one. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff further alleges the law enforcement personnel,
“acting in concert” and “engag[ing] in a joint venture,”
assaulted her and threw her against a wall and into an
entertainment center. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11.) Plaintiff
alleges she was also “illegally seized and attacked” by each
officer. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff additionally alleges
she later discovered that the officers were acting pursuant to a
Burlington County warrant and an Ocean County warrant for the
arrest of an individual identified as Eugene Gresham for failure
to pay child support and for a theft-related matter,
respectively. (3rd Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)

2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her original complaint on November 6, 2014,
naming Ocean County and John Doe Sheriffs as Defendants. [Doc.
No. 1.] OC Defendants filed an answer on January 8, 2015. [Doc.
No. 8.] Plaintiff then filed a motion for leave to amend her
complaint on August 3, 2015. [Doc. No. 18.] Plaintiff’s motion
was granted on August 18, 2015. [Doc. No. 21.]
Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint on October 6,
2015 and two additional amended complaints on November 2, 2015
and November 15, 2015. [Doc. Nos. 25, 34, 35.] Her third amended
complaint identified the Defendants previously designated as John
Doe by name and made only minor changes to the pleadings by
adding that all Defendants acted in concert. (3rd Am. Compl.) OC
Defendants moved for a more definite statement on November 25,
2015. [Doc. No. 36]. OC Defendants argue that they are unable to
defend against the suit without knowledge of the specific actions
each individual is alleged to have committed.
JURISDICTION
Plaintiff’s two-count third amended complaint alleges causes
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that, “[e]very
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

3

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.”

This Court has original jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1343.
LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) allows a defendant to request a “more
definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Defendants must file this
motion “before filing a responsive pleading and must point out
the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(e). “The prevailing standard employed by Third Circuit
courts is to grant a Rule 12(e) motion when the pleading is so
vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even
with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to
[itself].” MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor Stores Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 729, 736-37 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Clark v. McDonald's
Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 232–33 (D.N.J. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
“Motions for a more definite statement, however, are
‘generally disfavored,’ particularly in light of the liberal

4

pleading standards under the Federal Rules.” Marley v. Donahue,
No. 14-1597, 2014 WL 5152618, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2014)
(citation omitted). Thus, “only where the allegations lack
sufficient specificity to enable a defendant to determine the
propriety of interposing in his answer a waivable defense, where
the nature of the complaint leaves the defendant unable, without
prejudicing itself, to respond with a general denial, or in order
to pare down shotgun pleadings.” Id. (citing Clark, 567 F.R.D. at
232-33). “Resolution of a motion under Rule 12(e) rests ‘largely
[in] the discretion of the district court.’” Id. at *2 (citing
Clark, 213 F.R.D. at 232). However, “[b]ecause there is potential
that Rule 12(e) could require more specificity than that required
by Rule 8(a)(2) and therefore be prone to abuse by defendants,
its exercise should be cast in the mold of strictest necessity.”
Gittens v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 13-5534, 2014 WL
1744851, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2014) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
The OC Defendants make three general arguments in support of
their motion for a more definite statement. First, OC Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint does not identify
“who did what,” in other words, which officers did what actions
to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Further, since

5

Section 1983 liability cannot be predicated upon a respondeat
superior theory, Ocean County argues it is entitled to a more
definite statement with regard to the specific allegations
against it. Second, OC Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
allegations that all Defendants “acted in concert” or were
“engaged in a joint venture” are “insufficient to make out a
claim” for conspiracy. (Reply at 2.) Third, OC Defendants argue
that Plaintiff’s claim for Monell liability “clumps all
defendants together,” “fail[s] to allege an unconstitutional
policy,” and “fail[s] to identify any alleged maker of any
unconstitutional policy.” (Reply at 5.)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is not
so vague or ambiguous that OC Defendants cannot reasonably
prepare a response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). While OC Defendants
point out perhaps several pleading deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
third amended complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations against the OC Defendants are specific enough to
enable them to provide good faith response.1

1

“It is not the

The Court offers no opinion on whether Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint would survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as that application is not before the Court. The
Court notes that “the difference between a pleading that either
fails to state a claim for relief or is so poorly drafted that it
gives the appearance of not stating a claim for relief [Fed. R.
12(b)(6)] and a pleading that states a claim so vaguely or
ambiguously that it cannot be answered [Fed. R. 12(e)] often is
difficult to perceive[.]” 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1376 (3d
6

function of 12(e) to provide greater particularization of
information alleged in the complaint or which presents a proper
subject for discovery.”

MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor Stores

Corp., 567 F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims, “[w]hile not the model of
particularly,” were not so vague, ambiguous or unintelligible

ed.). Indeed, some may belief the difference is so small as to be
non-existent. We note here those commentators who have raised the
question as to whether Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
have rendered Rule 12(e) meaningless. See Kipp, Rule 12(e): What
Is It Good For? Absolutely Nothing, http://www.law360.com/
articles/424046/rule-12-e-what-is-it-good-for-absolutely-nothing.
The sentiment that more definite statements are largely
inconsistent with modern pleading standards had some support long
before Justice Souter’s decision in Twombly forced the Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), pleading standard into “retirement.”
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Walling v. American Steamship Co.,
4 F.R.D. 355 (W.D.N.Y. 1945) (describing the earlier version of
Rule 12(e) as “ill-advised”). Nonetheless, we think that Rule
12(e) retains some utility post-Twombly and Iqbal and that the
answer lies in Twombly itself. In discussing Conley, Justice
Souter’s noted that Conley’s “no set of facts” test was never
intended to be “the minimum standard of adequate pleading to
govern a pleading’s survival” but merely “described the breadth
of the opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. In other words, in attempting to
harmonize Conley and his opinion in Twombly Justice Souter
appeared to leave room for the possibility that a complaint could
meet the Twombly standard and still contain additional
allegations subject to a claim of ambiguity and vagueness. That
having been said, we believe it to be the rare case that a
pleading states a viable legal theory supported by adequate facts
establishing plausibility but also includes additional assertions
so vague and ambiguous that the opposing party is unable to
respond. The need for relief under Rule 12(e) is therefore
extremely limited and after our review of the Third Amended
Complaint in this matter the Court finds this is not one of those
cases.
7

that the defendant could not respond in good faith); Marley v.
Donahue, No. 14-1597, 2014 WL 5152618, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 14,
2014) (finding that while the complaint was challenged because it
failed to outline the plaintiff's specific claims of
discrimination and retaliation, it was not unintelligible, vague
or ambiguous as required to grant a Rule 12(e) motion).
Accordingly, the OC Defendants are not entitled to relief under
Rule 12(e).
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint
gives the OC Defendants fair notice of the claims against it and
enables them to respond in good faith. For this reason, OC
Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement will be denied.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: July 19, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

8