EVANS v. GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 22

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/20/2015. (TH, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CRYSTAL A. EVANS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 14-7160 (JBS/JS)

v.
GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP, et al.,

OPINION
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
Vera McCoy, Esq.
1134 S. Black Horse Pike, #103
Blackwood, NJ 08012
Attorney for Plaintiff Crystal A. Evans
Douglas Diaz, Esq.
ARCHER & GREINER, PC
One Centennial Square
Haddonfield, NJ 08033
Attorney for Defendants Gloucester Township, Gloucester
Township Police Department, and David R. Mayer

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Crystal A. Evans, a former
Gloucester Township Councilmember, alleges that Gloucester
Township (“the Township”), Gloucester Township Police Department
(“the Police Department”), former Mayor David R. Mayer, and
other municipal employees conspired to violate her rights under
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of

the United States Constitution by fostering a culture of
political retribution. Plaintiff also asserts several state law
claims arising from the same alleged misconduct. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that Mayer and others in his administration
subjected Plaintiff to hostility and harassment during council
meetings, implicated Plaintiff in an alleged voting fraud
scheme, orchestrated Plaintiff’s arrest for stalking without
probable cause, and participated in a sexually-explicit internet
defamation campaign against Plaintiff. Plaintiff attempts to
present this series of incidents as part of an expansive
conspiracy directed by Defendant Mayer to squelch political
opposition and as the product of a municipal policy or custom of
political retaliation.
This matter comes before the Court upon a motion to dismiss
by Defendants Gloucester Township, Gloucester Township Police
Department, and David R. Mayer. [Docket Item 13.] Defendants
argue that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
U.S.C. § 1985 should be dismissed as untimely, that Plaintiff’s
state tort claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), and that Plaintiff’s
claims are otherwise insufficiently pleaded. The Court must
therefore determine whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
statute of limitations or the notice requirements under the

2

NJTCA and whether Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to
support her various claims.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
A.

Facts

The Court accepts as true for purposes of the instant
motion the following facts from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
[Docket Item 11.]
Plaintiff Crystal Evans is a former Gloucester Township
Councilmember and member of the Gloucester Township Democratic
Party. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff served as a constituent
caseworker for the New Jersey Fourth Legislative District under
former state assemblyman and current Mayor of Gloucester
Township, Defendant David R. Mayer from January, 2004 to
January, 2008. (Id. ¶ 27.) During this time, Plaintiff developed
a close relationship with Mayer and he nominated her as the
Democratic candidate for Gloucester Township Council in 2007.
(Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was elected and served on Council from
January, 2008 to January, 2012. (Id. ¶ 29.)
1.

Alleged political retaliation while councilmember

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after entering office she
fell out of favor with Democratic council members and party
leaders because she refused to participate in unethical behavior
3

and consistently opposed proposals she believed benefitted a
small group of political insiders. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 40.) Before
Plaintiff’s first council meeting she was instructed by Township
Clerk Rosemarie DiJosie 1 to vote in favor of a voluminous budget
which Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to review. (Id. ¶
31.) When Plaintiff objected, DiJosie explained that party
leadership expected her “to do as she was told” and Gloucester
Township Tax Assessor Chuck Palumbo allegedly “brow-beat” her in
a private meeting to ensure a favorable vote on the budget. (Id.
¶¶ 32-35.) During the vote, Plaintiff stated on the record that
she did not have time to review the budget and only voted in
favor of it because she was told that failure to do so would
result in the shutdown of essential city services. (Id. ¶ 36.) A
few days later, Mayer, the acting president of the Gloucester
Township Democratic Party at the time, “chastised” Plaintiff for
“embarrassing the Democratic Party” and “belittled” her by
suggesting that he made a mistake in supporting her run for
council. (Id. ¶ 37.) Thereafter, Mayer and S. Daniel Hutchinson
engaged in a series of character attacks which inhibited
Plaintiff’s ability to carry out her official duties and
culminated in her dismissal from the constituent caseworker

1

The Amended Complaint contains multiple spellings of the
Township Municipal Clerk’s name, including “Rosemarie DiJosie”
and “Rose Mary DiJosie.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 47.) The Court adopts the
spelling as it first appears in the Amended Complaint.
4

position in June, 2008. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff also observed
Mayer “routinely instruct subordinate municipal officials to
quash political opposition to unpopular measures” by subjecting
individuals to fines, audits, and civil and criminal
investigations. (Id. ¶ 41.) As mayor, Mayer encouraged other
council members to “publicly deride Plaintiff in an effort to
psychologically intimidate” and force her from office. (Id. ¶
42.) Plaintiff completed her council term in January, 2012 and
did not seek reelection due to the allegedly ongoing hostility
and harassment. (Id. ¶ 43.)
2.

Pay-to-play referendum

Plaintiff alleges that after leaving office she continued
to experience harassment directed by Gloucester Township
officials. (Id. ¶ 44.) As a councilmember, Plaintiff supported
“South Jersey Citizens,” a Gloucester Township watchdog group,
in its effort to gather signatures for a referendum petition
which sought to establish an ordinance limiting campaign
contributions from municipal contractors. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff
alleges that from March, 2012 to July, 2012, Mayer conspired
with Gloucester Township Solicitor Howard C. Long and a legal
assistant to the Gloucester Township Law Manager to fabricate a
voting fraud charge against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 46.) South Jersey
Citizens submitted the petition signatures to Rosemarie DiJosie
on February 19, 2012. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff contends that
5

Defendant Marianne Coyle, a legal assistant in the Township Law
Department, threatened an elderly constituent who had signed the
petition, JoAnne Stallworth, with a lawsuit if she did not sign
an affidavit stating that Plaintiff tricked her into signing the
petition by saying it supported funding for a local recreation
center. (Id. ¶ 50.) Ms. Stallworth allegedly signed such an
affidavit at the law offices of Wade, Long, Wood & Kennedy, LLC
in the spring of 2012. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff maintains that all
three partners of this firm were members of Mayer’s
administration. (Id. ¶ 53.) The affidavit was leaked to a
reporter at the Courier Post who contacted Plaintiff to inquire
into voter fraud allegations leveled by the Mayer
administration. (Id. ¶ 55.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants
also attempted to use Ms. Stallworth’s affidavit “to manufacture
a voter fraud allegation against Plaintiff in a public lawsuit”
brought by South Jersey Citizens against Rosemarie DiJosie. (Id.
¶ 56.)
3.

Alleged workplace harassment

From July 19, 2010 to November 12, 2012, Plaintiff was
employed as the manager of the Turnersville branch of the New
Jersey Motor Vehicles Commission (“MVC”). (Id. ¶ 57.) Between
September, 2011 and November, 2012, Plaintiff began receiving
automated phone calls from the Gloucester Township Police
Department and Mayer’s office announcing weather alerts and
6

emergency storm procedures. (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiff found these
phone calls unusual because her MVC branch was outside the
normal target area for such notifications, she received them on
her private extension which was only known by state employees,
and other MVC employees were not receiving the notifications.
(Id. ¶¶ 60-61.) During this same period, Plaintiff suspected
that the director of the MVC, Robert Grill, was asked to monitor
her activities because Grill required Plaintiff to share her
computer username and password with a new hire, Kathleen Sharpe.
(Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff discovered Ms. Sharpe using the computer
in Plaintiff’s office on several occasions. (Id.) Plaintiff
asserts that the harassment became so severe that she wrote a
letter to the Department of Justice in September, 2012 alleging
that she was being targeted for political retaliation. (Id. ¶
63.)
4.

Alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution

Plaintiff further alleges that on the evening of November
7, 2012, Angela DeLucca 2 contacted the Gloucester Township Police
Department to report that someone had damaged the downspouts on
her home. (Id. ¶ 64.) Ms. DeLucca and Plaintiff’s brother-inlaw, Daniel Evans, were involved in a domestic dispute and Mr.

2

The Amended Complaint also contains conflicting spellings of
Ms. DeLucca’s name. The Court adopts the spelling as it first
appears.
7

Evans asked Plaintiff to pick him up from Ms. DeLucca’s home.
(Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff contends that the reporting officers,
Defendants Benjamin Lewitt and Gregory A. Jackson, took
advantage of Ms. DeLucca’s agitated state to elicit “highly
emotional responses . . . about her relationship with
Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 68.) These responses included allegations
that Plaintiff harassed Ms. DeLucca by calling her approximately
500 times, visiting her home uninvited on at least twelve
occasions, damaging her home, and once threatening Ms. DeLucca’s
life. 3 (Id. ¶ 69.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Lewitt
improperly used these statements to “unilaterally escalate
initial allegations of a predicate disorderly person’s offense
into a Fourth Degree Felony Stalking charge.” (Id. ¶ 70.)
Plaintiff alleges that Ms. DeLucca never asked the police to
pursue charges. (Id. ¶ 72.) Plaintiff also asserts that the
Investigative Field Reports prepared by the officers reveal a
failure to investigate and collect evidence in good faith before
the Criminal Complaint-Summons was issued on November 8, 2012.
(Id. ¶ 74.) No attempt was made to contact Plaintiff prior to
issuing the summons. (Id. ¶ 77.) According to Plaintiff, on

3

Plaintiffs note that the “alleged recorded statement has never
been produced for Plaintiff or her legal representatives.” (Id.)
8

November 8, 2012, 4 both Ms. DeLucca and Mr. Evans attempted to
explain that Mr. Evans had called Plaintiff to Ms. DeLucca’s
residence the prior evening, but the Township Police Department
refused to withdraw the stalking complaint. (Id. ¶ 78.) Despite
their efforts, the police refused to take a statement from
either Ms. DeLucca or Mr. Evans. (Id. ¶ 81.)
On the morning of November 8, 2012, Plaintiff’s counsel,
Gary Lammono, Esq., contacted the Township Police Department and
arranged for Plaintiff to voluntarily appear at the station that
afternoon for processing. (Id. ¶ 82.) Nevertheless, arrangements
were made with the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office for the
Gloucester Township police officers to arrest Plaintiff out of
district at her place of work, the Turnersville MVC. (Id. ¶ 83.)
In the late afternoon of November 8, 2012, a Camden County
prosecutor and three Gloucester Township Police Department
officers made “a very public display of entering” the
Turnersville MVC to arrest Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 84.) Soon
thereafter, on November 14, 2012, 5 Plaintiff was terminated from
her position at the MVC. (Id. ¶ 88.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was
not indicted by a grand jury and the felony stalking charge was

4

The Amended Complaint provides a date of November 8, 2014,
however the context makes clear that Plaintiff in this paragraph
refers to November 8, 2012. (Id. ¶ 78.)
5 Again, the Amended Complaint states this date as November 14,
2014, but it is apparent from the pleadings as a whole that the
correct date is November 14, 2012. (Id. ¶ 88.)
9

downgraded to a disorderly person citation for harassment and
dismissed. (Id. ¶ 89.) Following dismissal of the charge, a
member of the Camden County Prosecutor’s office allegedly
admitted to Plaintiff’s counsel, William H. Buckman, Esq., that
the charges never should have been forwarded to the Camden
County Prosecutor’s Office. (Id. ¶ 90.)
5.

Alleged internet defamation

Beginning in March, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that Mayer
and/or the Gloucester Township Police Department directed
Defendants James Dougherty, Frank Mellace, Melissa Mellace, the
Gloucester Township Residence Media Resources (a/k/a gtrmc.com),
and others to publish false, offensive, and sexually explicit
materials about Plaintiff and her family in the comments section
of articles published on gloucestertownship.patch.com and in
blogposts on gtrmc.com. (Id. ¶ 91.) The Amended Complaint
contains numerous examples of such comments. Around November 9,
2012 Defendant David Harkins contacted Sean McCullen, 6 the editor
of a local community blog, gloucestertownship.patch.com, to
publish details of Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. ¶ 92.) On November
9, 2012, someone using the handle “gtisblue” began a blogpost on
gtrmc.com entitled, “Gloucester Township Councilperson
Arrested??” which reported that a councilperson had been

6

“McCullen” is alternately identified as “Sean McMullen.” (Id. ¶
97.)
10

arrested for “erratic and reckless driving as well as a battery
of civil charges involving a domestic dispute.” (Id. ¶ 94.) On
November 10, 2012, someone using the handle “ymbdfa” posted the
following: “Well the story I heard was that she was driving in a
reckless fashion without headlights and as it turns out it was
because she apparently was trying to find her husband.” (Id. ¶
95.) Plaintiff contends that these posts indicate detailed
knowledge of allegations which were not revealed until November
13, 2012 in a Supplementary Field Report filed by Gloucester
Township Police Officer Christer Lewis Gerace. (Id. ¶ 96.)
On or about November 13, 2012, Sean McCullen published
details of Plaintiff’s arrest as obtained from Defendant David
Harkins in an article entitled “Former Gloucester Township
Councilwoman arrested.” (Id. ¶ 97.) On November 14, 2012,
someone using the handle “Best4GT” whom Plaintiff believes to
have been Defendant Mayer, wrote that “Ms. Evans just went off
her rocker when she found her husband in this woman’s home.”
(Id. ¶ 98.) On the same day, someone using the handle “YMBDFA”
posted that Plaintiff had a previous criminal record for “using
a government computer for unofficial business.” (Id. ¶ 99.) On
November 15, 2012, gtrmc.com was closed for public comment and
thereafter only private paid members of gtrmc.com could post to
the site. (Id. ¶ 100.) Also on November 15, 2012, “Best4GT”
stated that Plaintiff had driven to Ms. DeLucca’s residence and
11

caught her spouse “banging the hell” out of one of her friends.
(Id. ¶ 101.)
Several months later, on February 21, 2013, a gtrmc.com
user with the handle “Sybil Evans” wrote that Plaintiff had a
previous history of criminal incidents involving stalking,
threats of violence, and vandalism and “insinuated” that
Plaintiff was having an affair with her brother-in-law Daniel
Evans. (Id. ¶ 102.) On February 22, 2013, “YMBDFA” stated that
Plaintiff had a criminal history and implied that Plaintiff was
providing names and addresses of minors to a known male sex
offender and previously used her teenage modeling business, Role
Models, Inc., as a recruitment vehicle for underage female
victims. (Id. ¶ 103.) On March 4, 2013, “Best4GT” whom Plaintiff
believes to be Defendant Mayer, posted the following: “It is
known that Crystal Evans was previously arrested for stalking
and made death threats by phone to Mr. Mellace in the past.
Police reports were filed on the night of July 19, 2011, and the
police have been investigating the incident since.” (Id. ¶ 104.)
At the time of these posts, gtrmc.com was owned and operated by
Defendant Frank Mellace, a Gloucester Township Democratic
Committee member who worked in the Gloucester Township Tax
Assessor’s Office. (Id. ¶ 105.)
Plaintiff further alleges that beginning on November 9,
2012, Mayer and/or the Gloucester Township Police Department
12

directed Mellace and others to use “Search Engine Optimization
techniques to backlink the original Patch media and gtrmc.com
articles” to make the allegedly degrading statements appear near
the top of the internet search results for Plaintiff’s name.
(Id. ¶ 106.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that since at least
June, 2014, Defendant James Dougherty and others published false
profiles using Plaintiff’s name and likeness on internet
pornography sites, including xhorni.com. (Id. ¶ 108.) Beginning
in March, 2015, Mayer and/or the Gloucester Township Police
Department directed an unknown individual to create pages on
Frompo.com which include Plaintiff’s name, photograph, and
address. (Id. ¶ 109.) Plaintiff asserts that from November, 2012
to present the above conduct by Defendants has significantly
diminished her ability to secure employment. (Id. ¶ 110.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action on November 14, 2014. [Docket
Item 1.] Defendants Gloucester Township, Gloucester Township
Police Department, and Mayor Mayer filed a motion to dismiss
which the Court dismissed as moot [Docket Item 12] after
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on April 20, 2015. [Docket
Item 11.] Plaintiff’s 12-count Amended Complaint consists of
claims for municipal liability; conspiracy to commit gender
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; violation of
Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to engage in protected
13

political speech; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; false
arrest; violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest in reputation; false light; tortious interference with
a business relationship; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; and violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive and procedural due process rights. Plaintiff asserts
such claims against 17 named defendants: Gloucester Township;
Gloucester Township Police Department; David R. Mayer; David
Harkins; David Carlamere; Howard C. Long; Marianne Coyle;
Officer James Dougherty; Officer Benjamin Lewitt; Officer
Gregory A. Jackson; Robert Grill; Frank Mellace; Melissa
Mellace; Gloucester Township Residence Media Resources;
gtrmc.com accountholder “Best4GT;” gtrmc.com accountholder
“ymbdfa;” and gtrmc.com accountholder “Sybil Evans.” 7
Defendants Gloucester Township, Gloucester Township Police
Department, and Mayor Mayer filed the instant motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. [Docket Item 13.] After the Court
granted Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s initial
opposition brief [Docket Item 19], Plaintiff filed opposition in

7

Plaintiff also asserts these claims against numerous fictitious
defendants: Jane Doe Camden County Prosecutor; John Doe
Gloucester Township Police Officers (1-3); John Does (1-10); and
XYZ Corporations (1-10).
14

conformity with the Court’s Order. [Docket Item 20.] Defendants
filed a reply. [Docket Item 21.] 8
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that
the plaintiff failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint will survive a
motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Although a court
must accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint, that
tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 678.
A statute of limitations defense may be raised by motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) if the limitations bar is apparent on the
face of the complaint. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d
Cir. 2014).

8

None of the other Defendants have responded to the Amended
Complaint.
15

DISCUSSION
A.

Statute of limitations

The Court begins by addressing Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 and §
1985 are time-barred because they were filed beyond the two year
limitations period applicable to personal injury claims in New
Jersey. 9 See Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dep’t, 441 F. App’x 826,
828 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff agrees that the two year period
applies to her claims, but argues that they are subject to the
continuing violation doctrine, the discovery rule, and equitable
tolling. The timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims depends on the
alleged misconduct on which each is based. Because Plaintiff’s
claims arise from a series of discrete incidents, many of which
occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the initial
complaint on November 14, 2014, the Court must address each in
turn.
Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is an
affirmative defense and “the burden of establishing its

9

A claim under § 1985(3) accrues when the plaintiff “knew or
should have known of the alleged conspiracy.” Bougher v. Univ.
of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989). “The statute of
limitations, accordingly, runs from the date of each overt act
causing damage to plaintiff.” Id. Therefore, the Court’s statute
of limitations analysis is the same for Plaintiff’s § 1983 and §
1985 claims.
16

applicability to a particular claim rests with the defendant.”
Pension Trust Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset
Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 271 (3d Cir.
2013). A statute of limitations defense may be raised by motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) if the limitations bar is apparent on the
face of the complaint. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d
Cir. 2014). Moreover, the Third Circuit has stated in the
context of the discovery rule that when “the pleading does not
reveal when the limitations period began to run . . . the
statute of limitations cannot justify Rule 12 dismissal.”
Schmidt, 770 F.3d at 251 (collecting cases) (quotation and
citation omitted).
At the outset, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that
the continuing violation doctrine applies to this case. Both the
federal courts and New Jersey courts recognize this equitable
exception to the statute of limitations. As this Court has
noted, “[v]irtually all of the precedent discussing the
continuing violation doctrine involves workplace discrimination
suits.” Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 799 F. Supp. 2d 376, 387
(D.N.J. 2011); see also Speth v. Goode, Civ. 95-0264 (JBS), 2011
WL 221664, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2011). New Jersey courts
have described the doctrine as “an equitable exception to the
statute of limitations” that applies to “causes of action
arising under anti-discrimination laws” because “[a]n actionable
17

claim under [New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination] based upon
a hostile work environment frequently arises out of repeated
incidents that take place over time and by their cumulative
effect make it unreasonable and unhealthy for the plaintiff to
remain in that work environment.” Alliance For Disabled In
Action, Inc. v. Renaissance Enterprises, Inc., 853 A.2d 334, 340
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004).
In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002), which New Jersey courts have followed, the Supreme Court
addressed the doctrine in the context of workplace harassment.
Id. at 115-21. See also Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 8 A.3d
198, 203 (N.J. 2010); Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental
Center, 803 A.2d 611, 623 (N.J. 2002); Green v. Jersey City Bd.
of Educ., 828 A.2d 883, 891 (N.J. 2003). The Supreme Court in
Morgan established that the doctrine applies only to a certain
class of claims, holding that “[h]ostile environment claims are
different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves
repeated conduct. The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore
cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a
series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to
discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable
on its own.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. The Morgan Court
“distinguished between ‘discrete’ discriminatory acts, such as
wrongful terminations, and acts concerning unlawful employment
18

practices, which ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular
day,’” and applied the continuing violation doctrine to the
latter set of claims. Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 846 A.2d
596, 599–600 (N.J. 2004) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).
Addressing the continuing violation doctrine in the context
of a retaliation claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
explained the doctrine as follows:
[T]he continuing violation theory cannot be applied to sweep
in an otherwise time-barred discrete act . . . . As we have
said, the continuing violation theory was developed to allow
for the aggregation of acts, each of which, in itself, might
not have alerted the employee of the existence of a claim,
but which together show a pattern of discrimination. In those
circumstances, the last act is said to sweep in otherwise
untimely prior non-discrete acts . . . . What the doctrine
does not permit is the aggregation of discrete discriminatory
acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of
discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was
actionable.
Roa v. LAFE, 985 A.2d 1225, 1233 (N.J. 2010).
The continuing violation doctrine does not apply to
Plaintiff’s claims because her claims are based on a series of
separate acts which she knew or should have known were
actionable at the time they occurred, namely, alleged
discrimination during her time as a constituent caseworker and
councilmember from 2008 to 2012 (including her dismissal from
the constituent caseworker position in June, 2008); 10 a

10

Plaintiff does not address this alleged misconduct in her
opposition brief, and Plaintiff’s position on the timeliness of
claims based thereon is thus unclear.
19

purportedly false voter fraud allegation in the spring of 2012;
alleged harassment at her workplace from July, 2010 to November,
2012; an allegedly false arrest and subsequent prosecution
beginning in November, 2008; and allegedly disparaging and
defamatory statements about Plaintiff published on the internet.
The doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims based on these
alleged acts because it “does not apply when the plaintiff is
aware of the injury at the time it occurred.” Montanez v. Sec'y
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
these incidents do not constitute the same type of
discrimination because they involve allegations of political
discrimination or retaliation, false arrest, defamation, as well
as gender discrimination. Plaintiff does not allege a series of
workplace sleights which would not be independently actionable
such as the jokes and racial epithets at issue in Morgan. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 120 (2002).
Although Plaintiff alleges an overarching conspiracy, at bottom
Plaintiff’s claims rely on a series of isolated incidents rather
than a recurring pattern of harassment or discrimination. See
Beckett v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 597 F. App'x 665, 668
(3d Cir. 2015); Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157,
166 (3d Cir. 2013). See also Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
191 (3d Cir. 1993) (addressing timeliness of conspiracy claim
20

and stating that “[a]doption of the last overt act rule urged by
[the plaintiff] would invite attempts to revive time-barred
injuries by piggy-backing them onto actions occurring within the
relevant period”). Indeed, as the New Jersey Supreme Court found
in Roa, Plaintiff here cannot use allegedly ongoing acts to
salvage otherwise untimely acts of discrimination or instances
of alleged wrongdoing that Plaintiff knew or should have known
were actionable. Roa, 985 A.2d at 1233. Therefore, the Court
finds the continuing violation doctrine inapplicable to
Plaintiff’s claims.
Having rejected Plaintiff’s reliance on the continuing
violation doctrine, the Court must consider whether the
discovery rule or equitable tolling applies to Plaintiff’s
claims. 11 The Court first considers Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985
claims to the extent they are based on Plaintiff’s November 8,
2012 arrest and subsequent prosecution. “[A] § 1983 claim for
false arrest accrues on the date of the plaintiff’s arrest,
while a malicious prosecution claim does not accrue until a
favorable termination is obtained.” Torres v. McLaughlin, 163
F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d

11

Plaintiff appears to argue only that the discovery rule
applies to her claims based on her November 8, 2012 arrest and
the alleged internet defamation campaign. As such, the Court
only addresses the discovery rule below in the context of these
two underlying circumstances.
21

331, 348–351 (3d Cir. 1989)). 12 Accordingly, it is apparent on
the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim is time-barred. Plaintiff argues that her false arrest
claim based on the November 8, 2012 arrest did not accrue until
various subsequent events occurred, including when she learned
that the police lacked probable cause to arrest her, when she
suffered damages through loss of employment, or when she was
formally arraigned. Plaintiff’s arguments are inapposite because
“the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages
for a false arrest . . . begins to run at the time the claimant
becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). “The relevant inquiry becomes whether
the plaintiff had sufficient information on the night of his/her
arrest to state a claim for false arrest.” Dique v. Mulvey, Civ.
04-563 (KSH), 2008 WL 1882856, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2008),
aff'd sub nom. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181
(3d Cir. 2010). As in Dique, the Court finds that the Amended
Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff knew that she was arrested
on November 8, 2012 and she knew the circumstances of her

12

“A claim for false imprisonment accrues when an arrestee
appears before a magistrate and is bound over for trial,
because, after that, he is being held pursuant to legal
process.” Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dep't, 441 F. App'x 826,
828 (3d Cir. 2011). However, the Amended Complaint purports to
state a claim for false arrest, not false imprisonment.
Plaintiff’s arguments in briefing regarding false imprisonment
are therefore misplaced.
22

arrest. Plaintiff may not have known everything that she now
alleges, but she knew at the time of her arrest that the police
allegedly lacked probable cause. Because Plaintiff filed this
action over two years after she was “detained pursuant to legal
process,” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397, Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim is time-barred. 13
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim and her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
are time-barred to the extent they are based on her allegedly
improper arrest on November 8, 2012. Because Plaintiff was
arrested on November 8, 2012 more than two years before she
filed the original complaint, Plaintiff’s due process claim is
also time-barred. See Blow v. Paterson Police Dep't, Civ. 112128 (SRC), 2012 WL 368206, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2012)
(dismissing as time-barred plaintiff’s due process and equal
protection claims based on allegedly improper arrest and

13

Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule applies to her false
arrest claim. Plaintiff contends that she did not have
constructive notice of the alleged lack of probable cause until
criminal discovery was produced to her attorney on or around
February 1, 2013. Plaintiff does not allege this fact in the
Amended Complaint and therefore the Court cannot rely upon it.
See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir.
2007). The same is true of Plaintiff’s contention in briefing
that she was not arraigned until the charges were downgraded and
transferred to the Gloucester Township Municipal Court on
January 9, 2013. (Pl. Opp. at 16.) Consequently, the Court
rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the discovery rule based
on facts absent from the Amended Complaint.
23

search). As to the First Amendment claim, such claims “are
always individually actionable, even when relatively minor.”
O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2006).
The Third Circuit has held that principles in Morgan “apply with
equal force to § 1983 claims,” and to the extent Plaintiff’s
allegations are “discrete, then each gave rise to a cause of
action at the time it occurred.” O'Connor, 440 F.3d at 129.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim barred by the
statute of limitations to the extent it is based on an arrest
which occurred over two years prior to the filing of the
complaint.
To the contrary, it is not apparent on the face of the
Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim
is barred by the statute of limitations. As noted above,
malicious prosecution claims do not accrue until charges are
dismissed. Ginter v. Skahill, 298 F. App'x 161, 163 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1996)).
The Amended Complaint does not state when the charges were
dismissed and the Court therefore cannot conclude that
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is time-barred. For this
same reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims, to the extent based on an allegedly
improper prosecution, are not clearly time-barred.
24

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims
based on the alleged political retaliation during her time as a
constituent caseworker and councilmember, the purportedly false
voter fraud allegations against her, the alleged workplace
harassment, and the alleged internet defamation. Plaintiff’s
claims based on these allegations appear barred on the face of
the pleadings. The alleged political retaliation or
discrimination about which Plaintiff complains during her time
on Mayer’s staff and as a councilmember concluded when her
council term expired in January, 2012 – over two years prior to
filing the initial complaint in this action. Similarly, the
Amended Complaint describes a conspiracy directed by Mayer to
manufacture a voter fraud allegation against Plaintiff from
March, 2012 to July, 2012. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
alleged harassment at her workplace from July 19, 2010 to
November 12, 2012 involve conduct prior to November 14, 2012. As
to the allegedly defamatory internet statements that Plaintiff
contends began in March, 2012 and continue to present, Plaintiff
relies on several statement made prior to November 14, 2012. Any
claims based on statements published prior to November 14, 2012
are untimely.
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the
doctrine of equitable tolling under New Jersey and federal law
by relying on facts not pleaded in the Amended Complaint. For
25

example, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to equitable
tolling for her § 1983 and § 1985 claims related to events
between April, 2012 and July, 2012 pertaining to the voter fraud
allegations because Plaintiff did not learn until July, 2012
that Ms. Stallworth was coerced into signing false affidavits.
This fact is absent from the Complaint, and even if accepted as
true, fails to render Plaintiff’s claim timely. Plaintiff also
asserts in briefing regarding the allegedly defamatory internet
posts that bloggers attempted to conceal their identities by
using pseudonyms and Plaintiff only learned of the connection to
Frank Mellace in November, 2014. Because Plaintiff failed to
include these allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court
cannot rely on them and they cannot be used to invoke equitable
tolling. 14
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds, based on the
allegations in the Amended Complaint, that Plaintiff’s § 1983
and § 1985 claims are time-barred with the exception of those
based on an allegedly improper prosecution following her
November 8, 2012 arrest, as well as Plaintiff’s claims based on
statements published on the internet after November 14, 2012.

14

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that “two
different legal representatives have refused to take steps to
preserve Plaintiff’s claims, due to fear of retaliation.” (Pl.
Opp. at 21.) The allegations supporting such an argument appear
only in briefing and are wholly absent from the Amended
Complaint.
26

B.

Notice under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act

Defendants further argue, as a preliminary matter, that
Plaintiff’s state tort claims for false light, tortious
interference with a business relationship, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to give Defendants proper notice as required by
the NJTCA. Plaintiff contends the NJTCA does not apply to her
claims against Defendant Mayer because they involve conduct
undertaken outside the course of his official duties. Plaintiff
also makes clear that she is only asserting state tort claims
against the individual defendants, which for purposes of the
instant motion means only Mayer.
The NJTCA requires notice of a claim of injury against a
public entity to be presented within ninety days of the accrual
of the cause of action. A plaintiff is barred from recovering
damages from a public entity if “he fail[s] to file his claim
with the public entity within ninety (90) days . . . .” N.J.S.A.
59:8–8. 15 Providing such notice within 90 days achieves several
goals. It allows the public entity time to review the claim and
to promptly investigate the facts and prepare a defense;
provides them an opportunity to settle meritorious claims before

15

Failure to comply with the notice requirements under the NJTCA
precludes recovery against a public employee, as well as a
public entity. N.J.S.A. 59:8–3; Velez v. City of Jersey City,
850 A.2d 1238, 1243 (N.J. 2004).
27

bringing suit; grants them an opportunity to correct the
conditions which gave rise to the claim; and allows them to
inform the State in advance as to the expected liability. Velez
v. City of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1242 (N.J. 2004). The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Velez expressly held that the notice
provisions of the Act apply to intentional tort claims against
public employees such as those at issue here. Id. at 1244-45.
See also Lassoff v. New Jersey, 414 F. Supp. 2d 483, 490 (D.N.J.
2006) (“Suits against a public officer in his individual
capacity are subject to the notice provisions of the TCA even
though the public officer is not entitled to immunity under
N.J.S.A. § 59:3–14.”); Mawhinney v. Bennett, Civ. 08-3317, 2010
WL 2557713, at *7 (D.N.J. June 22, 2010) (same). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s argument that the NJTCA does not apply to her tort
claims against Defendant Mayer because he acted outside the
scope of his official duties to inflict intentional harm on
Plaintiff is meritless and directly contrary to the holding in
Velez. Because the Amended Complaint provides no indication that
Plaintiff satisfied the notice requirements under the NJTCA and
Plaintiff has provided none in briefing, Plaintiff’s tort claims
against Defendant Mayer are barred by N.J.S.A. 59:8–8 and must
be dismissed.

28

C.

Section 1985 conspiracy claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a §
1985 claim against Defendant Mayer based on alleged gender
discrimination. Section 1985(3) creates a cause of action
against any two persons who “conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3) plaintiff must allege
the following elements: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States.” United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463
U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983). The second element requires plaintiff
to allege that the conspiracy was motivated by racial, gender,
or other class-based discriminatory animus. Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Slater v. Susquehanna
Cnty., 465 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farber v.
City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)).

29

In the present action, Plaintiff has failed to allege the
deprivation of any federally protected right. Plaintiff’s §
1985(3) claim, at least with respect to Defendant Mayer, is
premised on allegations that Mayer and others “engaged in an
internet defamation campaign using the same pattern of derision
and psychological abuse Plaintiff experienced” as a
councilmember. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 158.) This campaign, according to
Plaintiff, consisted of a series of posts in the comments
section associated with online articles, the use of a “cyber
harassment technique” that manipulated internet search results
for Plaintiff’s name, and the creation of fake profiles using
Plaintiff’s name and “likeness” on pornography sites. (Id. ¶¶
167-68.) Although Plaintiff’s allegations may be sufficient to
plead a cause of action under state tort law, numerous courts
have held that defamation is not actionable under § 1985(3). See
White v. United States, 791 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“[E]ven if plaintiffs were to allege sufficient facts of
conspiracy in this Count, defamation is not actionable under §
1985(3) . . . . Plaintiffs do not maintain, and the Court does
not know of, any theory under which an individual is

16

For purposes of this analysis, the Court does not consider
Mayer’s alleged conduct upon becoming Mayor of Gloucester
Township in 2010, including encouraging council members to
deride and intimidate Plaintiff, because this conduct is outside
the limitations period as explained above.
30

constitutionally protected against defamation.”); Lancaster v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“While the injury to reputation asserted by the plaintiff may
be actionable under state tort law, it falls far short of a
constitutional violation.”); Aruai v. Mallozzi, Civ. 14-2320,
2014 WL 3600482, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2014) (dismissing §
1985(3) claim based on false light, libel, and defamation
because “[s]tate law claims cannot support an action under §
1985(3)”); Banks v. Pittsburgh Tribune Review, Civ. 07-336, 2007
WL 1314617, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 2007) (finding that § 1985(3)
claim based on defamation fails to state a claim “because a
conspiracy to defame does not deprive Plaintiff of any federally
protected right”). Plaintiff has provided no relevant argument
to the contrary. 17 Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
§ 1985(3) claim against Defendant Mayer for failing to allege
the deprivation of a federally protected right. 18

17

Instead, Plaintiff attempts to bolster her allegations of
gender-based discrimination by noting for the first time in her
opposition brief that Plaintiff was referred to as “that woman”
during Gloucester Township Council meetings.
18 The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s allegations
supporting a conspiracy between the defendants are conclusory.
Beyond bald assertions that defendants “conspired to . . .
harass” Plaintiff and “acted in concert” to “engage[] in an
internet defamation campaign,” the Amended Complaint contains
very little to suggest that the conduct about which Plaintiff
complains was anything more than a series of unrelated acts by
several individuals. This is insufficient to allege an actual
conspiracy.
31

D.

Section 1983 claim against Mayer

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a §
1983 claim against Defendant Mayer in counts four through eight.
Plaintiff argues in response that Plaintiff has sufficiently
pleaded a § 1983 claim against Mayer for political retaliation
under the First Amendment, for malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment, for abuse of process under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, for deprivation of liberty and property
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for deprivation of
Plaintiff’s rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. 19
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under section
1983, a plaintiff must allege: 1) the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2)
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d

19

Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff’s attempt to add a
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241 via her opposition brief is
improper.
32

Cir. 1994). See also Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d
Cir. 2011).
Having conceded that Plaintiff’s claims against Mayer in
his official capacity should be dismissed, the Court only
considers Plaintiff’s claims against him in his individual
capacity. 20 “Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676
(2009). State actors may be liable only for their own
unconstitutional conduct. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366
(3d Cir. 2012); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). In addition to a claim based on Mayer’s own conduct,
Plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim against Mayer in his
supervisory capacity by alleging that 1) Mayer was a policymaker
who “with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which
directly caused [the] constitutional harm;” or 2) he
“participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed
others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had

20

Plaintiff concedes that all claims against Defendant Mayer in
his official capacity are duplicative of those against the
Township and should be construed as claims against the Township.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state
officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as
suits against the State.”). The Court will therefore dismiss all
claims against Mayer in his official capacity.
33

knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.”
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotations and citations omitted).
See also Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d
Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes,
135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).
Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion above that many of
Plaintiff’s claims against Mayer are time-barred on the face of
the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient
facts demonstrating Mayer’s personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to establish a § 1983 claim against him in his individual
capacity. Plaintiff’s claims for political retaliation, for
malicious prosecution, for abuse of process, for deprivation of
liberty and property interests, and for deprivation of
Plaintiff’s rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241 are principally based
on her purportedly false arrest on November 8, 2012. 21 Plaintiff
alleges throughout these counts that Defendants were acting at

21

Even when discussing her claim for political retaliation under
the First Amendment, Plaintiff, in briefing, focuses almost
exclusively on Plaintiff’s November 8, 2012 arrest. Like the
pleadings, Plaintiff’s arguments in briefing discuss at length
the conduct of Ms. DeLucca, the officers who reported to the
scene of the incident, and to a lesser extent, certain Township
prosecutors. Plaintiff’s failure to discuss, even in briefing,
any involvement by Mayer in the November, 2012 arrest belies
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that he was somehow
personally involved in her purportedly false arrest and
subsequent prosecution.
34

all relevant times “under the express and/or tacit approval of
Defendants, Mayor David R. Mayer and/or Deputy Chief David
Harkins.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 200, 218.) However, this bare
allegation is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for
supervisory liability. The Amended Complaint is similarly devoid
of allegations supporting an inference that Mayer was personally
involved or even aware of Plaintiff’s arrest on November 8,
2012. The allegations central to Plaintiff’s arrest and
subsequent prosecution focus on the Township police officers who
arrived on the scene on November 8, 2012 and others in the
Police Department who allegedly failed to adequately investigate
the underlying incident on which the charges against Plaintiff
were based. Plaintiff does not allege that Mayer was involved in
the investigation of the underlying incident or the decision to
charge Plaintiff in a criminal complaint. In fact, at one point,
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Lewitt “unilaterally escalate[d]
initial allegations of a predicate disorderly person’s offense
into a Fourth Degree Felony Stalking charge.” (Id. ¶ 70.)
Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to
set forth plausible grounds for Defendant Mayer’s personal
involvement in the November 8, 2012 arrest and subsequent
prosecution as required to state a § 1983 claim against him. 22

22

The Court finds no need to address Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding conduct outside of the statute of limitations period,
35

Although Plaintiff alleges that Mayer personally posted
disparaging comments on the internet about her and directed
others to engage in additional forms of cyber harassment, such
allegations are also insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
As discussed above, allegations of defamation are “actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if it occurs in the course of or is
accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status
guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.” Clark v. Twp. of
Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiff alleges that
her ability to secure employment has been significantly
diminished as a result of the alleged internet defamation. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 110.) The Third Circuit in Clark, however, found in the
context of a due process claim that the potential loss of future
employment insufficient to constitute the alteration or
extinguishment of any right or interest. Id. at 620 (“The
possible loss of future employment opportunities is patently
insufficient to satisfy the requirement . . . that a liberty
interest requires more than mere injury to reputation.”). As in
Clark, there is no allegation here that Plaintiff applied for

including the supposedly trumped-up voter fraud allegation, the
alleged harassment at Plaintiff’s workplace, and the alleged
attempt to arrest her at her workplace on November 9, 2012. Even
if these allegations were relevant, they too would be
insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against Mayer because they
do not demonstrate his personal involvement through anything
other than conclusory statements regarding conspiratorial
conduct.
36

and was rejected from employment. 23 Therefore, the Court also
finds Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Mayer’s role in an
internet defamation campaign insufficient to state a § 1983
claim against him. 24
E.

Municipal liability

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim for municipal liability. Plaintiff maintains in response
that all of the alleged misconduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s
claims resulted from an unconstitutional municipal custom,
policy, or practice.
It is well-established that municipal liability under §
1983 “may not be proven under the respondeat superior doctrine,
but must be founded upon evidence that the government unit
itself supported a violation of constitutional rights.”
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing

23

Plaintiff argues in briefing that as a result of the alleged
internet defamation she suffered tangible loss of a business
relationship when she was discharged from her job at the
Turnersville MVC, as well as loss of goodwill in a business
venture called Role Models, Inc. (Pl. Opp. at 34.) However,
Plaintiff explicitly alleges that she was terminated from the
MVC “as a direct and proximate result of the criminal charges
and subsequent arrest.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) She does not allege
that she lost her position at the MVC due to statements on the
internet. Moreover, Role Models, Inc. is identified in the
Amended Complaint solely as Plaintiff’s teenage modeling
business. (Id. ¶ 103.) Plaintiff does not allege any loss of
goodwill related to this entity as a result of the alleged
defamation.
24 Having so concluded, the Court need not consider Defendants’
qualified immunity argument.
37

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978)). As a consequence, a municipality is liable under § 1983
only when “execution of a government's policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.” Monell, 436 U .S. at 694; Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only
where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made
from among various alternatives by the official or officials
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the
subject matter in question.”). Whether a policy or a custom,
“The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its
deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.,
Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Thus, for a plaintiff
to sufficiently demonstrate municipal liability under § 1983, he
or she must present facts to support a finding that execution of
a specific policy or custom, or the directive of the
municipality’s final decision maker, caused the alleged harm.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations in counts one and two as
to municipal liability fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mayer and
others “fostered a political culture of fear and intimidation .
38

. . to resolve political grudges” and discourage individuals
from exercising their right to political speech. (Am. Compl. ¶
112.) According to the Amended Complaint, Gloucester Township
and the Gloucester Township Police Department “have exhibited an
unconstitutional custom, policy, and practice” by which
municipal officials harass and intimidate political opponents
through “unreasonable fines, audits, civil actions, criminal
charges, arrests, prosecutions, cyber harassment and smear
campaigns.” (Id. ¶ 114.) Plaintiff asserts that she “witnessed
firsthand” Defendant Mayer and others in his administration
“routinely direct Gloucester Township . . . officials to harass
and intimidate political opponents.” (Id. ¶ 115.) Plaintiff then
casts each instance of alleged misconduct “as a direct and
proximate result of Gloucester Township’s unconstitutional
customs, policies and practices.” (Id. ¶¶ 118-24.) 25 Beyond these
conclusory allegations, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
to suggest that the Township or the Police Department was the
moving force behind the alleged misconduct. Instead, as
discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that the

25

Plaintiff’s allegations in count two are substantially similar
to those in count one, except that count two focuses on
Defendant Mayer and Defendant David Harkins as the purported
final policymakers with respect to the Township and the Police
Department. Plaintiff in count two again relies on bare recitals
and does not allege additional facts that lend plausibility to
Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim.
39

allegedly offending conduct arose from the decisions of the
individuals involved.
For example, in regards to Plaintiff’s November 8, 2012
arrest, Plaintiff notes the “unilateral” decision by Officer
Lewitt to escalate the initial allegations. Plaintiff maintains
that Defendants David Carlamere, Marianne Coyle, and Howard C.
Long elicited false statements about Plaintiff from an elderly
constituent and that various unidentified Camden County
prosecutors and Gloucester Township police officers attempted to
arrest Plaintiff at her place of work. Likewise, Plaintiff
alleges that numerous individuals using different internet
pseudonyms posted offensive comments on the internet about
Plaintiff. 26 Plaintiff cannot transform such conduct into the
basis of a municipal liability claim by merely alleging in
conclusory fashion that it stemmed from a municipal policy or
custom. Plaintiff’s allegations attempt to frame a series of
separate incidents as an extensive and prolonged conspiracy to
retaliate against her for her political views, but the Amended
Complaint contains no facts to support the conclusion that each
act was the direct result of a municipal policy or custom or

26

The Court again notes that much of the conduct about which
Plaintiff complains occurred outside the statute of limitations
period. However, the Court finds that, even if Plaintiff could
rely on such conduct, it is insufficient to maintain a municipal
liability claim against the Township or the Police Department.
40

that a final policymaker’s conduct caused the alleged
constitutional harm. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of
Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2003). As such, the
Amended Complaint fails to assert a plausible municipal
liability claim, and the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss as to this claim.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 and §
1985 claims against Defendants Mayer, Gloucester Township, and
the Gloucester Township Police Department are time-barred except
to the extent based on an allegedly improper prosecution
following her November 8, 2012 arrest and allegedly defamatory
internet posts published on or after November 14, 2012.
Plaintiff’s state law claims against these Defendants are
precluded by the NJTCA’s notice requirements. In addition, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1985 claim must be dismissed
for failure to allege the deprivation of a federally protected
right and failure to plausibly allege an actual conspiracy.
Plaintiff has likewise failed to allege plausible § 1983 claims
against Defendant Mayer or a plausible municipal liability claim
against the Township and the Police Department.
Because the Court cannot conclude that amendment would be
futile, dismissal will be without prejudice except for
41

Plaintiff’s tort claims which are barred under the NJTCA. Any
such amendment within this 21-day period is permitted only for
the purpose of curing the deficiencies in the present pleading
addressed herein, and not to relitigate matters already decided
by repeating the same deficient averments. An accompanying Order
will be entered.

August 20, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

42