MANFRE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 13

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 9/22/2015. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 10)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
Jerrilyn MANFRE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
:
SECURITY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :

Civil No. 14-7680 (RBK)
OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the appeal of Jerrilyn Manfre for review of the
final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). The
Commissioner denied her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2010, Ms. Manfre filed a claim for SSDI benefits because of migraine

headaches and depression. The relevant time period is from February 28, 2007 to December 31,
2008, the last date that Ms. Manfre was insured. The Commissioner denied Ms. Manfre’s claim
on May 9, 2011. Ms. Manfre requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”),
and the hearing was held on November 8, 2012. On February 6, 2013, ALJ Joseph M. Hillegas
decided that Ms. Manfre could not receive SSDI benefits. The Appeals Council denied Ms.

1

Manfre’s request for review on October 14, 2014, and the ALJ’s determination became the final
decision of the Commissioner. Ms. Manfre filed a complaint in this Court on April 28, 2015.
A. Ms. Manfre’s Alleged Impairments
Ms. Manfre alleged that her headaches originated after a car accident that occurred in
1990. Pl. Br. at 3. She worked as a nursing assistant from 2005 to 2007, but she stopped due to
her headaches. Id. at 2. Prior to December 2007, Ms. Manfre used Tylenol ES or Aleve on a
daily basis to treat her headaches. Administrative Record (“Rec.”) at 47. Additionally, Ms.
Manfre testified that she took Paxil and Depakote in 1999, and she was hospitalized for
depression in 2007.1 Id. However, there is nothing else in Ms. Manfre’s medical records to
support that her symptoms from depression were severe during the relevant time period.
Dr. Loretta Mueller summarized Ms. Manfre’s condition, and stated that she suffered
from migraines and sinus headaches. Id. In 2008, Dr. Mueller saw Ms. Manfre four times, during
which time Ms. Manfre experienced some relief from her headaches. Id. Dr. Mueller prescribed
Pamelor and Maxalt to help Ms. Manfre’s migraines.2 Id. Throughout 2008, Ms. Manfre told Dr.
Mueller that her condition improved, and in March 2008 she described herself as “functional.”
Id. Ms. Manfre apparently felt well enough to return to work in 2008.3 Pl. Br. at 2. However, in
November 2008, Ms. Manfre’s more severe headaches returned, and reached a level that required
her to rest in bed all day. Rec. at 48.

1
Paxil and Depakote are mood-stabilizing drugs prescribed to people who suffer from
depression and other neurological conditions.
2
Pamelor is taken daily as a prophylactic and Maxalt is taken as needed for symptom relief.
3
Ms. Manfre reported earnings of $2,872.69 in 2007 and $3,676.32 in 2008.

2

B. The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . .
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ used the established five-step evaluation process to
determine if Ms. Manfre was disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. For the first four steps of the
evaluation process, the claimant has the burden of establishing her disability by a preponderance
of the evidence. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611–12 (3d Cir. 2014). First, the claimant must
show that she was not engaged in “substantial gainful activity” for the relevant time period. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) (explaining the first step); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (defining
“substantial gainful activity”). Second, the claimant must demonstrate that she had a “severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that lasted for a continuous period of at
least 12 months. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (explaining the second step); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1509 (setting forth the duration requirement). Third, either the claimant shows that her
condition was one of the Commissioner’s listed impairments, and therefore she is disabled and
entitled to benefits, or the analysis proceeds to step four. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii)
(explaining the third step). See also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. Fourth, if the condition
is not equivalent to a listed impairment, the claimant must show that she cannot perform her past
work, and the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual function capacity (“RFC”).4 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (explaining the fourth step); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (same). If the claimant
meets her burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner for the last step. Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at

4
A claimant’s RFC is used to determine if the claimant can return to her past work, but also to
measure “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

3

612. At the fifth and last step, the Commissioner must establish that other available work exists
that the claimant is capable of performing, based on her RFC, age, education, and work
experience. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (explaining the fifth step). If the claimant can
make “an adjustment to other work,” she is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 
First, the ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre was not engaged in substantial gainful activity
during the relevant time period. Second, the ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre was severely
impaired by depression and migraine headaches, but not impaired due to other ailments. Third,
the ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre’s ailments did not meet or equal one of the Commissioner’s
listed impairments.
Because Ms. Manfre failed to demonstrate that her impairment was one of the listed
impairments, the ALJ proceeded to the fourth and fifth steps of the evaluation process. Although
the ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre could not return to her past work, he found that she was
capable of performing the full range of unskilled, light-work jobs. The ALJ identified
approximately 1,600 different jobs classified as sedentary or light unskilled occupations. Rec. at
55. Each of these occupations represented several jobs in the national economy. Id. The ALJ
decided that the Commissioner had met its burden of establishing the existence of other work
that Ms. Manfre could perform. Id. Due to this final determination, the ALJ decided that Ms.
Manfre was not suffering from a disability during the relevant time period. Id.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision, this Court is limited to determining

whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, after reviewing the administrative
record as a whole. Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 610 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

4

conclusion.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2000). The often-used quotation for
the standard is that substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance of the evidence.” See, e.g., Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 2005). Courts may not set aside the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence, even if this court “would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Fargnoli v.
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).
When reviewing matter of this type, this Court must be wary of treating the determination
of substantial evidence as a “self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.
2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983). This Court must set aside the Commissioner’s decision if it did not
take into account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict. Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284–85 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776
(3d Cir. 1978)). Evidence is not substantial if “it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion,” or if the ALJ “ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983)
(citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114). A district court’s review of a final determination is a “qualitative
exercise without which our review of social security disability cases ceases to be merely
deferential and becomes instead a sham.” Kent, 710 F.2d at 114.
III.

DISCUSSION
The ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act at any point during the relevant time period, and thus that she was not entitled to
SSDI benefits. This Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s denial of
Ms. Manfre’s SSDI benefits. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

5

A. The ALJ was not required by SSR 83–20 to call a medical advisor.
Social Security Rule 83–20 does not require the ALJ to hear testimony from a medical
advisor. The purpose of this SSR is “[t]o state the policy and describe the relevant evidence to be
considered when establishing the onset date of disability.” SSR 83–20. This SSR concerns what
the ALJ must do to determine the onset date of a claimant’s disability, not whether a disability
exists. Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 612. The claimant has the burden of proving that she is disabled. Id.
However, Ms. Manfre claims that the ALJ erred by not calling a medical expert “to assist in
determining the onset of Ms. Manfre’s severe headaches.” Pl. Br. at 8.
In cases of slowly developing impairments “it will be necessary to infer the onset date
from the medical and other evidence that describe the history and symptomatology of the disease
process.” SSR 83–20. This determination does not require an ALJ to call a medical expert.
Contrary to Ms. Manfre’s assertions, an ALJ must consult with a medical advisor pursuant to
SSR 83–20 only when a claimant’s medical history is not definite concerning the onset date of
her disability, and adequate medical records for the relevant time period are not available. Newell
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 549 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003).
The ALJ had access to Ms. Manfre’s medical records, and Ms. Manfre went to the doctor
four times in 2008. The ALJ had enough evidentiary support to make a reasonable inference as
to the onset date of the disability. See Jakubowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 104,
107–08 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the ALJ had access to adequate medical records, and
therefore could make a reasonable inference regarding the onset date of the claimant’s disability
without consulting a medical advisor). As such, the ALJ was not required to call a medical
advisor to determine the onset date of Ms. Manfre’s impairments.

6

B. Social Security Ruling 83–20 does not require the ALJ to credit lay testimony.
The ALJ considered Ms. Manfre’s testimony, weighed it against her medical records and
other evidence, and decided that she was not disabled during the relevant time period. The ALJ’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record. The ALJ conducted a thorough
analysis of Ms. Manfre’s medical history after the relevant time period. Rec. at 48–51. He noted
medical records up to four years beyond the relevant time period. Id. The ALJ was aware that the
severity of Ms. Manfre’s migraines, headaches, and other maladies increased after 2009.
However, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Manfre was not
disabled during the relevant time period. Notably, Ms. Manfre told her doctor that her headaches
were improving in March of 2008 and that she no longer experienced them on a daily basis. Id at
47. She stated on April 29, 2008 that she experienced two migraines in the last two months. Id. at
48. Additionally, Ms. Manfre did not refill her Maxalt prescription after January 2008, and she
worked for a time period during 2008. Id. at 52. The ALJ addressed the lay testimony of Ms.
Manfre and the evidence of her doctors both during and after the relevant time period. As such,
the ALJ’s determination that Ms. Manfre was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence.
C. The ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ reasonably determined that Ms. Manfre had the RFC to perform unskilled, light
work. Unskilled, light work requires a person to understand and perform simple instructions,
appropriately respond to supervision and usual work situations, and cope with routine changes in
her work setting. SSR 85–15, at *4. An ALJ should base determinations of the claimant’s RFC
on acceptable medical sources, and should describe the claimant’s ability to perform physical
and mental work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(c). The ALJ should conduct an
independent analysis of the evidentiary record and make a determination on that basis. SSR 96–

7

8p, at *2. The ALJ, not the treating or examining physicians, makes the final RFC determination.
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
The ALJ’s determination is based on how much the impairments reduced the claimant’s
ability to perform work. SSR 96–8p, at *2. Ms. Manfre’s impairments during the relevant time
period were migraines and depression. Rec. at 42. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Manfre could
still perform the full range of unskilled, light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The
ALJ found it significant that, during the relevant time period, Ms. Manfre stated that her
headaches were improving. Rec. at 47. Ms. Manfre testified that Maxalt relieved her symptoms,
but she did not refill her her Maxalt prescription during the majority of 2008. Id. at 52. Dr.
Mueller first examined Ms. Manfre in regards to her depression in December 2007. Nevertheless,
between that first diagnosis and November 23, 2010 when she again met with Dr. Mueller,
nothing in Ms. Manfre’s medical history shows that her depression significantly limited her
RFC. Id. at 53. By April 2008, Ms. Manfre experienced two migraines in two months. Id. at 52.
She also noted that her headaches were better in 2007 than they were in 2006, a year in which
her income was over the substantial gainful activity threshold. Id. The ALJ evaluated her
doctors’ notes, prescription history, and her own testimony. The ALJ’s determinations regarding
Ms. Manfre’s impairments and RFC are supported by substantial evidence.
D. The ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Manfre’s credibility.
Normally, a reviewing court should defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations. Reefer
v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). When developing support for his determination,
an ALJ should state why some evidence was accepted and some was rejected. Id. An ALJ may
discount a claimant’s testimony if it is inconsistent with other evidence. Schaudeck v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ fully developed his rationale for

8

rejecting Ms. Manfre’s testimony. The ALJ thoroughly analyzed all of Ms. Manfre’s medical
records. He demonstrated how other evidence did not support her testimony regarding the
severity of her migraines. As such, this Court defers to the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Manfre’s
credibility.
E. The ALJ properly determined that other jobs existed in the national economy
that Ms. Manfre could perform.
The ALJ properly relied on the medical-vocational grids to determine that Ms. Manfre
could perform jobs that existed in the national economy. Grids are rules that “reflect major
functional and vocational patterns.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(a). The grids
help an ALJ determine if the claimant is disabled through an analysis of the vocational factors
and the claimant’s RFC. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 416.969. At the time Ms. Manfre was last insured, she
was 46 years old. Rec. at 54. For the purposes of the grids, that age classifies her as a “younger
individual.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.00(h)(1). She also had a high school
education. Rec. at 54. The ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre was capable of performing the full
range of unskilled, light work. Id. The application of these findings to the grids led to the ALJ’s
conclusion that Ms. Manfre was not disabled during the relevant time period. Id. at 55.
Additionally, the ALJ did not need to hear testimony from a vocational expert. The ALJ
should consult a vocational expert when a claimant’s non-exertional symptoms erode the
occupational base of available jobs. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2000). When there
is a “fit” between “the facts of a given case and the way in which an SSR dictates that an
individual’s non-exertional limitations impact upon her occupational base[,]” vocational
testimony is unnecessary. Guerrero v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 249 Fed. App’x. 289, 293 (3d Cir.
2007). When a person’s mental impairment prevents her from returning to past work, “the final
consideration is whether that person can be expected to perform unskilled work.” SSR 85–15, at

9

*4. The grids in Appendix 2 specifically take notice of the number of unskilled jobs in each
exertional category. SSR 96–9p, at *2.
The ALJ’s reliance on the grids and decision to not hear testimony from a vocational
expert were appropriate. The ALJ determined that Ms. Manfre was capable of performing the
“full range of unskilled, light work.” Unskilled work requires a person to remember, understand,
and carry out simple instructions, make basic judgments according to one’s tasks, and to respond
appropriately in the work setting. SSR 85–15, at *4. The severity, not the existence, of Ms.
Manfre’s headaches, migraines, and depression symptoms was the focus of the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Manfre’s non-exertional symptoms did not prevent her from
remembering and understanding simple instructions or making basic judgments, or restrict her
from acting appropriately a work setting. There was substantial evidence to support this
conclusion, and that evidence disposed of the need for a vocational expert’s testimony.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

Dated: 09/22/2015

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B KUGLER
United States District Judge

10