TEAMSTERS HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND OF PHILADELPHIA AND VICINITY et al v. MECO TRUCKING COMPANY

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION WITH FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 6/2/17. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
TEAMSTERS HEALTH AND WELFARE
FUND OF PHILADELPHIA AND
VICINITY, et al.,
Civil No.

Plaintiffs,

14-7886 (JS)

v.
MECO TRUCKING COMPANY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION WITH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 1
This Memorandum Opinion with Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law serves as the Court’s decision with regard to the non-jury
trial of this matter. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), 1132 and 1145, and 28 U.S.C. §
1367. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the
jurisdiction of this Court to hear this matter. For the reasons to
be discussed, the Court will enter Judgment in plaintiffs’ favor. 2

1

With the consent of counsel, the Court will only address the two
main liability issues in dispute. The Court will not decide at
this time the precise sum to be paid by defendant. The parties
advised the Court that after its decision is issued the parties
should be able to work out their minor issues and then calculate
the amount due plaintiffs, if anything. Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief
(“PTB”) states: “The parties agree that once the legal issues are
resolved, that a stipulated amount can be determined for damages.”
PTB at 1, Doc. No. 28.
2 No live testimony was heard at trial. The Joint Final Pretrial
Order (“JFPTO”) contains eighteen (18) stipulated facts (“JFPTO at
1

FINDINGS OF FACT
The plaintiffs are Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund of
Philadelphia

and

Vicinity

(“Welfare

Fund”),

Teamsters

Pension

Trust Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity (“Pension Fund”), and Adam
H. Garner, Administrator. 3 (Hereinafter the two Funds will be
collectively referred to as the “Funds”). Plaintiffs filed this
ERISA collection action on December 18, 2014. In brief summary,
the Funds are multi-employer Trust Funds that provide pension
benefits and medical insurance, among other benefits, to eligible
participants who work for contributing employers. Plaintiffs seek
to recover from defendant Meco Constructors, Inc. d/b/a Meco
Trucking Company (“Meco”) alleged delinquent payments due the
Funds for the calendar years 2006-2014, plus interest, liquidated
damages and attorney’s fees and costs.
Meco is an employer that provides hauling and construction
services in Southeastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Meco employs
members of Teamsters Local 384. Meco contracted to pay its union
employees wages and benefits pursuant to two sets of Collective
Bargaining Agreements. The location and type of work an employee

&__). In addition, the parties stipulated to the testimony their
witnesses would present at trial if they testified in person.
(Hereinafter “Stip. at __”). The parties agreed their written
testimony will be used in lieu of live witnesses and the Court is
not bound to accept the truth of the stipulated testimony.
3 Garner replaced the Administrator named in the complaint, William
J. Einhorn, on September 1, 2015.
2

performed determined which Agreement applied. First, Meco is a
party

to

a

series

of

Collective

Bargaining

Agreements

with

Teamsters Local 384, which is affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman and Helpers of
America. In particular, Meco was a party to the “Material Hauling
Agreement” (“MHA”) with Teamsters Local 384 for all time periods
relevant to this action. A worker was paid pursuant to the MHA
when he/she hauled to or from a work site. These workers did not
have

to

be

union

members

and

were

not

required

to

be

paid

prevailing wages. There is no geographic limitation under the MHA.
Second, Meco was also a signatory to the FHA with Teamsters Local
See JFPTO at &7.

384 for all relevant periods to this action. 4
The

FCA

covers

work

performed

in

Bucks,

Chester,

Delaware,

Montgomery and Philadelphia Counties. Id. The wage rates in the
FCA

were

designed

to

be

in

compliance

with

prevailing

wage

requirements.
Pursuant to the FCA, all work performed in the five-county
area was subject to its terms. However, Teamsters Local 384 and
Meco agreed on a compromise to permit Meco to compete with nonunion employers. Pursuant to their agreement, Meco only had to pay
its workers pursuant to the FCA when he/she worked “exclusively on
a construction job site” in the five-county area. See MHA at

4

The MHA and
“Agreements.”

FHA

will

be

collectively

3

referred

to

as

the

Article 30. The amount Meco contracted to pay for wages and
benefits under the FCA was higher than what was due for work done
pursuant to the MHA.
Under the MHA and the FCA, Meco is obligated to submit monthly
contributions to the Funds. The amount of contributions due is
determined by the terms of the applicable MHA and FCA, but is
generally calculated by multiplying the hours worked by the rate
in the Agreements. Meco is obligated to submit contribution reports
and payments to the Funds the month following the month in which
the work was performed. The contribution reports contain Meco’s
employees’ names, social security numbers, hours worked and the
total contributions paid. The Funds provide employee benefits to
Meco’s employees covered under the Agreements, including but not
limited to retirement benefits by the Pension Fund and medical,
life and disability benefits by the Welfare Fund. Article VI,
Section 6 of the Amended and Restated Agreement and Declaration of
Trust of the Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia and
Vicinity permits the Pension Fund to conduct payroll audits of
contributing

employers,

including

Meco.

Section

9(e)

of

the

Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the Teamsters Health and
Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity permits the Welfare Fund
to conduct payroll audits of contributing employers, including
Meco.

4

Plaintiffs’ audits for the year 2006-2014 are at issue in the
case. On September 28, 2007, Meco was sent a copy of the audit for
2006. Meco disputed the audit which noted a deficiency. On March
12, 2010, Meco was sent a copy of the audit for 2006 to 2009. The
audit noted another deficiency which Meco disputes. On December
18, 2014, plaintiffs filed their complaint against Meco seeking
payment of contributions based upon the audit results for the
period from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2009. As part of
discovery, an audit was conducted for the period from January 1,
2010 to December 31, 2014. The audit reflected another deficiency
that Meco disputed. 5 The parties’ primary dispute for the time
period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2014, relates to whether
the “cap” on hours to be paid under the MHA applies to work
performed under the FCA. The parties’ second dispute involves the
trigger

date

for

the

statute

of

limitations

that

applies

to

plaintiffs’ claim.
The first main issue to be decided involves the interpretation
of the parties’ Agreements. As to the MHA, Article 28, Section A
(effective 8/1/2003 to 7/31/2006) states:
The Employer will contribute to the Teamsters Health &
Welfare fund the sum of Four dollars, fifty four and
three quarters ($4.5475) dollars for each hour worked by
a covered Employee up to the maximum of eight (8) hours
per calendar day, or ten (10) hours per calendar day for
employees assigned to work a ten hour day, forty (40)
5

The parties agree the claim in plaintiffs’ complaint asking for
an audit (Count III) is moot.
5

hours per calendar week and one hundred sixty (160) hours
per calendar month.
Each successive MHA has similar language in Article 28, with the
exception of the hourly rate. Article 29 of the MHA (effective
8/1/2003 to 7/31/2006) states:
The Employer will contribute to the Teamsters Pension
Fund the sum of Three dollars and three quarters of a
cent ($3.075) for each hour worked by a covered Employee
up to the maximum of eight (8) hours per calendar day,
or ten (10) hours per calendar day for employees assigned
to work a ten hour day, forty (40) hours per calendar
week and one hundred sixty (160) hours per calendar
month[.]
Each successive MHA has similar language in Article 29, with the
exception of the hourly rate. As is apparent, the MHA has a cap on
the contributions to be paid to the Funds.
As to the FCA, Article VII (effective May 1, 2004 to April
30, 2007) states:
Section 7.1 For the period beginning May 1, 2004 to April
30, 2005, each Employer shall pay weekly into the
Teamsters’ Health, Welfare and Insurance Fund, the sum
of Four Dollars and Ninety Cents ($4.90) per hour for
each hour for which payment has been made to each
chauffeur or helper employed by such Employer, including
overtime hours. Effective May 1, 2005 ($1.35) to be
apportioned among Wages, Welfare and Pension. Effective
May 1, 2006 ($1.35) to be apportioned among Wages,
Welfare and Pension.
Each successive FCA has similar language in Article VII, with the
exception of the hourly rate. Article VIII of the FCA (effective
May 1, 2004 to April 30, 2007) states:
Section 8.1 For the period beginning May 1, 2004 to April
30, 2005, each Employer shall pay weekly into the
6

Teamsters’ Pension Plan the sum of Five Dollars and
Seventeen and One Quarter Cents ($5.1725) per hour for
each hour for which payment has been made to each
chauffeur or helper employed by such Employer, including
overtime hours.
Each successive FCA has similar language in Article VIII, with the
exception of the hourly rate. Importantly, there is no reference
to a cap in the FCA.
As noted, the first main issue to be decided is how to apply
the cap referenced in Articles 28 and 29 of the MHA. This is
necessary because on some days an employee was paid under the MHA
and the FCA. The parties’ contract interpretation issue involves
Article 30 of the MHA which states:
Should the covered Employee work exclusively on a
construction job site, the covered Employee will then be
paid under the terms and provisions of the August 1,
2003 through July 31, 2006 Five-County Agreement
executed contemporaneously herewith, which wage rate and
fringe fund benefits are strictly limited and restricted
to the time restricted to the time spent working on the
construction site so situate. However, unless the work
comes within the express terms and provisions of the
Philadelphia Five (5) County Agreement, it shall not be
by that Agreement, but by this Agreement. (Emphasis
supplied).
In order to apply the cap referenced in the MHA, Meco added
the total number of hours an employee worked. The total included
an employee’s hours subject to the rates in the MHA (driving to or
from a work site) and the FCA (work exclusively on a construction
site). Meco argues it “coalesced” the MHA and FCA. Plaintiffs argue
only the hours subject to the MHA rate should be added to apply

7

the cap. In other words, an employee’s work exclusively on a
construction site should not be used to compute the cap. 6
The second issue to be addressed involves the statute of
limitations. 7 As noted, plaintiffs are seeking damages for the time
period of January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2014. Plaintiffs filed
their complaint on December 18, 2014. The parties do not dispute
that ordinarily a six (6) year statute of limitations applies. See
Sturgis v. Mattel, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (D.N.J. 2007).
Thus, Meco argues, plaintiffs cannot recover any damages for the
time period of January 1, 2006 to December 17, 2008.
Plaintiffs acknowledge their claim for damages for 2006 is
barred by the statute of limitations. 8 However, plaintiffs argue

6

A simple example illustrates the parties’ dispute. The
hypothetical fact situation the Court will use involves a Meco
employee who works 3 1/2 hours driving to a construction site,
then 3 hours on the site, and then drives 3 1/2 hours away from
the site. Under Meco’s analysis the employee gets paid 7 hours
under the MHA and 3 hours under the FCA. However, as to benefits,
Meco would only contribute 5 hours under the MHA and 3 hours under
the FCA. Therefore, under this hypothetical, although the employee
worked 10 hours, Meco’s obligation to pay contributions to the
Funds would be capped at 8 hours. Under plaintiffs’ analysis the
employee would be paid the same as under Meco’s calculation.
However, as to benefits, Meco would pay 7 hours under the MHA and
3 hours under the FHA. Thus, plaintiffs argue, the employee would
get paid for 10 hours and Meco would have to pay contributions to
the Funds for 10 hours. This is 2 more hours than Meco’s
calculation. This results from the fact that under plaintiffs’
analysis the FHA hours are not used to calculate the cap.
7 Meco preserved its limitations defense by asserting it as an
affirmative defense in its answer. Answer at Affirmative Defense
&7, Doc. No. 4.
8 See Trial Transcript (“TT”) 52:7 to 53:7; 54:5 to 10.
8

the period between January 1, 2007 and December 17, 2008 is not
barred because the limitations period did not run because of the
“discovery rule.” Plaintiffs argue the limitations period began to
run on March 12, 2010, when the Funds sent Meco a copy of the audit
report for 2006 – 2009. Wm. Einhorn Stip. at &20. Plaintiffs argue
this date triggered the statute of limitations because this is
when they learned of Meco’s alleged erroneous calculations.
Meco argues the Funds have been aware of Meco’s practice since
at least as early as 1999 and no later than 2004. It points out
that the Funds audited Meco for the calendar year 1999 and issued
an audit report on January 30, 2004. The audit report noted the
same reason for the deficiency of $178.18 that is at issue in this
case.

In addition, Meco’s prior counsel pointed out to the Funds

in

letter

a

dated

January

21,

1999,

that

the

MHA

and

FCA

“coalesced.” Defense Trial Exhibit (“DExh.”) 2. Defendant also
points out plaintiffs knew when they sent out the 2006 audit on
September 28, 2007, how Meco calculated the cap. Therefore, Meco
argues, plaintiffs knew or should have known prior to December 18,
2008 about its claim against Meco, and, therefore, plaintiffs’
claim prior to December 18, 2008 is barred.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Contract Interpretation Issue

The general principles of contract construction that apply to
the parties’ dispute are relatively straightforward. Collective
9

Bargaining Agreements, including those established under ERISA
plans,

are

contract law.

interpreted

according

to

ordinary

M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett,

Ct. 926, 933 (2015).

principles
U.S.

of

, 135 S.

In this regard the Court must determine and

implement the intention of the parties. Tessmar v. Grosner, 23
N.J. 193, 201 (1957). It is the objective, not subjective, intent
of the parties the Court must determine, as manifested in the
language

of

their

contracts

in

light

of

the

circumstances

surrounding their execution. Dome Petroleum Ltd. V. Employers
Liability Ins. Co. of Wisc., 767 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985).
The first step in the Court’s analysis is to determine if the
relevant contract language is clear or ambiguous. Schor v. FMS
Financial Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002). An
ambiguity exists if the terms of a contract are susceptible to at
least two reasonable alternative interpretations. Id. To determine
if

an

ambiguity

exists

the

Court

must

examine

the

parties’

contracts as a whole. The Court should not torture the language in
contracts to create an ambiguity where one does not exist. Id.
Ultimately the Court’s task is to ascertain the parties’ intention
from the language in their contract taken in its entirety, “the
situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the
objects the parties were [attempting] to attain.” Celanese Ltd. v.
Essex County Improvement Authority, 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App.
Div. 2009).
10

Contract provisions should be “read as a whole, without
artificial emphasis on one section, with a consequent disregard
for others.” Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of
Mercer, 333 N.J. Super. 310, 325 (App. Div. 2000), aff’d, 169 N.J.
135 (2001). Words and phrases should not be isolated but instead
should relate to the context and contractual scheme as a whole and
given the meaning that comports with their probable intent and
purpose.

Newark Publishers’ Ass’n v. Newark Typographical Union,

No. 103, 22 N.J. 419, 426 (1956). The Court, of course, understands
that a contract should be interpreted in a common sense manner.
Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 103 (2009).
The

Court

finds

that

the

term

“work

exclusively

on

a

construction job site” in Article 30 of the MHA is ambiguous. The
term is not specifically defined in the MHA, nor is the term
referred to in the FCA. Plaintiffs and Meco both present reasonable
interpretations for how the cap in the MHA should be computed.
Thus, the Court now has to interpret the term “exclusively” in
Article 30 of the MHA and decipher the parties’ intention.
No persuasive evidence has been submitted by plaintiffs or
Meco regarding the parties’ contemporaneous negotiations regarding
the cap issue. Thus, the Court is left to base its decision
primarily on the language of the Agreements and the circumstances
attendant to the execution of the Agreements. Based on the evidence
in the record, the Court rules in plaintiffs’ favor on the contract
11

interpretation issue.

This is primarily based on the fact there

is no language in the Agreements that says the Agreements should
“coalesce.” Since only the MHA refers to a cap, the most reasonable
interpretation is that only the hours subject to the MHA are
subject to the cap. Since the FCA does not refer to a cap, it is
reasonable to interpret its terms to hold that hours paid pursuant
to the FCA are not subject to the MHA cap. The Agreements contain
no language supporting Meco’s view that the hours worked under the
MHA and FHA should be combined to compute a cap that only exists
in the MHA. The Court will not read into the parties’ Agreements
terms that do not exist.
If the parties intended for the cap in the MHA to be subject
to hours paid under the FCA, they could have and should have
included specific language to this effect in the MHA and/or FCA,
or

in

their

separate

written

agreement.

See

August

13,

2007

Agreement between Local 384 and Meco at 1, Doc. No. 1-6. This was
not done. Teamsters Local 384 could have insisted that Meco pay
its workers under the FHA for all work performed in the fivecounty

area.

However,

Local

384

accommodated

Meco’s

business

concerns when it agreed to accept lower wages unless work was done
exclusively on a construction job site in the five-county area.
There is no evidence Local 384 also agreed to forego some of their
FCA benefits, (i.e., benefit contributions) which would be the
case if the MHA cap applied to hours worked under the FCA. Needless
12

to say, the Court disagrees with Meco’s suggestion that plaintiffs’
interpretation of the Agreements is nonsensical. Meco Trial Brief
at 10-11, Doc. No. 29. There is nothing nonsensical about the fact
that Local 384 made a concession to Meco on wages but not on
benefit contributions.
Meco provides no persuasive evidence to support its position
that a term that does not exist in writing should be read into the
parties’ Agreements. Mr. Foy’s January 21, 1999 letter (Defense
Exhibit

(“DExh.”))

2

is

nothing

more

than

Meco’s

attorney’s

interpretation of the parties’ Agreements. Mr. Foy provided no
evidence

to

support

his

interpretation.

Further,

plaintiffs

disputed Foy’s interpretation. Plaintiffs’ Trial Exhibit 13.
The Court rejects Meco’s argument based on Article 30 that a
worker who worked part of a day on a five-county construction site
and part of the same day hauling to or from the site, should only
be paid contributions pursuant to the MHA.

TT 29:1-9. Meco posits

this result is compelled by the “exclusivity” language in Article
30. However, it was not until relatively recently that Meco raised
this argument. The fact that Meco did not take this position for
a substantial number of years is evidence that Meco is misinterpreting the parties’ Agreements. 9 Further, Meco may be basing

9

Meco acknowledges that its present argument is inconsistent with
its past practice. Meco’s Trial Brief states: “Meco paid its
Teamster employees under the Five County Agreement (including both
higher wage rates and benefits rates) for only time that the
13

its argument on how the term “exclusivity” is interpreted in the
“industry.” However, there are no facts in the record to support
the custom or practice in the industry. 10

In addition, it is not

insignificant that Meco’s Agreement to be bound by the terms and
conditions of the FHA (see August 13, 2007 Agreement at 1) does
not contain “exclusivity” language. The scope of work in the FCA
applied only to Meco’s employees “during the period of time while
they perform work on a construction site or project.” Id. This
evidences Meco should pay FCA benefit contributions for all FCA
work. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the term “exclusively
on a construction job site” is used to distinguish on-site work
from material hauling. See PTB at 13-14. The Court does not accept
Meco’s argument that unless a worker is employed exclusively on a
construction job site for a complete day, even if he works a few
hours on a job site, contributions should not be paid under the
FCA.

employee was physically located at a job site.” Meco Trial Brief
at 4-5, Doc. No. 29.
10 Given the Court’s interpretation of the parties’ Agreements,
there is no need to decide whether Meco’s interpretation violates
the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act of 1961, 43 P.S. ' 165-1, et
seq. The Court notes that Meco’s prevailing wage argument is based
in part on its conclusion that “[t]he facts in this case are that
drivers are hauling to and from remote locations. They are not
driving to locations adjacent to the job site, or to borrow pits
(or any other location) devoted exclusively to the prevailing wage
project.” Meco Reply Brief at 4, Doc. No. 30. However, there are
no facts in the record to support this statement.
14

Further, the Court finds that the specific language used in
Article 30 supports plaintiffs’ position. Pursuant to Article 30,
wages and “fringe fund benefits” under the FCA “are strictly
limited

and

restricted

to

the

time

spent

working

on

the

construction job site so situate.” The Court finds this language
evidences an intent that a worker must be paid FCA benefits for
all hours worked on a job site. This would not occur under Meco’s
interpretation of the FCA because a worker’s benefits would be
subject to the MHA cap. Further, Articles VII and VIII of the FCA
provide that benefit contributions have to be paid “per hour for
each hour for which payment has been made[.]” Again, this evidences
that Meco must pay benefit contributions for each FCA hour worked.
This does not occur under Meco’s interpretation of Article 30.
2.
As

Statute of Limitations
noted,

limitations

the

applies

parties
to

agree

a

plaintiffs’

six

(6)

claims.

year

statute

Therefore,

of

since

plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 18, 2014, all claims
prior

to

December

18,

2008

would

ordinarily

be

barred.

As

applicable to plaintiffs’ claims, this includes the time period of
January 1, 2006 to December 17, 2008. Plaintiffs, however, argue
their claim from January 1, 2007 to December 17, 2008 is not barred
by the statute of limitations because of the discovery rule.
For the following reasons the Court finds that plaintiffs’
claims prior to December 18, 2008 are barred by the statute of
15

limitations. As noted, plaintiffs argue the limitations period
from January 1, 2007 – December 17, 2008 did not begin to run until
it completed its audit for the time period. Plaintiffs argue this
is when it learned of Meco’s deficiency. Although the exact date
the audit was completed is not known, plaintiffs argue for March
12, 2010, which is the date the audits for 2007-2009 were sent to
Meco.
Under

New

Jersey

law

the

discovery

rule

operates

as

an

exception to the six year statute of limitations. Nix v Option One
Mortg. Corp., C.A. No. 05-03685 (RBK), 2006 WL 166451, at *10
(D.N.J. Jan. 2006). The discovery rule is an equitable principle
under which “the accrual of a cause of action is delayed until the
injured party discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis
for an actionable claim.” Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., 320 N.J.
Super. 34, 42 (App. Div. 1999)(citation and quotation omitted).
Since “the discovery rule imposes on plaintiffs an affirmative
duty to use reasonable diligence to investigate a potential cause
of action, and thus bars from recovery plaintiffs who had ‘reason
to know’ of their injuries, the discovery rule generally does not
apply to contract actions.” County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J.
80, 110 (N.J. 1998)(citation and quotation omitted).
The Court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that the limitations
period began to run on March 12, 2010. The applicable case law
16

requires

that

plaintiffs

must

use

reasonable

diligence

to

investigate a potential cause of action. The Court finds that if
plaintiffs

exercised

reasonable

diligence

they

would

have

discovered Meco’s deficiencies shortly after Meco submitted their
monthly summaries. No good reason has been presented for why
plaintiffs had to wait until 2010 to audit Meco’s submissions from
January 1, 2007 – December 17, 2008. This is especially true since
plaintiffs were on notice since 1999 that Meco applied the MHA cap
to hours worked under the FCA. Further, it would be fundamentally
unfair to rule that the statute of limitations did not run until
plaintiffs completed and sent its audit to Meco on March 12, 2010.
This permits plaintiffs to control when the limitations period
begins to run, and could result in an indefinite suspension of the
limitations period. Instead of this inequitable result, the Court
holds the limitations period began to run after plaintiffs received
Meco’s paperwork documenting its benefits calculations. Thus, the
portion of plaintiffs’ claim prior to December 17, 2008 is barred
by the statute of limitations. 11

11

Since plaintiffs were on notice of Meco’s method of calculating
the cap before December 18, 2008, the Court will not hold that the
limitations period was triggered in January 2009, when plaintiffs
presumably received Meco’s December 2008 calculations.
17

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED
this 2nd day of June, 2017, that Judgment will be entered in favor
of plaintiffs on the liability issues tried by the Court. The
Judgment shall incorporate the following conclusions of law:
1.

The hours an employee worked pursuant to the Five County

Agreement should not be included when computing the cap set forth
in Articles 28 and 29 of the Material Hauling Agreement.
2.

Plaintiffs’ claim from January 1, 2016 to December 17,

2008, is barred by the statute of limitations; and it is hereby
ORDERED that by June 23, 2017, the parties shall submit a
proposed Judgment to the Court, incorporating the precise amount
due plaintiffs; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee and cost claim shall
be submitted in accordance with the applicable Federal and Local
Rules of Civil Procedure.

s/Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United State Magistrate Judge
Dated: June 2, 2017

18