RUFFIN v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY

Filing 17

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 9/22/2015. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MURIANDA RUFFIN,
Civil No. 15-501 (NLH/AMD)
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
KATIE ANN PILGREN
ARI R. KARPF
KARPF, KARPF & CERUTTI, P.C.
3331 STREET ROAD, SUITE 128
TWO GREENWOOD SQUARE
BENSALEM, PA 19020
On behalf of plaintiff
KERRIE RESTIERI HESLIN
NUKK-FREEMAN & CERRA, PC
26 MAIN STREET
SUITE 301
CHATHAM, NJ 07928
On behalf of defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendant to
dismiss plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims against it.
Also pending is plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint.

For the reasons expressed below, defendant’s motion

will be denied, and plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND & DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, Murianda Ruffin, is a black (African-American)

female who was hired on June 2, 2008 by defendant, Allstate
Insurance Company, as a trial attorney.

Plaintiff claims that

during her employment she was subjected to discrimination and
retaliation due to her race, including the denial of
authorization to take certain continuing legal education
courses, the selective enforcement of leave policies, the denial
of a promotion because she complained about racial inequality,
and being forced to resign on August 6, 2014 while on medical
leave when defendant learned of plaintiff’s complaint she filed
with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights.
On January 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed a three-count
complaint against defendant, claiming wrongful termination,
failure to promote, and race discrimination and retaliation in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Counts I and II), and violations
of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611, et seq.
(“FMLA”) (Count III). 1

Plaintiff is seeking to amend her

complaint to add counts for violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

These claims were not included in the

original complaint because plaintiff had not yet exhausted her
administrative remedies with the Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) for her September 23, 2014 charge of

1

The Court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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discrimination.

Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter on

March 3, 2015, and is timely seeking to add these additional
claims based on the same factual allegation in her original
complaint.
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, and
opposes plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint,
because it contends that plaintiff settled all her claims
against defendant during the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights
(“DCR”) mediation. 2

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s entire

case is barred by that settlement agreement, which defendant
attaches as an exhibit to its motion.

In response, plaintiff

argues that not only is defendant’s motion improperly brought
pursuant to Federal Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because defendant
asks the Court to consider documents extraneous to her
complaint, but also that she vigorously denies that she settled
her claims with defendant at the DCR mediation.
The Court agrees with plaintiff that the relief defendant
seeks is outside the bounds of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

A court

in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must only consider the facts

2

Defendant has also moved for a “declaratory judgment” under 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a) that the settlement bars plaintiff’s claims.
Recognizing, as pointed out by plaintiff, that a motion for
declaratory judgment under this section is not the proper
procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment, defendant has
withdrawn its request, and will seek this remedy through its
answer and counterclaim.
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alleged in the pleadings, the documents attached thereto as
exhibits, and matters of judicial notice.

S. Cross Overseas

Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426
(3d Cir. 1999).

A court may also consider “an undisputedly

authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a
motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
document.”

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,

Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

Here, however, it is

clear that plaintiff’s complaint is not “based” on the purported
settlement agreement that defendant asks the Court to consider.
Thus, the Court cannot dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on that
document.

See, e.g., Glauberzon v. Pella Corp., 2011 WL

1337509, at *15 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2011) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiffs are barred from
bringing their claims by virtue of a settlement agreement
because the complaint makes no reference to the settlement);
Medici v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 1006917, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss of
defendants based on their argument that a settlement agreement
between the parties defeated plaintiff’s current claims because
the settlement agreement was not attached to or reference in
plaintiff’s complaint).
In order for the Court to consider the purported settlement
agreement, the Court must treat defendant’s motion as a summary
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judgment motion.

Rule 12(d) provides, “If, on a motion under

Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.

All parties

must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the
material that is pertinent to the motion.”

The process of

treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment is
known as “conversion.”

In re Rockefeller Ctr. Properties, Inc.

Securitites Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999).
Even though defendant has requested in its reply brief the
alternative relief that its motion should be treated as one for
summary judgment, the Court finds that converting defendant’s
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion is not the
judicially expeditious course at this time.

This is because

converting the motion would not provide defendant with the
relief it is seeking – i.e., the determination that the
settlement agreement bars plaintiff’s claims against it.

From

plaintiff’s submissions filed in opposition to defendant’s
motion, it is evident that as of at least October 8, 2014, when
plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to defendant, plaintiff
disputed that she reached any settlement with defendant.
(Docket No. 13-2 at 38.)

If the Court converted defendant’s

motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, and considered
the documents submitted by both parties, with the evidence of
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plaintiff, as the non-moving party, being “believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor,” Marino
v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)), summary judgment would have to be denied due to genuine
issues of material fact as to the impact of the settlement, if
any, on plaintiff’s claims.

Thus, the conversion of defendant’s

motion will not advance the matter at this time.
The Court recognizes, however, defendant’s position that it
should not be forced to expend more time and expense in
litigating plaintiff’s claims if they are barred by a valid
settlement agreement.

Plaintiff appears to appreciate this

concern, and suggests that the parties “should be given a
limited timeframe within which to complete discovery related to
Defendant's allegations of settlement with a schedule for
briefing same following proper discovery.”

(Docket No. 9 at 2.)

If defendant contends after such discovery that this action is
barred by the purported settlement, it may file a properly
supported motion for summary judgment at that time.
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint will be denied, and defendant’s request to convert its
motion into one for summary judgment will also be denied.

The

Court will grant plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, finding that she is properly adding her new claims
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after exhausting her administrative remedies. 3

The First Amended

Complaint, at Docket No. 15-3, shall be the operative pleading
in this case going forward.

The parties are to meet with the

Magistrate Judge to develop an expedited discovery plan to
address defendant’s contention that a settlement agreement bars
plaintiff’s entire complaint.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: September 22, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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Amendments to pleadings are governed by Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 15, which provides that the Court “should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
An amendment must be permitted in the absence of undue delay,
bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or futility of
amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108
(3d Cir. 2002) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). Third Circuit precedent “supports the notion that in
civil rights cases district courts must offer
amendment--irrespective of whether it is requested--when
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so
would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
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