BAKER v. D'ILIO et al

Filing 22

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 2/5/18. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FORREST M. BAKER, SR.,

Civil Action No. 15-1294 (RBK)

Petitioner,
v.

OPINION

STEPHEN D’ILIO, et al.,
Respondents.

ROBERT B. KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Presently before this Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of Forrest M. Baker,
Sr. brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging Mr. Baker’s state court conviction. (ECF
No. 1.) Following an order to answer, Respondents filed a response to the petition. (ECF No.
12.) Mr. Baker thereafter filed a letter formal reply, (ECF No. 18), and provided a handful of
additional documents related to his state court proceedings. (ECF No. 15.)
Mr. Baker seeks to have this Court overturn his state conviction based on his claim that
the multiple transfers of him to and from the federal detention center where he was serving his
federal sentence to attend court proceedings in his subsequent New Jersey state criminal matter
violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainer Act’s (“IAD’s”) mandates that “trial shall be
commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving
State[,]” 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(c), and that “[i]f trial is not had on any indictment,
information, or complaint . . . prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of
imprisonment . . . the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” Id. at Art.
IV(e). (Accord Pet’r’s Pet. at Ground One ¶ 5, ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, this
Court will deny the petition and will deny Mr. Baker a certificate of appealability.

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I. BACKGROUND
From April 29, 2002 through October 30, 2002, Mr. Baker committed five separate bank
robberies in southern New Jersey. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 12-7, 12-8.) During that period, on June
29, 2002, Mr. Baker and his then-thirteen-year-old son also robbed a Rite Aid store located in
Mount Laurel, New Jersey. See State v. Baker, 945 A.2d 723, 725-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008).
On July 23, 2003, Mr. Baker pled guilty in United States District Court to five bank
robbery charges. (See Criminal J., United States v. Baker, No. 1:03-cr-539 (RBK) (D.N.J. Nov.
25, 2003), appended to Resp’ts’ Answer at ECF No. 12-7.) On November 25, 2003, this Court
sentenced Mr. Baker to seventy-eight months of imprisonment. (Id.) On January 6, 2004, Mr.
Baker began serving his federal sentence at the federal correctional facility at Fort Dix. Baker,
945 A.2d at 728.
Mr. Baker’s plea in federal court did not, however, address the Rite Aid robbery he and
his son committed on June 29, 2002; instead, that crime was prosecuted by the State of New
Jersey. On June 5, 2003, Mr. Baker was charged in a two-count state indictment with: (i)
robbery in the first degree and; (ii) using a juvenile to commit a crime in the first degree. Id. at
725. Mr. Baker entered a formal plea of “not guilty” to these charges in September 2005.
(Resp’ts’ Answer 7, ECF No. 12.)
Between July 1, 2003 and February 2, 2006, Judges Thomas S. Smith Jr. and Marvin E.
Schlosser of the Superior Court of New Jersey collectively executed sixteen separate “Order[s]
to Produce” by which the state trial court requested that Mr. Baker be produced from federal
custody to attend various hearings and appear at trial; thirteen of these Orders to Produce were

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executed prior to Mr. Baker pleading not guilty to his state charges in September 2005.1 (ECF
No. 12-11.) It also appears that many of those Orders to Produce were accompanied by separate
Prosecutor’s Certifications executed by the Burlington County Prosecutor requesting temporary
custody of Mr. Baker pursuant to the Orders to Produce.2 (See ECF No. 12-12.)
On or about August 12, 2005, Mr. Baker filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the New
Jersey indictment based on the argument, discussed in greater detail infra, that the Orders to
Produce represented “detainers” which triggered application of the IAD and required dismissal
of that indictment pursuant to the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision. (ECF No. 12-5.) Mr. Baker’s
self-prepared certification in support of that argument universally refers to these Orders to
Produce as “writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.” (Id.) The trial court denied Mr. Baker’s
motion to dismiss during a hearing on October 14, 2005, and Mr. Baker’s state criminal matter
proceeded to trial. (Tr. 1T, 8:17-10:23, ECF No. 12-33.)
On January 31, 2006, after five days of trial, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against
Mr. Baker on both counts charged in the indictment. (Tr. 7T, 125:6-16, ECF No. 12-39.) The
trial court concluded proceedings on that date with the following exchange with the prosecutor:
MR. MORMANDO: As to any detainer, Your Honor, I know he’s in federal
custody right now. Is there any specific detainer we need to lodge at this point in
time or –
THE COURT: Well, if he’s – he goes back in federal custody, he’s not going
anywhere.
MR. MORMANDO: All right. Thank you.

1

It is unclear on how many occasions, and on which dates, Mr. Baker actually appeared
before the state court pursuant to these pre-trial Orders to Produce. It is also unclear what
transpired at each such hearing Mr. Baker attended prior to October 14, 2005. This specific
information, however, has no bearing on the result reached by the Court in this Opinion.
2
Respondents, regrettably, have made no effort to explain the import of these
Certifications on Mr. Baker’s current habeas petition.
3

THE COURT: All right? Okay. Because he’s – his bail is here. So, if they were
going to release him, he’d still have to come back here anyway, all right?
(Id. at 129:9-19.)
At Mr. Baker’s sentencing on February 17, 2006, “the trial judge imposed a mandatory
life sentence without parole on the first-degree robbery [count], and a concurrent sentence of
fifteen years, seven and one-half years without parole, on the second count.” Baker, 945 A.2d at
725. Notably, Mr. Baker acknowledges that “[o]nly after [Mr. Baker’s] sentencing did the State
send the [federal] Bureau of Prisons an actual detainer letter.” (Pet’r’s Reply 23, ECF 17.)
A. Mr. Baker’s Direct Appeal to the State
Mr. Baker appealed his conviction and sentence, based on, inter alia, his assertion that
his pre-trial motion to dismiss the State’s indictment should have been granted in light of the
State’s alleged violations of IAD Article IV’s anti-shuttling provision. Baker, 945 A.2d at 727.
This appears to be the lone IAD-related argument which Mr. Baker presented on direct appeal.
(See Pet’r’s Mar. 5, 2007 Appeal Br. at Point I, ECF No. 12-16.)
On April 14, 2008, the Appellate Division affirmed Mr. Baker’s conviction and sentence.
Baker, 945 A.2d at 736. In so doing, the Appellate Division expressly found that the IAD was
not implicated because “the State never filed a detainer with the federal correctional authorities.”
Id. at 730. That appellate court also found it “unnecessary” to remand Mr. Baker’s case to the
trial court “for a plenary hearing to determine exactly how he was produced from the federal
facility for the several appearances he made before his trial commenced.” Id. at 728.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in June 2008. (ECF No. 12-19.) On
March 16, 2009, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a written opinion affirming3 Mr. Baker’s

It is unclear why the last sentence of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 2009 decision
indicates that “the matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings.” State v.
3

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conviction “substantially for the reasons expressed” in the written opinion of the Appellate
Division. State v. Baker, 966 A.2d 488, 489 (N.J. 2009). The New Jersey Supreme Court then
went on to add the following:
On several occasions, the State procured the presence of [Mr. Baker] from federal
custody (where [Mr. Baker] was serving a term of imprisonment) to appear in thenpending State criminal proceedings. The State never lodged a detainer against [Mr.
Baker]. Instead, in each instance [Mr. Baker] was transferred between federal and
New Jersey custody via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or an order to
produce. . . . [A]lthough orders equivalent to an order to produce, such as writs of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, qualify as the required “written request for
temporary custody [under IAD Art. 4(a)],” they do not constitute a detainer. United
States v. Mauro, [436 U.S. 340, 360–61(1978)] (“[W]hen [Congress] used the word
‘detainer,’ it meant something quite different from a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum . . . . We therefore conclude that a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the [IAD].”). Viewed thusly, it is
clear that, in the circumstances presented, the two necessary conditions precedent
to the invocation of the IAD never coalesced.
[Mr. Baker] nevertheless asserts that the repeated use of orders to produce or writs
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum subverts the purposes of the IAD and must, in
the aggregate, trigger the provisions of the IAD. . . .
....
[I]n order for the receiving state’s[, i.e., New Jersey’s,] actions to trigger the IAD,
Article IV(a) of the IAD . . . specifically requires both that a detainer be lodged and
a written request for temporary custody be made by the receiving state. The
absence of either element renders the IAD inapplicable. That was the case here.
No doubt, the State made several written requests for [Mr. Baker’s] temporary
custody; thus, the second prong of Article IV(a) of the IAD obviously was satisfied.
However, the absence of a detainer lodged by the State—the required first prong of
Article IV(a) of the IAD, and one that cannot be satisfied by a writ commanding a
prisoner’s appearance—is fatal to [Mr. Baker’s] efforts to invoke the IAD’s
protections.
Id. at 489-90.

Baker, 966 A.2d 488, 490 (N.J. 2009). Whatever the reason, it in no way appears that the matter
was ever remanded, as confirmed by both Respondents’ and Mr. Baker’s habeas filings.
5

Mr. Baker’s Application for Post-Conviction Relief
Mr. Baker continued to zealously pursue his IAD claims on his motion for postconviction relief (“PCR”) to the New Jersey Superior Court, and presented those arguments to,
inter alia, the trial-level PCR court by way of a pro se brief dated December 11, 2009. (ECF No.
12-24.) On May 24, 2010, the PCR court held a hearing regarding Mr. Baker’s wish to proceed
pro se on his PCR application. (See Tr. 9T, ECF No. 12-41.)
Thereafter, on or about October 6, 2010, Mr. Baker – this time through counsel – filed an
additional PCR application with the PCR court; that application does not independently advance
any IAD-related arguments. (ECF No. 12-22.) Instead, the brief submitted by Mr. Baker’s PCR
counsel expressly notes that “[Mr. Baker] has previously submitted at least one pro se petition
with supporting paperwork to the [c]ourt for consideration in this matter.” (ECF No. 12-23 at
Point IX.)
The PCR court held a hearing on the merits of Mr. Baker’s PCR application on December
17, 2010. (See Tr. 10T, ECF No. 12-42.) On December 21, 2010, that court issued a letter
opinion denying Mr. Baker’s PCR application, (ECF No. 12-26), and on January 3, 2010, entered
a formal order of denial. (ECF No. 12-28 at 173.) In so doing, the PCR court expressly held that
Mr. Baker’s IAD-related claims were procedurally barred. (ECF No. 12-26 at 21.) On January
16, 2013, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Mr. Baker’s PCR
application; the Appellate Division did so without providing any analysis on Mr. Baker’s IAD
arguments. (ECF No. 12-31.) The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on Mr.
Baker’s PCR application on January 23, 2015. (ECF No. 12-32.)
Mr. Baker thereafter filed his current habeas petition in this Court on February 19, 2015.
(ECF No. 1.) The sole argument advanced by Mr. Baker in support of his habeas petition is that

6

the State’s violations of Article IV of the IAD mandates dismissal of his New Jersey indictment.
(See, e.g., Pet’r’s Reply 4, ECF No. 17; see also, generally, ECF No. 1.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court “shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for
each claim presented in his petition based upon the record that was before the state court. See
Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 40
(2012). Under the statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), district courts are required to give
great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett,
559 U.S. 766, 772-73 (2010).
Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state courts, the district court
shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Federal law is clearly established for these purposes where it is clearly expressed in “only
the holdings, as opposed to the dicta” of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court. See
Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). “When reviewing state criminal convictions on

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collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning
their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.” Id.
Where a petitioner challenges an allegedly erroneous factual determination of the state courts, “a
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and the]
applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The AEDPA standard under § 2254(d) is a “difficult” one to meet; it is a “highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions
be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Review
under § 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.” Id. In applying AEDPA’s standards, the relevant state court decision that
is appropriate for federal habeas corpus review is the last reasoned state court decision. See
Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008).
B. Analysis
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an interstate compact entered into by 48 States
(among them, New Jersey), the federal Government, and the District of Columbia. See United
States v. Hornick, 491 F. App’x 277, 281 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1181 (2013)
(citing 18 U.S.C.App. 2, § 2); see also N.J.S.A. § 2A:159A-1. The IAD creates uniform
procedures for resolving one State’s pending charges against an individual imprisoned by
another State. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 148 (2001); New York v. Hill, 528 U.S.
110, 111 (2000); Hornick, 491 F. App’x at 281-82.
The IAD is also “a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact
Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction.”

8

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985). “IAD violations are cognizable in federal habeas
corpus because the IAD is a ‘law of the United States’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”
McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339,
347 (1994)); see also Pero v. Duffy, 10-cv-3107 (JAP), 2013 WL 6579758, at *12-13 (D.N.J.
Dec. 16, 2013) (same).
Article IV of the IAD gives “the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information,
or complaint is pending” the right “to have a prisoner against whom” it “has lodged a detainer . .
. made available” for trial. 18 U.S.C.App. 2, § 2, Art. IV(a). If the state that lodged the detainer
(the “receiving state”) secures custody of the prisoner, that receiving state must, as a general
matter, bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days. Id. at Art. IV(c). An “anti-shuttling
provision” further requires the receiving state to retain custody of the prisoner until disposition of
the charges. Id. at Art. IV(e). Absent a waiver, transfer of the prisoner back to the sending state
results in dismissal, with prejudice, of the charges pending in the receiving state. Id.; see also
Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 156 (holding that the IAD commands dismissal of charges even for a oneday transgression of the anti-shuttling provision).
In this case, Mr. Baker claims that the State’s multiple transfers of him to and from the
federal detention center where he was serving his federal sentence to the state trial court to
appear for court proceedings violated the IAD’s mandates that “trial shall be commenced within
one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State[,]” 18
U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(c), and that “[i]f trial is not had on any indictment, information, or
complaint . . . prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment . . . the
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” Id. at IV(e).

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More pointedly, Mr. Baker asserts that the State’s “abuses of its [use of] writs [of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum, i.e., the state trial court’s Orders to Produce]” triggered IAD Article
IV’s speedy trial and anti-shuttling provisions. (Pet’r’s Pet. at Ground One ¶ 5, ECF No. 1.) Mr.
Baker further asserts that even if these writs did not trigger the IAD protections he now seeks,
there are also additional documents in the record before this Court which show that an IADtriggering detainer was filed. (See Pet’r’s Reply at 23, ECF No. 17.) Importantly, Mr. Baker, in
his own submissions to this Court and to the state courts, consistently refers to the sixteen Orders
to Produce issued by the New Jersey Superior Court to obtain Mr. Baker’s appearance at state
court criminal proceedings as “writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.” (See, e.g., ECF No.
12-5; ECF No. 17 at 6.)
In United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal district court is not a “detainer” for purposes
of the IAD although, when preceded by a proper detainer, the writ can serve as a “written request
for temporary custody” which, if honored, will trigger the speedy trial and anti-shuttling
provisions set forth in IAD Art. IV. Id. at 349; accord Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d
Cir. 1987).
In other words, pursuant to Mauro and its progeny, a necessary prerequisite to the
operation of the IAD is that a “detainer” has actually been lodged by the receiving state with the
jurisdiction in which the prisoner is held. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 447, 449 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citing Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358). “The Supreme Court has emphasized that writs of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum and detainers are distinct forms of legal process, with different
purposes, histories, and effects on prisoners.” Hornick, 491 F. App’x at 282–83 (citing Mauro,
436 U.S. at 357–61).

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Unlike a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a . . . court, a detainer
may be lodged against a prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law
enforcement officer. Rather than requiring the immediate presence of the prisoner,
a detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is
incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial
upon his release from prison. Further action must be taken by the receiving State
in order to obtain the prisoner. Before it was made clear that a prosecuting authority
is not relieved of its obligation to provide a defendant a speedy trial just because he
is in custody elsewhere, see Smith v. Hooey, [393 U.S. 374 (1969)], detainers were
allowed to remain lodged against prisoners for lengthy periods of time, quite often
for the duration of a prisoner’s sentence.
Mauro 436 U.S. at 358–59.
Although the IAD contains no definition of the word “detainer,” see, e.g., Mauro at 358,
the Supreme Court has consistently stated that “[a] detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice
agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to
hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is
imminent.” Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719; Reed, 512 U.S. at 342 n. 1; accord Hill, 528 U.S. at
112; Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993). Stated somewhat differently, a detainer is “a legal
order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual
when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a
different crime.” Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 148.
By contrast, a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum directs prison officials to make the
prisoner available immediately for court proceedings. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 357–58.
Importantly, a court that issues a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum need not have lodged a
detainer in order to secure the presence of the prisoner. See Hornick, 491 F. App’x at 282 n. 2.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s finding that the
Orders to Produce issued by the state trial court were indeed writs of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum and were not formal detainers which triggered the IAD, see Baker, 966 A.2d at

11

489-90, is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court
precedent. Indeed, each of the Orders to Produce by which Mr. Baker was brought before the
state trial court was executed by a state court judge and sought to obtain Mr. Baker for
contemporaneous court proceedings. Thus, to the extent Mr. Baker’s habeas petition seeks relief
based on his argument that the “State trial court’s abuse of its writs” triggered the protections
afforded under IAD Article IV, his claim clearly fails.
Mr. Baker’s additional assertion that certain other documents separate and apart from the
Orders to Produce demonstrate that the State did in fact lodge a formal detainer against him prior
to his January 2006 trial is thornier, particularly where the Appellate Division’s 2008 opinion
affirming Mr. Baker’s conviction expressly noted that “[Mr. Baker] has not marshaled any
evidence that would support the conclusion that anything other than the trial court’s [Orders to
Produce] were ever used to produce him in court in Burlington County, or that any other
document was ever ‘filed’ with the federal authorities to preserve the opportunity to do so in the
future.” Baker, 945 A.2d at 732.
Indeed, Mr. Baker points to several Prosecutor’s Certifications in the state court record
which suggest that additional transfer-related documents were filed by the State with federal
authorities to secure Mr. Baker’s presence in state court.4 Mr. Baker correctly notes that these

Mr. Baker also points to two “Release Authorization” forms from the Federal Bureau of
Prisons dated December 29, 2004 and October 12, 2005, which are appended to his habeas
petition as exhibits. (ECF No. 1 at Exs. 16 and 17.) Although both of these documents indicate
that the Bureau of Prisons was producing Mr. Baker to New Jersey officials pursuant to a state
writ, the word “Yes” is checked in the “Detainer” portion of each form. (Id.)
Mr. Baker does not claim that these Release Authorizations are in and of themselves
IAD-triggering detainers; instead, Mr. Baker asserts that these documents lend additional
credence to his claim that an IAD-triggering detainer was indeed filed. More specifically, Mr.
Baker argues that these documents “prove that the Bureau of Prisons fully grasped the fact that
[Mr. Baker] was not only facing charges in another jurisdiction but the very fact that a detainer
existed.” (Pet’r’s Reply 17, ECF No. 17.)
4

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Prosecutor’s Certifications also requested temporary custody of Mr. Baker for purposes of
securing his attendance at state court proceedings. (See ECF No. 12-12.) Each of these
Certifications was executed by the representatives from the Burlington County Prosecutor’s
Office, and not a judicial officer. (Id.) Moreover, the last two such Certifications, dated January
5, 2006 and February 2, 2006, indicate that the Prosecutor’s request for temporary custody was
made “via IAD.”5 (Id.) Respondents’ answer fails to provide any meaningful explanation

These Release Authorizations do not appear to have been included in the state court
record produced by Respondents (see, generally, ECF Nos. 12-1 to 12-42), and appear to have
been obtained by Mr. Baker after the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Mr. Baker’s direct
appeal via document requests made to the Bureau of Prisons. (See ECF No. 1 at Exs. 6-14.)
Ultimately, however, it remains unclear whether these Authorizations were presented to state
court, and Respondents’ answer is silent on this issue. (See, generally, ECF No. 12.)
What is clear is that Mr. Baker’s IAD-related arguments were resolved by the state court
“on the merits.” Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 232 (3d. Cir. 2009) (“[a] state court decision
is an ‘adjudication on the merits’ [for § 2254(d)’s purposes] where it is ‘a decision finally
resolving the parties’ claims . . . that is based on the substance of the claim advanced”) (citations
omitted).
As such, to the extent these Release Authorizations were never presented to the state
court, it would appear that this Court is now precluded from even considering the import of these
documents in resolving Mr. Baker’s habeas petition under § 2254(d) review. See Pinholster, 563
U.S. at 181 (“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”); Moore v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 457 F.
App'x 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2012) (in evaluating whether relief under § 2254(d) is appropriate, a
federal court is to “limit [its] review to the record that was before the state when it adjudicated
the petitioner’s claim on the merits”).
Respondents have not argued, however, that this Court is precluded from considering
these documents under Pinholster and its progeny; instead Respondents claim that these
Authorizations are simply “administrative order[s] that track[] petitioner’s movements while in
custody” and have no IAD-triggering implications. (ECF No. 12 at 32). Thus, to the extent
these Authorizations were previously presented to the state court and are now properly before
this Court for consideration under § 2254(d), they still ultimately fail to provide any basis for this
Court to grant habeas relief to Mr. Baker under ADEPA’s highly deferential standard; these
Authorizations are not IAD triggering “detainers” as the Supreme Court has defined that term
and – aside from the word “Yes” being checked in the “Detainer” portion of each form – fail to
in any way suggest that a separate IAD-triggering detainer was lodged by New Jersey with the
federal government.
5
The Prosecutor’s Certifications executed between November 15, 2004 and September
29, 2005 expressly indicate that the request is made “via State Writ”; the Certifications executed
on August 23, 2004 and October 10, 2004 are silent on this issue. (ECF No. 12-12.)
13

regarding the significance of these Certifications. (See ECF No. 12 at 32 (stating in wholly
conclusory fashion that “Petitioner cannot succeed on this argument.”).)
While this Court is sympathetic to Mr. Baker’s assertion that the import of these
seemingly material documents has been ignored by the state courts, ultimately, there is no basis
for this Court to construe any of these Certifications as an IAD triggering “detainer” as the
Supreme Court has defined that term under Mauro and its progeny; indeed, there is no language
in those documents by which the State requests that federal detention officials hold Mr. Baker
after he finished serving federal his sentence or requesting that federal officials notify the State
when the release of Mr. Baker became imminent.
Furthermore, based on other uncontroverted evidence in the state record, it wholly
appears that the State did not file a formal detainer with federal authorities until after Mr. Baker
was sentenced by the state trial court. (See Pet’r’s Reply at 23, ECF No. 17 (acknowledging that
“[o]nly after [Mr. Baker’s] sentencing did the State send the [federal] Bureau of Prisons an actual
detainer letter.”); see also Tr. 7T 129:9-19, ECF No. 12-39 (colloquy between prosecutor and
state trial judge explicitly discussing the need for the State to file a detainer with federal
authorities and implicitly recognizing that no formal detainer had yet been filed).)
In sum, the record before this Court demonstrates that the state courts properly applied
the relevant Supreme Court precedent and found that no IAD-triggering detainer had been
lodged by the State.6 The state courts’ factual basis for this conclusion, recounted above, is
entitled to deference and must be “presumed to be correct.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Mr.

It is for this reason that Mr. Baker’s reliance on Alabama v. Bozeman is misplaced; in
Bozeman, it was undisputed that an IAD-triggering “detainer” had been lodged by the receiving
state and that IAD Article’s IV(e)’s anti-shuttling provision had been violated because the
prisoner had been returned to his “original place of imprisonment” before the prisoner county
court “trial” was “had.” Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 151-52.
6

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Baker can only overcome that deference by showing “by clear and convincing evidence” that this
factual determination was unreasonable in light of the available evidence. Id. Mr. Baker has
failed to provide any such evidence under this standard.
In light of the foregoing, this Court can only conclude that the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s ruling that the IAD was inapplicable to Mr. Baker because no IAD-triggering detainer
had been lodged by the State was neither an unreasonable application of Mauro and its progeny,
nor an unreasonable application of the facts before it. Mr. Baker is therefore not entitled to
habeas relief.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), a petitioner may not appeal from a final order in a habeas
proceeding where that petitioner’s detention arises out of his state court conviction unless he has
“made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution
of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented here are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003).
Because all of Mr. Baker’s claims are either without merit or are otherwise insufficient to
warrant habeas relief, Mr. Baker has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. As such, and because jurists of reason could not disagree with this Court’s
denial of Mr. Baker’s habeas petition, Mr. Baker’s claims are inadequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further and Mr. Baker is denied a certificate of appealability.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Baker’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No.
1) is DENIED and Mr. Baker is DENIED a certificate of appealability. An appropriate order
follows.

s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER,
United States District Judge

Dated: February 5, 2018

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