REED v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE et al

Filing 39

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/2/15. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
JOHNNY L. REED, IV,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 15-1305 (NLH/JS)

v.
OPINION
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, NEW JERSEY
STATE TROOPER “JOHN DOE,” WINSLOW
TOWNSHIP (POLICE DEPARTMENT),
POLICE OFFICER J. HURD, WINSLOW
TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, RONALD
B. THOMPSON, ESQ., CAMDEN COUNTY
HEALTH SERVICES, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES (DYFS),
Defendants.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Johnny L. Reed, IV
P.O. Box 109
Sicklerville, NJ 08081
Pro Se Plaintiff
Christopher A. Orlando, County Counsel
Anne E. Walters, Assistant County Counsel
520 Market Street, 14th Floor
Camden, NJ 08102
Attorney for Defendant Camden County Health Services
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is Defendant Camden County’s1
unopposed Motion to Vacate Clerk’s Entry of Default.

For the

reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

1

Camden County states it was improperly named as “Camden County
Health Services” in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
1 

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Johnny L. Reed, IV, filed a pro se complaint on

February 19, 2015 [Doc. No. 1].

In essence, Plaintiff alleges

that in 2008 he was falsely arrested by the Winslow Township
Police Department, involuntarily committed to Kennedy Memorial
Hospital, and then transferred to Camden County Health Services
for a three week evaluation.

Compl. ¶¶ 52-53.

Plaintiff

further alleges while he was involuntarily committed he was
administered dangerous drugs which caused him to suffer side
effects.

Compl. ¶¶ 54, 56.

On April 17, 2015, Plaintiff moved for entry of default
against Camden County Health Services.

[Doc. No. 12].

Default

was entered on April 20, 2015.
Camden County sold Camden County Health Services in 2013,
which now operates as Northbrook Behavioral Hospital under new
ownership.

See Cert. of Karyn Gilmore [Doc. No. 17-3].

While

Plaintiff served Northbrook, Camden County contends it was never
served.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55, which states, in relevant part, as follows:
When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party's default.
2 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

After default is entered pursuant to

Rule 55(a) the plaintiff may seek the court's entry of default
judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Starlight Ballroom Dance Club, Inc.,
175 F. App'x 519, 521, n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 10A Wright,
Miller & Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2682 at 13 (3d ed. 1998)).
After default judgment is entered, “the factual allegations of
the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages,
will be taken as true.”

Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d

1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed.
Prac. & Proc. § 2688 at 444 (2d ed. 1983)).
Rule 55 of the Federal Civil Rules likewise provides the
mechanism for setting aside the entry of default.

More

specifically, Rule 55(c) provides as follows: “The court may set
aside an entry of default for good cause[.]”
55(c).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

In determining whether good cause exists to set aside an

entry of default, the court should consider: “(1) whether the
plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a
meritorious defense; and (3) whether the default was the result
of the defendant's culpable conduct.”

World Entm't Inc. v.

Brown, 487 F. App'x 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Although district courts are urged to make explicit findings
concerning all of these factors when considering a motion to

3 

vacate entry of default, the second factor is often considered
to be the most important inquiry.

Nat'l Specialty Ins. Co. v.

Papa, No. 11–2798, 2012 WL 868944, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2012)
(Bumb, J.) (citing United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency,
728 F.2d 192, 194–95 (3d Cir. 1984)).

To establish culpable

conduct the defendant must have acted willfully or in bad faith.
World Entm't Inc., 487 F. App'x at 761 (citing Hritz v. Woma
Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1182–83 (3d Cir. 1984)).

Moreover, as is

the case with respect to a court's entry of default judgment, a
clerk's entry of “‘[d]efault is not favored and all doubt should
be resolved in favor of setting aside default and reaching a
decision on the merits.’”

CGB, 2001 WL 253745 at *4 (quoting 99

Cents Stores v. Dynamic Distrib., No. 97–3869, 1998 WL 24338
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1998)); see also Papa, 2012 WL 868944 at *2;
$55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 194–95.
III. DISCUSSION
“Adjudication of a motion to set aside default is left to
the discretion of the district court.”

Toy v. Hayman, No. 07–

3076, 2008 WL 5046723, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2008) (citing
Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2002)).
As indicated above, in reviewing such a motion, the Court must
consider three factors prior to vacating an entry of default.
The first factor requires the Court to consider whether
lifting the default would prejudice Plaintiff.
4 

“Prejudice under

this prong only accrues due to a ‘loss of available evidence,
increased potential for fraud or collusion, or substantial
reliance upon the judgment.’”

Toy, 2008 WL 5046723 at *3

(citing Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656–57
(3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court

finds there is nothing to suggest that any evidence would be
lost since Plaintiff filed his complaint in January.

Further,

there is no increased potential for fraud or collusion or any
evidence Plaintiff substantially relied on the default.
Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of setting aside
default.
The Court next considers whether Camden County has raised a
meritorious defense.

“A meritorious defense is one that, if

established at trial, would constitute a complete defense to the
action.”

Id. at *4 (citing $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728

F.2d at 195).

In order to satisfy this second factor, “[t]he

defaulting party must [ ] set forth specific facts demonstrating
the facial validity of the defense.”

Id.

Here, Camden County has raised a meritorious defense.
First, Camden County argues that Plaintiff’s claims, which
relate to events in 2008, are barred by a two-year statute of
limitations.

Further, Camden County alleges it is not a

“person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Plaintiff failed to file a
Notice of Tort Claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
5 

N.J.S.A. 59:9-3.

Accordingly, Camden County has raised a

meritorious defense and the second factor weighs in favor of
setting aside default.
Last, the Court considers whether the entry of default was
the result of culpable conduct.

Camden County avers that it

sold Camden County Health Services Center in November 2013,
which now operates as Northbrook Behavioral Health Hospital
under new ownership.

Cert. of Karyn Gilmore. ¶ 5.

Camden

County was informed that Northbrook was served with Plaintiff’s
complaint, but declined to accept service.

Id.

Camden County

avers that it has not been served with Plaintiff’s summons and
complaint.

Id. ¶ 6.

Accordingly, the failure of Camden County

to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint was not the result of
culpable conduct.
In summary, all three factors weigh in favor of vacating
the default judgment.

Accordingly, Camden County’s Motion to

Vacate the Clerk's Entry of Default will be granted.
Camden County will have twenty-one days from the date of
the entry of this Opinion and accompanying Order to file its
responsive papers.

Dated: October 2, 2015

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

6