WEBSTER et al v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
115
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 3/29/18. (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
ROBERT WEBSTER, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
Civ. No. 15-1525 (RBK) (JS)
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Robert Webster, is a former prisoner that was incarcerated in the New Jersey State
Correctional System. Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a second amended complaint asserting civil
rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also alleges violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the New Jersey Law against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). Presently
pending before the Court are two motions for summary judgment, one filed by the State of New
Jersey and the New Jersey Department of Corrections (collectively the “State Defendants”) (ECF
No. 91), and the other filed by Rutgers University and William Briglia, D.O. (collectively the
“Medical Defendants”) (ECF No. 94). Both the State and Medical Defendants have also moved
to seal certain exhibits submitted with their motion papers. (ECF Nos. 92, 95, & 110). Plaintiff
opposes both motions for summary judgment, but not the motions to seal. For the following
reasons, both the State and Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are denied.
Additionally, the State and Medical Defendants’ motions to seal are granted.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
As noted in this Court’s previous opinion, this case centers around Plaintiff’s allegations
that during his incarceration he suffered a sudden yet persistent bilateral arm paralysis that went
untreated for the entirety of his confinement. Upon being released from prison in July 2012,
Plaintiff was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), which he contends was
exacerbated by the Defendants’ failure to treat his condition. Plaintiff also alleges that he was
denied adequate living accommodations, harassed, and ridiculed on account of his paralysis.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 8, 2011, while incarcerated at Bayside State Prison, he
presented to the prison physician with a sudden onset of paralysis in both arms. (See ECF No. 46
at ¶ 25). Available medical records indicate that Plaintiff complained of shoulder pain and
experienced a decreased range of motion in his hands in October 2011. (See ECF No. 93 at pp.
257-58). Additionally, medical staff observed a decreased range of motion in Plaintiff’s shoulders
in November 2011. (See id. at p. 231). As a result of this observation, a lower bunk restriction
was ordered.1 (See id. at pp. 232-33). Plaintiff also complained to medical staff that he was unable
to lift his arms above shoulder height on December 29, 2011. (See id. at pp. 201-02).
The available medical records show that Plaintiff’s medical condition became
progressively worse. By April 2, 2012, Dr. Briglia noted chronic arthritic changes and muscle
atrophy of Plaintiff’s hands and shoulders as well as Plaintiff’s inability to lift his hands to shoulder
height. (See id. at pp. 104-05). Following his evaluation by Dr. Briglia, Plaintiff continued to
complain to the prison medical staff of his upper extremity weakness, limited mobility, and the
inability to lift his arms above his head. (See id. at pp. 48-53, 88-90, 100-02). At a physical
1
A work order restriction was provided to Plaintiff in September 2010 due to arthritis. (ECF No.
93 at pp. 448-49).
2
therapy appointment on June 21, 2012, Plaintiff complained of muscle weakness, paresthesias, and
tremors. (See id. at p. 26). The physical therapy records also note that Plaintiff “states he has not
been able to move his arms since winter 2010. Weakness has advanced … unable to lift arms up
at all.” (See id.). It was further observed that Plaintiff presented with “severe bilateral [upper
extremity] flaccid paralysis and hand contracture” and that he was “unable to move much, very
limited function.” (See id.).
Plaintiff claims that as a result of his arm paralysis, he required assistance to participate in
daily living activities such as eating, bathing, dressing, brushing his teeth, and using the restroom.
(See ECF No. 46 at ¶ 39). Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he requested assistance and
accommodations from the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and medical staff on a regular
basis. (See ECF No. 91, Ex. F at 39:20 to 40:12; ECF No. 100, Ex. D at 110:25 to 111:18). Despite
these requests, Plaintiff alleges that the State and Medical Defendants failed to provide him with
reasonable accommodations, such as an aide to assist him with daily functions. (See id. at ¶¶ 3637). As a result, Plaintiff contends that he was forced to pay other inmates to help him engage in
these daily activities. (See id. at ¶ 39).
Plaintiff argues that the State and Medical Defendants were both aware of his disability
and need for accommodations as his condition was obvious and apparent to all who observed him.
In support of this contention, Plaintiff cites to his medical records and an adjudication of
disciplinary charge report dated April 3, 2012, wherein a DOC hearing officer found Plaintiff not
guilty of committing the prohibited act of possession or introduction of a weapon because he was
unable to physically reach the top locker area where the item was found. (See ECF No. 91, Ex.
P). Plaintiff also asserts that the medical records do not include all of the oral complaints he made
to DOC and medical staff. In support of this contention, Plaintiff points to the testimony of Dr.
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Ralph Woodward, Rutgers’ designee, wherein Dr. Woodward stated that not all informal
communications and complaints generate documentation, thus indicating that the available
medical records are not necessarily the entire extent of the communications between the inmate,
medical personnel, and prison staff.2 (See ECF No. 102, Ex. L at 97:22 to 98:8). Despite this
knowledge, Plaintiff contends that the State and Medical Defendants failed to provide him with
any reasonable accommodations to assist him in daily life activities.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 7, 2013 in the Camden County Superior
Court naming the State, the DOC, and numerous fictitious “John Does.” (See ECF No. 1, Ex. B).
On December 1, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming Rutgers (incorrectly plead as
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey) as a defendant and replacing the John Doe
defendants with the following individuals: Niranjana Shah, M.D.; Jennifer Stackhouse, RN; Judith
Fidler, RN; Victoria D’Amico, RN; Natasha Auguste, RN; Rhonda Kuteyi, RN; Francis Meo,
M.D.; Stephanie Smith, RN; Denise Schnee, RN; Sherita Latimore-Collier, M.D.; Roni J.
Feldman, APRN; Assistant Warden Lanoza; Sergeant Rojas; Officer Ronald Long; Social Worker
Eisinger; Sergeant Joynes; Corrections Officer Battle; Corrections Officer Urgo; and Associate
Director Ronald Riggins. (See ECF No. 1, Ex. A). Mr. Lanoza was never served with the amended
complaint. (See ECF No. 91 at p. 2).
On February 27, 2015, the State Defendants removed Plaintiff’s amended complaint from
the Camden County Superior Court to the District Court of New Jersey. (See ECF No. 1). On
2
Plaintiff also claims that the medical records produced in discovery are incomplete as Dr.
Woodward further testified that “[t]here appeared to be some documents that were unrecoverable.
It appeared that other people had signed them out. So I can’t say that the whole of that medical
reference file was reviewed, although we made a great attempt to find them.” (See ECF No. 102
Ex. L at 153:10-14).
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March 24 and April 20, 2015, the State Defendants and the Medical Defendants, respectively, filed
motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (See ECF Nos. 3, 8). In an order and opinion
dated September 15, 2015, this Court partially granted the Defendants’ motions, dismissing
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment, NJLAD, and ADA claims without prejudice for failure to state
a claim.3 (See ECF Nos. 17, 18).
On December 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint asserting violations of
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
individual defendants (Count I); violations of the New Jersey Constitution against the individual
defendants (Count II); violations of the NJLAD against the institutional Defendants, Mr. Lanoza,
and Mr. Riggins (Count III); and violations of Title II and Title III of the ADA against the
institutional Defendants (Count IV). (See ECF No. 46). The parties have consented to the
dismissal of all claims against the individual Defendants except for Dr. Briglia and Mr. Lanoza.
(See ECF Nos. 53, 105, 108, 113).
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir.
2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d
386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue
Plaintiff’s wife, Cynthia Webster, was also named as a plaintiff in the initial state court complaint,
alleging a loss of consortium claim. (See ECF. No. 1 at Ex. A.). Mrs. Webster’s loss of consortium
claim was dismissed by this Court for failure to file a tort claims notice. (See ECF Nos. 17, 18).
3
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of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
If the moving party meets its threshold burden, the opposing party must present actual
evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely
to support its assertion that genuine issues of material fact exist). “[U]nsupported allegations ...
and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation,
912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of
Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment,
the nonmoving party needs to show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that
party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. ADA and NJLAD Claims against the State, DOC, and Rutgers
Plaintiff asserts claims against the State Defendants and Rutgers arising under Title II of
the ADA, which provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132. To establish a violation of Title II, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) he is a qualified
individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any
such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” Dahl v. Johnston, 598 F. App’x 818, 819-20 (3d Cir.
6
2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524,
553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, the NJLAD provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons shall have the
opportunity ... to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place
of public accommodation ... without discrimination because of ... disability.” N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:5-4. The courts of this district have regularly held that correctional facilities are places of
public accommodation within the meaning of the NJLAD. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cnty. of Salem,
No. 09-4718, 2010 WL 3081070, *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Chisolm
v. McManimon, 97 F. Supp. 2d 615, 621-22 (D.N.J. 2000), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court would find that jails
and prisons are “places of public accommodation”).
“New Jersey courts generally interpret the LAD by reliance upon [the construction of]
analogous federal antidiscrimination statutes.” Chisolm, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 621. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to analyze an NJLAD disability discrimination claim by applying the test employed to
analyze claims under the ADA. See Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 70 (3d
Cir. 2006). See also Brewer v. Hayman, No. 06-6294, 2009 WL 2139429, *9 (D.N.J. July 10,
2009) (citing D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 502-03 (D.N.J. 2008)). That
is, to prevail, a plaintiff must establish that he “(1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual,
and (3) has suffered an adverse action because of that disability.” D.G., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
1. Qualified Individual with a Disability
A “qualified individual with a disability” is defined by the ADA as “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
7
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). A
“disability” within the meaning of the ADA is, inter alia, “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” of an individual.
42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A). Whether a person is “substantially limit[ed]” must be determined by whether the
individual is “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform,” or is “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.” Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir.
2003) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)).
The Supreme Court has interpreted “major life activities” as “those activities that are of
central importance to daily life,” such as “walking, seeing, and hearing.” Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); see also Taylor v. USF-Red Star Exp., Inc.,
212 Fed. Appx. 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2006) (listing examples of major life activities as “caring for
oneself, walking, breathing, seeing, hearing, and working”); Matthews v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 613
F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting “if [plaintiff's] impairment substantially limited his
ability to walk, he suffered a ‘disability’ for purposes of the ADA”).
Here, Defendants do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.
2. Discrimination by Reason of Disability
The ADA authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities,
Unites States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 153 (2006), and Title II of the ADA “unmistakably
8
includes state prisons” as covered public entities.4 Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
209-10 (1998). Further, medical care is “one of the ‘services, programs, or activities’ covered by
the ADA.” Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corrs., 451 F.3d 274, 284 (1st Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court
has held that the “alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a prisoner’s]
disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all
other prison programs constitute[s] exclusion from participation in or denial of the benefits of the
prison’s services, programs, or activities.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157 (internal quotations and
alterations omitted); see also Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210 (noting that the phrase “services, programs,
or activities” in § 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison
programs).
However, “[t]he treatment (or lack thereof) of a prisoner's medical condition typically does
not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the ADA.” McClintic v. Pa. Dep't of
Corr., No. 12-6642, 2013 WL 5988956, *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2013); see also Iseley v. Beard,
200 F. App’x 137, 142 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that denial of medical treatment for disabilities “is
not encompassed by the ADA's prohibitions”); Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir.
2005) (concluding that a lawsuit under the ADA “cannot be based on medical treatment
decisions”); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (medical
decisions do not ordinarily fall within the scope of the ADA); Rashad v. Doughty, 4 F. App’x 558,
560 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he failure to provide medical treatment to a disabled prisoner, while
perhaps raising Eighth Amendment concerns in certain circumstances, does not constitute an ADA
violation.”); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“He is complaining about
4
Defendants do not contest that South Woods State Prison is a public entity.
9
incompetent treatment of his paraplegia. The ADA does not create a remedy for medical
malpractice.”).
A plaintiff claiming discrimination on the basis that a public entity failed to provide a
particular reasonable accommodation needs to show that the public entity had knowledge that the
individual required accommodation. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 500 F.3d
1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[B]efore a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide
an auxiliary aid ..., the entity must have knowledge that the individual is disabled, either because
that disability is obvious or because the individual (or someone else) has informed the entity of the
disability.”). However, “[w]hen a disabled individual's need for an accommodation is obvious,
the individual's failure to expressly ‘request’ one is not fatal to the ADA claim.” Chisolm v
McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 330 (3d Cir. 2001).
In their motion for summary judgment, the State Defendants argue that they should be
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA and NJLAD claims as Plaintiff did not put the
State Defendants on notice of his disability by filing any written requests for accommodations.
(See ECF No. 91 at pp. 42-43). The State Defendants also contend that the record shows that
Plaintiff was provided with ample medical care and accommodations including a medical work
restriction and a lower bunk restriction. 5 (See id. at p. 44).
5
The State Defendants argue, for the first time on reply, that they are also entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on Plaintiff’s ADA and NJLAD claims. (ECF No. 109 at pp.10-11). The
Court declines at this time to entertain the State Defendants’ untimely argument. See Bernstein v.
Atl. City, No. 08-3796, 2011 WL 2559369, *3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2011) (“Arguments raised for the
first time in reply briefs should not be considered by courts because the Local Rules of Civil
Procedure prohibit, without leave of court, sur-replies. Consequently, the party opposing summary
judgment has no opportunity to respond to any newly raised arguments contained within the
brief.”); YSM Realty, Inc. v. Grossbard, No. 10-5987, 2011 WL 735717, *3 n.3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23,
2011) (“The Court will not entertain arguments not raised in Defendants’ initial brief”); Halprin
v. Verizon Wireless Serv., LLC, No. 07-4015, 2008 WL 961239, *8 (D.N.J. April 8, 2008) (A reply
brief's purpose, as evidenced by its name, “reply brief,” is to “respond[ ] to the opposition brief
and explain[ ] a position that the respondent has refuted.”).
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Rutgers argues in its motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff’s claims are improperly
brought under the ADA and NJLAD as Plaintiff’s claims are actually based on allegations of
medical negligence relating to the failure to appropriately treat his symptomology. (See ECF No.
94 at p. 19). Rutgers contends that because the ADA does not provide a cause of action for
discrimination based on medical decisions, it is entitled to summary judgment.
(See id.).
Additionally, Rutgers argues that Plaintiff was provided every accommodation he requested and
was never refused any requested accommodation because of his disability. (See id.). Moreover,
Rutgers argues that there is no evidence that any of Plaintiff’s medical providers were actually
aware that Plaintiff was disabled from participating in some activity and required an
accommodation (other than his work and bunk order). (See id. at p. 20).
Plaintiff contends that the record demonstrates that the State Defendants and Rutgers had
knowledge of his inability to use his arms and hands and his resultant need for assistance and
accommodations. (ECF No. 100 at pp. 3-6, 14-18, 22-24). Despite this knowledge, Plaintiff
asserts that the Defendants deliberately failed to provide him with necessary accommodations to
enable him to participate in daily living activities including eating, dressing, bathing, and using
the toilet. (Id. at pp. 7-8, 19-21). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that his ADA and NJLAD claims
are not medical malpractice claims as he is not alleging that the Defendants failed to treat and
diagnose him, rather the focus of his claims is that the Defendants failed to provide reasonable
accommodations for him.6 (Id. at pp. 26-27).
In his brief in opposition to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff raises, for the
first time, a hostile environment claim under the NJLAD. (ECF No. 100 at pp. 25-26). Since
Plaintiff failed to plead this claim in the second amended complaint, the Court will not consider it.
See Anderson v. DSM N.V., 589 F. Supp. 2d 528, 534 n.5 (D.N.J. 2008) (declining to consider
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because it was alleged for the first time in plaintiff's opposition
to defendant's motion for summary judgment and not alleged in plaintiff's complaint); Bey v.
Daimler Chrysler Servs. of N. Am., No. 04-6186, 2006 WL 361385, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb.15, 2006)
(“claims [that] were not alleged in the complaint [ ] cannot be raised for the first time in opposition
6
11
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there are unresolved factual
questions in this case regarding whether the State Defendants and Rutgers had notice of Plaintiff’s
disability and need for assistance and whether the Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with
accommodations on the basis of his disability. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.
There is a question of material fact as to whether the State Defendants and Rutgers were
aware of Plaintiff’s disability. The record reveals that prison physicians and staff had knowledge
of Plaintiff’s physical symptoms as it is noted in the available medical records that Plaintiff
displayed an inability to lift his arms, very severe functional limitations, muscle atrophy, and
severe bilateral arm paralysis. (See ECF No. 93 at pp. 26-27, 104-05). The record also indicates
that the State Defendants may have known of Plaintiff’s physical disability as a DOC hearing
officer noted in a disciplinary charge report that Plaintiff was unable to reach a top locker area.
(ECF No. 91, Ex. P).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is also a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Plaintiff informed the State Defendants and Rutgers of his need for
accommodations. Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he made oral and written requests
to DOC and medical staff for assistance and accommodations, which were denied. (See ECF No.
91, Ex. F at 39:20 to 40:12; ECF No. 100, Ex. D at 110:25 to 111:18). Additionally, even if a
factfinder concluded that Plaintiff did not make requests for accommodations, it could still find
that the Defendants were on notice of Plaintiff’s need for accommodations if the need was
“obvious” to Defendants. As noted above, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether
Defendants knew Plaintiff suffered from a physical disability. If Defendants knew that Plaintiff
to a motion for summary judgment”); see also Shanahan v. City of Chi., 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir.
1996) (“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment.”).
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was disabled, there is a question of fact regarding whether his need for an accommodation was
obvious when he attempted to participate in daily living activities that required the use of his arms
such as eating, bathing, dressing, and using the toilet.
Further, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the State Defendants
and Rutgers failed to provide Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations to engage in daily living
activities. While Plaintiff agrees that the Defendants did provide him with a lower bunk order and
a work restriction order, he claims that he required additional accommodations such as assistance
with eating, dressing, bathing, brushing his teeth, and using the toilet. The effectiveness of the
accommodations provided by the Defendants is a question of fact best determined by a jury. See
Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 327 (“Generally, the effectiveness of auxiliary aids and/or services is a
question of fact precluding summary judgment.”).
B. Section 1983 Claims against Dr. Briglia
Plaintiff also asserts a Section 1983 deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Briglia,
Plaintiff’s managing physician from April to July 2012. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Briglia subjected
Plaintiff to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement as a result of his failure to provide Plaintiff
with necessary assistance and accommodations for daily life activities. Dr. Briglia argues that
Plaintiff’s claims against him are merely medical negligence claims which do not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference required to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that Dr. Briglia acted
under the color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of a right protected by the United States
Constitution. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). The Eighth
Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment, and requires that prison officials provide
adequate medical care to inmates. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Rouse v.
13
Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). To bring a cognizable claim for violation of his right
to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on
the part of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Satisfaction of the first Estelle prong requires an inmate to demonstrate that his medical
needs are serious. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“Because society does not
expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical
needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are serious.”). The Third
Circuit defines a serious medical need as: (1) “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment;” (2) “one that is so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention;” or (3) one for which “the denial of treatment would result in the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent loss.” Atkinson
v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)).
In order to qualify for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must also satisfy the second prong
of the Estelle standard and establish that each individual acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. Deliberate indifference is more than mere malpractice or negligence; it is
a state of mind equivalent to reckless disregard of a known risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be displayed in a myriad of ways, such
as where an official “(1) knows of prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses
to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; (3) prevents
a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatments.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197
(citing Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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The standard applied in reviewing the actions of prison doctors and medical staff is
deferential. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts
will generally refrain from “second guessing” the adequacy of a particular course of treatment
when it is based on sound professional judgment. See id. A misdiagnosis or preference for a
certain type of treatment will not alone rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See e.g., Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a
medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
Amendment.”); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[M]ere disagreements over
medical judgment do not state Eight Amendment claims.”). Moreover, “a court will generally not
find deliberate indifference when some level of medical care has been offered to the inmate.”
Christy v. Robinson, 216 F. Supp. 2d 398, 413-14 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Clark v. Doe, No. 99-5616,
2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) (“Courts have consistently rejected Eighth
Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.”)).
Providing some type of treatment, however, does not automatically preclude liability under
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 414. Courts have found constitutional violations where some level
of care had been provided, but the care was not based on sound medical judgment, the decision to
pursue a course of treatment was based primarily on non-medical reasons, or a medical official
denied the requested treatment with the intention of inflicting pain. See, e.g., Rouse, 182 F.3d at
197 (citing examples such as leaving Debrox in the ear of one prisoner when there was no
legitimate medical reason for doing so or denying Maalox and increasing the risk of peptic ulcer
based on inappropriate non-medical considerations); White, 897 F.2d at 109 (finding violation
where prison physician did not base the course of treatment on sound medical judgment and
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“insisted on continuing courses of treatment that [he] knew were painful, ineffective or entailed
substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoners”).
Here, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, an issue of material fact
exists as to whether Dr. Briglia was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need.
The available medical records reveal that Dr. Briglia evaluated Plaintiff on April 2, 2012 and noted
Plaintiff’s severe muscle atrophy and inability to lift both hands to shoulder height. (See ECF No.
93 at pp. 104-06). Medical records show that Plaintiff’s condition continued to deteriorate as time
progressed. (See id. at pp. 26-27) (noting severe bilateral paralysis and functional limitations).
Despite these observations, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Briglia failed to provide any
accommodations or assistance to Plaintiff for completing daily life activities.
Dr. Briglia first argues that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need as there is no
evidence that ALS, as opposed to Plaintiff’s preexisting rheumatoid arthritis, was the cause of his
upper extremity paralysis. However, Plaintiff’s upper extremity paralysis, whether caused by ALS
or rheumatoid arthritis, was chronic, debilitating, and deforming. See Christy, 216 F. Supp. 2d at
413 (finding that hepatitis C and arthritis are serious medical needs); Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347
(medical needs may be deemed serious if the denial or delay potentially would result in serious
injury, long term harm, or permanent disability); Washington v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1018, 1021
(11th Cir. 1988) (condition need not be life threatening in order to be considered serious).
Accordingly, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff has
sufficiently shown that his upper extremity paralysis is a serious medical need.
Dr. Briglia also argues that he was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs
as medical records demonstrate that he ordered diagnostic testing including radiological imaging
and lab work following his initial evaluation of Plaintiff. While Dr. Briglia did order initial testing,
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the records also indicate that Dr. Briglia did not issue any accommodations or orders for assistance
in connection with Plaintiff’s completion of daily life activities including the ability to eat, bathe,
use the restroom, and maintain personal hygiene. Additionally, the medical records indicate that
some of the diagnostic testing ordered by Dr. Briglia, such as MRIs, were never completed.
Accordingly, an issue of material fact exists as to whether Dr. Briglia deliberately refused to
provide accommodations to Plaintiff for his serious medical need.
Therefore, the Medical
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Eight Amendment claim is denied.
C. Motions to Seal
Local Civil Rule 5.3 governs requests to seal documents filed with the Court. Specifically,
the Rule requires that any motion seeking to seal or restrict public access to filed materials must
include in the motion papers a description of “(a) the nature of the materials or proceedings at
issue, (b) the legitimate private or public interests which warrant the relief sought, (c) the clearly
defined and serious injury that would result if the relief sought is not granted, and (d) why a less
restrictive alternative to the relief sought is not available.” L. Civ. R. 5.3(c)(2). In addition, where
a party moves to seal pretrial motions of a “non-discovery nature” such as a motion for summary
judgment, the moving party must make a showing sufficient to overcome a “presumptive right of
public access.” Leucadia v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993). The
moving party can rebut this presumption by demonstrating that “good cause” exists for the
protection of the material the party is seeking to seal. “Good cause exists when a party makes a
particularized showing that disclosure will cause a ‘clearly defined and serious injury to the party
seeking closure.’” Securimetrics, Inc. v. Iridian Tech., Inc., No. 03-4394, 2006 WL 827889, at *2
(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2006) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir.
1994)).
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Here, all four factors weigh in favor of sealing Plaintiff's medical records from public
access upon the docket. With respect to factor (a), the nature of the materials at issue are Plaintiff’s
medical records attached as exhibits to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Since the
materials at issue are medical records, which have long been recognized as confidential by nature,
this factor supports Defendants’ motions. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“We have long recognized the right to privacy in one’s medical information....”). Second, with
respect to factor (b), the Court finds that there is a legitimate private interest (namely, Plaintiff's
privacy rights) in maintaining privacy with respect to such records.
Third, with respect to factor (c), the Court finds that Defendants have sufficiently set forth
the risk of harm to the private interests if Plaintiff's medical records are disclosed—namely,
Plaintiff's privacy rights will be irreparably harmed. Finally, with respect to factor (d), the Court
finds that a less restrictive alternative is not available. Moreover, the Court notes that the
documents at issue are not of general interest to public health or safety. Thus, the Court finds that
the factors enunciated in Local Civil Rule 5.2(c)(2) weigh in favor of sealing Plaintiff's medical
records that are attached to the State and Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the State and Medical Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s disability and whether the State
and Medical Defendants knew that an accommodation was necessary to enable Plaintiff to
participate in daily life activities to the same extent as a non-disabled prisoner. Accordingly, the
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State and Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are denied. Additionally, State
and Medical Defendants’ motions to seal are granted. An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: March 29, 2018
/s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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