KAZAR v. CITY OF CAMDEN et al
Filing
74
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 12/8/2016. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KAZAR MILTON,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 15-1527 (NLH/KMW)
OPINION
v.
INVESTIGATOR JAMES BRUNO,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
SURINDER K. AGGARWAL, ESQ.
1 University Plaza, Suite 617
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
and
CONRAD J. BENEDETTO, ESQ.
1405 Chews Landing Road, Suite 21
Laurel Springs, New Jersey 08021
Counsel for Plaintiff
ROBERT LOUGY, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
By: Akeel A. Qureshi, Deputy Attorney General
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 116
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Counsel for Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Kazar Milton asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and New Jersey state law alleging that Defendant James
Bruno, an investigator for the Camden County Prosecutor’s
Office, maliciously prosecuted him, resulting in an indictment
for murder, which charges were subsequently dismissed.
Bruno
moves to dismiss the two claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion will be
denied.
I.
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Defendant Bruno,
during the course of his investigation of the murder of Luis
Rolon, “engaged in a series of coercive and/or manipulative
tactics geared toward Plaintiff [Milton] being prosecuted for
Rolon’s murder.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 6)
According to Milton, Bruno
sought to have Milton prosecuted for the murder not because
Bruno had probable cause to believe Milton committed the crime,
but rather “to shield two potential suspects from prosecution,”
which suspects happened to be “the nephew and step-son of Camden
City Police Officer William Benjamin.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 6)
As will be discussed further infra, the Amended Complaint
sets out with some particularity various pieces of exculpatory
evidence (including evidence that arguably inculpated Officer
Benjamin’s nephew and step-son), and inculpatory evidence,
uncovered in the investigation. (See Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 7-15)
Most notably, however, the Amended Complaint alleges that
Milton had an alibi for his whereabouts during the time of the
murder, and that the alibi was “corroborated by witnesses and
video surveillance.” (Id. ¶ 19)
On the other hand, the only
witness to the murder, Rolon’s girlfriend, identified Milton as
2
the murderer. (Amend. Compl. 16)
Milton alleges, however, that
the identification was “coerced and manipulated” by “detaining
[the witness] for an inordinate number of hours,” “placing her
under duress, and threatening her with arrest for possession of
drug paraphernalia.” (Id.)
Moreover, Rolon’s girlfriend later
recanted her identification. (Id. ¶ 23)
Milton was indicted for Rolon’s murder sometime in 2009
(Amend. Compl. ¶ 18), but the charges were dismissed in “March
or April 2013.” (Id. ¶ 24)
As a result of the indictment, which
Milton alleges was “procured by fraud, perjury and/or other
corrupt means,” and without probable cause, Milton was
“incarcerated for four days [and] his appearance in court over
the next five years was secured by means of bail in the amount
of $750,000.00 cash or bond.” (Id. ¶ 22)
The Amended Complaint asserts two counts of malicious
prosecution (one under federal law, and one under New Jersey
law) against Bruno in his individual capacity only. 1
Bruno moves
to dismiss, asserting that he is entitled to qualified immunity
and that the complaint fails to state a claim.
II.
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
1
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
3
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under the liberal federal pleading rules, it is not
necessary to plead evidence, and it is not necessary to plead
all the facts that serve as a basis for the claim. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 562 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
However, “the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do require that the
pleadings give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Baldwin Cnty.
Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984)
(quotation and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claim.’” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009)(“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’
. . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
4
2009)(“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in the coffin for the
‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints
before Twombly.”).
III.
Bruno argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because Milton has not pled facts plausibly supporting a
conclusion that a constitutional violation occurred.
“‘To prove malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.’” Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)). 2
Bruno argues that the facts alleged do not establish
elements (2), (3) and (4).
A.
Proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor
2
As to the specific issues raised in the instant motion, the
parties assume the legal analysis is the same for the New Jersey
state law claim; accordingly the Court assumes the same.
5
Relying on facts and documents outside the Amended
Complaint, Bruno asserts (and Milton does not dispute) that the
charges in the indictment at issue were dismissed by way of a
plea agreement whereby Milton “agree[d] to plead guilty to
unrelated charges.” (Qureshi Decl. ¶ 2)
Therefore, Bruno
argues, “[b]ecause the charges were dismissed as part of an
agreement, Plaintiff cannot establish that the underlying action
terminated in his favor.” (Moving Brief p. 10, Docket # 55-1)
While Milton objects to the Court considering this argument
at all on a motion to dismiss (as opposed to summary judgment),
the Court has considered it and now rejects it. 3
The alleged
fact that the charges were dismissed “as part of an agreement”
is not dispositive.
The key allegation is that the charges to
which Milton pled guilty were unrelated.
Thus, the alleged
resolution of Milton’s murder charges-- dismissal and a guilty
plea to an unrelated crime-- is not inconsistent with Milton’s
alleged innocence of the murder charges which are the basis of
his malicious prosecution claims. See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187
3
To be clear, the Court does not convert Bruno’s motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Indeed, Bruno
expressly argues that the Court need not convert his motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. (Moving Brief, p. 2
n.1, Docket #55-1; Reply Brief, p. 2 n.1, Docket #49) The Court
proceeds as if Milton had pled the entire disposition of his
murder charges-- i.e., not just that they “were dismissed,”
(Amend. Compl. ¶ 24), but also that the charges were dismissed
as part of an agreement with the prosecutor whereby Milton pled
guilty to unrelated charges.
6
(“The purpose of the favorable termination requirement is to
avoid ‘the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort
action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal
prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy
against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out
of the same or identical transaction.’
Consistent with this
purpose, we have held that a prior criminal case must have been
disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused
in order to satisfy the favorable termination element.”)(quoting
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). 4
The Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads that the murder
charges against Milton were terminated in his favor.
The Court
leaves for summary judgment the separate inquiry into the
circumstances under which Milton pled guilty to the unrelated
charges. See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 950 (2d Cir.
1997)(“In general, the issue of whether a given type of
termination was favorable to the accused is a matter of law for
4
Cf. Cuthrell v. Zayre of Virginia, Inc., 214 Va. 427, 428
(1974)(“Disorderly conduct is not a lesser included offense of
larceny. The conviction of disorderly conduct does not
establish that the arrest for petit larceny was without malice
and upon probable cause. Since the petit larceny charge was
dismissed, plaintiff had a right to maintain this malicious
prosecution action. The petit larceny prosecution terminated in
a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.”)(internal citations
and quotation omitted).
7
the court.
If, however, there is a question as to the nature of
the circumstances leading to that termination, that question is
one for the trier of fact.”).
B.
Lack of probable cause
A “grand jury indictment or presentment constitutes prima
facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute”; this presumption
will only be overcome “by evidence that the presentment was
procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.” Rose v.
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989).
At the pleadings stage, the Court cannot reasonably expect
Milton -- or any malicious prosecution plaintiff for that matter
-- to allege facts concerning what happened in the grand jury
room, nor Bruno’s interactions with the prosecutor(s) who
appeared before the grand jury.
Thus, contrary to Bruno’s
argument (Moving Brief, p. 14, Docket #55-1; Reply Brief, p. 46, Docket #67), the absence of specific factual allegations
concerning exactly how the indictment was allegedly “procured by
fraud, perjury and/or other corrupt means” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 18)
is not fatal at this stage of Milton’s case. 5
Such issues, and the related issue of causation, are more
appropriately resolved at summary judgment. See, e.g., Halsey v.
Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2014)(“[W]e reinstate
Halsey’s malicious prosecution claim, principally because the
prosecutor instrumental in the initiation of the criminal case
against Halsey has acknowledged that the false confession that
appellees claimed they obtained from Halsey contributed to the
prosecutor’s decision to charge Halsey, and for that reason we
5
8
The Court holds that the particular factual allegations of
the Amended Complaint in this case are sufficient to allow the
case to proceed to discovery.
Milton has alleged sufficient
facts which plausibly support an inference that there was not
probable cause to believe that he committed the murder.
In addition to the alibi allegations discussed above, the
Amended Complaint also alleges that there was reason to doubt
the veracity of the inculpatory evidence against Milton, in
particular: the witness who identified Milton as the murderer
later recanted, and also gave other information that was
inconsistent with Milton’s guilt; the witness said the murderer
will not treat the decision to prosecute as an intervening act
absolving appellees from liability. Moreover, without that
false confession, there would not have been direct evidence
linking Halsey to the crimes so that the prosecutor would not
have had cause to prosecute Halsey. Therefore, the District
Court should not have held on the motions for summary judgment
that appellees had a probable cause defense to Halsey’s
malicious prosecution claim.”); Rentas v. Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214,
220–21 (2d Cir. 2016)(“A grand jury indictment gives rise to a
presumption that probable cause exists and a claim for malicious
prosecution thereby is defeated. The presumption may be
rebutted by evidence of wrongful acts on the part of police,
including fraud, perjury, or the suppression of evidence. For
example, when an officer provides false information to a
prosecutor, what prosecutors do subsequently has no effect
whatsoever on the officer’s initial, potentially tortious
behavior. But if the prosecution relied on independent,
untainted information to establish probable cause, a complaining
official will not be responsible for the prosecution that
follows. In that situation, the chain of causation between a
police officer’s unlawful arrest and a subsequent conviction and
incarceration would be broken by the intervening exercise of the
prosecutor’s independent judgment.”)(internal citations and
quotations omitted).
9
was left-handed, whereas “Bruno was aware that [Milton] was
right-handed.” (Amend. Compl. ¶ 21)
At this early stage of the case, the facts pled support a
plausible conclusion that there was not probable cause to
believe Milton murdered Rolon. 6
Accordingly, it may also be
inferred that Milton should not have been indicted, and
therefore the indictment must have been procured by fraud,
perjury or other corrupt means. See generally, Leatherman v.
Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993)(rejecting a heightened pleading standard
for § 1983 claims).
C.
Defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice
Bruno asserts that the Amended Complaint contains only
conclusory allegations that Bruno acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.
disagrees.
The Court
The Amended Complaint specifically alleges that
6
Cf. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d at 300 (“Courts should
exercise caution before granting a defendant summary judgment in
a malicious prosecution case when there is a question of whether
there was probable cause for the initiation of the criminal
proceeding because, generally, the existence of probable cause
is a factual issue.”)(internal citation and quotation omitted);
see also Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir.
1998)(“[T]he question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage
suit is one for the jury.”) (discussing Section 1983 claim for
malicious prosecution). It follows that if caution is called
for at the summary judgment stage in determining such issues, an
even greater quantum of caution is appropriate under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
10
Bruno’s purpose for pursuing the prosecution of Milton was “to
shield two potential suspects from prosecution [which suspects
were] the nephew and step-son of Camden City Police Officer
William Benjamin.” (Amend. Compl. ¶6)
Such allegations are
sufficient to withstand the instant motion to dismiss. See also,
Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993)(“[m]alice
may be inferred from the absence of probable cause.”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Bruno’s Motion to
Dismiss will be denied.
An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
Dated: December 8, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman___
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
11
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