SPANN v. LACROCE

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 6/11/2015. (tf,n.m. )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MS. LACROCE,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________:
ROBERT SPANN,

Civ. No. 15-1561 (NLH)
OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Robert Spann, #291048C/834319
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Road South
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Plaintiff Pro se

Plaintiff Robert Spann, an inmate currently confined at
South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey, filed this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On April 1,

2015, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in
forma pauperis and noted that summons would not issue until such
time as the Court completed its sua sponte screening pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and, for the
reasons set forth below, the Complaint will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s Complaint is premised upon the assertion that
he was fired from his prison job at South Woods State Prison
because he refused to cut his hair.

No other factual

information regarding the circumstances of his termination is
provided and it is unclear in what capacity he was employed.
Plaintiff indicates that Ms. Lacroce, whom Plaintiff explains is
a “psychiatric employer for state,” told Plaintiff that he must
cut his hair or he could not “work in her department anymore[.]”
(Compl. 4-5, ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff then alleges that Ms.

Lacroce violated his rights by “being very personal and bias
prejudice, conflict of interest, sadistically, cruel, and
intertained [sic] role of discrimination.” (Compl. 5, ECF No.
1).

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $600,000.00.
II.

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific
facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the
defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (citations omitted).

While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level
... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

“A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).

The determination of whether the factual

allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is
“‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Bistrian v.
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations omitted).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to accept its factual allegations as true,
see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.
2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
In general, where a complaint subject to statutory
screening can be remedied by amendment, a district court should
not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the
amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson
v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence of
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or
futility of amendment”), cited in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F.
App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013); Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
I.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108
S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641
F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
II.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not assert a specific
cause of action.

Presumably, he is alleging a violation of his

constitutional rights based on his employment termination.
Also, due to the language of his Complaint in which he alleges
that Ms. Lacroce is “bias[ed] and prejudice[d]” (Compl. 5, ECF
No. 1), it appears that Plaintiff may be asserting a
discrimination claim.
However, even construing Plaintiff’s pro se submission
liberally, there are no factual allegations present in the
Complaint which could form the basis of a cause of action under
§ 1983.

As noted above, basic information is absent from the

Complaint.

Among other things, it is unclear in what capacity

Plaintiff was employed, when he was told to cut his hair, the
date of his termination, who exactly terminated him, and how his

termination for failure to cut his hair resulted in, or stemmed
from, the discrimination he alleges.
A. Loss of Employment
To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a
claim for loss of employment, he has failed to allege a
constitutional violation.

The Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has stated, “We do not believe that an inmate's
expectation of keeping a particular prison job amounts either to
a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest entitled to protection under
the due process clause.” Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 240
(1975), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct.
2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also Mestre v. Dombrowski, 566
F. App'x 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding that prisoner had no
constitutionally protected interest in his prison job); James v.
Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Traditionally,
prisoners have had no entitlement to a specific job, or even to
any job.”).
Therefore, to the extent the Complaint is premised solely
on his termination from employment, Plaintiff has failed to
allege a constitutional violation and his Complaint will be
dismissed.
B. Discrimination
Plaintiff implies in his Complaint that he may have been
subject to some type of discrimination by Ms. Lacroce, although

the exact basis for the discrimination (race, religion, gender,
etc.) is not alleged.

Plaintiff merely asserts that his rights

were violated “on the matter of [Ms. Lacroce] being very
personal and bias prejudice, conflict of interest, sadistically,
cruel, and intertained [sic] role of discrimination.” (Compl. 5,
ECF No. 1).

Without more facts, the Court cannot discern the

contours of the underlying right which Plaintiff alleges was
violated. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (2000) (en
banc) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (“The
first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to identify the
exact contours of the underlying right said to have been
violated and to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”).

Accordingly,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim.

However, because it

is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able to supplement his
pleading with facts sufficient to state a claim under § 1983,
the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an application to

re-open accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. 1 See Denton,
504 U.S. 25; Grayson, 293 F.3d 103.
An appropriate Order follows.

___s/ Noel L. Hillman_____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: June 11, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey

1

Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts
the earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates,
LLC v. Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir.
2013) (collecting cases). See also 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). To avoid
confusion, the safer practice is to submit an amended complaint
that is complete in itself. Id.