CHANDLER v. DEX MEDIA
Filing
17
OPINION filed. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/1/2015. (drw)n.m.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
LORREN CHANDLER,
Plaintiff,
Civil No.
15-1973(NLH/AMD)
v.
OPINION
DEX MEDIA,
formerly known as
SUPERMEDIA,
Defendant.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
LORREN CHANDLER
936 RUTH WAY
DOVER, DE 19904
Appearing pro se
ROBIN KOSHY
THERESA DONAHUE EGLER
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART PC
10 MADISON AVENUE
SUITE 400
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07960
On behalf of defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This case concerns allegations of employment discrimination.
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendant to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint.
For the reasons expressed below,
defendant’s motion will be granted, and plaintiff shall be
afforded 30 days to file an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Lorren Chandler, worked at defendant, Dex Media.
Plaintiff claims that she was fired from her job on May 5, 2012
in violation of her civil rights.
Plaintiff, appearing pro se,
filled out a form “EEOC Complaint,” 1 claiming “Termination while
covered under Disability, Retaliation due to ongoing Workers
Compensation, and Sexual Harassment Complaint (known).”
No. 1 at 3.)
(Docket
Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims
because she did not timely exhaust her EEOC remedies.
Plaintiff
has opposed defendant’s motion.
DISCUSSION
A.
Jurisdiction
Plaintiff brings claims for discrimination and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
This Court exercises
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
B.
Standard For Motion To Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
1
The form “EEOC Complaint” is provided by the Court to nonprisoner pro se litigants at
http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/forms/eeoc-complaint.
2
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under the
liberal federal pleading rules, it is not necessary to plead
evidence, and it is not necessary to plead all the facts that
serve as a basis for the claim.
F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 562
However, “[a]lthough the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth
an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for
relief, they do require that the pleadings give defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”
Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 149-50 n.3 (1984) (quotation and citation omitted).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claim.’”
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’
. . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
3
2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for
the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal
complaints before Twombly.”).
C.
Analysis
A Title VII plaintiff raising claims of discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory acts must file her charge with the
EEOC within the appropriate time period - 180 or 300 days - set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1).
National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002).
If the EEOC finds
that that it sees no reason to take action on the complaint, it
will issue a “right-to-sue” letter; a complainant cannot file a
Title VII suit without having first received a right-to-sue
letter, and the suit must be filed within 90 days of the date on
which the complainant receives the right-to-sue letter.
Burgh
v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
“Both the 180–day [or 300-day]
period for filing the administrative complaint and the 90–day
period for filing the court action are treated as statutes of
limitations.”
Id.
Here, plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC on April 23,
2014, and she received a right-to-sue letter on January 5, 2015. 2
2
The right-to-sue letter was issued on June 20, 2014, but it was
mailed to an incorrect address. The error was discovered and
the right-to-sue letter was mailed to plaintiff’s correct
address on January 5, 2015. For equitable reasons, the Court
will consider January 5, 2015 as the date of her right-to-sue
4
Even though plaintiff filed her complaint within 90 days of the
right-to-sue letter, the conduct she alleges violated Title VII
occurred on or before May 12, 2012, which is beyond the 300-day
time period.
Thus, plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.
The Court recognizes, however, that the Third Circuit case
law “supports the notion that in civil rights cases district
courts must offer amendment--irrespective of whether it is
requested--when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim
unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482
F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
Even though plaintiff’s civil
rights claims are time-barred, plaintiff’s complaint cursorily
references discrimination for violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, claims based upon which are not subject to the
EEOC exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements.
Consequently, the Court will allow plaintiff to file an amended
complaint, if she can do so consistent with Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 11. 3
Plaintiff is instructed that even though pro
letter. See Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose,
251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We have strictly construed
the 90–day period and held that, in the absence of some
equitable basis for tolling, a civil suit filed even one day
late is time-barred and may be dismissed.”).
3
Rule 11 provides, in relevant part,
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
5
se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), pro se litigants
“must still plead the essential elements of [their] claim and
[are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil
procedure,” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster
Video, 205 F. App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se
plaintiffs are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint will be granted.
Plaintiff shall
be afforded 30 days to file an amended complaint consistent with
this Opinion.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date: October 1, 2015
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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