COTTRELL et al v. FAMILY PRACTICE ASSOCIATES AT WASHINGTON, PA et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/28/2016. (dmr)(n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
MARYANN COTTRELL and
RICHARD HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 15-2267 (NLH/KMW)
v.
OPINION
FAMILY PRACTICE ASSOCIATES at
WASHINGTON, PA,
Defendants.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Maryann Cottrell
Richard Holland
31 S. Academy Street
Glassboro, NJ 08208
Pro Se Plaintiffs
Arnold Robert Gerst
Weiner Lesniak
P.O. Box 438
Parsippany, NJ 07054
Attorneys for Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants Family Practice Associates at Washington, PA, Robert
L. Venuti, William A. Madison, John D. Venuti, Janine M. Pecora,
Dana Zeiner, and Stefani Venuti.
For the reasons that follow,
the motion [Doc. No. 11] will be converted into a motion for
summary judgment and the Court will set a schedule for
supplemental briefing.
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I.
JURISDICTION
The Court exercises original jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 over the federal claim asserted in this case under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq.
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367 over the state law claim based on an alleged
violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6–1 et seq.
II.
BACKGROUND
As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiff Maryann Cottrell
(“Cottrell”) is the mother of a severely disabled daughter, and
Plaintiff Richard Holland (“Holland”) serves as a secondary
caregiver to Cottrell's daughter.
litigants in this Court.
Plaintiffs are frequent
Typically, Plaintiffs “assess[] and
document parking access at public accommodations that they come
into contact during their daily services” and then bring
complaints in federal court.
(Compl. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiffs are former patients of Family Practice
Associates, a medical office.
On February 4, 2013, Plaintiffs
allege they were passing by Family Practice Associates when they
observed a van illegally parked in a handicap parking space
outside the building.
(Compl. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiffs informed the
manager of Family Practice Associates, Stefani Venuti, about the
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violation but Venuti allegedly did not ask the van to move.
(Compl. ¶¶ 25-32.)
On February 15, 2013 Plaintiffs signed citizens’ complaints
against the company which owned the van and Family Practice
Associates.
(Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.)
According to Defendants, Family
Practice Associates was found not guilty in municipal court of
any parking violation because it did not own the parking space
Plaintiffs reported; rather, it belonged to an adjacent
condominium complex.
On April 2, 2013, Plaintiffs received a letter from Dr.
Robinson of Family Practice Associates terminating their
patient-doctor relationship.
(Compl. ¶¶ 33-34.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all allegations
in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
A complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether
the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
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claims[.]’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8
(2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974));
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953
(2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard
for ‘all civil actions[.]’”) (citation omitted).
The Third
Circuit has instructed district courts to conduct a two-part
analysis in deciding a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
First, a district court “must accept all of the complaint’s
well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions.”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949).
Second, a district court must “determine whether
the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
Id. at 211
“[A] complaint must do
more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”
Id.
“‘[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’’”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s Twombly
formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus:
‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual
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matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.
This
‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’
the necessary element.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A court need not credit “bald assertions” or “legal
conclusions” in a complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss.
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–
30 (3d Cir. 1997).
The defendant has the burden of
demonstrating that no claim has been presented.
Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.
1991)).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for
retaliation under the ADA or NJLAD.
With respect to both
claims, a plaintiff must establish (1) s/he was engaged in
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken; and (3)
there is a causal link between the protected conduct and the
adverse action.
Cottrell v. Good Wheels, 458 F. App'x 98, 100
(3d Cir. 2012).
Defendants argue there is no causal connection
between the doctor-patient termination and any protected
activity because the municipal court found Defendants not guilty
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of parking violations because they did not own the referenced
parking space.
In support of this proposition, Defendants rely
on the certifications of their attorney and Stefani Venuti
regarding the outcome of the municipal court proceedings.
Additionally, Defendants submit the certification of Dr.
Robinson which states that he terminated the doctor-patient
relationship because he felt it was irreparably harmed as a
result of the frivolous nature of the municipal court
proceedings against his practice.
The evidence proffered by Defendants in support of their
motion to dismiss goes beyond the pleadings and, therefore,
cannot be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss.
R. Civ. P. 12(b).
See Fed.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court
only considers “the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon
these documents.”
Cir. 2010).
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d
If matters outside of the pleadings are considered,
then the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
When converting a 12(b)(6) motion to
one for summary judgment “all parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent the
motion.”
Id.
Further, a court should give notice of its intent
to convert a defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for
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summary judgment.
Brown v. U.S. Steel Corp., 462 F. App'x 152,
155 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Court has determined it should fully consider all the
documents referred to by the parties which go beyond pleadings.1
Importantly, it does not appear that discovery will aid in
producing facts relevant to the decision that are not already
known to both parties.
Therefore, in the interest of
completeness and procedural fairness to all parties, the Court
will convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment.
In this regard, the parties will have a
reasonable opportunity to present all material relevant to a
summary judgment motion and fully brief this issue.
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d); see also Brown, 462 F. App’x at 155 (remarking
that the notice requirement is satisfied by an order advising
the parties that a motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion
for summary judgment); Le v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.,
379 F. App’x 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2010) (indicating that the Court
of Appeals has required at least ten days’ notice before
conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment).
1
Although the Court can take judicial notice municipal court
orders, it cannot do so for other documents relied upon by
Defendants such as their certifications.
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Accordingly, the Court will enter an Order for the
submission of supplemental briefing and document submissions.
Following these submissions, the Court will decide Defendants’
motion as a summary judgment motion.
Dated: April 28, 2016
___s/ Noel L. Hillman_______
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
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