FRANK v. SHARTLE
Filing
11
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 1/14/16. (js)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
TOBIAS A. FRANK,
Petitioner,
v.
J.T. SHARTLE, WARDEN,
Respondent.
:
:
: Civ. Action No. 15-2405 (RMB)
:
:
:
OPINION
:
:
:
:
:
BUMB, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s
submission of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1);
Respondent’s answer to the petition (ECF No. 6); Petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 9); and Respondent’s
Response to Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
10.) For the reasons discussed below, the habeas petition will
be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a federal inmate confined at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Fairton, New Jersey (“FCI-Fairton”)
(ECF No. 1 at 1.) On July 21, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, to
a 262 month term of imprisonment with a five-year term of
supervised release, upon his conviction of possession with
intent to distribute over five grams of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Declaration of Bryan
Erickson (“Erickson Decl.”), Att. I.) Petitioner’s sentence was
subsequently reduced to 156 months. (Id., Att. A and Att. K). If
Petitioner receives all Good Conduct Time available to him, his
projected release date is May 1, 2016. (Id., ¶5o, Att. L, p.2.)
Petitioner contends he should have been given prior custody
credit for the time he spent in Richmond County Jail, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). He asserts he was only given credit
toward his state sentence beginning July 1, 2003, but he was in
state custody beginning on March 6, 2003. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) He
states:
[T]he time served in the County Jail was not
in service of a probation sentence because
the GDOC did not compute that sentence to
have commenced until he was released from
the County Jail and Georgia never sentenced
him to any incarceration, but simply paroled
him into his federal sentence. Although the
state charge was dismissed in lieu of
federal prosecution, the state probation
sentence did not commence until July 1,
2003, as computed by GDOC.
(ECF No. 9 at 5.) Petitioner seeks credit for time in state
custody from March 6, 2003 through July 1, 2003. (ECF No. 1 at
6.) Respondent opposes the petition. (ECF No. 6.)
2
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Petitioner’s Presentence Custody
Respondent provided the following additional facts in
support of the Bureau of Prison’s calculation of Petitioner’s
sentence. (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner was arrested in Richmond
County, Georgia on May 25, 2000, and charged with possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana
in Richmond County Superior Court Case No. 00RCCR885. (Erickson,
Decl., ¶¶4e, 5a; Att. C.) In Case No. 00RCCR885, Petitioner was
sentenced in state court to a five-year term of probation and
360 days of detention, and a concurrent term of 12 months’
probation for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
(Id., ¶5b; Att. D.) The sentencing court directed the sentence
to be made effective nunc pro tunc February 7, 2001. (Id.)
On March 6, 2003, while Petitioner was on probation in Case
No. 00RCCR885, he was arrested and detained in state custody in
Richmond County, Georgia, and charged with the state offense of
trafficking cocaine. (Id., ¶5c.) Georgia state authorities
revoked Petitioner’s five-year term of probation imposed in Case
No. 00RCCR885, due to his arrest for cocaine trafficking. (Id.
at ¶¶5e, 5d.)
The Georgia Department of Corrections then computed
Petitioner’s five-year term of imprisonment, in Case No.
00RCCR885, as beginning on January 29, 2001, with a maximum
3
possible release date of January 28, 2006. (Erickson Decl., ¶5e,
Att. E.) The January 29, 2001 date was determined by giving
Petitioner nine days of state jail credit to the court-ordered
sentence effective date of February 7, 2001. (Id.)
Petitioner was held in the Richmond County Jail until July
1, 2003, when he was committed to Coastal State Prison in
Georgia. (Id., ¶5f; Att. F & G.) A grand jury in the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Georgia returned an eightcount indictment against Petitioner on July 10, 2003, for
criminal acts that occurred between May 1, 1998 and March 6,
2003. (Id., ¶¶4b, 4f, 5g.) The federal authorities adopted the
conduct associated with Petitioner’s state arrest on March 6,
2003, and the state charges were dismissed in lieu of federal
prosecution. (Id. at ¶¶4c, 4f, 5g.)
Petitioner was borrowed from state custody on July 24, 2003
via a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to appear in
the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Georgia. (Id.,
¶5h, Att. H.) Petitioner pled guilty to the federal indictment
on March 9, 2004. (Id., ¶¶4d, 5i, Att. I.) On July 21, 2004,
Petitioner was sentenced on the federal conviction to 262 months
imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised
release. (Id. at ¶5j, Att. I.) On the day the sentence was
imposed, July 21, 2004, the U.S. Marshals returned Petitioner to
4
state custody in satisfaction of the writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum. (Erickson Decl., ¶5k, Att. H.)
Georgia state authorities released Petitioner into federal
custody on November 29, 2004, when he completed service of his
state sentence in Case No. 00RCCR885. (Id., ¶5l, Att. F, G and
H.) On November 17, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia reduced Petitioner’s federal
sentence of imprisonment to 156 months. (Id. at 5n, Att. K.)
The Richmond County Sheriff’s Department advised the BOP
that Petitioner received credit for custody from January 1, 2001
through January 28, 2006 against his state sentence in Case No.
00RCCR885. (Id., Att. E, F & G.) The BOP computed Petitioner’s
federal sentence as commencing on November 29, 2004, the date he
was released by Georgia on the federal sentencing detainer.
(Id., ¶¶51, 5o, Att. F, G, H, and L, p.2.)
The BOP did not award any prior custody credit against
Petitioner’s federal sentence because all of the time served
from January 29, 2001 through November 29, 2004 was credited to
Petitioner’s probation revocation term in Case No. 00RCCR885.
(Id. at ¶¶5e, 5o, 11, Att. E, F, G.) Petitioner exhausted his
administrative remedies in challenging the BOP’s sentence
computation. (Id., Att. B.)
Petitioner submitted a motion for summary judgment on his
petition (ECF No. 9), which this Court construes as a Reply to
5
Respondent’s Answer. See Rule 5(e), Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, applicable to cases
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through Rule 1(b) (“the petitioner may
submit a reply to the respondent’s answer or other pleading
within a time frame fixed by the judge.”) Petitioner contends
that the GDOC computed his state sentence as having commenced on
July 1, 2003, and ending on November 29, 2004. (ECF No. 9 at 4.)
he asserts “the GDOC is responsible for awarding jail credit,
and the fact that the GDOC did not award credit to his state
sentence from March 6, 2003 to July 1, 2003, he is entitled to
credit towards his instant federal sentence pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b).” (Id.)
Petitioner argues that his time served in a county jail was
not credited toward service of a probation sentence because the
GDOC did not compute that sentence to have commenced until
Petitioner was released from the county jail, July 1, 2003. (Id.
at 5.) He also contends that the State of Georgia never
sentenced him to incarceration, it only paroled him into his
federal sentence. (Id.) Petitioner seeks credit toward his
federal sentence from March 6, 2003 through July 1, 2003. (Id.)
In Reply, Respondent asserted:
The BOP has confirmed, through the Georgia
Department of Corrections Sentence
Computation Form and through telephonic
communication with the Richmond County
Sheriff’s Department, that the period in
6
question indeed was included in the time
credited by state authorities to
Petitioner’s state parole revocation
sentence.
(ECF No. 10 at 2, citing Erickson Decl., Att. E and G.)
B.
Federal Sentence Computation
The Attorney General of the United States has the
responsibility of computing a federal prisoner’s sentence and
has delegated that task to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. U.S.
v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-35 (1992). The computation of a
federal sentence involves two determinations: (1) when the
federal sentence commenced; and (2) whether the prisoner is
entitled to prior custody credit for time in custody prior to
the commencement of the sentence. See Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d
203, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), (b)). Here,
only the second determination is at issue.
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides:
(b) Credit for prior custody.—A defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of
a term of imprisonment for any time he has
spent in official detention prior to the
date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after
the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed;
7
that has not been credited against another
sentence.
Time served in state custody that is credited toward a
state sentence cannot also be credited against a federal
sentence. See Castro v. Sniezak, 437 F. App’x 70, 72 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (quoting Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992)
(“Congress made clear [in § 3585(b)] that a defendant could not
receive a double credit for his detention time.”)
The sovereign that first arrests a defendant has primary
jurisdiction over him until the sovereign relinquishes primary
custody, for example, by expiration of the sentence. Williams v.
Zickefoose, 504 F. App’x 105, 107 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012)). Release
of a prisoner pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum does not relinquish a sovereign’s primary custody.
Davis v. Sniezek, 403 F. App’x 738, 740 (3d Cir. 2010).
“Generally, a sovereign can only relinquish primary jurisdiction
in one of four ways: (1) release on bail; (2) dismissal of
charges; (3) parole; or (4) expiration of sentence.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir.
2005)).
C.
Analysis
The Court begins by resolving the factual dispute of the
parties over whether the GDOC credited the period of March 6,
2003 through July 1, 2003 against Petitioner’s state sentence.
8
The GDOC Sentence Computation Form Summary Report, dated June 6,
2003, shows that Petitioner committed the state crime in
question on March 25, 2000, and he was sentenced on February 7,
2001. (Erickson, Decl., Att. E, ECF No. 6-6 at 2-3.) The GDOC
recalculated his state sentence when his probation was revoked.1
The adjusted beginning date for his state sentence was January
29, 2001, and the adjusted end date was January 28, 2006. (ECF
No. 6-6 at 3.)
Respondent also submitted the BOP Designation of Sentence
Computation Center’s Log of Telephonic Communication of Record.
(Erickson Decl., Att. F, ECF No. 6-6 at 2.) The log indicates
that a BOP Classification and Computation Technician called the
Richmond County Sheriff’s Department and received the following
information from a sergeant. (Id.) On April 15, 2003,
Petitioner’s probation was revoked in Case No. 00RCCR885,
relating to his May 25, 2000 arrest that resulted in a five-year
sentence. (Id.) Petitioner was given credit for the period of
January 29, 2001 through January 28, 2006 toward his state
probation revocation. (Id.) On July 1, 2003, Petitioner was
released to Coastal State Prison to serve his sentence. (Id.) On
November 29, 2004, Petitioner was released from his state
sentence to federal custody. (Id.)
1
Under the heading “Report Reason” is the entry: “new
sentence.” (ECF No. 6-6 at 3.) The “new sentence” was
Petitioner’s probation revocation.
9
Petitioner’s assertion that the GDOC computed his state
sentence as commencing on July 1, 2003, and ending on November
29, 2004 is not borne out by the record. It is true that the
record contains a GDOC Inmate Information printout, which
indicates under the heading “State of Georgia-Incarceration
History” that Petitioner’s incarceration begin date was July 1,
2003, and his incarceration end date was November 29, 2004.
(Erickson Decl., Att. F, ECF No. 6-7 at 2-3; Pet., ECF No. 1 at
10-13, Ex. B.) However, Petitioner’s incarceration history
refers only to the time Petitioner spent in Coastal State
Prison, not to the computation of his state sentence.
The GDOC’s Sentence Computation Form Summary Report, on the
other hand, shows that adjusted beginning date for Petitioner’s
state sentence was January 29, 2001, and the adjusted end date
was January 28, 2006. (ECF No. 6-6 at 3.) Thus, Petitioner was
given credit against his state sentence, which takes into
account his resentencing upon his probation revocation, for the
period including March 6, 2003 through July 1, 2003. Petitioner
cannot be given double credit for that period against his
federal sentence. Vega v. U.S., 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007)
(where BOP credited period of prior custody against state parole
violation, same period could not be credited against federal
sentence).
III. CONCLUSION
10
In the accompanying Order filed herewith, the Court will
deny Petitioner’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: January 14, 2016
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?