HATCH v. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 18

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/23/16. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIE E. HATCH,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Petitioner,
Civil Action
No. 15-2514 (JBS)

v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
et al.,

OPINION

Respondents.

APPEARANCES:
WILLIE E. HATCH, Petitioner pro se
#553234
East Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Rahway, New Jersey 07065
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Willie Hatch seeks reconsideration of an order
dismissing his amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time-barred.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Petitioner was tried before a jury and was
convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:14–2(a); second-degree sexual assault, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14–2(c); and second-degree child endangerment, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:24–4(a), for acts committed against his fourteen-year-old
stepson. State v. W.H., No. A-0948-11, 2012 WL 6698694, at *1

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 27, 2012). The New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed his convictions,
State v. W.H., No. A-6478-05, 2008 WL 2596116 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 2, 2008), and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied
certification on January 20, 2009, State v. W.H., 963 A.2d 845
(N.J. 2009).
Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction
relief (“PCR”) in the state courts. The PCR court denied the
petition without an evidentiary hearing on March 7, 2011, and
the Appellate Division affirmed that court’s judgment. W.H.,
supra, No. A-0948-11. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied
certification on June 28, 2013. State v. W.H., 67 A.3d 1192
(N.J. 2013).
Petitioner handed his § 2254 petition to prison officials
for mailing on March 14, 2015. (Petition, Docket Entry 1 at 16).
Upon initial review of this petition, the Honorable Renée Marie
Bumb, D.N.J.,1 noted that on its face, it appeared the petition
was untimely under the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
Judge Bumb ordered Petitioner to submit a written statement
“asserting any basis upon which the statute of limitations may
properly be tolled or any facts establishing that the statute of
limitations did not expire on or before June 29, 2014[.]” (May

1

This matter was reassigned to the undersigned on August 4,
2015.
2

11, 2015 Order, Docket Entry 3 at 2). Petitioner did not comply
with the order, and on June 12, 2015, Judge Bumb
administratively terminated the proceedings in order to give
Petitioner one final chance to submit a written statement on
timeliness. (June 12, 2015 Order, Docket Entry 5).
Petitioner submitted an amended petition on July 15, 2015.
(Amended Petition, Docket Entry 6). He argued he could not file
a timely habeas petition because he was placed into
administrative segregation for 280 days and he “had no way of
knowing time sequences [sic] of filing appeals.” (Id. at 23).
After reviewing the documents provided by Petitioner in light of
the applicable law, this Court determined the petition was timebarred and that the facts did not warrant the application of
equitable tolling. The Court therefore dismissed the petition as
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (January 26, 2016 Order,
Docket Entry 12).
On February 5, 2016, the Court received a letter from
Petitioner objecting to the application of the statute of
limitations. (Motion, Docket Entry 13). On March 7, 2016, the
Court ordered the letter to be designated as a motion for
reconsideration and the case to be reopened for review of the
motion. (Docket Entry 14). The Court subsequently received two
letters from Petitioner dated March 12 and 11, 2016. (Docket
Entries 15 and 16).
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Local Civil Rule 7.1 allows a party to seek a motion for
reargument or reconsideration of “matter[s] or controlling
decisions which the party believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge
has overlooked . . . .” Local Civ. R. 7.1(i). Whether to grant a
motion for reconsideration is a matter within the Court's
discretion, but it should only be granted where such facts or
legal authority were indeed presented but overlooked. See DeLong
v. Raymond Int'l Inc., 622 F.2d 1135, 1140 (3d Cir. 1980),
overruled on other grounds by Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975
(3d Cir. 1981); see also Williams v. Sullivan, 818 F. Supp. 92,
93 (D.N.J. 1993).
To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the movant must
show:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence that was not available
when the court ... [rendered the judgment in question];
or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice.
U.S. ex rel. Shumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837,
848-49 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou–Ann,
Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). The standard
of review involved in a motion for reconsideration is high and
relief is to be granted sparingly. United States v. Jones, 158
F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994).

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IV. DISCUSSION
In the letter objecting to the dismissal of his petition,
Petitioner argues “[t]he law clearly states that the innocent
shall not languish in prison. This thereby outweighing any
limitations of a timebar. . . . A timebar is and has been
unconstitutional for a long time now.” (Motion at 1). The Court
interprets this as an argument for the application of the actual
innocence exception to the statute of limitations.
In McQuiggin v. Perkins, the Supreme Court held that a
claim of actual innocence can overcome ADEPA’s statute of
limitations in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 133 S.
Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013); see also Burton v. Horn, 617 F. App'x
196, 197 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting Ҥ 2244(d)'s timeliness
requirements do not bar a claim where a petitioner makes a
convincing actual-innocence claim” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Supreme Court limited its application to “a
severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows
‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted [the petitioner].’” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933
(alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
329 (1995)). This standard is “demanding,” and only overcomes
the statute of limitations where “a petition presents evidence
of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in
the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that
5

the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” Id. at
1936. Furthermore, “actual innocence means factual innocence,
not mere legal insufficiency.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181,
191 (3d Cir. 2012).
Petitioner has not identified any new evidence that would
support his claim of actual innocence or cast doubt on the
validity of the jury's guilty verdict. Indeed, a letter from the
Office of the Public Defender that was submitted with the
amended petition indicates the evidence against Petitioner at
trial was “significant.” (Amended Petition at 19). The evidence
that Petitioner argues was wrongfully withheld from the jury,
that his stepson is gay and “show[ed] compulsive sexual
misbehavior,” (March 12, 2016 Letter, Docket Entry 15 at 1),
does not meet the “supremely high bar” set forth by the Supreme
Court in Schlup and McQuiggin. Sistrunk, 674 F.3d at 192.
Petitioner is not entitled to the actual innocence exception to
the statute of limitations. His petition is time-barred, and the
motion for reconsideration is denied on this basis.
Although the Court denies the motion based on the
inapplicability of the actual innocence exception, it notes that
in one of Petitioner’s letters to this Court he indicates he has
a learning disability and suffers from what he terms
Developmentally Delayed Syndrome. (March 12, 2016 Letter, Docket
Entry 15 at 1). Petitioner did not raise this argument prior to
6

the entry of judgment; therefore, it is not a proper argument in
a motion for reconsideration. Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Court, 238
F. App'x 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[Motions for reconsideration]
may not be used to re-litigate old matters or raise arguments
that could have been raised prior to judgment.”); Bowers v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613
(D.N.J. 2001) (noting motions for reconsideration “are not an
opportunity to argue what could have been, but was not, argued
in the original set of moving and responsive papers” (emphasis
in original)). Petitioner cursorily states his condition “causes
[him] to take a bit more time to problem solve” and makes
references as to how it caused problems at trial. (March 12,
2016 Letter at 1). He does not claim it impacted his ability to
file a timely habeas petition, however. (Id.). Thus even if this
argument were properly before the Court at this time, it would
not warrant reconsideration of the dismissal as Petitioner does
not argue it prevented him from filing his § 2254 petition on
time.
Petitioner has not demonstrated actual innocence as defined
by Schlup and McQuiggin, nor has he provided the Court with any
other evidence warranting reconsideration of its prior order.
The motion is denied.

7

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is denied. An accompanying Order will be
entered.

March 23, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIE E. HATCH,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Petitioner,
v.

Civil Action
No. 15-2514 (JBS)

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
et al.,
ORDER
Respondents.

This matter having come before the Court on Petitioner
Willie E. Hatch’s Motion for Reconsideration (Docket Entry 13);
the Court having considered the submissions of the Petitioner;
for the reasons explained in the Opinion of today’s date; and
for good cause shown;
IT IS this

23rd

day of

March

, 2016, hereby

ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Docket Entry 13) is DENIED; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of
this Opinion and Order upon Petitioner by regular mail and mark
this matter CLOSED.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge