THOMPSON v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 12

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/28/16. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JEREMIAH THOMPSON,
Civil No. 15-2621 (NLH)
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
JEREMIAH THOMPSON
1 WASHINGTON AVE
CHESILHURST, NJ 08089
Appearing pro se
CATHERINE ELISABETH HAMILTON
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
300 SPRING GARDEN STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19123
On behalf of defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
On April 22, 2015, Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a
complaint pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review the final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying
Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income
(“Social Security benefits”) under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.

Plaintiff filed the

application for benefits on behalf of his minor daughter, D.T.,

for an alleged onset of disability of August 26, 2010. 1

After a

hearing on April 16, 2013, and the submission of additional
medical records, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied the
application on July 26, 2013.

The Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review on February 3, 2015, which caused
the decision of the ALJ to be the Commissioner’s final decision.
Plaintiff has timely filed his appeal with this Court for
judicial review.

For the reasons expressed below, the decision

of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
DISCUSSION
For a child under the age of eighteen to be considered
disabled and eligible for SSI under the Social Security Act, she
must have a “medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, which results in marked and severe functional
limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or

1

A parent who is not a lawyer cannot represent his child in
federal court, see Osei–Afriyie v. Medical College of Pa., 937
F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991), but a parent may be permitted to
proceed when the parent’s own interests are at stake, such as in
cases seeking judicial review of the denial of a minor child’s
social security benefits application, Price v. Barnhart, 129 F.
App'x 699, 700 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Machadio v. Apfel, 276
F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where a district court, after
appropriate inquiry into the particular circumstances of the
matter at hand, determines that a non-attorney parent who brings
an SSI appeal on behalf his or her children has a sufficient
interest in the case and meets basic standards of competence, we
hold that in such cases a non-attorney parent may bring an
action on behalf of his or her child without representation by
an attorney.”))(other citation omitted).
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which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.”
1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).

42 U.S.C. §

The Commissioner applies a three-part

sequential analysis to evaluate whether a child is disabled and
eligible for SSI:
(1)

If the child is doing substantial gainful activity,

the Commissioner will determine that the child is not disabled.
Moreno v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 199 F. App'x 178, 179 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)).
(2)

If the child is not working, the Commissioner will

determine whether the child's impairment is severe.
(3)

Id.

If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner must

determine whether the impairment “meets, medically equals, or
functionally equals the listings.”

Id.

In this case, Plaintiff’s daughter was born on April 18,
2006 and, given her age, was not working as of the date of her
alleged onset of disability, August 26, 2010.

The ALJ

determined that D.T.’s asthma, speech/language delay, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) were severe.
The ALJ found, however, that D.T.’s impairments did not meet the
medical equivalence or functional equivalence criteria of the
listings.
For the ALJ’s decision as to medical equivalence, the ALJ
observed that over the last three years, D.T. did not require
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physician intervention for an acute asthma exacerbation at least
once every two months or at least six times a year, and that
thanks to the positive use of Flovent and Ventolin, the child
did not experience persistent low­grade wheezing.

The ALJ also

found that the record did not support a finding of a listinglevel growth impairment.

The ALJ found that D.T.’s

speech/language delay did not result from a medically
determinable neurological impairment, somatoform disorder, or
autistic disorder, and it did not relate to a loss of hearing.
As for D.T.’s ADHD, the ALJ found that the record did not
support a finding of a marked limitation in at least two areas
of functioning, such as cognitive/communicative function, social
functioning, personal functioning, and concentration,
persistence, or pace.

(R. at 23-24.)

With regard to the determination as to whether D.T.’s
functioning met the listings criteria, the ALJ determined that
D.T. had a “less than marked” limitation for acquiring and using
information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and
relating with others, moving about and manipulating objects,
caring for herself, and health and physical well-being.

(R. at

27-37.)
In his appeal, D.T.’s father disputes the ALJ’s findings.
Plaintiff contends that D.T. is severely psychologically
impaired, has significant developmental delays, she cannot
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control her bladder, and she requires around-the-clock care.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the
record evidence in making his decision and improperly
disregarded the consultative report of a state agency
psychologist.

(Docket No. 11.)

A decision by the Commissioner will be affirmed if it is
supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is such

relevant evidence as a reasoning mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.

Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73, 76 (3d

Cir. 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Court finds that the ALJ’s

decision in this case is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ issued a comprehensive decision that meticulously
details the standards for evaluating D.T.’s claims, as well as
the record evidence to support his findings.

In assessing

D.T.’s medical and functional limitations, the ALJ properly
considered the chronology of D.T.’s conditions, her treatments,
and her special education services in tandem with the reports of
D.T.’s teachers, doctors, and the testimony of Plaintiff.

The

ALJ properly articulated why he provided less weight to certain
evidence, including the report of the consultative psychologist
and Plaintiff’s testimony, and afforded more weight to other
evidence, such as the medical records and statements from D.T.’s
teachers.

See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.

1999) (citations omitted) (“When a conflict in the evidence
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exists, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.

The ALJ must

consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting
the evidence she rejects.”); see also Diaz v. Commissioner, 577
F.3d 500, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In evaluating medical reports,
the ALJ is free to choose the medical opinion of one doctor over
that of another.”).
Most of the description and complaints about D.T.’s
condition has come from Plaintiff. 2

Plaintiff’s depiction of his

daughter’s health and behavior, at least as of July 2013, 3 is not
supported by the evidence in the record before the ALJ.

The ALJ

determined that Plaintiff’s statements about D.T. to various
interested parties, such as doctors, teachers and evaluators, as
well as his testimony at the hearing before the ALJ, were
contradictory and not corroborated by the evidence in the
record.

For example, where Plaintiff describes D.T. as acting

out, being disrespectful in school, and having social problems,
D.T.’s teacher for the proceeding seven months did not report

2

The ALJ attributed several of D.T.’s conditions to her
“uncertain daily existence,” as she missed a great deal of
school when she was “shuttled from a shelter (with Mr. Thompson)
to the ‘even more chaotic’ home of her mother.” (R. at 35.)
3

The Appeals Council informed Plaintiff that if he wanted the
Commissioner to consider evidence after July 26, 2013, Plaintiff
would have to apply again for benefits with that alleged onset
date. (R. at 2.)
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any of this behavior, particularly when D.T. took the medication
Adderall.

(R. at 32.)

In his decision, the ALJ provides many

other instances of discrepancies between Plaintiff’s testimony
and the record evidence.

An ALJ may reject a claimant's

subjective testimony if he does not find it credible so long as
he explains why he is rejecting the testimony.

Snedeker v.

Comm'r of Social Security, 244 F. App’x 470, 474 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social Security, 181 F.3d 429,
433 (3d Cir. 1999); SSR 96-7p).

The ALJ properly did so here.

CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit has instructed that “an administrative
decision should be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests” in order for the
appellate court to perform its statutory function of judicial
review.

Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1981).

The ALJ’s decision in this case provides a “clear and
satisfactory” explanation to support his finding that the sevenyear-old D.T. was not disabled as of July 2013.

Accordingly,

this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date:
April 28, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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