STRETCH v. SEVENSON ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC.

Filing 30

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 12/5/2016. (tf, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. No. 24)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
ADRIENNE AMEY STRETCH,
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
:
:
v.
:
:
SEVENSON ENVIRONMENTAL
:
SERVICES, INC.,
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :

Civil No. 15-2873 (RBK/AMD)
OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Adrienne Amey Stretch (“Plaintiff”) brings a state law discrimination claim against
Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. (“Defendant”). This matter comes before the Court on
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 24). For the following reasons,
Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts, in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff are as follows: Plaintiff graduated
from Pennsylvania State University in 1999 with a degree in Environmental Resource
Management with a technical area in water and sewer quality control. Def. Mot., Ex. B (“Stretch
Depo.”) at 7:2-13. Plaintiff held various positions after graduation, including soil and water
sampling and retail work. Id. at 7:17-9:21. Around April 2000, Plaintiff was employed by OnSite
Environmental to collect water samples at the Vineland Chemical Superfund Site groundwater

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treatment plant project (the Vineland OU-2 site). Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts
(“Def.’s Statement”) ¶ 22; Plaintiff’s Response to Def.’s Statement (“Pl.’s Resp.”) ¶ 22. When
Plaintiff first started at Vineland OU-2, Black & Veach was the prime contractor and OnSite was
a subcontractor. Def.’s Statement ¶ 23; Pl’s Resp. ¶ 23. Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc.
became the prime contractor at the Vineland OU-2 site later in 2000. Def.’s Statement ¶ 25; Pl.’s
Resp. ¶ 25.
Sevenson is an environmental hazardous waste clean-up company with job sites from the
eastern United States to Louisiana. Def.’s Statement ¶ 1; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 1. Sevenson subcontracted
Plaintiff’s services as a Lab Technician from OnSite after it became the prime contractor at the
Vineland OU-2 site. Def.’s Statement ¶ 25; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 25. Plaintiff’s duties included making
standards, preserving bottles, creating labels, and generally assisting the chemist as needed.
Stretch Depo. at 15:19-16:7. Plaintiff worked in this position from 2000-2003. Def.’s Statement
¶ 25; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 25. Steven Gillespie (“Gillespie”), the Sevenson Project Manager at the
Vineland OU-2 site, hired Plaintiff for Sevenson in November 2003 after overseeing her work
for OnSite. Def.’s Statement ¶ 37-38; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 37-38. Sevenson hired Plaintiff as an
Environment Technician in November 2003. Def.’s Statement ¶ 37, 39; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 37, 39.
Plaintiff held this position from 2003 to 2010. Def.’s Statement ¶ 39; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 39. Plaintiff’s
duties included her previous duties at OnSite, in addition to creating spreadsheets and graphs to
record arsenic contamination in water samples, manifesting waste that left the site, performing
field samples, and other tasks asked of her. Stretch Depo. at 16:11-22.
Plaintiff was promoted to Project Engineer in 2010. Id. at 18:15-21. Plaintiff’s new
position retained all duties from her old position, in addition to new responsibilities for creating

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monthly supports and providing quality control oversight in the field (as the Alternate Quality
Control Manager). Id.; Def.’s Statement ¶ 65; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 65.
Plaintiff informed Gillespie that she was pregnant in September 2012. Def.’s Statement
¶ 72; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 72. Plaintiff informed Gillespie of her pregnancy to ensure that adequate
safety steps were taken to protect her and her child. Def.’s Statement ¶ 73; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 73.
Gillespie testified that he recalls having a one-on-one conversation with Plaintiff to make sure
her duties would not be a detriment to her or her child. Def.’s Statement ¶ 74; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 74.
Gillespie understood that Plaintiff was entitled to at least 12 weeks of maternity leave and that
she would likely miss work for doctors’ appointments. Def.’s Statement ¶ 76-77; Pl.’s Resp.
¶ 76-77.
Gillespie claims that from September 2012 through September 2013, he had planned to
cover Plaintiff’s maternity leave but did not speak to anyone else about the matter. Def.’s
Statement ¶ 78; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 78. However, Gillespie did not design a formal plan to manage
Plaintiff’s absence and his informal plan was designed “within [his] head.” Plaintiff’s Statement
of Additional Facts That Preclude Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Statement”) ¶ 19-20 (Doc. No. 283); Defendant’s Responsive Statement to Pl.’s Statement (“Def.’s Resp.”) ¶ 19-20. Plaintiff
argues that Gillespie’s intent to cover her maternity leave is at issue since Gillespie had never
handled having a pregnant employee before Plaintiff and never spoke to anyone above him
regarding arranging or managing maternity leave. Def. Mot., Ex. E (“Gillespie Depo.”) at 27:2428:1 (Doc. No. 24-9). Gillespie testified that covering for Plaintiff’s workload during her leave
would be difficult and would require several individuals to divide her work up without additional
compensation. Pl.’s Statement ¶ 23-24; Def.’s Resp. ¶ 23-24. Gillespie was also aware that he

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could not fire or change Plaintiff’s job position simply because she was pregnant. Pl.’s Statement
¶ 28; Def.’s Resp. ¶ 28.
In February 2013, Sevenson’s contract as the prime contractor at the Vineland OU-2 site
expired and the contract was awarded to a different contractor. Def.’s Statement ¶ 85; Pl.’s Resp.
¶ 85. Sevenson was also aware that its contracts at the South Jersey Clothing Company and
Lipari Landfill sites would end shortly after February 2013. Id. On February 5, 2013, Gillespie
informed Plaintiff that she would no longer be working at the Vineland OU-2 site, and would
instead be transferred to the South Jersey Clothing Company site. Stretch Depo. at 22:17-23:21.
Gillespie also informed Plaintiff that Sevenson’s involvement with the South Jersey Clothing
Company site would end in mid-to-late May 2013. Id. at 24:21-25:5. Gillespie informed Plaintiff
that she would be laid off when the South Jersey Clothing Company site closed, with the “hope
of being brought back in the fall.” Id. at 25:6-10.
Plaintiff also contends that Gillespie told her that he “was not happy about the decision”
to transfer and then terminate her position. Stretch Depo. at 23:5-6. Gillespie allegedly told
Plaintiff that he called Al LaGreca to yell at him regarding the decision to transfer and terminate
Plaintiff. Id. at 23:5-10. Al LaGreca is a Vice President of Sevenson who oversaw the Vineland
sites from 2000-2012. Pl.’s Statement ¶ 2; Def.’s Resp. ¶ 2. Gillespie testified that he did not tell
Plaintiff that the decision to terminate her was made by anyone other than him. Gillespie Depo.
at 142:5-10. Defendant also points out that Plaintiff testified that LaGreca never indicated that he
knew who she was, let alone made the decision to terminate her. Stretch Depo. at 95:18-21.
LaGreca testified that he never discussed layoffs at the Vineland sites with Gillespie. Pl.’s.
Opp’n Br., Ex. D (“LaGreca Depo.”) at 26:2-6.

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Plaintiff testified that she then complained to Gillespie that Sevenson was predominantly
terminating women on February 21, 2013. Stretch Depo. at 33:03-23. She testified that Gillespie
responded by asking “are they supposed to fire a project engineer and keep an administrative
assistant?” Id. at 33:18-20. Plaintiff mentioned her own situation, and Gillespie allegedly
responded “well, what about you, are you really going to travel to Cornell with a new baby at
home?” Id. at 33:21-23. Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s claims regarding this conversation.
Defendant notes that Gillespie testified that he has no memory of this alleged conversation.
Gillespie Depo. at 144:1-6. Gillespie also testified that he “kind of knew [Plaintiff] wanted to
work after the baby,” and that he has no recollection of expressing concern about Plaintiff’s
willingness to travel for work after her baby. Id. at 144:7-19.
Plaintiff’s final day of employment at the South Jersey Clothing Company site was April
1, 2013. Stretch Depo. at 128:8-129:15. On April 2, 2013, Plaintiff contacted Sevenson Human
Resources for assistance in filing an unemployment claim. Def.’s Statement ¶ 150; Pl.’s Resp.
¶ 150. Plaintiff also mentioned that she felt she had been laid off because she was pregnant. Id.
Plaintiff only complained to Ms. Wienke in Human Resources directly. Def.’s Statement ¶ 152;
Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 152. Plaintiff has not secured full-time employment since her layoff in April 2013.
Def.’s Statement. ¶ 173; Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 173.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for pregnancy discrimination in violation of
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination in Camden County Superior Court on March 13,
2015. Compl. Defendant removed the case to this court on April 22, 2015. Notice of Removal
(Doc. No. 1).

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II. STANDARD
The court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “material” to the dispute if it could alter the
outcome, and a dispute of a material fact is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In
deciding whether there is any genuine issue for trial, the court is not to weigh evidence or decide
issues of fact. Id. at 248. Because fact and credibility determinations are for the jury, the nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed and ambiguities construed in her favor. Id. at 255.
Although the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the non-movant likewise must present more than mere allegations or denials to
successfully oppose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party must
at least present probative evidence from which jury might return a verdict in his favor. Id. at 257.
Furthermore, the nonmoving may not simply allege facts, but instead must “identify those facts
of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.” Port Auth. of New York
and New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002). The movant is
entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving party fails to “make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three articulable claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”): pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and unequal pay. Defendant notes that
Plaintiff withdrew her claims regarding retaliation and unequal pay. See Def.’s Resp. Br. at 1

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(Doc. No. 29); Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 1 n.1 (Doc. No. 28). Therefore, the Court need only review
Plaintiff’s pregnancy discrimination claim under NJLAD.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her because of her protected status
as a pregnant woman. New Jersey courts have recognized pregnancy discrimination as sex
discrimination prohibited by NJLAD. See McConnell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d
356, 362 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 386 A.2d 396, 402 (App. Div.
1978), mod. on other grounds, 400 A.2d 1182 (1979)). The New Jersey courts have also adopted
the burden-shifting framework laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., 800 A.2d 826, 833 (2002).
Under McDonell, the plaintiff must first lay out a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. (citation
omitted). A prima facie case of discrimination requires showings that Plaintiff: “(1) belongs to a
protected class; (2) applied for or held a position for which he or she was objectively qualified;
(3) was not hired or was terminated from that position; and that (4) the employer sought to, or
did fill the position with a similarly-qualified person.” Id. (citations omitted). Establishing a
prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimination. Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff, as a pregnant woman, certainly belonged to a protected class. Plaintiff has also
demonstrated that she held a position for which she was objectively qualified and that she was
terminated from that position. As for the fourth prong, the Third Circuit has held that in the
context of a reduction in force, “it is sufficient to show that [Plaintiff] was discharged, while the
[employer] retained someone [outside the protected class].” Marzana v. Comput. Sci. Corp., 91
F.3d 497, 503-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that she was
discharged while Mr. Carr was retained.

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After the Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
provide a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Viscik, 800
A.2d at 833 (citation omitted). Should the employer provide a non-discriminatory basis for the
adverse employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the basis was
mere pretext for discrimination. Id. This burden requires evidence that “(1) casts sufficient doubt
upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could
reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or (2) allow the factfinder to infer that
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse
employment action.” D’Alessandro v. City of Newark, 454 Fed. App’x 53, 55 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994)). The Third Circuit has also stated
that “a trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when . . .
its intent is at issue.” Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Defendant alleges that Mr. Carr’s skills and experience were more necessary for
Sevenson’s ongoing work than Plaintiff’s in light of their change in economic circumstances.
Def.’s Br. at 11-14 (Doc. No. 24-2). This allegation suffices as a non-discriminatory basis for the
adverse employment action taken against Plaintiff. The Court therefore looks to whether Plaintiff
has made a showing that Defendant’s basis for her termination was mere pretext for
discrimination.
The Court notes that the parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s conversation with Mr.
Gillespie on February 21, 2013 truly took place. If Gillespie did in fact ask Plaintiff if Sevenson
was “supposed to fire a project engineer and keep an administrative assistant” and if she was
“really going to travel to Cornell with a new baby at home,” then Plaintiff has alleged evidence

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that would allow a jury to “infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause” of her termination. See D’Alessandro, 454 Fed. App’x at 55. As discussed
above, Defendant denies this conversation ever took place. The parties’ dispute over this
conversation presents a genuine dispute as to a material fact that goes towards pretext and
potential discriminatory intent. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Dated:

12/5/2016

s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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