MCNEIL v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/30/2016. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
TERRY MCNEIL,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 15-2939 (RBK) (KMW)
:
v.
:
:
ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY et al., :
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
_________________________________________ :
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Terry McNeil, was previously confined at the Atlantic County Justice
Facility. On January 20, 2016, this Court screened the complaint and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice in part and without prejudice in part. Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended
complaint. Presently pending before this Court is plaintiff’s motion to reopen this case which
includes an attached proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff’s motion to reopen will be granted
and the Clerk will be ordered to file the amended complaint so that it can be screened.
At this time, this Court must screen the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the following reasons, the amended complaint
will be permitted to proceed in part.
II.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the amended complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this
screening Opinion. Plaintiff names the following individuals as defendants in his amended
complaint: (1) Warden Cohen; (2) Captain Marks; (3) Lieutenant Trout; (4) Sergeant Neal; (5)
Chaplain Miller; and (6) Nurse Pryor.
The amended complaint states that in January, 2015, he complained to the Crisis Hotline
about the conditions of his confinement at the Atlantic County Justice Facility. However,
plaintiff states that he received a retaliatory misconduct from Sergeant Neal for his complaints
about the conditions of confinement.
Furthermore, in January, 2015, plaintiff filed a grievance to challenge his living
conditions at the facility, which included: “lack of heat in the cells, denial of showers and
unsanitary showers, no phone access for legal calls, torn mattress, inadequate food[.]” (Dkt. No.
23-1 at p. 3) Plaintiff states that he sought assistance from the Defendants to rectify these
conditions as they were directly responsible for the violations of his constitutional rights. He also
inquired about improper deductions from his prisoner account.
Plaintiff also states that he was forced to sleep on a top bunk despite his medical records
indicating that he was required to have a bottom bunk because of a rod in his leg. On February
25, 2015, plaintiff states that he fell and injured himself while attempting to climb down from top
bunk.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of
his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
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judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v.
Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. 104–134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66
to 1321–77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). That standard is set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. To survive the court's
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screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Retaliation
Plaintiff asserts that defendant Neal retaliated against him for exercising his First
Amendment rights when he complained about the conditions of confinement to the “Crisis
Hotline.” “A prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2)
an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from
exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal connection between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Mack v. Yost, 427 F. App'x 70, 72
(3d Cir.2011) (quoting Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.2003)). At this early stage of
the proceedings, this Court will permit plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Neal to proceed past
screening.
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To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert this claim against the other defendants,
however, he fails to state a claim. Indeed, he fails to allege how the other defendants were
personally involved in retaliating against him for his exercise of his constitutional rights. See
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988); see also In re Bayside Prison Litig.,
No. 97–5127, 2007 WL 327519, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2007). Thus, this claim will be dismissed
without prejudice against them.
B. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff also appears to be attempting to bring a condition of confinement claim against
the defendants. Plaintiff’s amended complaint includes in list form the conditions of his
confinement. The Eighth Amendment requires prison official to provide humane conditions of
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care, and must “'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27
(1984)). A prisoner asserting a condition of confinement claim must show that the alleged
deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and that he has been deprived of the “minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities.” Id. at 834 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
These minimal civilized measures of life's necessities include food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
medical care and personal safety. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must also allege that the prison official acted with
deliberate indifference to the prisoner's health or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–
99 (1991). Thus, “'the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.'” Wilson v. Burks, 423
F. App'x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In analyzing whether the
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conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, a court examines the totality of the
conditions at the institution. See Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996). “Relevant
considerations include the length of confinement, the amount of time prisoners must spend in
their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, noise, education and rehabilitation
programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair and functioning of basic
physical facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers.” Id. (citing Tillery v. Owens, 907
F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Riley v. DeCarlo, 532 F. App'x 23, 26 (3d Cir. 2013).
As written in the amended complaint, this Court does not find that plaintiff’s conditions
of confinement allegations satisfy the Iqbal standard to state a claim. Indeed, plaintiff merely
lists the conditions of confinement in conclusory form without any context as to their totality of
the conditions at the facility. Furthermore, as with plaintiff’s original complaint, it is incumbent
upon him to allege with some level of facial plausibility that the individually named defendants
were personally involved in the purported constitutional violation. As this Court previously
explained, that can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge
and acquiescence as to each defendant plaintiff wishes to sue. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (3d
Cir.1995); Jackson v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 12–7538, 2013 WL 1844636, at *3 n.1
(D.N.J. Apr.29, 2013). Plaintiff needs to allege this personal involvement of each and every
defendant he names (like he did with defendant Neal in his retaliation claim) if he is to proceed
with a conditions of confinement claim against certain individual defendants. Therefore, this
claim will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
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C. Telephone Access for Legal Calls
Plaintiff also seems to be asserting an access to courts claim by arguing that he lacked
telephone access to make legal calls. “Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners
retain a right of access to the courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)). “Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have
inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an
‘actual injury’—that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable’ underlying claim;
and (2) that they have no other “remedy that may be awarded as recompense” for the lost claim
other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
415 (2002)). Thus, to satisfy the requisite pleading requirements, “[t]he complaint must describe
the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must
describe the ‘lost remedy.’ ” Id. at 205–06 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416–17) (footnote
omitted).
In this case, plaintiff has failed to state an access to courts claim. The allegations of the
amended complaint do not state the arguable legal claim that plaintiff has lost as a result of his
purported lack of access to the courts. Thus, he fails to identify any “actual injury” he has
suffered to adequately state an access to courts claim. See Aruanno v. Main, 467 F. App'x 134,
137 (3d Cir. 2012) (agreeing with District Court's dismissal of an access to courts claim where
the plaintiff did not identify an actual injury he suffered). Therefore, this claim will also be
dismissed without prejudice.
D. Improper Deductions
Finally, plaintiff alludes to purported improperly deductions that this Court interprets to
have been taken from his prisoner inmate account.
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An unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor, whether
intentional or negligent, does not constitute a violation of the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy
for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530–36
(1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1981), overruled
in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986). In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36
(1982), the Supreme Court explained, however, that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy the Due Process Clause if the
deprivation of property is accomplished pursuant to established
state procedure rather than through random, unauthorized action.
Stokes v. Lanigan, No. 12–1478, 2012 WL 4662487, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2012). New Jersey
provides a post-deprivation remedy for unauthorized deprivation of property by public
employees through the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1–1, et seq. Because a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available, plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim
against the defendants with respect to this purported taking. Therefore, this claim will be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Neal shall be
permitted to proceed. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are dismissed. Plaintiff’s claim related to the
deductions from his prisoner account is dismissed with prejudice and the remaining claims are
dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: June 30, 2016
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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