EILAND v. HOLLINGSWORTH

Filing 5

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 6/8/15. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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Petitioner,
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v.
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WARDEN J. HOLLINGSWORTH,
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Respondent.
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TYRRELL L. J. EILAND,

Civ. No. 15-2995 (NLH)
OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Tyrell L. J. Eiland, # 85211054
F.C.I. Fort Dix
P.O. Box 2000
Fort Dix, NJ 08640
Petitioner Pro se

HILLMAN, District Judge
On or about April 29, 2015, Tyrell L. J. Eiland, a prisoner
confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix,
New Jersey, filed this request for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1).

On April 30, 2015, this Court

denied Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and
the action was administratively terminated. (ECF No. 3).

On or

about May 9, 2015, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee and the
case was reopened.

The Court has reviewed the Petition and, for

the reasons that follow, it will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Petition is based on four separate grounds for relief.
First, Petitioner contends that he is receiving inadequate
medical care.

With respect to this allegation, Petitioner

states that he arrived at FCI Fort Dix with a pre-existing
condition which requires specialized care. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1).
Although Petitioner does not provide specific information
regarding his condition, he contends that his medications were
late, that appointments have not been made and, generally, that
his medical condition is becoming worse. Id.
As his second ground for relief, Petitioner alleges that
the prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Id.

More specifically, he contends that the prison is

overcrowded and unclean to the point of posing a health and
security risk to inmates.

Petitioner also briefly alleges that

the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) miscalculated his sentence and
custody level.
As his third ground for relief, petitioner asserts that his
due process rights were violated when, as retaliation for
grievance reports filed by Petitioner, a prison official issued
an incident report that carried with it severe sanctions and
penalties. Id.
Finally, Petitioner alleges that he was sexually assaulted
by another inmate. Id. at 8.

He contends that prison officials

ignored his report and that proper protocol was not followed.

Petitioner states that the regional office granted his appeal,
in part, but that only an “interrogation” has come as a result.
In light of the attachments to his Petition, it appears that an
investigation is ongoing. (Pet. 18, Letter from Regional
Director, Apr. 7, 2015, ECF No. 1).
Petitioner requests relief in the form of “immediate
release from custody at Fort Dix, grant full gratuity, clothing,
and transportation to Nevada.”
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

United States Code Title 28, Section 2243, provides in
relevant part as follows:
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the
writ or issue an order directing the respondent to
show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless
it appears from the application that the applicant or
person detained is not entitled thereto.
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than
more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A pro se habeas petition must be construed liberally. See
Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
Nevertheless, a federal district court can dismiss a habeas
corpus petition if it appears from the face of the petition that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Denny v. Schult,

708 F.3d 140, 148 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2013); See also 28 U.S.C. §§
2243, 2255.
III. DISCUSSION
Habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism for a federal
prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence. See Coady
v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2001); Barden v.
Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1990).
A habeas corpus petition is also the proper mechanism for a
prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement,
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498–99, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36
L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), including challenges to prison disciplinary
proceedings that affect the length of confinement, such as
deprivation of good time credits, Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
749, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004) and Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997).
See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161
L.Ed.2d 253 (2005).
Here, Petitioner files this habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.

However, he alleges constitutional violations

rather than challenges to the fact or length of his confinement
or the execution of his criminal sentence.

Specifically, Ground

One is an allegation of inadequate medical care in violation of
the Eight Amendment; Ground Two asserts cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment; Ground Three

alleges retaliation in violation of the Due Process Clause and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, although its basis is
imprecise, Ground Four can be construed as either a due process
violation or a claim for failure to protect in violation the
Eight Amendment.

Because these claims do not challenge the fact

or length of his confinement or the execution of his criminal
sentence, they are not cognizable under § 2241. See Preiser, 411
U.S. 475; Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542-44 (3d Cir. 2002);
see also Lee v. Williamson, 297 F. App'x 147, 148 (3d Cir. 2008)
(claims concerning retaliation and medical needs did not lie “at
the core of habeas”).
Typically, these types of claims are appropriately brought
in the context of a civil rights action. See e.g., Leamer, 288
F.3d 532; Castillo, 221 F. App'x at 175.

Petitioner may, if he

chooses to do so, air his grievances and seek relief by filing
an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

The

Court makes no determination as to the merits of such an action;
nor does it make a finding as to whether Petitioner has
exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. §
1997e. See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct.
910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).
Petitioner is on notice, however, that the filing fee for a
civil action is $400 and that the prerequisites for in forma

pauperis status in an action under Bivens are different than
those in a habeas case.

Forms are available on the Court’s

website. See http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/.
The Court further notes that Petitioner makes a passing
reference to the fact that the BOP miscalculated his sentence
and custody level. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1).

Generally, petitions

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 have been the “usual avenue” or
presumptive means for federal prisoners seeking to challenge the
validity of their conviction or sentence. In re Dorsainvil, 119
F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Davis v. United States,
417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d
117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. McKeithan, 437 F.
App'x 148, 150 (3d Cir. 2011).
Thus, to the extent Petitioner meant to challenge the
calculation of his sentence, he must do so by way of a petition
under § 2255.

Any such filing must be brought before the

sentencing court, the Southern District of New York, and
Petitioner should be aware of the applicable one-year statute of
limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
Finally, the Court notes that the Petition references a
pre-existing medical condition, unclean conditions at the prison
which allegedly pose health risks, the imposition of “severe
sanctions” in retaliation for filing a grievance, and a sexual
assault. (Pet. 7-8, ECF No. 1).

Although these allegations are

vague, they are troubling nonetheless.

However, at this time

Petitioner has not alleged an emergent situation or medical
condition; nor do the allegations of the Petition suggest that
he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s claims are not
cognizable under § 2241, and the Petition will be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

___s/ Noel L. Hillman_____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: June 8, 2015
Camden, New Jersey