BALDWIN v. JUBILEE et al

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/26/2016. (TH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JULIUS A.H. BALDWIN, IV,

:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, ET AL. :
:
Defendants.
:

Civil No. 15-3130 (JBS/AMD)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
HERBERT MCDUFFY, JR., ESQ.
200 Campbell Drive, Suite 240
Willingboro, New Jersey 08046
Counsel for Plaintiff
LAW OFFICES OF RILEY & RILEY
By: Tracy Riley, Esq.
100 High Street, Suite 302
Mt. Holly, New Jersey 08060
Counsel for Defendant Officers Devlin, Karins, and
Hembrecht
BARKER,GELFAND & JAMES
By: A. Michael Barker, Esq.
Linwood Greene
210 New Road, Suite 12
Linwood, New Jersey 08221
Counsel for Defendant City of Atlantic City

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this § 1983 suit, Plaintiff Baldwin asserts that Atlantic

City police officers violated his constitutional rights during

Baldwin’s arrest.

Specifically, Baldwin alleges the police officers

used excessive force when they severely beat him and allowed their
police dog to bite him several times, all allegedly after Baldwin was
handcuffed.
Presently before the Court is Defendant City of Atlantic City’s
Motion to Dismiss the single Monell failure to train claim asserted
against it (Count IV of the Complaint).

For the reasons stated

herein, the Court holds that Count IV of the Complaint fails to plead
sufficient facts to plausibly support a conclusion that the City was
deliberately indifferent to a manifest need for training.

However,

Baldwin will be allowed an opportunity to amend his Complaint to
attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies.

II.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the Complaint.
On May 2, 2013, Baldwin was arrested by at least four Atlantic

City police officers.

Baldwin admits that he initially ran from the

police before being placed under arrest.

But he alleges that after

initially running, he fell to the ground and “surrendered.”
¶ 14)

After that point, the “beating frenzy” began.

(Compl.

(Id. at ¶ 16)

At least two or three officers “beat” Baldwin “with fists and clubs.”
(Id. at ¶ 15)

After Baldwin was handcuffed, the officers “continued

to strike Baldwin,” and “[a] police officer released a K-9 dog to
attack Baldwin as he lay handcuffed on the ground.
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The dog bit

Baldwin several times on the back of both of his legs.”

(Id. at ¶

17)
“Baldwin was falsely charged with aggravated assault on a police
officer and related crimes.

Baldwin pleaded guilty to disorderly

conduct in the Atlantic City Municipal Court.”

(Compl. ¶ 20)

Most directly relevant to the instant Motion to Dismiss, the
Complaint states only the following with respect to the failure to
train claim against Atlantic City:


“The actions and conduct of the defendant police officers
are the result of a policy, practice and deliberate
indifference of the City of Atlantic City, New Jersey.”
(Compl. ¶ 1)



“The unwarranted beating and dog bites inflicted upon Mr.
Baldwin and the resulting injuries were a direct, proximate
and foreseeable result of the City of Atlantic City’s
policies, customs and practices regarding the Atlantic City
Police Department....” (Compl. ¶ 23)



“Defendant[] City of Atlantic City . . . failed to properly
train . . . Defendant Police Officers Calabrese, Devlin,
Karins, Hembrecht and John Does.” (Compl. ¶ 40)



As a result of the aforementioned failure to train
Defendants were grossly negligent, deliberately indifferent
and reckless with respect to the potential violation of Mr.
Baldwin’s constitutional rights.” (Compl. ¶ 41)



Defendants’ failures were the moving forces behind the
actions of defendant police officers resulting in the
injuries and permanent disfigurement of Plaintiff.”
(Compl. ¶ 42)

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court
may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must allege facts that raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

While a court must accept

as true all factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, and
view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), a court is not
required to accept sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of
factual allegations, unwarranted inferences, or unsupported
conclusions.
Cir. 1997).

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d
The complaint must state sufficient facts to show that

the legal allegations are not simply possible, but plausible.
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an
amendment would be inequitable or futile.”

Great Western Mining &

Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 174 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal citation and quotation omitted; emphasis added).
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IV.

DISCUSSION
In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Supreme

Court described two possible theories supporting a failure to train
claim.

First, a municipality may be liable when “the need for more

or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need.”

Id. at 390.

Second, a municipality may be liable when “the police, in
exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights
that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to
the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are ‘deliberately
indifferent’ to the need.”

City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.

“Ordinarily, deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train
is demonstrated by a ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees.’”

Ewing v. Cumberland County, No. 09-5432, 2015

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37543 at *76 (D.N.J. March 25, 2015) (Simandle)
(quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)).
To state a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must plead facts
plausibly supporting the following inferences or conclusions: “(1)
municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular
situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history
of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee

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will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”

Carter

v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999).
The allegations of the Complaint regarding inadequate training
fall short of this mark.

At a minimum, “a § 1983 claim for failure

to train requires some allegations from which the court can infer
that the defendant failed to offer some specific training that would
have prevented the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Lockhart v. Willingboro High School, No. 14-3701, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41501 at *21 (D.N.J. March 31, 2015) (Simandle) (citing City of
Canton and Reitz v. Cnty of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The Complaint contains no such factual allegations at all.

Rather

the Complaint contains only brief and vague conclusory assertions
that do not contain the factual grounds for such allegations.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel admits that the Complaint is the
result of “less than optimal drafting,” and “concedes that [including
more factual] information in Count IV may have clarified Plaintiff’s
‘lack of training’ claim and possibly precluded many of the
Defendant’s concerns set forth in support of its Motion to Dismiss.”
(Opposition Brief, p. 6, 8)

Plaintiff proposes to amend the

complaint to add allegations relevant to establishing that there is a
pervasive pattern of numerous Atlantic City police officers using
excessive force during arrests.

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The City of Atlantic City makes no argument against amendment.1
Plaintiff shall have an opportunity to amend.

Atlantic City’s

Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the Complaint will be granted, but
Plaintiff will be given 20 days within which to file an Amended
Complaint as to Count IV.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Defendant City of Atlantic City’s

Motion to Dismiss Count IV of the Complaint will be granted.
Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend Count IV by filing an
Amended Complaint that attempts to remedy the Count IV deficiencies
within 20 days.

Date:

January 26, 2016

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE,
Chief U.S. District Judge

1

Plaintiff has not filed a Proposed Amended Complaint. The fact
that the City does not expressly argue against amendment at this
stage of the case will not estop the City from later moving to
dismiss the Amended Complaint, so long as the motion complies with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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